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THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS

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ANNOUNCEMENTS

An international conference on the major trends in twentieth-century aesthetics will be held at Certosa di Pantignano, University of Siena, Italy, on behalf of A.I.S.E. (Italian Association for Studies in Aesthetics) from 17 to 19 May 1990. For contact and information write to Professor Grazia Marchianò, Faculty of Education, via San Fabiano 9, 52100 Arezzo, Italy.

It is proposed to hold a one-day seminar on Russian philosophy, including aesthetics, in London in 1990 or 1991, if sufficient interest is shown in the project. For further information please write to Jonathan Sutton, 44 Prince George Road, London N16 8BY, tel. 01 249 4015.

A one-day conference on Nietzsche will be held on 28 April 1990 at Essex University. For information please contact Keith Ansell-Pearson, Dept. of Political Studies, Queen Mary College, University of London, Mile End Road, London E1 4NS. The occasion will be used to launch the Nietzsche Society of Great Britain.

British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 30, No. 1, January 1990

THE IDEAL AESTHETIC OBSERVER REVISITED

Charles Taliaferro

CAN WE conceive of an ideal aesthetic expert or referee? Many of the attempts to spell out what an ideal observer or judge would be like seem hopelessly inept, as inept as the attempts to spell out what an ideal moral expert would be like. I find neither project hopeless. I believe an ideal aesthetic observer theory can be developed which is not subject to the standard objections cited in the literature. Moreover, if both the ideal aesthetic and ethical observer theories are philosophically viable, I think we can make some headway in accounting for the close tie between aesthetic and ethical valuation. I develop this latter point briefly at the close of the paper and concentrate first on developing an aesthetic theory which can meet the powerful objections raised by John Hospers in his article, 'The Ideal Aesthetic Observer'.[1]

The ideal aesthetic observer theory I defend corresponds in important respects with the ideal ethical observer theory I defend elsewhere.[2] (Henceforth: IO for ideal observer.) It will be useful to compare these accounts. I understand the IO in both aesthetics and ethics to be impartial and omnipercipient. The omnipercipience of the aesthetic IO consists in the observer's being fully apprised of the expressive, experiential features of a work of art, e.g., how the symphony sounds under various conditions, how the painting looks, and so on. Paul Ziff has written of the importance for a critic to 'aspect' a work of art, grasping its aspects, its phenomenal effects, under a wide range of conditions.[3] I employ the term omnipercipience to designate the optimal conditions for being an IO, but Ziffian omni-aspecting or omni-sentience express essentially the same idea. In ethics the omnipercipience of the IO consists in his or her imaginative appreciation of the points of view of all involved parties. The third condition for being an IO concerns scope of knowledge. In aesthetics, the IO is to be understood as being omniscient with respect to all the facts, excluding what may be termed aesthetic-value facts. A fact is an aesthetic-value fact if it is not possible for any subject to know it to be a fact without knowing its aesthetic value or merit. An aesthetic-value fact would be something such as: 'This is an aesthetically excellent work of art'. It would be impossible to know this to be a fact and not know the work of art to be aesthetically excellent. Non-aesthetic value facts are such as, 'The work of art is representational', which a subject may know without knowing the aesthetic merit of the work. An IO in ethics is omniscient with respect to the non-moral facts. It is vital not to build into one's

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description of the IO explicit knowledge of the aesthetic and moral values for otherwise the meta-ethics and theory of aesthetics turn out to be circular and vacuous. It is not very illuminating to claim that an IO ethicist is one that knows all the ethical facts. The function of both IO aesthetic and ethical theories is to spell out the optimal conditions on the basis of which the IO's approval and disapproval delimits items of aesthetic and moral merit and demerit.

Although the versions of the IO aesthetic theory which Hospers formulates and then attacks differ from my own in important respects, many of his objections (if successful) apply against my theory. Hospers's two accounts of prospective IO conditions are as follows. According to the first, an IO in aesthetics is impartial, knows the facts, is omnisentient, in a 'proper' frame of mind, and psychologically normal. According to the second, which Hospers found set forth in an unpublished paper by Professor Paul Taylor, an IO has a high degree of discriminative sensitivity, serious experience in creative endeavour, knows art history, possesses wide, deep aesthetic experiences of works of art; the IO is highly competent intellectually in art analysis and is willing to reason. In a later section of this paper I point out some of the advantages of my IO theory over against these formulations.

IO accounts can be advanced as analyses of aesthetic and moral judgements. According to an analysis of the moral I defend elsewhere, 'X is morally right' is understood as 'X would be approved of by an IO', 'Y is morally wrong' as 'Y would be disapproved of by an IO', and 'Z is morally neutral' as 'Z would be neither approved of nor disapproved of by an IO'. IO aesthetic and moral theories can also be fashioned in a weaker form as merely providing necessary and sufficient conditions for correct moral and aesthetic judgements. In this weaker form, the IO theory turns out to describe what it is to be a kind of maximally great aesthetic expert. I delimit the two as weak and strong because, in my judgement, the strong thesis entails the weak thesis but it is not clear that the weak entails the strong. The viability of neither theory rests upon the actual existence of such an observer but upon there being true conditionals about how an IO would judge states of affairs, if an IO existed. In the first part of the paper I am content to defend what Hospers attacks: the thesis that a work of art is good if it would be approved of by an impartial, omnipercipient observer who is omniscient of all facts except non-aesthetic value facts; a work of art is bad if disapproved. I leave to one side the debate about whether this can be cast into an analysis of goodness in art or a sound account of some ideal aesthetic expert.

KNOWLEDGE

Hospers objects to IO theorists in both ethics and aesthetics who insist that the IO should be all knowing or omniscient of the non-moral and non-aesthetic-value facts respectively. He charges that two problems arise. First, the aesthetic and moral points of view as delineated by the IO theory are unattainable by us. 'No merely human being is an Ideal Observer' (p. 103). Second, Hospers

charges that such an 'ideal' breadth of knowledge may hamper or obstruct viable aesthetic judgements. There are indefinitely many facts about a work of art, its context in art history, its textual and structural features, facts about the artist including his or her dream life, and so on. Such an extensive grasp of detail may be profoundly damaging to a judge's aesthetic sensibility.

> May not facts sometimes get in the way of aesthetic appreciation and judgement instead of helping it? May not the art-historian who knows all about the artist, the period, and the work of art, sometimes appreciate the work less, and be a less reliable judge of it, than an aesthetically sensitive person who knows fewer facts? (p. 105)

Hospers claims that excellent, reliable judges of art may know little or no art history (p. 110). Moreover, Hospers contends that any IO theorist attempt to narrow the IO requisite scope of knowledge to the relevant facts, or simply 'fewer facts', faces serious problems determining just which facts are relevant. Should the IO be considered an isolationist, ignoring all facts pertaining to the artist's intentions, or a contextualist?

Reply. First note that Hospers does not suggest aesthetic appreciation of a work of art can proceed with *no* factual information at all about the work, how it appears under ordinary conditions and so on! Obviously some factual description of the work's features must ground the critic's judgement. Does the IO theory I outline above place unattainable and (if attainable) damaging conditions upon ideal aesthetic valuation? I do not think so. The IO theory does not in any way imply that someone must satisfy all the conditions of IOhood in order to make true or justified aesthetic judgements. None the less, I believe it is evident that in making intelligible, warranted aesthetic and moral judgements our critic cannot at the same time believe that a more accurate, fuller factual account would undermine his or her judgements. Consider ethics first. When I make an ethical claim—say, that current use of nuclear power is morally wrong—I assume (rightly or wrongly) that my judgement is based upon reliable, accurate information about hard energy. Surely it would be absurd for me to claim: 'I judge current use of nuclear power to be morally wrong, but my judgement is based upon information which would be judged false by someone who knew all the facts about nuclear power'. The same is true in aesthetic judgements such as 'Ensor's *Sombre Lady* is a deep study of melancholy and isolation'. It would be absurd for me to endorse this claim and simultaneously submit that an observer who had broader, more extensive knowledge of the work would think the painting a hackneyed, cheerful portrait of peaceful domesticity. I am certainly not omniscient. But if we assume any standard analysis of what it is to be omniscient or all knowing, surely I cannot coherently claim to know P and that an omniscient being knows not P.[4] If I know anything at all, I know some of what an omniscient being would know.

Hospers may be correct that an excellent aesthetic judge could have scanty

knowledge of art history; perhaps (though I doubt it) such a judge may have no such knowledge. Hospers may also be quite right in claiming a superior aesthetic judge may be unable to offer reasons for his or her valuations (p. 110). The IO aesthetic theorist can accept the possibility of this unknowledgeable judge. But surely our reliably identifying just who occupies the role of this unencumbered judge must involve our striving to approximate a different kind of judge, one who is knowledgeable, intellectually clearheaded, and competent at offering reasons for his or her judgements when appropriate. Without such reasoned assessment, how are we to know who has a 'fine flair for discriminating judgement'?[5]

One reason why IO theorists have been reticent to restrict the scope of IO knowledge to 'fewer facts' (Hospers's term) is that they hope to deploy the IO theory in explicating what it is to be a relevant fact. A fact about a given state of affair's aesthetic and moral value is relevant when it functions as a reason for IO approval or disapproval of the state of affairs.

Hospers's invoking of the isolationist–contextualist debate serves to bring to light a merit of the IO theory. An IO aesthetic theorist can read the debate as a debate about whether knowledge of the artist's intentions and background would affect the IO's appreciation of a work of art. Monroe Beardsley and W. K. Wimsatt may be taken to argue that the IO's judgements would not be affected, whereas Stanley Cavell may be understood as claiming that the IO's judgements would (on occasion) be affected.

Hospers's criticism seems to suggest that an IO aesthetic theorist is committed to the truth or falsehood of Cavell's claims. But this is false. The IO theory can make explicit the framework for debate over the intentionalist fallacy and the relevance of the endless facts which can be enumerated about a work of art, facts about the artist's mother-in-law, *et al*. The IO aesthetician is in a situation similar to the IO ethical theorist. IO meta-ethics is compatible with the truth of either consequentialism, deontology, and virtue theory (amongst others). One need not settle the truth of one of these theories prior to accepting an IO theory of moral judgements. Debate between a deontologist and a consequentialist may take the form of pressing each other to take more seriously a broader scope of non-moral facts, and the like, a debate which is intelligible (in part) because of a shared assumption about the character of a moral point of view.[6]

OMNIPERCIPIENCE

Hospers objects that this condition is as extravagant as omniscience. How much experiential acquaintance with the work is essential or even helpful? To assess the merits of Cézanne's work, is it pivotal that our IO have experiential acquaintance with the work of other Post-Impressionists? Perhaps not. What experiential affects of a work of art are superior to others? We may find ourselves weeping or laughing upon hearing an opera or seeing a film. When is such emotive reaction aesthetically relevant? Should the ideal aesthetic judge regard

only the narrowly sentient affects of a work of art as relevant or also the cognitive content? And if both, which is to be weighed more? Hospers's charge is that these questions are all unsettled in IO aesthetics.

Reply. The viability of the IO aesthetic theory no more rests upon settling some of the ancient controversies Hospers cites than the IO ethical theorist needs to settle ancient controversies about consequentialism versus deontology, the viability of the principle of double effect or the moral status of abortion. The IO aesthetic theory may be employed as a framework in which to debate the relevance of contextualism, self-sufficiency, tears and laughter. Thus, the proponents of an art work's self-sufficiency may be understood as arguing that an ideal judge of Cézanne's *oeuvre* would not have his or her judgement swayed in the least by experiential work by other Post-Impressionists and an imaginative appreciation of the influences that shaped the artist's intentions. Contextualists will argue for the contrary position. The same holds true for Hospers's observation about different kinds of experience. As it happens, I hold that some form of at least modest contextualism is indispensable. Works of art are neither produced, appreciated nor despised in a vacuum and one of the handsome features of the IO aesthetic theory is that it does not prejudice us to accept at the outset a narrow characterization of an art work's boundary.

IMPARTIALITY

In rough outline Hospers's characterization of impartiality in ethics seems to me to be accurate. You are not impartial if you judge some action or state of affairs favourably when you are an involved agent whereas you would reverse your judgement if you were not. I believe an IO aesthetic condition amounts to the same thing. I do not judge a painting in an impartial fashion if I think it is excellent on the assumption that I was the artist, but an utter failure if you were the artist (all other conditions remaining constant). If the statue of Tweedledee is beautiful, so is the statue of Tweedledum. The fact that you happen to have sculpted Tweedledee and I Tweedledum should not give rise to a judgement that would be different were I to have made Tweedledee and you Tweedledum.

Hospers is less sanguine about the applicability of impartiality to aesthetic cases. He articulates his objection with the following device. A romantic may appreciatively assess romantic art and a Christian appreciate religious art. Imagine our Romantic and Christian abandon their ideologies and alter their aesthetic assessments. Does this establish that their aesthetic judgements after their change of mind is superior to their earlier judgements? Hospers does not think so. In what way should aesthetic judgement take into account intellectual, religious or emotional bias (or leaning)? Hospers appears to be sceptical that partiality disqualifies one from being an IO.

Reply. According to the IO aesthetic theory defended here, irrational or arational bias does disqualify one from being an IO. But the theory does not entail that a biased judge is *ipso facto* mistaken in his or her valuations. I may

loathe and adversely judge a symphony principally because it was composed by a rival (a person whom I would find quite admirable were he not a rival). My judgement of the symphony is not thereby shown to be false, but surely the fact that I would have loved the same symphony were I to have composed it reveals that my judgements lack proper warrant and credence.

Hospers's query is not so immediately bypassed, however, as it does raise the deep issue of the aesthetic relevance of truth and falsehood, irrationality and rationality. I see no reason why each should not be legitimate aesthetic terrain; indeed a great deal of art criticism involves praising and condemning works of art for their true, false, reasoned and unreasoned depictions of the world, the human psyche and all. The IO aesthetic theorist can certainly give ample room for judging works of art to be good even if they represent (depict or otherwise presuppose) a false view of human life. Wordsworth's early romanticism may be false, but for all that it is not without intellectual merit and the resultant poetry splendid. But the IO aesthetic theorist can also be well within his or her rights in deploring, say, Nazi art as art in virtue of its metaphysics and ethics. He or she is by no means theoretically committed to a narrow *l'art pour l'art* outlook and to severing aesthetic criticism from moral and cognitive assessment.

The IO aesthetician advances the notion of an overarching point of view from which (or within which) other viewpoints may be assessed. The intelligibility of such an encompassing perspective is defended by a range of contemporary philosophers; Thomas Nagel is perhaps the most recent and best known. In *The View from Nowhere* he offers an illuminating account of what it is for one point of view to contain another. In a passage describing our embracing an overview of our prior beliefs and attitudes, Nagel writes of our being able to acquire a more objective understanding of some aspect of life in the world by stepping 'back from our initial view of it and form(ing) a new conception which has that view and its relation to the world as its object'.[7] I believe that some measure of this Nagelian stepping back is possible in both our own case and others. It is not impossible to assess impartially works which themselves are produced under cognitively partial (or biased, prejudiced) conditions. The critical factor in IO aesthetic judgement is that the valuation not be swayed by the narrow self-interest or involvement of the IO.

AESTHETIC OBSERVER PSYCHOLOGY

The IO aesthetics I defend has some advantages over the two IO aesthetics Hospers articulates. One advantage is simplicity. Some of the conditions Hospers singles out as candidates for IOhood seem contained in the conditions I have specified. Thus, I assume that being omnipercipient and omniscient as articulated above involve attributing to the IO a range and depth of awareness that would not be outstripped by someone who had 'some practice in artistic techniques' (p. 108).[8] My theory also bypasses debate about the nature of 'psychological normalcy' (pp. 106–108). Hospers criticizes IO theories which

attribute normalcy to the IO on grounds that either 'normalcy' itself does not admit of illuminating analysis and that even if we could give determinate sense to what it means to be normal, the resultant IO theory would be suspect.

> Those who are psychologically normal in the psychologist's sense are not necessarily the best aesthetic observers. Is there any evidence that psychological normalcy is a prerequisite for aesthetic sensitivity or reliable aesthetic judgement? Or even that there is a high correlation between the two? I see no evidence of this at all. Indeed, great aesthetic sensitivity and creative ability seem more often to accompany disturbance, unhappiness, maladjustment, even psychosis and disease. (p. 108)

The IO aesthetic theory defended above need not suppose matters are otherwise.

Is the resultant IO supposed to lack any temperament or mindset whatever except for what is delineated by impartiality, omniscience and omnipercipience? Hospers draws an inhuman portrait of an IO shorn of emotion.

> If the possession of any kind of temperament whatever prevents a person from being an Ideal Observer, then of course there can be so such thing as an Ideal Observer among human beings Not only could there not be, as an empirical fact: we could not even imagine one, any more than we could imagine a solid object without some colour or other. Of course we could say that only God could be an Ideal Observer. But this does not help either; it only points up the difficulty. Can we really imagine a timeless being who had no infancy and no childhood, no conditioning, no parental authority, no early tastes, no habit-patterns, and can we imagine how he could observe or judge a moral situation or a work of art? I submit that when we try to imagine this we come up with a complete blank. (p. 107)

Reply. The IO I have depicted may be imagined to have any temperament or upbringing you like. The critical feature of the theory as meta-aesthetics is that the IO's approval and disapproval of states of affairs should be determined by his or her impartial, omnipercipient, all-knowing grasp of the state of affairs. Suppose you cannot imagine an observer who lacks personality disorders or episodic neurological problems. Fine. We can still suppose such an observer's judgements of approval and disapproval are ideal on the infrequent occasion when they are formed in virtue of the conditions constituting IOhood. It may be that personal unhappiness, disturbance, maladjustment, psychosis and disease accompany great 'aesthetic sensitivity' *because* such states serve to sharpen the very affective, noetic, imaginative powers which are attributed in a heightened form to the IO. Appeal to such ideal conditions, whether in aesthetics or ethics, is far less mysterious than Hospers supposes. In any serious moral debate about say, abortion or infanticide, we appeal to an impartial, affective consideration of the facts of infancy, childhood, parenthood, and so on. If this is an appeal to a God's eye point of view, so be it. The fact that we will never be God nor attain fully such a lofty view of the cosmos, is no reason to think we cannot approach

such a vista nor that we do not already possess part of a God's eye perspective.

I conclude that the IO aesthetic theory can stand up to Hospers's critique. Hospers ends his paper underscoring the limited nature of his depiction of good aesthetic judgements.

> The good artist is one who creates good works of art, and the good aesthetic judge is the one who correctly evaluates them. And while this remark about the aesthetic observer seems to be (as indeed it is) singularly unhelpful, it is the only remark about him that I can suggest with complete confidence that is true. (p. 111)

I think we can go considerably further. The IO tradition can offer an account of aesthetic evaluation not subject to Hospers's objections.

AESTHETICS AND ETHICS

It would not be viable to conclude that Hospers's criticism is unsuccessful, therefore the IO aesthetic theory is true At best I can hope to have removed some of the obstructions to accepting the theory. In closing I address a different kind of problem facing the would-be IO aesthetic theorist, a problem of motivation. Even if an IO aesthetic theory were philosophically acceptable, what is the pay-off? I think one promising gain may lie in the developing of a unified theory of aesthetics and ethics.

Many writers for many reasons have underscored a close tie between aesthetics and ethics. For example, Julian Mitchell and R. M. Hare have highlighted respects in which reading good fiction can be a means of moral instruction.[9] Given the truth of the IO aesthetic and ethical theories this should not be surprising. I propose to extend the IO aesthetic theory defended above in a far more speculative direction, developing an IO characterization of beauty and ugliness. In the course of sketching this extended theory I vie for the thesis that if some act is morally right it is beautiful. If it is morally wrong, it is ugly. The discussion below will go far beyond art criticism.

I suggest that some object (object in the broadest sense to include some property or act or event) is beautiful if and only if it would please (or be appreciatively enjoyed by) an impartial, omnipercipient being that knows all the facts except the aesthetic-value facts. An object is ugly if and only if the object would displease the IO. Because I hold that there is an ideal correlation between approval and pleasure, disapproval and displeasure, I maintain that if some act, X, is morally wrong and (assuming the truth of the IO moral theory) X is disapproved of by the ideal observer, the reasons which ground disapproval would serve to prevent appreciative delight and, in its stead, ground displeasure. There would surely be an oddity (if not a conceptual absurdity) for an observer meeting the respective ideal conditions to take pleasure in that which he or she disapproves of. Because pleasure and approval are correlated, the IO's approval of X will coincide with the IO's pleasure in X. Given the viability of

both IO theories, X's being good correlates with X's being beautiful. While I claim that if X is morally good it is beautiful, I do not claim that if X is beautiful, it is morally good. The categories of beauty and ugliness are, of course, broader than moral goodness and evil. A mountain range may be beautiful, but it would surely be odd to call it morally good or good from an ethical point of view.

I confess at the outset that my case for even a partial conflation of ethics and aesthetics or subsuming ethics as a branch of aesthetics is largely a matter of an appeal to the phenomenology of aesthetic and moral valuation. In a useful phrase John McDowell employs, it concerns the phenomenology of value experience. It seems to me that the very same qualities that make Mother Teresa's character and action beautiful (or aesthetically pleasing) make her character good and her action morally right. Similarly, the very same qualities that make Adolf Hitler's character and action evil and bad make his character and action ugly (or aesthetically repugnant).

I believe this IO aesthetics and ethics can accommodate hard moral cases. Imagine an agent cannot avoid one or two outcomes, both of which involve doing something morally wrong but one involves more wrongdoing than the other. If it is plausible to hold that the agent *should do the least amount* of wrong, is this a case in which the IO would approve what he or she would not take pleasure in? I suggest that such cases may be construed in an expanded fashion. The agent should do that which is least disapproved of by the IO. (To put the matter rather cumbersomely: the IO approves of acting in a fashion which is least disapproved of by the IO.) In explicitly aesthetic terms, our troubled agent may be understood as compelled to choose between ugly alternatives, one of which is uglier than the other. He or she should do the least ugly act, that act which occasions the least displeasure in the IO. In the further explication and defence of IO aesthetics-cum-ethics I will ignore such hard cases. What sort of pleasure is involved in the delimitation of aesthetically relevant IO attitudes? Just as my main positive case for the correlation of ethics and aesthetics rests upon phenomenological grounds, any constructive account of aesthetic pleasure as distinct from the pleasure derived from being tickled, sexually aroused or tasting ice cream must likewise be phenomenological or descriptive. There is no better route to settling this matter (or tentatively adopting a position) than to engage in describing the pleasure taken in paradigm aesthetic cases, cases which seem paradigmatically aesthetic. There are far worse ways to adjudicate the issue![10]

My views about goodness and beauty are speculative and I make no pretence to establishing the conformity or unity of aesthetic and moral valuations. I have more confidence in claiming that some of the main objections to this unified picture are unsuccessful. I note five such objections and sketch in the briefest fashion problems with each.

(1) Any unity between moral valuation and aesthetic valuation of beauty and ugliness is accidental. There are objective norms in ethics, but none in aesthetics.

Reply. I hope that the IO aesthetic theory articulated and defended above has laid at least one plausible foundation by which to ground objective aesthetic judgements.[11] Some of my earlier work on IO theory in ethics, defending it against the charge that distinct IOs could have different judgements, could be employed here to secure uniformity of IO aesthetic judging.

(2) Morally relevant states of character cannot be fit candidates for beauty and ugliness, which are applicable to the phenomenal appearance of objects.

Reply. This represents an implausible restriction of what items can be beautiful or ugly, a restriction which has had damaging consequences.[12]

(3) Ethics pertains to action, whereas aesthetics to contemplation.

Reply. As the IO theory brings to light, ethics does not itself circumvent appeal to how an observer assesses the relevant states of affairs. Also, the contrast between activity and contemplation is suspect. Judging is an activity.

(4) Ethics pertains to matters in which guilt, punishment and forgiveness are appropriate, whereas the aesthetics of beauty and ugliness do not.

Reply. The point is, in part, well taken. Issues we classify as moral pertain to action and character in which forgiveness *et al.* is appropriate. Aesthetics is broader in range. But consider our normative moral judgements in an aesthetic light. Why are guilt, punishment and forgiveness ever appropriate? Perhaps guilt is fitting under certain conditions precisely because some agent has destroyed a beautiful state of affairs. Philosophers from Plato and Aristotle to Rawls have claimed to find justice beautiful. Perhaps we value what we term justice and mercy because of an appreciative delight in states of the world. I see no reason to reject the view that the same properties which make some act just make the act beautiful.

(5) It is evident that aesthetic and moral valuation diverge. Witness the beauty of evil testified to by many artists. Consider too cases in which great figures have condemned aesthetic pleasure for moral reasons. Monroe Beardsley cites St Bernard along these lines.[13]

Reply. States of affairs are complex. Perhaps such artists correctly identify beautiful features of states of affairs which are unobjectionable morally (the blood's redness in the snow) and are not thereby judging that what is morally objectionable (the vengeful delusions of a serial killer) is itself beautiful.[14] Perhaps the person who believes X is beautiful but morally wrong is misinformed about X or perhaps the person is simply wrong (X is not truly wrong morally or X is not beautiful). St Bernard's condemnation of aesthetic pleasure on moral and religious grounds is a well-known instance of someone condemning what he takes to be lesser, more base pleasure in the light of the expansive delight and ecstasy that the soul may enjoy on a higher plane. The Saint of Clairvaux may be understood as counselling higher, more satisfying aesthetic goods (God and the *opus Dei*) and not pitting ethics against aesthetics. Other examples in literature of aesthetic and moral conflict seem to me to be based upon either less than impeccable aesthetics or morality or both.[15]

This partial defence of the unity of the moral and the aesthetic is intended as a general contribution to philosophical aesthetics or axiology more broadly construed. I do not at all suggest that moral features and beauty as they are narrowly construed or conventionally understood by contemporary art critics are either jointly or individually necessary nor always sufficient conditions for a good work of art. There seem to me to be indefinitely many features of an art work in virtue of which it is good or bad *tout court* or neither good nor bad, which many critics would not take to involve recourse to the categories of the beautiful and the ugly (e.g., its ideational content). The account of beauty advanced here may be too broad and extensive for many critics. According to the views I defend, it follows that a good work of art is beautiful. If it is true that a work of art is good if and only if it would be approved of by an IO, something is beautiful if and only if it pleases an IO, and approval and pleasure are ideally correlated, then good works of art would please the IO and thereby be properly counted as beautiful. So, what is to be done about works of art which critics on all sides judge to be excellent and ugly? A broader account of what is beautiful can, I believe, be of assistance. There is nothing beautiful about someone who tries to cover up or ignore the horror of our world and our inhumanity. There is something beautiful about relentless, courageous soul searching and about honest, even dangerous, attempts to understand evil or what an artist believes to be the aimlessness of the cosmos. Re-introduction of beauty and ugliness into art criticism would only lead to an overly precious, puerile aesthetic sensibility in so far as we restrict what we recognize as beautiful to what is pretty or handsome in some shallow sense, and I see no reason why we should labour under such an inimical limited understanding of beauty.

I do not think the IO theory should be easily dismissed either as developed as a depiction of a supreme expert in assessing works of art or in the extended form as an analysis of beauty and ugliness. It can hold up under Hospers's vigorous criticism and it may well provide a framework in which the aesthetic and the ethical are interlinked.[16]

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[3] Paul Ziff, 'The Task of Defining a Work of Art', *Philosophical Review*, 42, 1 (1953)

[4] I defend an analysis of omniscience in 'Divine Cognitive Power', *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, Vol 18 (1985), pp 133–140. See Nicholas Rescher's fascinating, positive account of research programmes which are guided by ideals, such as omniscience, which cannot be attained by the researchers themselves, *Ethical Idealism. An Inquiry into the Nature and Function of Ideals* (London. California U P , 1987).

[5] A reliabilist account of aesthetic judgements would have the same advantages and disadvantages as reliabilism and externalism in epistemology. See the balanced, forceful critique of this theory of knowledge in Richard Foley's *The Theory of Epistemic Rationality* (Cambridge, Mass. Harvard U. P., 1987) and John Pollock's *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge* (New Jersey. Rowmand and Littlefield, 1986)

[6] See my 'Relativizing the Ideal Observer Theory' for an extended treatment of this

[7] Thomas Nagel, *The View from Nowhere* (New York Oxford U. P , 1986). For a further account of impartialism see my papers cited above, reference 3, as well as 'Nagel's Vista or Taking Subjectivity Seriously' *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, Vol 26, No. 3 (September 1988), pp 393–401

[8] To put the matter in Ryle's terms, I understand omniscience and omnipercipience to allow the observer full 'knowledge that' and 'knowledge how' of the given states of affairs to be assessed

[9] See R. M. Hare, *Freedom and Reason* (Oxford U. P., Galaxy Books, 1965), pp. 180–185, and Julian Mitchell, 'Truth and Fiction' in *Philosophy and the Arts* (New York St Martin's Press, 1973). Compare also papers by R. W Beardsmore, D. Z. Phillips, and Oliver Johnson, same volume More recently John McDowell has brought to our attention respects in which the case for an objectivist ethic and aesthetic are in the same boat See for example, 'Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the World', *Pleasure, Preference and Value*, edited by Eva Schaper (Cambridge U P , 1983)

[10] Adopting the IO in aesthetics does nothing to supplant the task remaining for work along the lines of the great Gestalt psychologists such as Wolfgang Kohler and Kurt Kaffka. Roderick Firth, perhaps the best known contemporary defender of the IO in ethics, thought the work of the Gestaltists was also necessary to supplement our moral theorizing A fuller account of the IO aesthetic theory than I am able to offer here could allow for degrees of beauty and even types of beauty and ugliness

[11] Some recent work supporting objective aesthetic valuation of beauty and ugliness includes Mary Mothersill's *Beauty Restored* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) and Guy Sircello's *A New Theory of Beauty* (Princeton U. P., 1979)

[12] This point is made effectively by Umberto Eco in his *Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages* (New Haven: Yale U. P., 1986)

[13] Monroe Beardsley, 'The Aesthetic Point of View', reprinted in *Philosophy Looks at the Arts*, edited by Joseph Margolis (Philadelphia Temple U P , 1987)

[14] I follow Sircello's analysis of such cases.

[15] See especially St Bernard's sermons on 'The Canticle of Canticles'. On my reading, St Bernard endeavours to draw our attention to what he believes is truly unsurpassably beautiful and ravishing. Beardsley also cites Henry James's *The Spoils of Poynton* and Henrik Ibsen's *When the Dead Awaken* as cases of morally criticizable aesthetic indulgence. But aren't both works exquisite examples in which central figures underestimate the beauty of a life without integrity and an aesthetic taste for non-deceptive respectful relationships? Compare G K. Chesterton's delightful 'A Defence of Ugly Things' in which he endeavours to overturn our sense of beauty for a more profound, exciting vision, *The Defendant* (London. Dent, 1901) Chesterton concludes the defence with 'The moment we have snapped the spell of con-

ventional beauty, there are a million beautiful faces waiting for us everywhere, just as there are a million beautiful spirits' (p 118).

[16] I am indebted to T J. Diffey, P. Goold, J. Evans, M. LeGall, E Noujain, P Reasoner and G. Iseminger for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

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AESTHETICS AND THE INSULARITY OF ARTS EDUCATORS

Nick McAdoo

IN *Culture and Value*, Wittgenstein several times emphasizes the rich possibilities for aesthetic education of looking at the arts side by side, as when he says, of music: 'teaching [the student] to understand poetry or painting may contribute to teaching him what is involved in understanding music'.[1] Yet nowhere is the division between aesthetic theory and the practice of arts educators more striking than over the question of the interrelatedness of the various art forms. Thus, on the one hand, there is a natural tendency for aestheticians to approach the arts, for all their differences, as a relatively distinct and unified area of human experience, as does Wittgenstein in the above passage.[2] This may also be seen in the widely followed practice of illustrating central aesthetic arguments with examples drawn even-handedly from a variety of the arts in order to ensure that none is favoured as a paradigm of the aesthetic form of life at the expense of any other. On the other hand, it is only too clear that in schools, colleges and universities, there are long-standing divisions between the teaching of the fine arts and music, and the teaching of literature—the first two tending to stand apart, respectively, in 'creative arts' and 'performing arts' faculties (along with drama and dance), while the latter, nowadays, is most commonly to be found annexed to the 'humanities'. Such divisions are also reflected in the popular conception of 'art', where the word 'art' itself has, for a long time, been virtually synonymous with painting.

There are, of course, many obvious, practical reasons why this state of affairs should be so. Over and above such considerations, however, there is the powerful influence of the one aesthetic position that does not fall into line with what I take to be the normal, synthesizing tendency of aesthetics—namely, aesthetic 'formalism'. The 'formalist' drive to separate out the 'aesthetic' from the 'non-aesthetic' in art inevitably results in an aesthetically dismissive view of literature (and, of course, any 'literary' aspirations to be found in music and painting) from a position that favours music and the fine arts. For the 'formalists', as is well known, any concern with the non-aesthetic significancies of a painting or piece of music at the expense of concern with its aesthetic form represents an intolerable distraction away from what they take to be the aesthetic purity of unadulterated perceptual awareness. As Harold Osborne has succinctly expressed such deep-rooted suspicions: '[a work of art's] semantic information invites attention away from the properties of the work itself

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towards that which it depicts, specifies or symbolizes'.[3] For writers such as Bell and Fry,[4] thematic content in painting is at best no more than a peg on which to hang the garment of 'significant form' and, as such, whether the peg is a war-torn city or a bowl of fruit is really of no great consequence aesthetically speaking.

If, then, for the 'formalist' teachers of painting and music, it is the sensuous 'surface structure' of colour and line, harmony and rhythm that holds the centre stage, it is, by contrast, thematic content that mainly preoccupies teachers of literature. Interestingly, the 'cognitivist' approach to which literature seems to lend itself manages to display the reverse image of 'formalism' while, at the same time, going along with the 'formalist' thesis, for in its pursuit of all the moral, psychological, political and other *non*-aesthetic associations of literature, it is often only too happy to ignore the aesthetic pleasures of language and literary form that relate the subject to the mainstream of art—thereby confirming 'formalist' separatism. Whereas most aestheticians take aesthetic pleasure to be an integral part of our experience of literature, even where the work's theme is of the utmost seriousness, as in tragic drama and the poetry of war, 'cognitivist' teachers of literature tend actively to distrust such 'aestheticism' as they see it, as deeply as their 'formalist' colleagues in music and the fine arts distrust thematic content. Leavis, for example, whose influence on the teaching of literature at all levels in this country has been profound, at times seems to regard *any* 'aesthetic' preoccupation in literary works as a clear indication of superficiality of content. Of *Madame Bovary*, for instance, he says: 'It was James who put his finger on the weakness in *Madame Bovary*: the discrepancy between the . . . "aesthetic" intensity, with the implied attribution of interest to the subject, and the actual moral and human paucity of this subject on any mature valuation'.[5]

And so we arrive at one law for literature and another, antithetical one for music and the fine arts—and both finding sustenance from the 'formalist' thesis!

What I want to question about such a divisive view is not just its educational desirability, however, but the actual coherence of such hard-line distinctions as 'aesthetic/non-aesthetic', 'formal/thematic' and so on, upon which the 'formalist' case rests. If it can be shown that such distinctions are in fact unworkable, and that music and the fine arts, like literature, can never be completely separated from their relationship to the rest of life via their non-aesthetic significancies, then it follows that they cannot ever be completely separated from each other. If it can further be shown that there are also powerful affinities between the *aesthetic forms* of music, the fine arts and literature, as Wittgenstein suggests, then our current divisions within aesthetic education become even more questionable. What really needs to be examined here, then, is (a) the over-simple dichotomy that too readily divides the arts into perceptual and intellectual (or formal and thematic) categories, with the fine arts and music subsumed under the former, and literature under the latter; and (b) the blind spot that tends

to exist in the teaching of *every* art form for its possible affinities with other art forms. As regards (a), with the exception of the extreme 'formalist', it would be rare nowadays to find *aestheticians* who would subscribe to such a view. Rather, it seems widely accepted in aesthetics that our distinctive interest in literature is inescapably bound up with the ways in which the text works on us at a *sensuous* level (which may include not only the sound and patterning of the words but also the quasi-perceptual mental imagery generated by the text);[6] and likewise, that much of our pleasure in aesthetic form in the perceptual arts is necessarily dependent upon our first recognizing any representational, symbolic or expressive meaning that is present in the work—as when our purely 'formal' pleasure in the gracefully curving line that we find, for example, in an abstract painting, must inevitably be modified upon our recognizing that it is the curve of a smile, or of a naked breast. Just how, indeed, we are to obey the 'formalist's' demand that we set non-aesthetic aspects to one side and view such a configuration as a 'pure' aesthetic object is an enigma, for how, one wonders, *could* our perception of the 'emergent' aesthetic configuration stay the same once we excluded any kind of significance from it? As Wittgenstein has pointed out, the dependence of 'formal' configurations on expressive and representational elements is such that they cannot be separated without drastic modification, as when a picture of a smile when turned upside down ceases to be a smile:

> Two schools:
> (1) 'What matters is the patches of colour (and lines—S).'
> (2) 'What matters is the expression on these faces.'
> In a sense these two don't contradict one another. Only (1) doesn't make clear that the different patches have different *importance*, and that different alterations have totally different effects: some make all the difference in the world.
>
> 'A picture must be good even if you look at it upside down.' Then, the smile may not be noticeable.[7]

Kandinsky's often quoted remark that he discovered the possibilities of 'non-representational' art through accidentally seeing one of his pictures on its side and being delighted by it is thus misleading, to say the least.[8]

Furthermore, once we have recognized the smile as such, how are we to compel ourselves *not* to see it in any way as a smile—a smile moreover that may distinctively evoke much else, expressing perhaps the pleasures of café life or the transience of human happiness? In this respect, it is not just that we have been conditioned, as Osborne has argued,[9] by a cultural tradition deriving from the Greeks that happens to view art as paradigmatically representational, *ut pictura poesis*, but rather that every sign (be it symbolic, iconic or expressive), however minimally present in the work of art is necessarily intentional—pointing towards, expressing or evoking what it signifies.

Suppose, however, that we *do* manage to meet the 'formalist' demand for a concentrated act of 'pure' perception, and in so doing, detach ourselves once

again from any significancies carried by the work's sensuous surface, e.g., by managing somehow to separate the curve from the smile or the thick brush strokes from the 'strength' and 'energy' that they express. If the attempt is successful, then not only, as we have seen, must the resulting *gestalt* alter in so far as its identity as a signifier is being denied, but all that could possibly remain would just be some coloured patches, lines, curves and the like which, *pace* Bell's misleading concept of 'significant form', would obviously *signify* nothing at all, however much they shaped up into aesthetically pleasing *gestalten* as a result of the interplay of colours, balancing of shapes and so on. Not that I wish to deny for one moment an important place within aesthetic education for such experiences, the likes of which James Joyce has aptly characterized, in *Ulysess*, as: 'The luminous, silent stasis of aesthetic pleasure'. Indeed, it is a central part of my argument that teachers of literature ignore this dimension at their peril. However, the main objection to making such experiences the overriding goal of aesthetic education is that, as a great many aestheticians have argued,[10] it separates art too sharply from the rest of life, notwithstanding the keenness of its promised pleasures.

A similar problem arises for those musical theorists who attempt to put forward a concept of 'meaning' that is purely musical, as does Phenix in the following statement, typical of its kind:

> The meanings of musical composition rest principally on its *musical ideas*, a term referring to those tonal or rhythmic patterns that provide the points of departure for the composition. . . . Such meanings derive from the cultivation of self-forgetful delight in the direct contemplation of the patterns of musical statement, contrast, accent, progression, repetition variation that critical analysis describes.[11]

However, as with the 'formalist' conception of the visual arts, if Phenix really means that music is only to be experienced in purely musical terms, then our aural *gestalten* must inevitably alter wherever we are required to turn our back on any significancies to which the music may lay claim, as when, for example, we attempt to take the 'sadness' out of the minor chord or the evocation of a sunken cathedral from Debussy's piano piece of that name, as does Dufrenne in *The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience* (p. 210). Furthermore, if it is argued that we are still left with something called a 'musical meaning', then it can always be countered that such a claim makes no more sense than does Bell's talk of 'significant form' in the visual arts, for to say, as does Phenix, that the *meaning* of a piece of music is its own formal pattern of sound is to disregard the obvious fact that the music already *shows* this. Enjoyed simply as patterns of sound, the music can no more *mean* anything than can the purely visual patterns that we find in painting. Of course I do not wish to deny for one moment the need for a language to describe how music *functions* to produce such purely 'formal' *gestalten*. Just as the painter needs to talk in a special way, e.g., of the 'hue' and 'intensity' of colours, so musicians need to talk, quite understandably, in their

own terms of, e.g., the flow of subject, counter-subject, inversion, doubling and halving of time values and so on, that characterize contrapuntal music, or the quasi-mathematical exploitation of acoustic relations that Webern, in *The Path to the New Music*, argues should be the 'one path' for the twentieth-century composer: 'So, a note is, as you have heard, complex—a complex of fundamental and overtones. Now, there has been a gradual process in which music has gone on to exploit each successive stage of this complex material. This is the one path.'[12] What is interesting, however, is that even in those seemingly most musically 'pure' of cases, as, for example, Bach's *Art of Fugue*, the connection between the aesthetic form of such works and their non-aesthetic significancies may continue to pursue us in so far as our use of terms such as 'development' and 'answering phrase' inevitably borrows something from our ordinary use of such terms. Fugues, for example, have their own elusive kind of 'entailment', as Wittgenstein has pointed out of our experience of such music, in *Culture and Value*:

> If I say for instance: here it's as though a conclusion were drawn, here as though someone were expressing disagreement, or as though *this* were a reply to what came before,—my understanding of it presupposes my familiarity with conclusions, expressions of agreement, replies [13]

Moreover, and even more plainly, when we come to the obvious fact that Western music, not to mention the music of other cultures, has evolved over the years a vast and infinitely subtle range of expressiveness that links it not only to the evocation of landscapes, national identities, the seasons, etc., but also to the emotions in general, then this view of music seems to be as inadequate as the similar 'formalist' response to representative and expressive painting. What, for example, can Webern say about the ancient Greek equation between the various 'modes' and their emotional significancies as discussed, for example, by Plato in *The Republic*?[14] What he does say, in fact, is this:

> We know of the Greek modes, then the church modes of bygone ages. How did these scales come about? They are really a manifestation of the overtone series. As you know, the octave comes first, then the fifth, then in the next octave the third.[15]

Clearly no place here for any expressive significance!

What, also, of the huge repertoire of musical directives that often preface musical scores, such as *largo* ('slow and majestic'), *con fuoco* ('with fire'), *giocoso* ('playfully') etc.? Although such instructions have a primary 'musical' function to indicate the tempo and dynamics, there is not one which does not carry with it secondary, affective significancies, as Wittgenstein again points out: 'Tender expression in music . . . isn't to be characterized in terms of degrees of loudness or tempo. Any more than a tender facial expression can be described in terms of the distribution of matter in space.'[16] Too often, I would argue, students become

confused by such musical directives because the teacher fails to relate the *musical* expressiveness that they imply to the *non-aesthetic* significancies that they have which relate music so interestingly to the world at large. After all, how *does* a student come to understand the musical directive that requires him or her to play the closing movement of a piece *con fuoco* ('with fire')? Given the unconditioned nature of aesthetic judgement,[17] no set of rules could ever be sufficient to convey what is intended. The student must, therefore, be able or be enabled through education to see the interrelatedness of the ordinary use with its extended, aesthetic function.[18] As Wittgenstein, for example, suggests in *Culture and Value*: 'I can imagine an exciting scene in a film accompanied by Beethoven's or Schubert's music and might gain some sort of understanding *of the music* [my emphasis] from the film'.[19] For Webern, however, the wholly aesthetic 'musical idea' (the musical equivalent to Bell's 'significant form') is everything, and all non-musical significance an intrusion.[20] Not only does such a view render terms such as *con fuoco* unintelligible, but also, in so far as musical form is here conceived of along quasi-mathematical lines deriving exclusively from the acoustic properties of sound, then we are left with a type of aesthetic 'naturalism' that would certainly prove inadequate to justify Webern's own description of his account as 'the one path'.

The notion that music may signify in any wider sense than a 'purely' musical one is dismissed by Webern in two ways: (a) it is dismissed patronizingly, as if all that such a view entailed were a naïve mimetic perspective: 'So how do people listen to music? How do the broad masses listen to it? Apparently they have to be able to cling to pictures and "moods" of some kind. If they can't imagine a green field, a blue sky or something of that sort, then they are out of their depth.'[21] (b) Significancies such as Wagnerian *leitmotifs* are treated as simply belonging to another art form, in this case drama, and therefore as having no *musical* interest—just as Bell apportions out the 'anecdotal' element in painting to the literary sphere: 'Wagner's *leitmotifs* are perhaps another matter. For example, if the Siegfried motif crops up many times because the drama calls for it, there is a unity, but only of a dramatic kind, not musical, thematic.'[22] Both of these arguments are deeply unsatisfactory. Up to a point, of course, the first may be explained as a justifiable reaction to the elevation of the 'tone poem' as the supreme form of musical expression by an earlier generation of composers. From an educational point of view, one thinks of the great disservice done to the cause of music here by all those teachers who, because they felt that music ought to *mean* something primarily in a literal sense, have attempted to introduce generations of children to the pleasures of music via such hackneyed 'representational' pieces as *Carnival of the Animals* and *Peter and the Wolf*, or *Fingal's Cave*, often with little success. None the less, to ignore the ways in which music, even of the most 'abstract' kind, may *expressively* evoke (rather than literally 'represent') ideas, images and emotions, is to disregard that feature of musical experience which is what enables many students to take an art form such as

music seriously as having some kind of bearing upon 'life issues', while at the same time enjoying it as a powerful source of aesthetic pleasure.

Webern's second argument, concerning the separating out of musical and dramatic elements, is not only insensitive to Wagner's own brave conception of a 'total' art form, but also leaves us with the unsatisfactory concept of such music as something merely tagged on to the drama. It is certainly not my aim to argue here for a *dissolving* of the obvious differences between the arts of music, drama, visual spectacle, etc. Rather, what I would like to see is a concept of aesthetic education that is sensitive to the affinities *between* such forms, wherever such affinities are posited by the catholic art-lover to exist. For example, students who have been fortunate enough to have had the kind of aesthetic education wherein they are given acquaintance with a range of art forms may come to recognize many such affinities between the different art forms of a stylistic epoch—e.g., as when the description 'exuberant and whirling' dawns as a common aspect to both the fugues of Bach and the architecture of the Baroque period, or when the dreamlike quality of Ravel's music is perceived to echo the poetry of Mallarmé and the later paintings of Monet. Without the presence of such affinities, 'mixed' art forms such as opera and dance would be unintelligible. Their presence may also be seen in the cinema's matching of the music of a period to its art and architecture, when these elements seem to quicken each other in a most remarkable way—as, for example, in the matching of jazz scores to the modern urban environment (providing that this does not degenerate into a cinematic cliché).

At the same time, however, such a concept of aesthetic education must heed Sparshott's fear that: 'teachers and theorists will overstress the common aspects at the expense of the unique aspects of the various arts, with a resulting vapidity and excessive generality'.[23] Furthermore, unless the relative autonomy of each art form is preserved within the posited 'emergent' common sensibility, considerable confusion may also arise in the students' minds. Poetry, for example, is only in a borrowed sense 'musical' and could not literally be governed by the same structural considerations that, according to writers such as Webern, dictate the general course of music. Here, it is instructive to look at some of the ways in which we do, in fact, borrow aesthetic terms from one art form in order to apply them to another, in so far as all such extended uses must have a 'natural home' in some primary use of the term.[24] For example, if the students are to be able to see the point of describing a piece of music as 'colourful', or 'full of light and shade', then this must presuppose a grasp, not only of the musical *extension* of such terms but also of their *primary* aesthetic use which, in this case, lies within the province of painting. Similar considerations would apply when we speak, for example, of the 'rhythms' created by the flying buttresses of a cathedral or by Mondrian's *Broadway Boogie-Woogie*, or the 'discordant' quality of Jacobean poetry. As long as the relationship between the primary and the extended use is preserved, then so is the relative autonomy of

each art form while, at the same time, allowing the pupils to recognize the powerful 'emergent' affinities between them.

What follows, then, is that teachers of literature and teachers of the fine arts and music have much to learn from each other—not least of which is the kind of cross-referencing outlined above. Not, however, that I am arguing for an 'aestheticizing' of literature such as does Margaret Macdonald in 'The Language of Fiction'. Thus, while I welcome her suggestion that: 'characters, e.g., might *for a change*, be compared with musical "themes" rather than with flesh and blood'[25] I would be unwilling, for the reasons given above, to accept her more general recommendation that a work of fiction: 'is more like a picture or a symphony than a theory or report'.[26] Rather, in line with the view that *all* works of art combine a sensuous 'surface structure' with underlying thematic significancies, I am suggesting that the many 'formalist' teachers of the fine arts and music would greatly benefit from the literature teacher's concern with moral, historical, psychological and other kinds of relevance. In this respect, for example, they might come to pay far more attention than they do at present to the fact that the evolution of aesthetic form *itself* may be powerfully influenced by non-aesthetic considerations, as in the following suggestion of the art historian, Wylie Sypher: 'The techniques of an abstract art always appear whenever man feels himself alien from the natural world; on the contrary, when man is at home in nature, the artist uses a naturalistic technique.'[27]

Secondly, I am suggesting that contact with teachers of music and painting would lead the teachers of literature and their students to a far greater awareness of the *aesthetic* aspect of their subject—that 'poetic' state of which Valéry speaks, wherein our sensitivity to language approaches our sensitivity to music. As Nietzsche points out, in commenting upon the limitations of Aristotle's 'psychologizing' of Greek tragedy:

> In order to understand the difficult phenomenon of Dionysiac art directly, we must now attend to the supreme importance of *musical dissonance*. The delight created by tragic myth has the same origin as the delight dissonance in music creates. That primal Dionysiac delight, experienced even in the presence of pain, is the source common to both music and tragic myth.[28]

It is the reluctance of arts educators, as contrasted with aestheticians, to give this kind of common ground the attention that it deserves that has led, in turn, to fragmented and conflicting justifications of the different art forms which inevitably undermine a collective rationale of aesthetic education as a whole when it is threatened, as it is now. As was pointed out at the start, there are, of course, formidable practical problems to be overcome in implementing this approach, such as the sheer amount of time needed to acquire the background knowledge and experience of music and literature that Nietzsche's remark presupposes. Certainly, teachers of all the major art forms would need to have

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followed a general course in aesthetics if the currently prevailing insularity of outlook is to be broken down None the less, for the reasons given, I would argue that the curriculum integration of literature with music and the fine arts in a way that is both cohesive and yet preserves the distinctive characteristics of each art form might then result in a new flowering of aesthetic education in our schools, colleges and universities.

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AESTHETICS IN SCIENCE AND IN ART

Gideon Engler

I

THE IDEA of aesthetic appreciation and beauty is perceived as an essential feature in the modern scientific process. Some of the greatest scientists of this century, reflecting on their work, make it clear that intuition and aesthetics guided them in formulating concepts and theories.

N. Bohr, P. A. M. Dirac, A. Einstein, W. Heisenberg, T. D. Lee, H. Weyl and C N. Yang, are among these scientists. Those who expressed such feelings most intensely were Dirac, Weyl and Yang. Dirac wrote: 'it is more important to have beauty in one's equations than to have them fit experiment'.[1] Weyl said: 'My work always tried to unite the true with the beautiful; but when I had to choose one or the other, I usually chose the beautiful',[2] and Yang wrote: 'The intrinsic elegance and beautiful perfection of the mathematical reasoning involved and the complexity and depth of the physical consequences are great sources of encouragement', and, 'One learns to hope that nature possesses an order that one may aspire to comprehend'.[3] These scientists express essentially the faith that what the mind perceives as beautiful finds its realization in nature, that is, the beauty of a scientific theory implies its truth. Historically, this faith was actually vindicated to a great extent in the works of these scientists. Theories which they created on what were considered primarily aesthetic grounds were later confirmed experimentally.

It is worth noting that these scientists convey anew an ancient attitude, as the philosopher Bertrand Russell noted: 'Perhaps the oddest thing about modern science is its return to Pythagoreanism'.[4] Indeed, the Pythagorean view, which has since become a corner-stone in science, was that problems in natural science often yield to the assumption that the natural world has certain formal and aesthetic features, and that natural processes therefore possess harmonies, symmetries and simplicities.

Another Pythagorean characteristic which these scientists manifest is their perception of the importance of mathematics in describing nature. They are all theoretical physicists, that is, they are mathematically orientated, and when they speak of beauty it is to a great extent the appreciation of mathematical beauty which they refer to. The aesthetician Harold Osborne touched on this subject in his article 'Mathematical Beauty and Physical Science',[5] where he expressed the idea that mathematics and mathematical physics possess the

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property of 'beauty of intellectual constructs'. H. Poincaré, the great mathematician and philosopher, demonstrated a wider perception of mathematical beauty by linking intelligibility with the sensous when he wrote: 'It may appear surprising that sensibility should be introduced in connection with mathematical demonstrations, which, it would seem, can only interest the intellect. But not if we bear in mind the feeling of mathematical beauty, of the harmony of numbers and forms and of geometric elegance. It's a real aesthetic feeling that all mathematicians recognize, and this is truly sensibility'.[6]

All of these attitudes raise an array of questions, the major one being what do the scientists actually mean by beauty and the aesthetic attitude in science? Is there a profound aesthetic basis for these feelings, or is this only the excitement and satisfaction which they experience from achieving perfection in describing nature through their mind's creations? Or is there perhaps a certain relation between the two parts of this last question?

II

These questions have not been systematically explored, and surprisingly enough even the scientists themselves paid very little attention to the analysis of their own expressed feelings of beauty in science. Perhaps the scientist who came the closest to a more thorough thinking about the subject was Heisenberg. In his article, 'The Meaning of Beauty in the Exact Sciences', he adopted a definition of beauty which was given in antiquity: 'Beauty is the proper conformity of parts to one another and to the whole'.[7] This definition conveys common feelings of beauty, and is widely appreciated in aesthetics under various names, such as, 'unity in diversity' or 'organic unity'. However, Heisenberg did not pursue any analysis of this definition, except for demonstrating it by an example from Newtonian mechanics where the 'parts' are 'the individual mechanical processes' and the 'whole' is 'the unitary principle of form which all these processes comply with and which was mathematically established by Newton in a simple system of axioms'.[8] But Heisenberg did, however, touch on valuable concepts related to aesthetics in science when he mentioned simplicity in citing the Latin motto: 'The simple is the mark of the true',[9] and when he referred to symmetry and harmony, in a conversation where he talked about the 'miracle of symmetry as the original archetype of creation, about harmony, about the beauty of simplicity, and its inner truth'.[10]

Unlike the scientists, mathematicians analysed their aesthetic experiences somewhat more deeply. G. H. Hardy, the outstanding mathematical analyst, gave an eloquent account of his feelings of mathematical beauty. A mathematician, according to Hardy, is a maker of patterns which 'like the painter's or the poet's must be *beautiful*; the [mathematical] ideas, like the colours or the words, must fit together in a harmonious way. Beauty is the first test: there is no permanent place for ugly mathematics'.[11] And he reflected on the meaning of beauty by saying: 'The beauty of a mathematical theorem *depends* a great deal on

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its seriousness'.[12] Seriousness, for Hardy, is tightly connected with the significance of mathematical ideas, whereby a mathematical idea is 'significant' if it can be connected in an illuminating way to a large complex of other mathematical ideas.

Similar to the questions raised by the scientists' attitudes to aesthetic appreciation in science, which were summarized previously, are these expressions of Hardy's which reveal, from the mathematician's point of view, the complex nature involved in such an appreciation, namely: it is not only form but also content and fruitfulness of ideas that seem to evoke aesthetic appreciation.

As is of course well known not only scientists and mathematicians but also philosophers of art and aestheticians in general deal with the meaning of aesthetics in science. Osborne, among others, wrote extensively on the subject.[13] Discussing the problem of scientific perception and the perception cultivated in aesthetic experience, he wrote: 'The things that are capable of sustaining and expanding contemplation in the aesthetic mode without the intrusion of discursive thinking, are the proper things of aesthetic awareness, enlivening percipience with a sense of heightened emotion. The most prominent of these things are artefacts: they are those that are called *artworks*'.[14] That is, the scientific mode of thinking, discursive thinking, is basically contrasted with the 'proper things' required for aesthetic appreciation.

What, however, is a 'proper thing'? According to Osborne it is an 'inner order that is sometimes called "organic unity"',[15] which characterizes any art work or other aesthetic object. What typifies 'organic unities' is that such systems exhibit a mode of organization which is incapable of analysis in terms of their parts, because any attempt to see an object as a collection of measurable unitary parts will destroy the possibility of aesthetic appreciation. Only coherence of the parts in a unified 'whole' is aesthetically appreciable. Thus, even though aesthetic properties such as elegance, gracefulness, clumsiness, etc., are dependent on separate physical properties, they are not deducible from them.

Osborne's approach is strongly supported by K. Aschenbrenner, who searched for coherence of elements in art works. He wrote: 'Aesthetic data are wholes whose character is more than or other than can be anticipated from parts . . . this is emphatically not true of physical quantities. It is just as little true of mathematical quantities, for these are conditioned by their components, not by their contexts.'[16]

Osborne's and Aschenbrenner's reactions about the basic inapplicability of aesthetics to science are not as definite as they might seem to be. At least Osborne also admitted that: 'Scientific theories and the regularities of nature are also capable of evoking the sort of aesthetic response that is evoked by artworks'.[17] These contradictory attitudes of Osborne's demonstrate a dilemma that has to be borne in mind in any discussion of aesthetics in science, namely: on the one hand science does not seem to fit into the traditional concepts of aesthetic appreciation, but on the other hand one has to have faith in both the scientists'

expressions of beauty in science ('beauty of intellectual constructs') and in the importance of the sense of unity in science, which in art is a crucial idea concerning aesthetic appreciation.[18]

Unity, it turns out, may indeed be a key idea for aesthetics in science as it is in art, but the perception of unity is different in the two disciplines. In art it is a 'whole' which is more than the parts and is not deducible from them, whereas in science unity is also a 'whole' and also more than its parts, but it can be perceived only through the analysis of its parts. For example, Einstein's famous mass-energy relation, $E=mc^2$, may be considered as such a unity, but each term is a symbol for concepts that can be understood in relation to other terms.

III

The study of aesthetics in science thus requires the analysis of constructs of formal and abstract relations of elements with distinguishable characteristics. However, the importance of such ideas was realized in art rather than in science, particularly in modern art. The art critic Clive Bell was strongly influenced by this idea, especially in his approach to abstract visual art. Bell formulated a theory along such lines emphasizing the view of 'significant form', which implies optimal unity and coherence of compositional patterns of lines and colours. Such a 'significant form', which every work of art possesses, provokes the 'aesthetic emotion', which is distinguished by an intensity surpassing the ordinary emotions of life. All we need in order to appreciate a work of art, that is, to experience the aesthetic emotion, is, according to Bell, to 'bring with us nothing but a sense of form and colour and a knowledge of three-dimensional space'.[19]

The disregard for representation in Bell's theory, and the assumption that only formal relations evoke aesthetic reactions, seem to present an appropriate example for probing aesthetics in science and so perhaps Bell is likely to have felt too when he wrote: 'The pure mathematician rapt in his studies knows a state of mind which I take to be similar [to that provoked by art], if not identical. He feels an emotion for his speculations which arises from no perceived relation between them and the lives of men, but springs, in-human or super-human, from the heart of an abstract science. I wonder, sometimes, whether the appreciators of art and mathematical solutions are not even more closely allied.'[20]

However, Bell's approach has in it Hutchesonian elements of 'uniformity in variety' or 'organic unity',[21] which means that his point of view is locked in 'wholes', and it is thus not very helpful in serving as a guide in the analysis of aesthetics in science, where 'parts' are of central importance.

These 'parts' are physical ideas and concepts which are eventually expressed in mathematical relations. This is so because mathematical ideas have come to be pre-eminent in science for the reason that the mathematical approach is abstract, formal, susceptible to the imagination and is more effective than any other

means, with regard to a synthesis of various aspects of reality. The importance of mathematics in science was stressed by the physicist F. J. Dyson when he wrote: 'For a physicist, mathematics is not just a tool by means of which phenomena can be calculated; it is the main source of concepts and principles by means of which new theories can be created'.[22] This feature of mathematics has important consequences for how reality can be envisioned. For example, the two major achievements in twentieth-century physics, general relativity and quantum mechanics, were built on speculative jumps of mathematical imagination.

IV

Thus, aesthetic concepts, like any other concepts in science, must find their representation in mathematical forms and relations, whatever their degree of abstraction. This requirement is fulfilled by concepts that are certainly more familiar from another discipline: art. Such are the classical aesthetic concepts of symmetry, simplicity, order, coherence, unity, elegance and harmony. These concepts are consistent with the views of the scientists who expressed their feelings for beauty in science. None of these concepts is easy to define but one has to rely on the intuition and experience of the scientists as to the existence of such properties in a given relation.

The aesthetic concepts are listed according to a 'hierarchy' which provides a certain indication of their importance in doing science. But it should be emphasized that even though symmetry may be a major concept in the approach to create a theory, some of the other concepts, and in particular simplicity, are more fundamental in the structure of scientific theories. This was well noted by the philosopher Nelson Goodman, who wrote in his article 'Science and Simplicity' that, 'without simplicity, there is no science'.[23]

Symmetry. It is hard to exaggerate the role of symmetry in physics, particularly modern physics. By means of symmetry it is possible to single out certain fundamental structures from among the huge diversity of physical phenomena and to reduce this diversity to a manageable number of formulas. And so, the search for symmetry has become one of the most powerful tools for the discovery of new laws.

Symmetry has to do with how objects remain unchanged when they are transformed. Such are translations of a triangle in space, ninety-degree rotations of a cube about its axis, or the reflection of an archway about a vertical centre-line. In all of these cases the objects remain unchanged or invariant under the symmetry operations. It should be emphasized that symmetry is related to both space and/or time. Thus, we have symmetry because nature does not distinguish between right-hand or left-hand features of space or between time past or time future. These symmetries are, like all other symmetries in theoretical physics, of an abstract nature. Two such symmetries come immediately to mind: the isotropy and homogeneity of space. A more sophisticated symmetry

is the invariance of physical laws under a space co-ordinate transformation of uniform velocity, the Galilean transformation, which had a decisive effect on Newtonian mechanics. Another type of consequence of symmetries is related to conservation laws, i.e., a symmetry principle (or equivalently an invariance principle) generates a conservation law. For example, the conservation of momentum follows from the invariance of a system under space displacement and the conservation of energy follows from the invariance of a system in time.

However, not until the creation of general relativity and particularly quantum mechanics, did symmetry play the essential role that it has acquired nowadays. The general structure of the periodic table, the antiparticles, quantum numbers which specify the elementary particles, i.e., the building blocks of the atoms, are all consequences of various symmetries.[24]

Again, as in other scientific endeavours, the great triumph of symmetry has been attained through appropriate mathematical formulations. This was found in group theory which symbolically describes symmetry operations. This theory turned out to be a powerful mathematical tool that opened up the understanding of symmetries through simple representations. From this an important conclusion may be derived: symmetry contributes greatly to simplicity.

This is a striking example, among many others, of the fundamental value of the concept of simplicity in science. However, both simplicity and symmetry are perceived as major guiding concepts to a comprehensive description of nature and as possessing heuristic values.

Simplicity. Poincaré wrote: 'It is clear that any fact can be generalized in an infinite number of ways, and it is a question of choice. The choice can only be guided by considerations of simplicity.'[25] That is, simplicity of some sort governs the choice between all the hypotheses that fit the same scientific data, and we tend to choose the simplest hypothesis. We then apply this hypothesis to unknown cases. At least in this respect simplicity is also a test of truth. This faith was beautifully conveyed by Einstein when he wrote: 'Our experience hitherto justifies us in believing that nature is the realization of the simplest conceivable mathematical ideas',[26] and in a letter to the physicist L. de Broglie he wrote: 'The equations of the theory of gravitation were *only* discoverable on the basis of a purely formal principle (general covariance), i.e., through confidence in the greatest imaginable logical simplicity of the laws of nature.'[27]

The significance of simplicity in science is therefore clear. But with all its importance simplicity is a vague concept since it is not usually as straightforward as in numerical forms, such as with the Copernican theory, in which the number of epicycles was reduced to 17 from 83 in the Ptolemaic solar system. This is a kind of simplicity that may be called 'economical'. Another kind of simplicity may refer not so much to the paucity of elements in its construction but to the way it is put together, i.e., to its structure. Then there are

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other kinds of simplicities and there is no sense in attempting to give criteria for making judgements on simplicity.

In conclusion, it is safe to say that there is no measure of the overall simplicity of theories.[28] It is therefore a highly debatable concept and not devoid of subjectivity. Nevertheless, there has rarely been a controversy about which of a number of competing hypotheses or theories is simpler.

Order, coherence, unity. These three aesthetic concepts are listed together for the reason that order and coherence may be considered as leading to unity. The meaning of order in science follows from the assumption that the natural world contains regularities and structures, and it is the task of science to find them. Order will then follow if we will formulate laws of these properties, which will bring them in concordance with nature. For these laws to fulfil their purpose, that is, to be well-grounded generalizations, they ought to form a fully coherent system. Unity may then be thought of as the ultimate aim of achieving the greatest coherence and explanatory power of a theory, with as few principles as possible. The great effort made in modern physics to unify all forces of nature under one scheme, the 'grand unified theories' (GUT), is an example of the idea of unity on a cosmic scale. Order, coherence and unity express therefore the essence of the perception of an orderly world that can be apprehended by the human mind.

Elegance. This is an aesthetic concept which is often used in the theory of beauty and has the meaning of: 'chosen skilfully or carefully'. This meaning is very appropriate when it is applied to a construction of a theory in science. To see this it is useful to turn to where the construction is formalized, namely, to mathematical relations and proofs. A proof may be called elegant if it is short, with no complicated steps, and if it makes use, when possible, of an unforeseen idea. It looks, therefore, as if elegance is just an obscure way to come back to simplicity. However, this is where skill comes in. In order for the proof to be elegant, it must achieve its conclusion in a particularly satisfactory way. Thus, if two proofs are equally simple, but one uses an ingenious device or a more satisfactory method, this proof will be judged as more elegant.

Harmony. The aesthetic concept of harmony has less practical value than the previous concepts, but it exerts a great appeal on scientists, perhaps because of its affinity with art.[29] The reason for this, at least to some extent, stems from the linkage of harmony, which is a phenomenon that pleases the senses, to numbers. Pythagoras was the first to show how musical harmonies, those combinations of notes pleasing to the ear, were related to ratios of the lengths of strings which were required to sound them. Thus, musical harmonies were related to numerical ratios.

This is the source for the development of more general relations between harmonies and numbers. Architectonic harmony is one such outcome. In this case the harmony is a result of certain proportions or other relations of a building or other spatial structures. Similarly, we have geometrical harmonies as well as

arithmetical harmonies, where only numbers are in relations. Wherever, therefore, there are relations between like parts, which are more or less pleasing, it is possible to talk of harmonies.

V

The concepts, or ideas, of symmetry, simplicity, order, coherence, unity, elegance and harmony, have been presented in some detail, with the intention of conveying the feeling of the wide, profound and lasting impact that these aesthetic concepts have on the scientists' perception and their work. Thus, with all their non-factual nature, these concepts have become, under the existing conventions in science, indispensable prerequisites for the *creation* of scientific theories.

Nevertheless, it should be added that with all their significance, the aesthetic concepts are, of course, not sufficient conditions for the *acceptance* of a scientific theory and should be corroborated for this purpose by criteria which possess factual values. Such criteria may be: accuracy, consistency, scope and predictive power.[30] Only if such a corroboration exists the theory may fulfil its purpose: description of nature.

Similarly to the factual criteria, the confidence in the guiding values of the aesthetic concepts may be held on a pragmatic basis, because these are assumptions that pay off. Indeed, there are scientists who adopt such an approach but it seems that for the great creative scientists, at least, these concepts are being maintained on a different level. For them this confidence is apparently based on a certain metaphysical faith that nature is fundamentally beautiful and it is therefore no coincidence that nature presents itself persistently through forms that are perceived by the mind as aesthetically attractive. This faith was most notably held by Einstein.

In summary, it may be said that the scientist takes delight from both perceptual-intellectual and sensuous-emotional modes, which are a composition of two experiences, between which it is very hard to differentiate. First, it is a deep satisfaction that he attains from the reconciliation of his mind's creation with unknown natural processes, that is, from the explanatory power achieved and its value of truth. Secondly, it is profound pleasure that he attains from the deep-rooted conviction that his accomplishments were guided by aesthetic concepts. This pleasure may be considered as aesthetic appreciation in science. The characterization of this appreciation is not unambiguous, but this only demonstrates the difficulty in differentiating between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic. Actually, this is a basic problem of aesthetics in general, in art no less than in science.

VI

The aesthetician Monroe Beardsley, who gave much thought to this problem in the fine arts, formulated five criteria for the distinction of the character of

aesthetic appreciation, or to put it in his terminology: 'criteria of the aesthetic character of experience'. These criteria are: object directedness (to explore probingly the object while contemplating it); felt freedom ('from the dominance of some antecedent concerns about past and future'); detached effect (emotional distance); active discovery (cognitive challenge or, 'insight into connections and organizations—the elation that comes from the apparent opening up of intelligibility'); wholeness (a sense of integration or, 'unity in the dimension of coherence').[31]

This family of criteria is not uniform. Each of them has a different weight but there is no doubt that all of them are of a vague character. However, with all their tentative nature, these criteria have important common features: on the one hand they rule out some phenomena with illusive aesthetic appearance and on the other hand they point to ways in which aesthetically characterized experience from different disciplines may overlap.

This raises the questions: do these criteria apply to aesthetic appreciation in science, as they do in art, and, what is the overlap between them? Considering the previous analysis of the aesthetic concepts in science, their consequences and the feature of detachment from practical concerns in science (science as a pursuit of truth), a clear conclusion may be reached as to the applicability of all of these criteria to science. Moreover, if to this are also added aesthetic elements that appear only implicitly in Beardsley's criteria, such as the previously mentioned judgement of beauty and pleasureableness in science, then it all converges into an important conclusion: there is a clear similarity of aesthetic appreciation in science and in art.

Another similarity between aesthetic appreciation in science and in art is related to the quantitative aspect of aesthetics. In science as in art the most profound aesthetic appreciation is achieved when the parts are contemplated in their unity (totality), that is, when a theory contains most of all the aesthetic concepts. In that case the theory is not considered only as the most beautiful theory but also as the best possible theory. The degree of the goodness of a theory thus depends on the degree of its aesthetic appreciation. In art too a quality judgement of an art work is inferred from its aesthetic content.

It is, however, difficult to conclude from the above analysis whether it indicates only the existence of similarity in the aesthetic appreciation in science and in art or implies an even closer affinity. In order to obtain a more profound insight into this problem it is necessary to look not only into the similarities between the aesthetic appreciation in these two disciplines but also into their differences. Indeed, the latter are, in general, even more noticeable than the former. This is well revealed in the esssential nature of the two disciplines and in the range of their aesthetic expressiveness. Thus, whereas in science the aesthetic appreciation has mostly an intellectual-conceptual character, in art the relations are predominantly between perceptual characteristics. As to the range of aesthetic properties invoked, in science the terminology is not much richer than:

'elegant', 'pretty', 'neat', 'dull', 'clumsy', 'ugly', and even then their use is limited. For example, 'pretty' or 'neat' are usually used with a specific aim to mark an effectiveness of a device which will lead to an 'elegant' proof of a mathematical relation. In art, in contrast, a large vocabulary is employed, including: 'charming', 'delightful', 'lovely', 'dainty', 'delicate', 'gloomy', etc. (It should be emphasized though, that in modern art, particularly in Constructivist art, the aesthetic properties invoked are mostly those of the scientific vocabulary!)

Most important among these differences is the perception of the aesthetic property 'beautiful' in science and in art. In science it is associated with what may be termed 'significant constructs' (this is an equivalent terminology to Bell's 'significant form'), which means that it is related to aesthetic concepts and structures that can be objectively apprehended. That is, beauty in science is mostly an object of the intellect. In art, however, beauty is considered predominantly as an object of the senses and therefore as a subjective property. All of these differences, which culminate in the objective–subjective problem, seem to weaken the assumption of a deeper relationship than mere similarity between the aesthetic appreciation in science and in art. But are these differences hopelessly unbridgeable, or can ideas that play a role in the evaluation of aesthetics in science be of relevance to the problem of objectivity in art as well?

No proper answer about such relevance can be given unless a detailed comparative study of subjects such as aesthetics, beauty, objectivity and subjectivity, in science and in art, is first presented. It should be pointed out nevertheless that since aesthetic appreciation in art involves not only emotional but also intellectual factors (otherwise it would not be possible to discuss art),[32] it is plausible to assume that the leading idea in the approach to aesthetics in science, that of analysing a complex unity in terms of its significant elements and their characteristics, differences and coherences, is a promising idea in art appreciation as well. This idea should therefore encourage the endeavour to achieve a theory of aesthetics in art with a reasonable degree of objectivity. In point of fact, a moderately objectivist model in aesthetics in the arts was recently constructed touching on similar elements.[33] This supports the view that aesthetic appreciation in science and in art indeed possess close affinity, possibly even to the degree of having the same 'genetic' origin.

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REMAPPING MODERNITY

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THE DEBATE between the defenders of post-modernism and Jürgen Habermas carries with it the echoes of the *Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes*. For his part, Habermas clings, with all the weight of his German philosophical heritage, to an Enlightenment project that he admits has failed thus far. His position is partially a response to Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer who looked despairingly at the historical development of the Enlightenment notion of reason and its transformation into instrumental rationality. Yet in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* one also discovers the frail hope that history can be redeemed, though not, like Habermas, in the name of the very ideals which have turned the modern world into a technological holocaust. More recently, Peter Sloterdijk, in his *Critique of Cynical Reason*, also appears at times to take on the role of *Aufklärer* against the *Aufklärung*. What all of these philosophies share is the project of turning reason against itself or, more precisely, against its modern historical manifestation. Habermas contrasts this project with post-modernism's abandonment of the idea that reason can heal itself. Post-modernism betrays the ideals of the Enlightenment which, however soured they may have become, may still be recuperated. The *promesse de bonheur* lies in these soured ideals themselves.

Habermas' often polemical speech against neo-conservatism and the 'young conservatism' of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault has rallied both admiration and outcry. Delivered in 1980 on the occasion of his receipt of the T. W. Adorno Prize, Habermas' speech lumps both Derrida and Foucault together as the exponents of 'irrationalism'. Since his speech, Habermas has been praised, condemned or, more foolishly, ignored. One of the more thoughtful and sensitive analyses of his speech has come from the pen of Andreas Huyssen. According to Huyssen, Habermas' 'labelling of Foucault and Derrida as young conservatives is as much a response to German cultural developments as it is to the French theorists themselves'.[1] Since 1984, however, Habermas appears to have modified his position on Foucault's work after participating with him in an interesting exchange on the topic of Kant's '*Was ist Aufklärung*?'. Habermas' published response to this question, half funeral oration and half critical commentary, reveals that he has appreciated what he calls the 'instructive contradictions'[2] in Foucault's work. Foucault's defence, in his own published response, of some aspects of the Enlightenment, appears to have solicited a wary form of admiration from Habermas. Perhaps, as Habermas admits, he 'did not

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understand him' (*FCR*, 103). Nevertheless, in his 'What is Enlightenment?', Foucault is not defending what he calls ' "the essential kernel of rationality" that can be found in the Enlightenment and that would have to be preserved in any event',[3] but rather an attitude, 'a philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our historical era' (*FR*, 42). What appears, then, as a *rapprochement* actually disguises important differences which these articles only spell out more clearly.

Despite the admitted failure of Enlightenment ideals, their fall into instrumental/purposive rationality, the technological nightmares of the ovens at Auschwitz and the bomb, Habermas insists that reason can through immanent critique serve to emancipate us from modern rationality. Even though the chances for emancipation 'today are not very good', our disillusionment should not 'serve as a pretence for conservative positions'.[4] It is precisely this disillusionment serving as a pretence which, according to Habermas, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida share. Their conservatism can be found in the 'revelations of a decentered subjectivity, emancipated from the imperatives of work and usefulness' (*AA*, 14). Derrida and Foucault 'move into the sphere of the far-away and the archaic the spontaneous powers of imagination, self-experience and emotion. To instrumental reason they juxtapose in Manichean fashion a principle only accessible through evocation, be it the will to power or sovereignty, Being or the Dionysiac force of the poetical' (*AA*, 14).

Before examining Habermas' (and others') specific claims about the work of Foucault and Derrida in detail, I shall briefly comment on some of the more general problems with Habermas' position. Like Horkheimer and Adorno before him, Habermas tends to conflate modern rationality and purposive or instrumental rationality. This kind of sweeping conceptual totalitarianism needs to be 'deconstructed'. Secondly, it is not clear why the cause of the ills of modernity should also be the cure. Although Habermas distinguishes between different forms of rationality (moral, instrumental, aesthetic), they would all appear to be a part of an obscure notion of rationality *per se*. This broader notion, enveloping as it does the destructive tendencies of instrumental rationality, may not serve to deliver us from the evils of modernity but only to enmesh us more deeply in them. Thirdly, although Habermas is not guilty, as Horkheimer and Adorno are, of turning instrumental reason into a 'negative' counter-image 'of true reason',[5] it is still not clear that his 'solution' of immanent critique can adequately address global problems that demand an immediate, radical and practical solution.

With these few comments behind me, I would like to assess the claim that Foucault and Derrida are post-modernist. In this assessment I shall concentrate on a number of characteristics which, according to the critics of post-modernism, are essential to it. These are the rejection of reason or 'irrationalism', the decentring or death of the subject and the rejection of representation. Only a close analysis of the work of Foucault and Derrida will show whether or not

these characteristics can actually be found in their work. I shall follow Andreas Huyssen to a certain extent, although his position with respect to these post-structuralists is sometimes marred by the kind of generalizations one normally associates with 'experts' on Foucault and Derrida who have never read them.

Habermas sees Derrida and Foucault as the direct philosophical heirs of Nietzsche and his supposed celebration of the irrational. It is the Nietzschean 'will to power or sovereignty' and the 'Dionysiac force of the poetical' (*AA*, 14) which characterize Foucault's work on power and Derrida's play of signifiers. Habermas criticizes what he considers to be an escapist move towards 'irrationalism'. Derrida and Foucault do not confront the rationality of modernity. They simply deny that reason can have any critical force and regress into mythopoetic philosophies. Nietzsche bears the blame for this regression because it was his view of reason that shaped Foucault's and Derrida's. Of course it is quite true that Foucault and Derrida have inherited a great deal from him, but to see them as Nietzscheans would force one to concede that Horkheimer and Adorno were also Nietzscheans. The influence of Nietzsche is strong in all of these philosophers as it is in many others but one can make sense of none of them if one views them strictly in a Nietzschean perspective. Gilles Deleuze has made the mistake of conflating Foucault and Nietzsche. His work testifies to the problems inherent in such an appropriation.

In Habermas' opinion, Nietzsche's 'irrationalism' has lain dormant throughout the modern age and has only resurfaced in the post-modern period via Foucault and Derrida. Habermas' 'notion of modernity—the modernity he wants to see continued and completed—is purged of modernism's nihilistic and anarchic strain' ('MPM', 30). I want to contend, then, along with Huyssen, that Nietzsche's 'irrationalism' is as much a part of modernity as the work of Habermas himself. Habermas expunges from the history of modernity those features which do not conform to his view of it. This deformation of history, this selective memory, would make it impossible to understand Horkheimer and Adorno, Heidegger, Blanchot, Bataille, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Adorno's critique of identity-thinking, Nietzsche's critique of universal ideas which reveals 'the fundamental weakness of ontology',[6] Heidegger's destruction of metaphysics and his re-evaluation of the concepts of identity and difference are of a piece. They all illustrate the project, central to twentieth-century modernity, of the 'self-critique of reason' (*ER*, 177). To exclude Nietzsche from this history is as erroneous as it is patently absurd.

Nietzsche's position on reason has been misunderstood by most of his critics, Habermas included. In his recent book on Hegel, Nietzsche and metaphysics, for example, Stephen Houlgate defends Hegel against Nietzsche in an argument which is supposed to show how Nietzsche divorces reason from life or becoming. This 'metaphysical distinction' makes Nietzsche's position untenable and is the basis for his 'irrationalism'. 'Within his own terms, therefore,

Nietzsche remains a metaphysical thinker because he employs a metaphysical distinction in order to reject metaphysical categories. Nor can we dismiss this contradiction as peripheral to Nietzsche's main aim: the opposition between "being" and "becoming", between articulable form and life, lies at the heart of Nietzsche's philosophy.'[7] If one confronts this claim with Nietzsche's own statements, however, the supposed *Gegensätz* of being and becoming disappears. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche writes: 'And we are fundamentally inclined to claim that the falsest judgements (which include synthetic judgements *a priori*) are the most indispensable for us; that without accepting the fictions of logic, without measuring reality against the purely invented world of the unconditional and self-identical, without a constant falsification of the world by means of numbers, man could not live—that renouncing false judgements would mean renouncing life and a denial of life'.[8] Although Nietzsche does make a distinction between being and becoming, this distinction is not one that would pit being over and against the world of becoming. Rather, in order to live at all, that is, in order to promote, preserve and cultivate life, reason is not only important, it is necessary. Even though, as products of reason, logic, metaphysics and mathematics are false, fictions and inventions, they remain the indispensable conditions for life. Nietzsche's 'irrationalism' can be stated simply: though we must use reason, we must also realize that reason does not produce any truths in the traditional sense.

Foucault's notion of reason shares with Nietzsche's a number of features. Foucault historicizes reason. In his *Histoire de la Folie à l'âge classique*, for example, Foucault writes: 'In the classical age, reason is born in an ethical space'.[9] At the beginning of the nineteenth century which, for Foucault, marks the start of the modern age of reason, reason appears in a different and less oppositional role with respect to its Other, unreason. The modern distinction between rationality and irrationality is the result of a *partage*. All historical periods begin with a radical break or rupture that distinguishes them from others. Our modern notions of reason and unreason are born as the result of one of these *partages*. Consequently, the modern and classical notions of reason as instantiated in institutions, laws, practices and the like are incommensurable. Nietzsche, Horkheimer and Adorno conceptualize history as a continuous process. Foucault's peculiar philosophy of history does not permit such a monolithic historical view of Reason. Nevertheless, along with these philosophers, Foucault agrees that reason is fundamentally historical and, further, that it is not its own ground. The ground of reason, in Horkheimer's and Adorno's work, is the will to dominate nature. 'The disease of reason is that reason was born from man's urge to dominate nature' (*ER*, 176). For Nietzsche, 'thinking is merely a relation of these drives [of the will to power] to each other' (*BGE*, 237). According to Foucault, the relationship between different historical instantiations of reason and power was present 'albeit in a somewhat confused fashion in *Madness and Civilization*'.[10] Although Foucault's philosophy

of history is contentious, his ideas concerning reason fit squarely within the modernist view that reason is historically linked to power.

The Derridean notion of reason has a different cast. Like Foucault, Derrida does not believe that history is continuous, yet he does not accept Foucault's view that it is discontinuous. The history of western metaphysics is the consequence of operations comprising the realm of arch-writing. The operation which is most important to the constitution of the western metaphysical notion of reason (which Derrida identifies rather simplistically with the logic of identity) is the operation of supplementarity. It is supplementarity as the necessarily *non*-rational 'origin' of reason which gives rise to the western metaphysical law of non-contradiction. Supplementarity is not an irrational force.

> Although the logic of the supplement 'should allow us to say the contrary at the same time without contradiction' (*OG*, 179), its logic is not simply irrational. Instead of being simply an opacity within the system of rationality, which would thus be comprehensible by it, it is nonrational, 'as the origin of reason must' be (*OG*, 259). Reason is structurally incapable of comprehending its origin in the possibility of supplementarity. . . . Not that this inability of reason to understand its origin in what it is not . . . shows a lack of power; rather this inability is constitutive of the very possibility of the logic of identity, and of what appears of necessity to reason, as its irrational other according to that very logic. Still, reason cannot turn the structure of supplementarity into simple irrationality, into the opposite of reason.[11]

Supplementarity, as the ground of the western metaphysical notion of reason, has its own structure, its own logic. It is not, *contra* Habermas, simply unreason or irrational. Horkheimer, Adorno, Nietzsche, Derrida and Foucault all share the view that reason is not its own ground.[12] Supplementarity, *rapports de force et de forme*, the will to power and man's desire to dominate nature are all, in their own way, 'origins' for the modern age of reason. Another characteristic common to all of these philosophies is the idea that, after modernity, a new historical instantiation of reason will arise. This form of reason will not 'continue and complete' modernity. It will, rather, introduce a new 'post-modern' age of reason. In the work of Derrida, the early Foucault, Horkheimer and Adorno, the conditions that would permit this new form of reason to appear are now present. This new form of reason finds expression in some modern art. Horkheimer and Adorno, unlike the early Foucault and Derrida, do not believe that modern art will, of itself, bring about change. They do think that some modern art '*prefigures* an order of reconciliation' (*HM*, 48) in a post-modern world. For Adorno especially, modern art carries with it 'the last residue of reason in a rationalised world' (*HM*, 48). In the work of Derrida and the early Foucault, modern art, as non-discursive and non-dialectical, will allow us to transgress the limits of modern reason (Foucault) or announces the closure of the western metaphysical notion of reason (Derrida). It is not, therefore, a world

without reason that Derrida and Foucault foresee but an age that will inherit a new form of reason. Unlike Adorno (or Marcuse), Foucault and Derrida do not interpret modern art as a *promesse de bonheur*. The normative claim that the post-modern world may be a better one is absent in their work.

The early Foucault and Derrida are to a certain extent the prophets of a post-modern age without themselves being post-modern. As Huyssen writes: 'poststructuralism is primarily a discourse of and about modernism' ('MPM', 37–38). If their concepts of reason reveal their roots in the modern age of philosophy, the same could be said of their positions with respect to subjectivity—especially if one believes that the death of the subject is characteristic of post-modernism. The association of the death of the subject and post-modernism appears, among other places, in Fredric Jameson's leftist critique of post-modernism. Jameson identifies post-structuralism and post-modernism and claims that for both 'not only is the bourgeois individual subject a thing of the past, it is also a myth; it *never* really existed in the first place; there have never been autonomous subjects of that type' (*AA*, 115). A careful analysis of the work of Derrida and Foucault will not, however, bear out Jameson's claim. The subject for these post-structuralists is not a myth. It is constituted differently from other modernist subjects but it none the less exists.

If one examines Foucault's early position on the subject, a kernel of truth might be discovered in Jameson's criticism. In Foucault's first works, it would appear as if the individual subject is not mythical but inessential to history as constituted by relations of forces. Yet, and as Huyssen notes as well ('MPM', 44), Foucault's later work represents an attempt to understand how subjects are constituted and the role that they play in fashioning history. The last three volumes of *History of Sexuality* map the constitution of subjectivity in the Greek, Roman and Christian eras. In this later account, the subject: 'n'est porté par aucun pouvoir, mais il est pouvoir de lui-même. Il n'est l'effet d'aucun discours, mais sujet de la philosophie, maître de sagesse, auteur souverain de sa propre existence'.[13]

Foucault's early work must be re-evaluated in the light of this idea of subjectivity. The Foucauldian subject is constituted in the reflexivity of ethical activity. In any historical age, the subject is brought into being by ethical practices. Further, on Foucault's own interpretation, his early work also describes, though in a confused fashion, the ethical constitution of subjectivity. Foucault's re-interpretation of his own work in view of his later ideas about subjectivity as well as the relationship between the ethical practices that constitute subjectivity and power and knowledge are problems that still need to be addressed if one is to understand Foucault's work. Nevertheless, Foucault's explicit statements counter any criticism that the subject in his work is a myth. It should also be noted that Nietzsche's rhetorical question 'Who speaks?' finds a ready answer in Foucault's work.

The Derridean subject is constituted by operations in the realm of arch-

writing. Like reason, then, the subject must be understood in terms of its relationship to *différance*, the trace, spacing and supplementarity. Since the category of the subject refers 'by the entire thread of its history, to the substantiality of a presence unperturbed by accidents, or the identity of the self-same [*le propre*] in the presence of self-relationship',[14] it participates in the phonocentric tradition of western metaphysics which, for Derrida, deconstructs itself. This is not to say that the subject does not exist. Western metaphysics with its autonomous subjects is no myth, no illusion. Nevertheless, to be adequately understood, the subject must be referred to the realm of arch-writing which has made it possible. The subject is constituted by the movement of spacing. 'Spacing as writing is the becoming-absent and the becoming-unconscious of the subject' (*OG*, 69). The production of subjectivity by spacing is termed inscription. 'Inscription is another name for constitution, or more precisely, "for the constitution of *subjects*, and, so to speak, of constitution itself" (*OG*, 281)'. (*TM*, 157). The subject is not, for this reason, autonomous, originary or self-constituting. Yet, *pace* Jameson, it is not a myth either. The western metaphysical subject owes its existence to operations that it does not itself control but which do, none the less, bring it into being and which will be responsible for its disappearance. When the western metaphysical subject disappears, however, it is not necessarily the case that it will not be replaced by a different subject. What lies beyond the closure of western metaphysics cannot be foreseen with any certainty.

It is interesting to note that Huyssen and Jameson, as leftist critics of post-modernism, do not agree whether or not the death of the subject is in fact characteristic of post-modernism. As I have noted, on Jameson's interpretation, the post-modern subject is a myth. Huyssen makes a different claim. According to him, post-modernists 'counter the modernist litany of the death of the subject by working towards new theories and practices of speaking, writing and acting subjects' ('MPM', 44). Although, on Huyssen's account, Derrida does not work towards such a theory, Foucault does. Habermas has yet another opinion. He feels that the post-modern subject has been decentred and 'emancipated from the imperatives of work and usefulness' (*AA*, 14). Jameson collapses the distinction between post-modernism and post-structuralism. Thus, the characteristics of one are *ipso facto* the characteristics of the other. For Huyssen, such a 'parallelization' ('MPM', 36) assumes what has to be proved, namely, that post-structuralism is post-modern. He takes a much larger view of post-modernism which includes its artistic, literary, philosophical and political forms and attempts to disengage from these features that are common to all. On his account, post-structuralism is not post-modern. Habermas shares Jameson's simplistic identification of post-modernism and post-structuralism. He is correct, however, when he points out that the Derridean subject has been decentred (though not necessarily with respect to work and usefulness). He is, on the other hand, simply wrong when he claims that the Foucauldian subject is so

decentred. History must according to Foucault be understood in relation 'to the truth through which we constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge; . . . in relation to a field of power in which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others; . . . [and] in relation to ethics through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents' (*MFBSH*, 237). To understand history amounts to understanding subjectivity. Far from being decentred then, Foucault's subject is central to his entire philosophy.

The belief that words can correspond to things has, according to post-modernism's critics, also been rejected by the post-structuralists. Although a critique of representation can indeed be found in the work of Foucault and Derrida, neither thinker rejects the idea that words have and can be used to refer to things. It is the traditional understanding of this use of words that is criticized, and especially by Derrida. Derrida and the early Foucault, like Adorno before them, see in modern art and literature a non-discursive element which reveals that language can do more than simply represent objects. In Foucault's work, this non-discursive aspect of language was discovered by Sigmund Freud. For his part, Derrida follows Heidegger who offered the first comprehensive critique of representation in 'The Age of the World Picture'. Further, Heidegger's analysis of the history of representation and its collapse, in the modern age, into calculative thinking, is separated by 'a thin line' from 'Horkheimer's and Adorno's analysis of instrumental rationality' (*HM*, 6).

Les Mots et les Choses is a history of the problem of representation. In this book, the classical belief that 'between the sign and its content, there is no intermediary element, and no opacity'[15] must be distinguished from the more problematic form representation takes in the modern age. Since the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries:

> [R]epresentation lost the power to ground, by itself, in its own deployment and by means of the game that turns it back on itself, the links that are able to unite its diverse elements. . . . The conditions for these links henceforth reside outside of representation, beyond its immediate visibility, in a kind of nether world which is more profound than it is and thicker. (*MC*, 251–52)

Foucault refers the modern view of representation to the *partage*, its historical condition. The effect of the *partage* is to make representation incapable of grounding itself. Instead, life, labour and language become the unrepresentable conditions for representation. To say, then, that Foucault rejects representation is patently false. Although he does point out the more obvious paradoxes in the modern notion of representation, he does not advocate, nor do his histories illustrate, a rejection of the idea that words can correspond to things.

The idea that representation has become problematic in the modern age also describes Derrida's view. Derrida links the occurrence of this phenomenon to the loss of a transcendental signified (the death of God) which once legitimated the transparency of words to things. Without a transcendental ground, language

becomes a play of signifiers. 'One could call *play* the absence of the transcendental signified as limitedlessness of play, that is to say as the destruction of ontotheology and the metaphysics of presence' (*OG*, 50). Nevertheless, language still retains a representative function. What makes this function possible can be found, once again, in the realm of arch-writing. Representation is not its own ground. In his 'Envoi', Derrida hypothesizes that there might be laws or a law which decides what can be representable and what is unrepresentable. Or, on the other hand, what cannot be represented might, of itself produce the law that determines what can be represented.[16] Derrida does not reject representation any more than Foucault does. He merely rethinks and reconceptualizes it within the larger framework of arch-writing. A text is thus 'mimetic, but its mimesis is not suspended upon an ultimate imitated and is thus not subject to truth as *adequatio*, or even, as Derrida argues in "The Double Session", to truth as *aletheia*' (*TM*, 281). Ultimately, *différance* means that the text is an inexhaustible plurality of meanings. Yet the idea that a text can and does refer to something beyond itself is not in question in Derrida's work.

Are Derrida and Foucault post-modernists? If post-modernism is associated with 'irrationalism', the death of the subject and the rejection of representation, they are not. Further, if one identifies post-structuralism with post-modernism, post-modernism cannot itself be characterized by any of these features. On the other hand, if one follows Huyssen and claims that post-structuralism is not post-modern because it calls 'for self-reflexiveness of the text' ('MPM', 38), is 'confident in its rejection of representation and reality' ('MPM', 39), and denies 'subjectivity in the very process of its construction' ('MPM', 44), then post-structuralism is not a modernist philosophy either. For different reasons, however, we agree with Huyssen. Post-structuralism is a philosophy of and about modernity. It is only when one sees modernity without its anarchic and nihilistic strain, *à la* Habermas, that Foucault and Derrida appear, if not anti-modern, then at least non-modern. New theories of the subject (in Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, for example), new conceptions of reason (in Nietzsche, Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse) and the problematizing (but not rejection) of representation are common to many modernist philosophies. Further, both Derrida and Foucault place their work squarely within the modernist tradition. 'Grammato*logy*, this thought, would still be walled-in within presence' (*OG*, 93). For Foucault: 'The questions of the Enlightenment . . . return. . . . Even in thought, language, far from introducing a new form, loses its centrality. Hence Foucault's sense that, far from being the cock's crow of a new age, it is the swansong of the obsessions of an old one.'[17]

The possibility that a post-modern age might soon begin, *remains* a possibility in the work of these post-structuralists. Foucault's philosophy of modernity pinpoints the breaks or ruptures that are responsible for modern power structures, forms of knowledge and ethical practices. In his early work especially, he hypothesized about the end of the modern age and the beginning of a

new, post-modern one. The post-modern age is a 'possibility we can at most intuit but of which we know neither the form nor the promise' (*MC*, 398). The later Foucault is even more cautious about this possibility. He also begins to situate his own work within the philosophical tradition that opens with Kant—hence his later interest in the Enlightenment. Derrida, on the other hand, continues to intimate that a new age is upon us. His own philosophy may still be walled-in within the metaphysics of presence but the conditions that will bring about the closure of western metaphysics have 'always already' been there. Even though 'we cannot not have inherited from this Enlightenment [*ces Lumières*]',[18] the closure of the age of Enlightenment, this 'apocalypse without apocalypse', has been prepared by the operation of arch-writing. The time of this closure is at hand.[19]

There has not yet been a philosophical form of post-modernism. At best, elements of the work of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida might be labelled post-modern. Substantially, however, their work continues and completes modernity, brings modernity, one could say, to its logical conclusion. The modernity post-structuralism completes is not Habermas'. It is rather the modernity that has produced cognitive-instrumental reason but also, and often in direct response to this, the conceptualization and practice of new forms of rationality. It is not anti-modern to reconceptualize reason, the subject and representation. This critique of traditional philosophical concepts has always been part and parcel of our Enlightenment heritage. Engaged in constant dialogue throughout the modern age, philosophers from Kant to Derrida have questioned the limits of reason, the subject and representation. Derrida and Foucault both agree that it is impossible to think outside of the confines of the *Aufklärung*. '[W]e cannot and must not . . . reject the Aufklärung' ('TA', 466). Foucault's own thinking about the Enlightenment illustrates that he himself is part of the modern philosophical project 'that is attempting to answer the question raised so imprudently two centuries ago: *Was ist Aufklärung?*' (*FR*, 32). It would appear then as if it is modernity that must be better understood. Post-structuralism is not post-modern in Habermas' sense because it is not anti-modern. One might even say that it is an essential feature of modernity to question, contest and so to perpetuate itself. The legacy of the Enlightenment will only be surpassed when this self-critique comes to an end, when the constant re-evaluation of traditional philosophical concepts gives way to genuinely new concepts. To think in a post-modern world, one will have to think very differently.

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[9] Michel Foucault, *Histoire de la Folie à l'âge classique*, (Paris. Gallimard, 1972), p 157.

[10] Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, 2nd Edition (Chicago U P., 1983), p. 237; cited henceforth in the text as *MFBSH*.

[11] Rudolphe Gasché, *The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection* (Cambridge, Massachussetts. Harvard U. P., 1986), pp 210–211; cited henceforth in the text as *TM*.

[12] The project of the self-critique of reason needs to be critically addressed. If reason is born from man's will to dominate nature, then reason is not its own ground. If reason is not its own ground, then the possibility of a new form of reason lies in the critique of the grounds of reason and not in self-critique.

[13] Georges Leroux, 'Le Sujet du Souci. A Propos de l'*Histoire de la Sexualité* de Michel Foucault', *Philosophiques* 14, no. 1 (Spring, 1987), p. 9. 'is borne by no power but is power of itself and over itself It is the effect of no discourse, but is subject of philosophy, master of wisdom, sovereign author of its own existence.' See also my 'The Turn Towards Subjectivity: Michel Foucault's Legacy', *The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 18, no 3 (October, 1987), pp 215–225.

[14] Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Spivak (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins U. P., 1976), pp. 68–69; cited henceforth in the text as *OG*.

[15] Michel Foucault, *Les Mots et les Choses* (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), p. 80; cited henceforth in the text as *MC*.

[16] Jacques Derrida, *Psyché* (Paris. Galilée, 1988), p. 142.

[17] John Rajchman, 'Foucault, or the Ends of Modernism', *October* 24 (Spring, 1983), p. 54.

[18] Jacques Derrida, 'D'un Ton apocalyptique', *Les Fins de l'Homme*, ed. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy (Paris. Galilée, 1981), p. 466; cited henceforth in the text as 'TA'.

[19] Jacques Derrida, 'Télépathie', *Furor* 2, (1981), p. 41.

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AN INTRODUCTION TO ADORNO'S AESTHETICS

Andrew Edgar

THE WORK of Theodor Adorno (1903–1969) embraces musicology, sociology and social theory as well as philosophy. It is precisely this range of interests that gives Adorno's writings on art and aesthetics such importance. Philosophically Adorno's work is grounded in the German tradition of Kant and Hegel. As such it is an overtly dialectical philosophy, demanding an appreciation of forms of argument that are alien to the main core of Anglo-Saxon philosophy. This paper will rehearse the development of Adorno's aesthetics out of this tradition. The central problem to be addressed will be the relationship that Adorno attempts to establish between aesthetics and the sociology of art. Following Adorno it will be suggested that a sociologically orientated aesthetics must acknowledge the dialectical claim that works of art are at once products of specific social processes, and yet embody a truth content that is autonomous of society, thereby making art critical of society. This will be developed through reference to the concepts of mediation and illusion, as developed in German philosophy since Kant.[1]

Two questions may be posed in order to analyse the relationship between sociology and aesthetics. First, can a sociology of culture deal adequately with art, even as sociology, if it ignores the aesthetic value of the works it discusses? If not then at least sociology is dependent upon the guidance of aesthetics. Secondly, are the social relations within which an art work is created and interpreted relevant to the aesthetic quality of the work? If such relationships do exist, however rarely, then aesthetics must take some account of the findings of sociology.

The first question may be examined quite briefly. Adorno directs a number of attacks at the German sociologist Alphons Silbermann. Silbermann's 'effects research' involves inquiry into the effects that the art work has upon the audience. Results may be generated through questionnaires, tabulated and statistically analysed.[2] This involves two assumptions about the nature of the art work. First that, as an object, it is essentially and normally in a communicative relationship with the audience, as subject. Specifically the subject and object are conceptualized as two wholly separate poles, connected through an 'art-experience' (in Silbermann's terminology).[3] Secondly, the art work has no inherent content beyond that which is read into it by the audience. The effect recorded from the audience, by the social researcher, need have no relationship

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to the intentions of the artists, or more importantly to any objective interpretation of the art work. Art is thereby denied any aesthetic value beyond the use that is made of it by an audience. However, this theoretical framework ignores the legitimate sociological problem of why a major work of art may have little or no social effect. Silbermann's sociology of art is unable to cope with any discrepancy between aesthetic value and social effect.[4] In sum, any work that cannot be attributed a role as entertainment or as of ritual significance within a consensus of values common to significant consumer groups is dismissed as socially irrelevant.[5]

The second question raises problems concerning the nature of aesthetic theory, and leads to Adorno's challenge on the traditional conception of aesthetics. While it may be of academic interest to know something of the social context within which art is produced, no way in which the inherent qualities of the art work may be related to the social context has yet been suggested. A first point of contact between the art work and external reality may be explored in the concept of subject-matter. The events or simply costumes and artefacts depicted in visual art, or the contemporary and fashionable issues dealt with in literature, are borrowed from a socially determined reality. However, abstract music, precisely in that it has no overt subject-matter, reveals the limitations of such an approach. To include music in such a subject-matter orientated aesthetics requires appeal to the emotions that music generates. This exposes an assumption common to sociological effects research, in so far as the relationship between the art work and the audience is presented as one of communication. The example of music points further, however. To perceive music predominantly in terms of emotional stimuli ignores the formal and structural aspects that are actually dominant. The madrigal, rondo or sonata would seemingly have no existence outside the narrow confines of music. Yet formal aspects, such as composition, metre, and dramatic structure are equally fundamental to the non-musical arts. These appear to exist independently of any extra-artistic reality. Such a divorce between art and social reality encourages the attempt within aesthetics to establish ahistorical and formal criteria for beauty and artistic excellence.

Kant's *Critique of Judgement* may represent, especially within Adorno's philosophical background, the most profound attempt to develop such an aesthetics. Within the concept of free beauty Kant attempted to analyse beauty in terms of the ahistorical faculties of the mind. The analysis is remarkable in that it provides the framework for an aesthetics of abstract twentieth-century art, emphasizing as it does the articulation of the object through the a priori particulars of time and space, prior to the intervention of the faculty of understanding. However, despite the importance that Kant seemingly gives to the concept of free beauty (and consequently its primacy over dependent beauty) he suggests, quite explicitly in so far as he associates abstract music with wall-paper designs,[6] that such beauty is of decorative importance only. The

pleasure [*Lust*] experienced in the presence of beauty is of a different order to the agreeableness [*Angenehmen*] experienced in the presence say, of good food or wine, because pleasure does not depend upon the physical existence of the object.[7] However, in the initial analysis, pleasure amounts to little more than a self-satisfaction in the workings of the human mind, thereby making art indistinguishable from intricate ornaments or even puzzles. The Kantian aesthetics of free beauty therefore insulates itself from the problems of practical reason (that is to say, from guiding action in the mundane world), that the discussion of telelogical judgement was intended to overcome.

Consequently, in order to establish a relationship between beauty and mundane practice, Kant introduces the theory of dependent beauty. Dependent beauty explicates beauty not purely in its own terms, but through extra-aesthetic references, specifically in the doctrines of aesthetic ideas, the ideal and symbolism. In order to establish an association between art and non-artistic reality, Kant appeals to two distinct, yet complementary strategies. On the one hand, in the doctrine of aesthetic ideas the formalist aesthetics (of free beauty) is modified by an aesthetics of subject-matter. Art is seen as offering sensuous representations of those ideas, the rational ideas, that are necessary to the working of practical reason.[8] In that rational ideas offer of themselves no object to sense experience, the sensuous representations in art merely stimulate further, but inconclusive, reflection upon the rational ideas. Art is consequently judged by the relationship between its subject-matter (and the presentation of that subject-matter)[9] and ahistorical moral precepts. On the other hand, the formalist aesthetics is reasserted in that this relationship is explicated in terms of the doctrine of symbolism.[10] Kant proposes an analogy between the structures of thought involved in judgements of beauty and judgements of the morally good. Importantly, in terms of Adorno's aesthetic theory and aesthetics in general, the relationship of analogy suggests that the experience (and ultimately production) of art is both similar and dissimilar to experience in mundane reality.

Hegel's aesthetics takes up these problems, in part developing Kant's doctrine of rational ideas. Crucially, however, Hegel attempts to abandon the ahistorical cast of Kantian philosophy. Whereas Kant had struggled to unify a number of different interpretations of beauty into a single, coherent system, Hegel recognizes that different criteria of aesthetic judgement must be brought to different historical periods. This historical perspective is compromised, however, in that it is formulated within the rigid structure of the late Hegelian dialectic. Only three artistic periods are recognized. The symbolic, classical and romantic correspond, broadly, to pre-Hellenic, Greek and Christian art respectively. The reference to Christianity is by no means accidental. Hegel attributes to art the task of knowing God or, in Hegel's terminology, Spirit. In terms of the idealist metaphysics that is fundamental to Hegel's philosophical system, art is the first stage of the self-consciousness of Spirit. Having created the natural and social

worlds, and yet in this process necessarily having become alien (or sundered) from itself, the creator Spirit, through the agency of human beings, the most important element of its creation, returns to itself in art, religion and philosophy. Art facilitates the comprehension of Spirit by giving the truth content of Spirit a pre-conceptual form, in the sensuous material that is used by art. This Hegel terms a sensuous illusion [*Schein*] of the Spirit.[11]

In sum, art is closely aligned to religion, articulating the religious ideas of a given society or epoch, although not passively (such that it merely illustrates ideas already developed in religious thought), but actively, of itself and appropriately to its materials generating new religious images.[12] Hegel thereby does away with the analogous relationship that Kant held between aesthetic and rational ideas. Kant's rational ideas presuppose that God cannot be grasped within the bounds of theoretical reason. Hegel's most general criticism of Kant is to reject any such fixed and confining boundary. For Hegel the boundary is pushed forward in the historical and logical momentum of Spirit. Once a boundary has been recognized and articulated, humanity may strive to overcome it, in that humanity may ask why the boundary exists.[13] In consequence the art of any particular historical epoch is not interpreted by Hegel as finding a sensuous representation of something that is inherently beyond its grasp. Rather, art embodies what is known of God at that historical moment, and at that moment there is nothing more to be known The artistic image is as such not an analogy, but is identical to God.[14]

As such, Hegel's aesthetics is what above has been termed an aesthetics of subject-matter. However, the subtlety of the concept of illusion, that in turn becomes central to Adorno's *Aesthetic Theory*, transforms the possibilities of such an approach.[15] In examining the possible aims of art, Hegel rejects the imitation of extra-artistic reality. Merely to reproduce reality is to sacrifice art's critical potential. The illusion is consequently a determinant distortion of reality, using the imperfection of artistic imitation to reveal the greater truth of Spirit that is otherwise concealed within the appearance of mundane reality. The subject-matter is to be represented in a new form, so that the art work becomes the illusion or manifestation of the spiritual essence of that reality. However, in that the truth of the Spirit is for Hegel ultimately to be grasped in concepts, and not in the sensuous forms of art, art is inadequate to the most profound understanding of Spirit. The illusions available to the first two stages of art are wholly adequate to their understanding of God. However, in the context of the revelations of Christianity, the sensuous aesthetic illusion is deceptive, a nullity that distorts the true image of God.

The criticism of illusion comes at once from outside art, in that religion develops by its own momentum (specifically in the existence of Christ), and thereby provides a subject-matter that art cannot adequately deal with; and yet, given the external impetus of a new subject-matter, art comes to reflect upon its own inabilities and the contradiction between its sensuous form and spiritual (or

mental) content, thereby generating from within a self-criticism of illusion. This self-criticism is realized in the three art forms that Hegel sees as typical of romanticism.[16] A classical sculpture is a three-dimensional object, existing in real space, and as such the audience perceives it as it would any other real object. However, the romantic arts of painting, music and poetry offer no such real objects. The object in a painting has three-dimensional existence only in the audience's mind. Music (which in accord with an aesthetics of subject-matter is presented as dealing with human emotions) and poetry further develop this relationship by presenting an object that exists only in human consciousness. Yet it is precisely in the fact that the art's true object, the self-consciousness of Spirit, has surpassed the material stage of its existence that art, dependent as it is on sensuous form, for Hegel is ultimately dead.[17]

The metaphysics that underpins Hegel's aesthetics may be unpalatable. Yet Adorno's *Aesthetic Theory* is in major part a materialist re-interpretation of the fundamental concepts introduced or developed by Hegel. Specifically, for Adorno Hegel had recognized the determinant historical and social existence of art, while reinforcing the possibility that art could have an objective truth content. To explore these issues, and thereby to present the core of Adorno's aesthetics, the development of German philosophy through Marxism may be briefly rehearsed.

At the centre of Hegel's metaphysics is the assertion that the Spirit posits[18] its other, such that the universal sunders itself into particulars. The original universal of the God-Spirit must become its own other. This is the act of positing, whereby the Spirit mediates itself by creating an existence that is in opposition to it, and yet remains identical to it. The subsequent development of the Spirit is the recognition of this identity, and thereby of the profundity of its own existence. However, according to Marx the relationship between the universal and the particular is analysed only as a relationship of knowledge. The Spirit posits its other only so that it can know itself. The Hegelian reconciliation of the opposition between the universal and the particular (in the self-conscious individual) takes place only abstractly in thought.[19] The sensuous existence of real human beings is consequentially marginalized. Real human suffering is resolved, not by mundane justice and political reform, but by abstract conceptualization of its place in the Spirit. The movement of the supra-human Spirit to self-consciousness makes use of human beings, as agents of its development, but does not ultimately come to rest in them. Marx summarizes his criticism so: 'Self-consciousness is . . . a quality of human nature, of the human eye, etc.; human nature is not a quality of self-consciousness'.[20]

However, Marx's attack is not the mere protest of an alternative philosophical paradigm. Marx rather subjects Hegelian philosophy to the same critical examination that it gave to Kantianism, thereby developing Marxism out of Hegelianism. While Hegel tends to leave his philosophy in a theological cast, resolving the problems of real human suffering only abstractly in the God-

Spirit, Marx interprets this as a response to real problems. Marx looks for this-worldly solutions, but finds his guide in the imaginary solutions of the past. Hence the sundering of universal and particular (as the opposition of subject and object) is not for Marx mere metaphysical fantasy. Rather it expresses a real human condition. Once the real human being is placed at the centre of the Hegelian system, deposing the God-Spirit, the sundering of Spirit from its other becomes the sundering (or alienation) of human beings from their essential nature. In sum, human beings, lacking full self-consciousness, remain ignorant of what they themselves have produced, just as the Spirit is initially ignorant of its own otherness. This human product is society.

Hegel's model for human existence is the philosopher, and as such the mental labourer. While Hegel is correct, Marx argues, in seeing labour as the essence of human existence (such that this is implied by humanity's role as agents of Spirit's movement to self-consciousness), he is wrong in restricting such labour to mental labour.[21] Marx's concept of social labour embraces both mental and manual labour. Positing thereby ceases to be an abstract activity, and becomes the exercise by human beings of their natural powers. Humanity is uniquely able to transform its environment through conscious consideration and planning (unlike the purely instinctual activity attributed to other animals),[22] and in that work comes to understand itself. The Marxist analysis thus begins with the economic base of society. However, in accord with the concept of illusion (and in the early writings of Marx the concept of ideology), this progress to self-knowledge is ambiguous. Humanity's own creations become fetishized, as if produced by supra-human powers (such as God or nature). In terms of Marxist political analysis, such distortions are instrumental to the maintenance of existing power structures and inequalities. As such, the boundaries to thought that Hegel recognized and sought to overcome are now interpreted as the consequence of (and instruments in the perpetuation of) political repression. While Marx may have believed in the possibility of a human society that is created free of illusion and oppression, the product of self-conscious human beings, such a possibility may be realized only when certain pre-conditions in the economic base of society (such as an appropriate development of technology) have been met. Illusion can be dispelled only when the historically developing material forces are available to solve in reality the problems which cultural illusions have solved in imagination.[23] Marx can criticize Hegel as he does only because society has presented to Marx (through the development of the economy and political science) the means to see through Hegel's illusions.

In line with Marx, Adorno postulates the absolute not simply as a resolution of epistemological problems, such that the subject comes to know the Kantian thing-in-itself, but also as a resolution of the problem of practical reason. The absolute is the realization of the good society that will allow human beings to live wholly as subjects, and not, as at present, subordinated to their own objectified products. Adorno further accepts the materialist re-interpretation of

Hegel, such that human knowledge of the absolute is necessarily restricted and distorted through its mediation in concrete social existence and the boundaries thereby imposed on thought. However, he transforms Marx's criticisms of Hegel. While rejecting Hegel's purely subjective absolute, Marx merely replaces this with his own, in the form of communist society, implying that its realization was imminent.[24] Adorno refuses to define the absolute positively. There is no ground-plan for a perfect society, for this society cannot be known until it is achieved.

Truth can then only be grasped through illusion. The immediate perception of social reality is regarded, initially, as the appearance [*Erscheinung*] of an essence. Given the Marxist re-interpretation of the Hegelian Spirit, such that it is now social rather than metaphysical, Adorno analyses essence as social. Yet, in a dialectical response to the tension between epistemological relativism and absolutism, he suggests that the essence is at once the rationality that may free humanity and the 'law of doom thus far obeyed by history'.[25] In that the Kantian division of pure and practical reason has been rejected, appearance cannot be analysed merely as the subject's formation of a thing-in-itself.[26] Reason (akin to the Hegelian Spirit) is interpreted historically, and is seen to develop through the exercise of social labour, and is embodied in labour's products. The essence is then that which is posited (through social labour) by the subject. Yet further, in that reason as a social product has become objectified as essence it returns to condition the subject.[27] The essence (as Spirit or reason) is then at once repressive in that it acts as a boundary to thought, ultimately legitimating social inequality, and potentially liberating, in that it is the medium of developing human self-consciousness. The appearance, for Adorno, is consequently neither arbitrary nor inevitable (as it would be in relativism or Kantianism, respectively). The appearance is the particular structuring of human perception of and in society. By recognizing the contradictions in the appearance and consequently the position that the appearance has in serving to maintain social inequalities, it may be criticized and surpassed (in the manner that Hegel sought to surpass the boundaries raised by Kant, and Marx those raised by Hegel). Truth may be grasped only in terms of the limitations that the inhumanity of contemporary society places upon its realization. However, because the normal (non-dialectical) forms of science and reflection are part of the appearance, (using thought forms that are functional to the status quo) they cannot be used to penetrate its spell (even if, like communism, they are ostensibly opposed to it). Adorno looks to art to confront appearance with illusion, precisely in that art is attributed a moment of autonomy from society.

In the production of an art work the artist must respect the inherent tendencies of the artistic content. The concept of content [*Inhalt*] requires further analysis. The foregoing discussion has opposed subject-matter orientated aesthetics to formal aesthetics. Adorno revises the concept of content in the light of practical experience in composition. Content is taken to include subject-matter, material,

and formal techniques of construction. The production of the art work requires a solution to the problem of realizing a harmonious combination of these moments.[28] In this the artist is striving towards the realization of the art work as an intrinsic teleology.[29] However, central to Adorno's analysis is the recognition that the social and the aesthetic are not merely two parallel parameters delimiting the art work from opposite sides. If they were, then sociology and aesthetics would remain two complementary activities, able to work quite independently of each other. Aesthetics would degenerate into the analysis of abstract laws of form or subject-matter, and while these laws could be interpreted dynamically in the progressive solutions to the aesthetic problem, their logical progress would be independent of the concrete movement of society and so, as was suggested for Kantian free beauty, irrelevant to non-artistic human practice.

In resistance to this complementarity Adorno offers the dialectical argument that the social and the aesthetic are identical at the same time as they are non-identical. The identity may be elaborated through examination of the three elements of content. First, the relationship of subject-matter and society has already been noted, and requires no further comment. Secondly, if the concept of material is taken broadly, to include not merely the physical matter used by the artist, but also the techniques or technology used to work it, then an identity may be suggested between those productive forces used in artistic activity and those in non-artistic activity.[30] Thirdly, it is suggested that rules of construction reflect the logical forms current in society.[31] Such forms are grounded in social practice. This may be illustrated by Adorno's brief analysis of the development of musical form in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[32] The beginning of the seventeenth century marked the change in the economic conditions of the musician from feudal patronage to a dependence on an open market. Within capitalism the composer has to pander to the demands of the rising mercantile and industrial bourgeoisie. Variety, both within and between compositions, is stimulated by a demand for entertainment. Adorno's point is that this social demand is transformed by composers into an aesthetic demand through the development of increasingly rigorous formal structures, culminating in the development section of the classical sonata. In sum, to treat formal structures as ahistorical, or abstract (as did, for example, neo-classicism) is to conceal the social origin of artistic content. However, if analysis recognizes only this level of the social, then a reductionist sociology of art has again become dominant. Hence, implicit in this analysis of sonata form is a tension between the market demand for entertainment and the composer's interest in the art work. Social problems are transformed into artistic problems.

To explicate this assertion, the teleological organization of the art work may be further discussed. While the purposefulness of most social labour is determined by the dominant purpose of society,[33] artistic practice entails a resistance to that purpose. The artist is seen as giving a determinate solution to

the problem posed by the artistic content. The determinacy of the solution is recognized at first only in the socialized instinct for form [*Formgefuhle*] of the artist, and as such as a problem that is defined wholly in artistic terms. The artist strives towards a harmonious art work, freed of all heterogeneous elements. Such striving is, however, in vain, because of the social nature of the content that is used to realize this intrinsic teleology.[34] Because the art work cannot be expected to use contents that are borrowed from a future, perfected society, the artist's contents must be those of contemporary and past societies, and as such of the false consciousness that corresponds to social repression. The artistic content is therefore inherently antagonistic and contradictory, precisely because the societies that gave rise to its content were antagonistic.[35] The essence of the art work is the same as the essence of society, and as such at once liberating reason and the 'law of doom'. The art work's truth, and the profound determinacy of the art work as solution, lie in exposing this falsehood through the deployment of artistic content.[36] The art work is therefore ultimately determined in its aesthetic worth in terms of its response to the unavoidable social content within it. Truth content [*Gehalt*] is recognized in the disruption of harmony. The art work that presents itself as harmonious, as if it had achieved intrinsic teleological organization, uses pre-existing content as if unproblematic. In effect it conceals the antagonisms within the artistic material, and as such reveals a failure to reflect upon the problems of the material itself, regardless of the artist's knowledge of society. Such seemingly harmonious works communicate with the audience, but only because they exist at the level of appearance (and consequently of the false appearance of a repressive society that conceals its essence). The dissonant work, disrupting harmony, refuses to communicate precisely because it is disrupting appearance. Such works replace appearance by illusion, and communication by mediation. As the Hegelian Spirit may come to recognize itself in its other, so may socialized humanity recognize itself in art works. The dissonance of illusion will serve to liquify the social labour that is crystallized within it, and thereby to have brought to potential human-consciousness the boundaries that have become imposed upon it.

Because art responds to social problems only in the mediated form of artistic problems, it does not conceptually present its results to the audience. Philosophical analysis, in the form of a socially orientated aesthetics, is necessary to decipher the art work. Philosophy's relationship to art is similar to that proposed by Hegel.[37] However, as has been noted, for Adorno philosophy cannot simply step outside the limitations of social existence in a false society, so it cannot realize full self-consciousness. As such, art works remain in part enigmatic to it. The great work is not exhausted by philosophical analysis precisely because it is the mediated consciousness of boundaries on thought that are, as yet, beyond the scope of conceptual articulation. Such depths await a better society.

In sum, Adorno's *Aesthetic Theory* suggests a complex relationship between

art and society. However, to use Adorno's insights requires acceptance, out of the German tradition, of the following. Humanity's grasp of truth must be seen to be mediated by social and historical existence. To avoid relativism the Hegelian concept of illusion, and ultimately the grasp of truth content negatively through the perception of false consciousness, is to be adopted. Sociological reductionism is avoided in that art's autonomy (and as such the aspect recognized by traditional aesthetics) is interpreted as art's critical moment, resisting its reduction to the dominant purposes of society. Yet, this presupposes the argument that society is antagonistic, and that this antagonism has a significant presence in artistic material and content. Adorno's aesthetics may then only be of use to an analyst who is prepared to accept this radical sociology. Aesthetics is not, as such, reduced to sociology, but as an area of inquiry is justified by sociological insight.

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[1] Adorno's major philosophical works in English include: 'The Actuality of Philosophy' (1931) in *Telos*, 31 (Spring 1977), pp 120–33, *Against Epistemology* (1956) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982); *Aesthetic Theory* (1970) (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), 'The Essay as Form' (1958) in *New German Critique*, 32 (Spring–Summer 1984), pp. 151–71, 'The Idea of Natural History' (1932) in *Telos*, 60 (Summer 1984), pp. 111–24; *Jargon of Authenticity* (1964) (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), *Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life* (1951) (London: New Left Books, 1974), *Negative Dialectics* (1966) (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973); *Prisms* (1955) (London: Neville Spearman, 1967). With Max Horkheimer, *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1944) (London: Allen Lane, 1973). See also Adorno's contributions in *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology* (London: Heinemann, 1976), and in *Aesthetics and Politics* (London: New Left Books, 1977).
For the complete works, see *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, 23 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970–).

[2] Inevitably, because Adorno's last works were completed in the 1960s, the targets of his attacks are no longer as prevalent in sociology as they once were. However, 'effects research' and the associated 'uses and gratifications' approach continue to be used, especially in media sociology. Further, recent popular debates concerning media violence and pornography continue to be grounded in the assumption that cultural products have some effect on the audience. Only the degree and nature of this effect is debated. Without wishing to deny the possibility of such effects, Adorno's aesthetics will offer an alternative and more subtle approach to the analysis of the association of art and society.

[3] See T. W. Adorno, *Introduction to the Sociology of Music* (New York: Seabury Press, 1976), pp. 78f; and T. W. Adorno, 'Theses on the Sociology of Art', trans. Brian Trench, in *Birmingham Cultural Studies*, 2, 1972, p. 123.

[4] T. W. Adorno, 'Theses on the Sociology of Art', pp. 123–4.

[5] The sociology of art thereby becomes an instrument to facilitate the administration of art, and so a form of market research that enables the more efficient co-ordination of the production and consumption of cultural artefacts.

[6] I. Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon, 1928), 229, p. 72. (First page number refers to Meredith's marginal references, the second to Meredith's own text.)

[7] I Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, 206–7, p. 45

[8] I. Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London· Macmillan, 1929), B 383; I. Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, 232, p. 76

[9] See I. Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, 312, p 174.

[10] I. Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, 312, p. 174, and 352, p. 223

[11] G. W. F. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, 2 vols, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1975), p 111. It may be noted that Hegel's concept of form is distinct from that used above to characterize formalist aesthetics. Form is the sensuous realization of the content, rather than the abstract structure of the work

[12] G. W F. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, p. 72.

[13] G. W. F. Hegel, *Logic*, trans. William Wallace and A V. Miller (Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1977), additional note to section 60

[14] See G W. F. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, p. 84.

[15] For the history of the concept *Schein*, see E M. Wilkinson and L A. Willoughby's notes in their translation of Friedrich Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man* (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 327–9.

[16] See G W. F. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, pp 87–9

[17] See, for example, Hegel on comedy. G. W. F. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, pp 1199–1202.

[18] To posit. *zu setzen*

[19] K. Marx, *Early Writings*, ed. L Colletti (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), p. 384.

[20] K. Marx, *Early Writings*, p. 387 (Italics removed.)

[21] K. Marx, *Early Writings*, p 386.

[22] See K Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), p. 284

[23] See K. Marx, *Early Writings*, p. 426.

[24] Marx, especially in his maturity, guards against the crude hubris of much Eastern bloc communism.

[25] T. W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, p. 167

[26] T. W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, p 159

[27] Kant expressed this in a distorted, or illusory, manner in the Critiques See T W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, p 170.

[28] Hence the Kantian concept of form has been incorporated within content, in so far as it is seen as a resource within the artist's control The realization of the content is form in the Hegelian sense

[29] Adorno is critical of much twentieth-century neo-classicism in that it attempts to realize subject-matter and material through pre-existing formal techniques Hence neo-classical composers presented dissonant intervals within baroque forms. The form is used as if it is indifferent to its content. However, in making this assumption the artist defuses the tension between the elements of content (and so renders pointless the idea of teleology) The assumption is akin to that of the ahistorical or asocial existence of reason Just as reason structures thought, so formal techniques structure (or in Adorno's terminology, construct) the art work. Formal techniques are then a boundary to the production of art, and neo-classicism (akin to Kantianism or relativism) presents these boundaries as inevitable or arbitrary Just as Adorno (following Hegel and Marx), criticizes Kantianism, so he criticizes the hypostatization of the separation of form and content in art, demanding rather the purposeful articulation of the art work's elements in relationship to each other The history of art is then seen as the historical development of an artistic logicality (albeit that this history is fractured and discontinuous)

[30] For example, musical instruments in the period of their invention tend to use the most sophisticated manufacturing technology. This is as true of the clarinet as it is of the computers at IRCAM

[31] Adorno draws attention to the similarity between the dialectical syllogism, as used by Hegel, and Beethoven's development of sonata form.

[32] T. W Adorno, *Introduction to the Sociology of Music*, p. 208.

[33] Which is, in capitalism, profit-maximization through the realization of surplus value.

[34] T. W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, p. 161.

[35] This follows from Marx's analysis of social labour, and the characterization of all known societies by some form of class conflict

[36] T. W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, p. 188.

[37] See T. W. Adorno, 'Essay as Form', p 153, and T W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, pp. 189–90

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THE AROUSAL AND EXPRESSION OF EMOTION BY MUSIC

R.T. Allen

IN HIS ' "Arousal Theory" Reconsidered',[1] Mr Stanley Speck argues in favour of interpreting the emotions thought to be *in* music as being aroused in the listener and projected by him onto the music. He invokes Santayana's account to argue that the feelings caused by music 'are so closely and immediately conjoined to the melodic and rhythmic contours of the tonal sequence that no separation is intuited'.[2] The emotion thought to be in the music is in fact aroused in the listener and projected on to it because of the close correlation of cause and effect. A theory of arousal can account for the facts but that of recognition cannot. Now clearly the emotional *impact* of emotion is a matter of arousal. Music is more affectively arousing than visual art, with verbal arts in between them. But I shall argue that a theory of arousal alone is both ambiguous and insufficient and that a theory of arousal is necessarily one of embodiment or expression as well, and so not a rival theory after all. I shall then suggest how we do recognize emotion in music.

Let us consider three sets of cases in which music, or works of another form of art, arouse emotions or moods in us. I shall not label the sets for the moment for that would be to beg the question.

(1) I hear a piece of film music which, apart from the events on the screen, arouses apprehension and fear in me. The whole purpose of such music is to do this. But, let us note, in this case I do not project *my* feeling on to the music, as Mr Speck argues. On the contrary, I recognize that *I* feel apprehensive or afraid but I do not at all think the music to be apprehensive or fearful. I take the music to be *menacing*, or suggestive of menace. In the latter case, we have still the same general problem of ascribing intentions to the music though not the specific one of ascribing emotions. Thus when the music is definitely felt to be arousing, it does not follow that one attributes the emotion aroused to the music. It is the same as in life: X displays his anger with Y to Y and, while that may induce anger in Y, it may instead induce some other emotion instead such as fear or derision.

(2) I hear *Songs My Mother Taught Me* and *None But the Lonely Heart*, and quite apart from the suggestions of title and the statements of a text, feelings of nostalgia and melancholy are respectively aroused within me. Prima facie it would seem possible to interpret my experience as a projection onto these pieces

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of music of the moods which they arouse within me. But, as we have seen from (1), the emotion aroused is not necessarily that in the music (or other person), and so, conversely, we cannot simply assume that what we feel in ourselves is simply projected back on to the music. Again, as with people, the emotion in the music can *communicate* itself to the listener. You feel and manifest your joy or sadness and, by infection or in sympathy,[3] I come to feel joyful or sad also.

(3) I now hear *Hearts and Flowers*, recognize it as meant to be sad but feel sickened or amused by it, and I do not feel sad at all. I hear *L'Arlesienne* and *Peter and the Wolf* and, for reasons which I cannot fathom, I feel intensely irritated by them. As far as I am concerned, they fall into the class of 'music to gnash your teeth to'. An emotion is aroused in me by the music, but it is an emotion directed to the quality of emotion ('sickly sentimentality') recognized to be in the music, and thus phenomenologically and logically distinct from it. I do not claim that *L'Arlesienne* and *Peter and the Wolf* express or embody irritation. I do not know what, if anything they do express or embody, for I cannot bear to hear them to the end. Here, let us note, we can be *aroused* to disappointment by the work precisely in finding it empty of emotion. It has an emotional effect in having no emotional effect; that is, it has the one effect (of arousing disappointment) because there is no emotion within it for it to *communicate* to us. A theory of arousal alone cannot cope with this response, but must classify such a work as 'disappointing' (or 'annoying' or 'embarrassing') *in the very same way* as another is classified as 'sad' or 'triumphant' or 'stirring'.

The notion of 'arousal' therefore fails to bring out the real differences among: (1) *evoking* an emotion which is the counterpart (fear to anger or malice) to that in or suggested by the music itself; (2) *communicating* a mood or emotion *in* the work to its audience who thereby come to feel it; and (3) *provoking* a mood or emotion in the audience which is directed towards the quality or the absence of the emotion recognized to be in the work itself. I shall now use 'evoke', 'communicate' and 'provoke', and their derivatives, to refer respectively to each of these three modes of arousal.

There are other features of provoked emotions (ones directed towards the emotion in the music) which clearly separate them from those evoked and communicated ones. First, the feeling in a piece of music itself, and apart from suggestions of any title and what is stated in any text which it accompanies, must always be an undirected mood and not a directed emotion. For in itself a piece of music is not *about* anything. It is nostalgic, melancholy, triumphant or whatever, without being nostalgic, melancholic or triumphant *about*, say, the golden days of childhood, the loss of a loved one, or victory over an enemy, respectively. In contrast, a provoked emotion is a directed emotion, one directed to the quality of the piece of music itself, such as revulsion or amusement at its sickly sentimentality. And, secondly, that emotion, being directed to the quality of the music itself, cannot be in, or unconsciously projected upon, the work. It must always be logically and phenomenologically

distinct from whatever, rightly or wrongly, is thought to be in the work, since that is the object, or part of the object, of the emotion provoked.

What usually happens in listening to music is that two sets of emotions, or of emotions and moods, are aroused in us: (a) those which the music *evokes* or *communicates*; and (b) those which it *provokes* about the mood or emotion which it evokes or communicates, or, when one finds it flat or dull or incomprehensible, about its failure to evoke or communicate anything. Thus I simultaneously feel the nostalgia in and communicated by *Songs My Mother Taught Me* also enjoy and find satisfying that (unique) expression of nostalgia.

Though at times we merely recognize that there is some, usually unspecifiable, mood or emotion in a piece of music, it is clear that normally we also feel it ourselves. A theory of recognition alone is insufficient, and needs to be supplemented by an account also of arousal, that is, of evoking and communicating. Yet 'arousal' cannot be a term adequate for the task of interpreting the phenomena, for talk merely of what music arouses in the audience cannot distinguish among the three different sets of moods and emotions identified above, and cannot account for arousal by communication at all nor for the presence in the music of a counterpart to the state of mind evoked in the audience. I suggest that it must collapse into an Empiricist account wherein a piece of music merely triggers off a given feeling in the audience, just as one of Hume's billiard balls merely sets another going. The object of attention becomes a merely mechanical stimulus, like the cheese eaten before going to bed which causes indigestion and thence a dream.

We therefore have to account for the moods or emotions or other states of mind *in* pieces of music and other works of art which they communicate or which are the counterparts to what they evoke. Works of art are not animate beings, and so cannot themselves feel anything. Even in drama, the emotion is in the words said, actions and gestures performed, and situation presented, not in the actors, who may feel bored with performing the play for the fiftieth time or amused at its histrionics. How, then, can art communicate emotion or evoke a counterpart to what is in it, and not merely provoke it? And, especially with reference to music, we have to account for emotions and moods which are not those of represented persons and animals. A verbal description or a painting of a cavern can embody and communicate the mournfulness or menace of the cavern, and music can embody and communicate moods without reference to any determinate objects. It does not help to refer to the artist, for, whatever he may have felt, he is in any case absent. Whether or not his emotions and moods are expressed in the work, it is the work and not him which we recognize as embodying the relevant mood or emotion.

Mr Speck refers to the alleged sadness of a weeping-willow which resembles the posture of sad persons, which, he says, a theory of recognition can account for.[4] But, he claims, only a few such symptomatic correlations can be explicated. What I would say is that it is wrong to think here in terms of analogy, as

both Mr Speck and those whom he opposes appear to think: that is, we do not observe that sadness and drooping posture go together, see the willow droop, and then by analogy and association see it as sad. Or, if we do, this is again a secondary and less frequent occurrence, and not the primary and usual one. Our real problem here is the Cartesian view of the mind in relation to the body, and its Empiricist and Behaviourist derivatives. These assume that the world, living bodies included, are, or are first apprehended as, mere chunks of matter in motion. The Cartesian and Empiricist story is that we then infer the existence of life and mind in some of those chunks. The Behaviourist story is that this is an unwarranted and unnecessary inference. The reality is that we do no such thing at all. On the contrary, we first take the world to be animate and expressive and then learn to de-personify and de-animate parts of it. Piaget has traced this process[5] and other psychologists have observed that the first response to things is as much one to their emotional tone as it is to their qualities of colour and shape.[6] Seeing the willow as sad and weeping is then usually an original response, not a process of inference by analogy. Likewise so is that of seeing everything dark as sad or threatening, of seeing a overhanging cliff as menacing, and of seeing a stormy sky as angry. We do not make any implicit inferences from how people look to how these things look and then apply emotional and other intentional terms in an analogous and secondary sense. Rather, now as when we were young unless our capacity for feeling has notably atrophied, we see the same physiognomy of sadness, gloom, threats, menace, anger, and so on. But, now we are older, we cancel any notion of a mind behind those physiognomies. We see them still as *expressive* but acknowledge that they are not *expressions*. Likewise we learn to recognize some looks, tones of voice, gestures and postures and words of others as being only expressive and not as being expressions of what the persons in question really think, feel, desire and intend. Hence the crudity of the view that what a work of art expresses is necessarily the expression of what its author himself really thought and felt.

It follows that what is called 'The Pathetic Fallacy' is often not a fallacy, an erroneous process of *inference*. Certainly there is no such thing in Wordsworth where it is a recall or continuance of the way in which we all spontaneously respond to the moving as alive and as conscious, and do not infer any such thing, for, at those stages of intellectual development, we have as yet no notion of the merely mobile.

What many works of art do, in all genres, is to use this first response to the physiognomy of the world, and thus to embody feelings in pictures, painted or verbal, of things and scenes, and, apart from any representation, in colours, shapes and sounds. We can contrast some of these with learned and variable associations such as those of rocks which in hotter climates are associated with heat and dryness but not in colder ones.

Emotions and other states of mind are therefore recognized as being *in* pieces of music and other works of art just as they are in natural objects and scenes,

which art often represents and so uses to embody, and thence to communicate or to evoke, emotions and moods. That is, the works themselves, plus perhaps what they depict, have physiognomies (and perhaps learned emotional associations) to which we respond emotionally, unless we are emotionally dead. Sensitivity to art, and to nature, thus requires something of the child in us, but is none the worse for doing so.

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[1] *British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol. 28, No 1 (1988).

[2] Ibid , p. 41.

[3] On emotional infection (which can produce only undirected moods in the infected person or animal) and sympathy, see M. Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy* (trans. Heath; London. Routledge, 1954), pp. 41–2.

[4] Op. cit , p 43

[5] *The Child's Conception of the World* (trans. Tomlins, London: Kegan Paul, 1929), pp. 173, 209–13, where Piaget shows that infants progress, not from awareness of inanimate bodies to ones like their own, but from taking all movement as signifying life and intention to a progressive de-animation of the world. Piaget concluded that up to about 6 or 7 they take everything active to be conscious, from then to 8 or 9, they attribute consciousness only to what can move; from then to 11 or 12 they distinguish between what moves itself, and so is conscious, from what does not, and then they attribute consciousness only to the animal world. This, of course, applies to European children: those of 'primitives' may take longer and not get as far. Behaviourists, in effect, claim to go further and to de-personify everything including themselves

The material for this section comes from a paper, 'Expressiveness without Expression' read at the Twenty-first Annual Conference of the British Society for Aesthetics in London in 1987.

[6] 'The world offers itself to a child physiognomically and expressively, laden with feelings', D. Katz, *Gestalt Psychology* (trans Tyson; London: Methuen, 1951), p. 154, and K Koffka *The Growth of the Mind* (trans. Ogden; London: Kegal Paul, 1924), p. 134. 'Physiognomical, not cognitive, attributes of the environment are primary. The principle applies as much to the comprehension of inanimate objects as it does to the understanding of living organisms As Wertheimer states, "An object is just as sinister as it is black; in fact it is sinister first of all" ', Katz, op. cit , p 82.

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COLOURIZATION ILL-DEFENDED

Jerrold Levinson

I

JAMES YOUNG has recently offered in these pages[1] a short and easily grasped defence of the now increasingly widespread practice of colourization of classic films. Unfortunately, his defence of this regrettable practice seems to me to almost entirely miss the point, and I will try in this note briefly to explain why.

Young begins by suggesting that what might be wrong with colourizing —the conversion of a black and white film into necessarily arbitrary coloured form—is that it is in some way a limitation on the cinematic artist's freedom of artistic expression. He then endeavours to show that it is not, in fact, such a limitation. But immediately, this is an odd way to put the matter. For it would seem that a film maker has artistically expressed himself, roughly speaking, if he has gotten his film made, pretty much as he wanted to, with at least some of the artistic aims he had in view satisfied. Can freedom to express really be the problem? Colourizers are not, after all, maliciously poised to tint the daylights out of films as they are being made.

The issue, I suggest, is more transparently put as follows: given a film artist who has managed to express himself by creating an expressive cinematic object, will the expressiveness now inherent in his creation be adequately preserved for, and conveyed to, his intended audience? The question, in other words, is whether the potential communication from artist to audience, of the expressiveness (or other sort of meaning) that has been achieved, is threatened by the prevalence of colourization. Being permitted to express oneself in a medium is not the artistic bargain it would appear to be if the results of one's expressive activity are regularly in peril of being coloured over, with the sickly cast of commerce, by any subsequent middleman. Freedom of expression through art, in the narrow sense, is not all an artist has a right to—in addition, he would seem to have a right not to have his expression interfered with in subsequent transmission.

I will assume that Young would grant the above—that what centrally concerns us is the effective preservation of an artist's expression, its possibility of transmission intact, and not the mere fact of such expression having once been allowed. (We could count this as part of 'freedom of expression' in a broad sense.) So the issue is really one of our continuing and undistorted access, epistemically and experientially, to what an artist has expressed in a work.

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But now we come to the crux of Young's defence. Films, he claims, along with sonnets and sonatas, have a different status from paintings and (most) sculptures with respect to the aesthetic rights at hand, because they exist in multiple instantiations—prints, copies, performances—whereas the latter are, ontologically, unique objects. Thus, if you alter the Arnolfini 'Marriage' in the National Gallery, London you have altered, possibly irrevocably, Van Eyck's painting, but if you tear up your copy of Eliot's *Wasteland*, or disrupt a performance of Beethoven's *Hammerklavier*, or colourize a few prints of Huston's *Asphalt Jungle*, you have done nothing untoward to those works of art themselves. You have not really altered the expressiveness of poem, sonata, or film, assuming that undoctored instances of each continue to exist to carry on the work's original structure and appearance. '. . . [T]here is nothing wrong with such modification so long as at least some unmodified instantiations of the work survive' (370). The rights of Eliot, Beethoven and Huston to sustain their works in the expressive condition in which they were created, and thus to provide for the possibility of their continued experience have not, it appears, been infringed, since harm to one instance does no harm to other instances, representative of the original state of the work. Metaphysics does, for once, make a difference!

Thus, as long as we don't fool with the master print of a film, and take care to see that some good second-generation prints are around as well as insurance, no one—surely not the film maker—can complain. Directors' artistic expressions, and the communicability of such to an audience, have not been threatened 'since artefacts still exist which embody what they [directors] wished to express' (370).

II

Whatever may be true of the innocuousness of disposing of a few copies of a famous poem, or crashing a performance here and there of a celebrated sonata, the speciousness of this analysis in regard to classic black and white film is glaring.

In the first place, our access to film is controlled, more than with any other art, by the commercial world and the channels of media distribution. It's easy for individuals to make additional copies of a poem, correcting for misprints if need be, and not hard to secure, with the co-operation of musicians, various sorts of performances of a sonata, but for the most part we must rely on the entertainment industry and its outlets to supply us with instances of films. If colourized versions of a film are what are predominantly available—in video stores, on television, in movie halls—then the film as a social entity turns into a coloured object, willy-nilly. The colourized film has a tendency to displace the original, in consciousness as on the shelves. It is hard to overestimate the likelihood of this happening, once a colourized version acquires an economic foothold, especially in our present culturally complacent environment. Access to the original becomes more and more strictly notional, or theoretical, anchored only by

unaltered prints remaining in existence somewhere, rarely screened. 'Freedom of choice' for the majority is all but inevitably purchased at the price of a drastically reduced avenue to an artist's original expression for those legitimately interested in it.

Secondly, colourizing is often minimally acknowledged, if at all, in the prefatory material provided with the new version, and this, together with the fact that viewers generally pay scant attention to such material, leads inevitably to false impressions and opinions of the nature of a director's work and the quality of his achievement. Although colourizations are obviously not forgeries, in practice they will have many of the same ill effects through misrepresenting, to all but connoisseurs, what the films subjected to this treatment, and bearing the very same titles afterwards, are really about, aesthetically and expressively. The reputations of both films and film makers are at stake here, and this is not a negligible thing. As Thomas Nagel and others have stressed, one can be harmed after one's death; having one's expressly black and white films wilfully colourized forty years later seems a particularly gratuitous example of this. More broadly, the image of the history of film as art is in danger of wholesale distortion and disintegration if colourizations, often minimally flagged as such, become rampant.[2]

A third point, related to the preceding, is this. A film artist would seem to be entitled to a fair shot at displaying his oeuvre as he created it—of having it come across as it is—to a broad range of well-meaning spectators, and not just those who are serious and dedicated scholars of the art form, who can be expected to make the often considerable efforts required to view works as they were meant to be viewed, and to get everything straight as regards appreciative context. It is unfair to older cinematic artists to so stack the deck against them with regard to less conscientious viewers, as the practice of widespread colourization would in effect do, despite the existence of original prints in film archives and a sprinkling of undoctored tapes in the odd video salon here and there.[3]

Consider such a viewer in front of a colourized version of Hitchcock's *Sabotage* (1936). Is he likely to be keeping in mind that this is not really how the film was conceived, and not really how the film looks? Not too likely, but let us suppose for argument's sake that he is. The viewing over, is he likely to feel that he has seen Hitchcock's film, and is in a position to take its measure? Of course. What are the chances he will ever feel he ought to see the original? Very slim. To the casual filmgoer or renter-of-videos, *Sabotage* will unfairly begin to take on whatever look and resonance, however enjoyable, it has in its colourized version, and certain aesthetic qualities of the original, though safe in vaults, and at film festivals, will in a real sense be on the way to disappearance.

Fourthly, we might note that colourizing is done for a number of reasons, but at least one seems central. Modern viewers, especially those whose earliest viewing years postdate the widespread adoption of colour film, are assumed to be too lazy or spoiled to interest themselves in products of an earlier cinemato-

graphic age, or simply incapable of sustaining what interest they may actually muster throughout the course of a film. Colourizing is the only way to get them, and hold them, where antiques such as Hitchcock, Lang, and Welles are concerned. If this is part of the rationale, as seems likely, then we have grounds for another moral complaint against the procedure. If we grant that experience of the arts—including the art of cinema—has a profound value, and that realizing this value presupposes adequate appreciation of objects and structures for what they are,[4] then we are implicitly cheating the aesthetically unformed by seducing them with substitutes, perhaps even assisting them to become indeed more and more incapable of comprehending the originals on their own terms. The cynical discounting of the capacity for aesthetic discipline on the part of the average viewer, which is part of the justification for going ahead with colourization, not surprisingly tends to be self-confirming. And this is a bad thing. It is a bad thing to foster degradation of taste in the general populace, since this leads, at least for viewers who are not literally constitutionally unable to deal with black and white film, to lives intrinsically worse than they might otherwise be.

III

Young argues, finally, that not only is there nothing morally wrong about colourizing, but it would be morally wrong to forbid it, because of the damper this would place on artistic creativity. 'There is every reason to suppose that the creative use of colourization could result in interesting works of art. . . . A prohibition against unauthorized colourization would be, in effect, a ban on creating . . . new art work' (370).

But the analogies that Young intends with artists' appreciative adaptations of earlier works, or even ones he does not invoke directly, with dadaistic acts of symbolic defacement, are misleading. For colourizers are not making artistic statements, are not coming up with synthetic fusions, to which they contribute some substantial material or perspective, are not engaged in the ongoing dialectic of reaction and counter-reaction that makes up the history of art. Instead they are out merely to 'improve' the original and still—paradoxically though actually hypocritically—pass it off as 'the same thing'. Colourizations, in the sense that is commercially at issue, are not homages to, or variations on, or even creative repudiations of,[5] the films they masquerade as, and it is dishonest to try to give them legitimacy by this kind of suggested assimilation. Surely it cannot be impossible to distinguish, either in moral assessment or in the legal code, between current efforts at colourization and certain artistically interesting modes thereof that we may envisage.

Of course, if it were not standard colourization, of familiar intent, that was involved, but instead post-modernist appropriation, or inventive re-use, or ironic commentary—akin, say, to what Woody Allen, one of the most outspoken opponents of standard colourization, did with an obscure Japanese spy film in his entirely distinct work of art, *What's Up, Tiger Lily?*—then my

objections would vanish. But that would be changing the subject. The subject is the activities envisaged by present-day commercial colourizers, and there are indeed moral objections to them. Neither Young's metaphysical observation as to a film's persistence despite the colourizing of some of its offspring, nor his laudable concern to prevent roadblocks for future artistic experimentation in film, shows that there aren't.[6]

We might, finally, turn this last argument of Young's around, and use it to our own account. Even were it the case that forbidding colourization of the sort in question could have as a consequence the inhibiting of certain forms of creative adaptation or appropriation, this would be more than offset by the dampening effect on future film artists of permitting such. If artists do not feel their works will generally be disseminated without significant alteration, their incentives to take the utmost pains to express themselves adequately, or to bring the maximum of beauty into existence they can, will have been seriously weakened.[7] And thus we would all be aesthetically impoverished down the line. This is a much greater danger than the one Young claims to espy.

Young frames his defence, recall, in terms of freedom of expression, in terms of artists being able to say what they want to say. I will revert in closing to that formulation of the issue. There are a manifold of ways, some more subtle than others, in which this freedom can be abridged. To be sure, an artist's materials can be taken away as he is clapped in irons and forcibly muzzled. Or, less crudely, he can be completely deprived of effective outlets of distribution. But more insidiously, even if his work is left intact and limited access to it ensured, an artist's right of expression—in the broad sense Young must be understood as invoking—can be undercut. For as noted earlier, it is not enough to be allowed merely to 'say' something, there must be a reasonable chance of its being correctly 'heard' by others. Suppressing an utterer, or modifying his output at the source, is a direct way to interfere with artistic 'saying'. But drowning out his voice in a sea of imitations, distorting the context which his utterance needs in order to be properly construed, and subverting his potential audience's capacity of comprehension, is only another, if more indirect, method of sabotage. It is the one with which the filmic 'sayings' of Hitchcock, Lang, Welles, and all the other 'marketable' directors of classic cinema are now menaced.[8] If philosophers wish to give rationales for colourization then they, at least, have a duty to see that such rationales are more substantial than those thin films which are, in the last analysis, the object of everyone's concern.

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[1] *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 28 (1988), 368–71.

[2] The situation of a film colourized 'against its will', and yet left to enjoy a parallel existence in its original state, is almost precisely analogous to that of Titular Councillor Golyadkin in Dostoyevsky's satirical novel *The Double*. No one puts Golyadkin in jail, or threatens him with liquidation, but meanwhile another, 'false' Golyadkin, a dashing and scurrilous fellow, obviously somewhat different from the original in matters of appearance and behaviour, is everywhere seen in his stead and taken for him, and—most maddening of all—gladly so. Though Golyadkin could of course lull himself with the knowledge that he was still who he was, unchanged—that perhaps his mother, at least, would acknowledge him—this was of little solace given the fact that his 'double' was running around town, out of Golyadkin's control, ruining his good name.

[3] Young's discussion gives the impression that colourized versions of classic films would be no more harmful than postcard or connect-the-dots versions of famous paintings, transcriptions of piano works for full orchestra, or translations of poems into foreign languages. But no one will take these to be the works they are derived from—no one is likely to conflate the two—whereas there is a real danger of viewers assuming an identity between colourized versions and the (unknown) films themselves.

[4] If this premiss seems too sweeping for the purpose, then we need only agree, more narrowly, that experience of the original is aesthetically superior to that of a random colourization. If so, then we do a disservice to the general viewer, ultimately, by pandering to a weakness for the easy and familiar.

[5] See Noel Carroll, 'Art, Practice, and Narrative', *The Monist*, 71 (1988), 140–56.

[6] I should add at this point that I do not believe I have touched on all, or even all the most important, moral objections to the currently threatening practice of colourization. I have attempted only to establish that Young's considerations fall far short of showing that the moral ground for today's colourizers is clear. (And there are angles to this issue which neither Young's remarks nor my own even broach; one concerns cases where there is strong evidence that a director working in black and white on a given film would have wanted to employ colour stock if it had been available. But that angle opens onto another paper.)

[7] The fact that current film makers do not regularly work in black and white is irrelevant. They will take the message, with transposition to some other feature of their films they regard as important, but which may some day prove economically or socially inconvenient.

[8] Thus, thankfully, Bresson, Antonioni, Godard, and Bergman are probably not endangered—though early Fellini and Truffaut might have more to worry about.

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NOTE ON COLOURIZATION

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In a recent number of this journal[1] James Young argues against the view that 'colourization' of films is immoral because it interferes with artists' freedom of expression.[2] Young notes that unlike works of painting, sculpture, and architecture, which are instantiated in single artefacts, films join novels, poems, musical compositions, and ballets in being capable of multiple instantiation. Colourization alters at most some of the prints of a film. Those remaining continue to be expressions of their creators' intentions. 'If there were only one print of a film and colourization modified its original state, then colour conversion would be objectionable. But this is not what happens'.[3]

I wish to contend first, that if painting a moustache on Leonardo's *Ginevra de' Benci* is in some way wrong, it is not wrong because it interferes with Leonardo's freedom of expression. Suppose, besides the Leonardo, I also own the Painted Desert, the Black Forest, and Mont Blanc, I not only insert the moustache, I bleach the Painted Desert, log the Black Forest, and raze Mont Blanc. In doing the latter I am not interfering with anyone's freedom of expression.[4] Yet in all cases, including inserting the moustache, what I do seems objectionable *on the same grounds*. So the barbarity of my act has nothing whatever to do with interference with expression or intention.

Secondly, despite this disagreement with what Young presupposes on the way to his conclusion, I want to suggest that his conclusion is correct. Colourization is not immoral.

It is often difficult to pinpoint exactly what is immoral. Ask yourself: is competition immoral? or, on the other hand, can there be morally ideal worlds, worlds where no evil is done, in which people play bridge, football, and hide and seek? I hope bridge is okay. I shall assume it is.

If certain sorts of competition are morally permitted, then it is not always wrong to frustrate other people's legitimate desires, since it is not wrong to frustrate their desires to make contracts, score goals, or to find someone. Thus, (a) to frustrate others' desires to do what they are morally permitted to do is not always immoral; and in consequence, (b) others do not have a moral right to have such desires satisfied,[5] for if they did, then frustrating their desires would be immoral. We *are* morally permitted to frustrate certain desires others have, the satisfaction of which is morally permitted, provided, of course, that in the process we do nothing that is morally wrong.

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Now, *do* artists have a special sort of right or freedom of expression having moral status, in that to tamper with their works is morally wrong? Suppose an artist makes an art work and further that the art work is an expressive symbol. Are we, and all our successors over the fullness of time, *morally* forbidden *ever*[6] to destroy or alter it, or permit its destruction? I cannot bring myself to believe so, even if the art work is one of great aesthetic value.

Or, taking into account the first point, are we, and all our successors over the fullness of time, *morally* forbidden *ever* to destroy things of rare beauty or curiosity, whether artefacts or natural, or to permit their destruction? Again, I fail to see what compels one to accede.

I suggest these matters have the moral status of competition: while it is not morally forbidden to destroy art works, things of beauty, or other rare and interesting items in our world such as rhinoceroses, nobody has a moral right, even through ownership,[7] to destroy them; and consequently it is not morally forbidden to bend all one's energies, short, of course, of wrong-doing, towards frustrating the desires of those artistic, cultural, and environmental barbarians who would destroy them.

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[1] 'In Defence of Colourization', Vol 28, No. 4, 368–72.

[2] The aesthetics of colourization is not in question here, although as the process exists and is used today, colourization is in fact an aesthetic failure, taking a print which, because of fine, subtle gradations in value from black to white, gives the viewer a direct, good sense of three-dimensionality and hence the solidity and reality of the world of its story, and obliterating these gradations. The result is cartoon-like and similar in appearance to paint-by-number pictures. The immediacy and quality of the original's three-dimensional solidity and realism is lost.

[3] Ibid., p. 370.

[4] I ignore the possibility that the Painted Desert, Black Forest, and Mont Blanc are expressions of the Divine Artist's intentions.

[5] It is easy to see that being permitted to do something doesn't entail having a right to do it. We are boxing. It is the second round. I am permitted under the rules to knock you down, but I do not have a right under the rules to do so. If I had a right, then your attempts to prevent me from knocking you down would be interfering with my rights. In contrast, I am not only permitted under the rules to throw in the towel and quit, I have a right to do so, and if you try to prevent me from doing so, you *are* interfering with my rights.

[6] It is hard to believe that art works have some particular morally protected lifetime, say, six hundred and fifty seven and one half years, during which it is morally forbidden to destroy them and after which it's not. This is why the word 'ever' seems fitting here.

[7] In general people seem to see their own local laws and institutions as embodying True Morality. But what rationale justifies our local faith that private property has a special *moral* status? Property might be an element in a morally permitted competition. others are morally permitted to control certain goods, and we are morally permitted to frustrate their desires to do so, provided, of course, in the process we do nothing morally wrong. (Whether theft is morally wrong or is a ploy of morally legitimate competition is itself in question here, since theft is a companion

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LORAND AND KANT ON FREE AND DEPENDENT BEAUTY

Robert Stecker

MOST ATTEMPTS to interpret Kant's puzzling distinction between free and dependent beauty do not take seriously Kant's claim that these are two *kinds* of *beauty*, each an object of judgements of taste.[1] Ruth Lorand, on the other hand, takes it for granted that Kant really intended such a distinction.[2] She then proceeds to argue that Kant was completely 'confused' in making this distinction in that: (1) the distinction is impossible; (2) it rests on a mistake; (3) it serves no purpose in Kant's, or any other, theory. I agree with Lorand that we should take seriously Kant's claim that there are two kinds of beauty and two kinds of judgement of taste. However, I shall show that Lorand establishes none of claims 1–3 and that Kant can be defended on each count.

(1) According to Lorand, dependent beauty has properties incompatible with Kant's 'general notion of beauty' and so cannot be a kind of beauty. Furthermore, even if this were not so, dependent beauty and free beauty have nothing in common, and so cannot be two kinds of the same thing.

That there is the appearance of inconsistency between Kant's discussion of dependent beauty and many other things he says about beauty is the starting point of all interpretations of Kant on this issue. Kant tells us that dependent beauty presupposes a concept of 'what an object should be'[3] whereas earlier Kant characterized beauty as 'that which, apart from a concept, pleases universally'. (60)

Kant seems to be committed to an inconsistent triad of propositions: (a) dependent beauty is a kind of beauty; (b) dependent beauty 'presupposes' concepts; (c) beauty presupposes no concepts.

However, if Kant really committed himself to this inconsistent triad, it is hard to believe that he would have failed to notice this. If we read Kant as Lorand suggests we do, the passages about dependent beauty go against virtually everything Kant said about beauty up to the point of their introduction. It would be an amazing lapse for Kant to overlook this.

Fortunately, there is a way to interpret Kant's remarks about beauty which do not commit him to this inconsistency while maintaining Kant's commitment to the claim that dependent beauty is a kind of beauty and an object of judgements of taste. On this interpretation, when Kant talks about beauty prior to section 16, he means free beauty. (That Kant means free beauty is a claim Lorand is willing to assent to.) Similarly, when Kant speaks of judgements of taste prior to

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section 16, he means pure judgements of taste. Kant did not always specify that he meant these things. Prior to section 16, Kant could not have specified this since he had not yet introduced the distinctions needed to do so. However, it is understandable that in most of the 'Analytic of the Beautiful' Kant would focus on free beauty and pure judgements of taste. He is giving, after all, a critique of aesthetic judgement, i.e., a transcendental deduction of the possibility of such judgements. Only pure judgements need or can have such a deduction. So it is natural that the focus of the 'Analytic of the Beautiful' is to spell out what *those* judgements involve.

The above interpretation dissolves the inconsistent triad by replacing (c) with (c') *free* beauty presupposes no concepts. (c') is compatible with (a) and (b).

However, Lorand is quite right to point out that Kant still has a problem. Even if what Kant says about free and dependent beauty is consistent, is there any reason to think that each is properly called a kind of beauty? Do they have anything in common? Lorand's answer is: no. She arrives at this answer after the examination of a single passage, a passage in which Kant says 'that to combine the good with beauty . . ., mars' the purity of a judgement of taste. While I don't think the passage is as problematic as Lorand claims, she is right to claim that it does not solve Kant's problem.

A more thorough examination of Kant's various remarks about dependent beauty is more helpful. Of several relevant passages, I will focus here on only one: Kant's discussion of the ideal of (human) beauty.

In discovering human beauty, Kant suggests, the imagination scans the appearance of face and figure in search of a visible expression of a moral ideal. 'The visible expression of moral ideas that govern men inwardly can . . . only be drawn from experience; but [the perception of] . . . this embodiment involves the union of pure ideas of reason and great imaginative power' (80). Kant's point, I take it, is that the perception of the expression of moral character is *not* an instance of subsuming an object under a concept according to a rule. It is not a judgement *determined* by a concept. There is no rule for seeing moral character; rather it requires the play of the imagination as it scans face and figure. However, unless concepts (moral ideas) are being used in some sense, there would be no basis for seeing face and figure *as* having any character at all.

What Kant's discussion of the ideal of human beauty suggests is that pure and impure judgements of taste have something in common after all. Negatively, all judgement of taste are judgements *not* determined by concepts. Positively, they are judgements that are expressions of pleasure having a subjective determining ground in the harmonious play of the faculties of understanding and imagination. In pure judgements of taste, according to Kant, the play is free (from all concepts of an object) In impure judgements of taste, the play is constrained by a concept of an object's purpose. An object is beautiful if it is a possible object of pleasure with such a determining ground.

Kant's distinction between free and dependent beauty is consistent and

implies a conception of beauty on which these two kinds of beauty have something in common. Or at least, Kant can be so interpreted.

(2) According to Lorand, Kant's distinction between free and dependent beauty rests on a mistake. What is the purported mistake, and does the distinction really rest on it? Lorand actually points to two mistakes: an unsatisfactory conception of form and a confused conception of what it is to appreciate a work of art.

I will not dwell on Lorand's critique of Kant's conception of form. All that needs to be pointed out is that Lorand says nothing about how this purportedly unsatisfactory conception of form gives rise to the distinction between free and dependent beauty. Nor would it be possible to do so since the apprehension of dependent beauty, being concept guided though not concept determined, is not exclusively concerned with form.

Kant's treatment of what we appreciate in art is another matter. This is *one* of the main motivations for the introduction of dependent beauty. Lorand's main charge against Kant here is, again, inconsistency. Though, in section 48, Kant claims that the appreciation of art has, at its basis, a concept, viz., of the artist's purpose in creating the work, in section 46, Kant claims that judgements of beauty about works of art do not have 'a *concept* for its *determining ground*' (168, second italics mine).

Notice there is no inconsistency on the account of dependent beauty given here. It is precisely the peculiarity of dependent beauty that judgements about it have a concept at their basis without having a concept as their determining ground.

While this resolves Lorand's purported inconsistency, there are, unfortunately, other problems with what Kant says in section 48. Section 48 says that all art is properly appreciated as having an end given to it by an artist. This seems to suggest that all art must be treated as a species of dependent beauty. However, when Kant initially introduced the distinction between free and dependent beauty in section 16, he cites certain works of art as examples of free beauty.

It *seems* that Kant has contradicted himself but, once again, there is a plausible interpretation of Kant which renders his position consistent. Kant does say that it is an essential feature of works of art that their 'producing cause had an end in view to which the object owes its form' (173). When that end is representation, Kant believes that the work is properly appreciated as an object possessing dependent beauty. However, there are types of art (landscape gardening, interior decoration, the decoration of ladies) whose 'sole function' is 'appealing to the eye, in order to entertain the imagination in free play with ideas' and 'engage actively the aesthetic judgement independently of any definite end' (188). Since the purpose of such works is to create free beauty, even if we take the artist's end into account, they need to be appraised as instances of free beauty.

(3) Kant's recognition that many works of art, and the most important ones at that, are not properly appreciated as instances of free beauty is one good reason for introducing dependent beauty into his aesthetic. The introduction of this kind of beauty makes his aesthetic considerably more plausible since it reveals that Kant was not committed to a barren formalism but merely to the view that there is a certain kind of aesthetic judgement that expresses appreciation for a purely formal (free) beauty. It is true that in introducing dependent beauty into his aesthetic, Kant appears to be involved in a number of inconsistencies. However, if we attend sympathetically to the details of the text, this appearance proves to be illusory.[4]

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[1] Interpretations that do not regard dependent beauty as a distinct kind of beauty include those of Donald Crawford, *Kant's Aesthetic Theory* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), pp. 56–7, 113–17; Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U. P., 1979), pp. 242–4, and Geoffrey Scarre, 'Kant on Free and Dependent Beauty', *British Journal of Aesthetics* 21, no. 4 (Autumn 1981), pp. 351–62; Mary McCloskey, *Kant's Aesthetic* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1987), pp. 74–9. Crawford and Guyer deny that dependent beauty is a kind of beauty proper while McCloskey and Scarre claim it is a species of free beauty.

[2] Ruth Lorand, 'Free and Dependent Beauty: a Puzzling Issue', *British Journal of Aesthetics* 29, no. 1 (Winter 1989), pp. 32–40.

[3] *Kant's Critique of Judgement*, Trans. James Creed Meredith, (Oxford U. P., 1959), p. 72. Parenthetical references are to this work.

[4] I have discussed these and other problems in Kant's discussion of dependent beauty in more detail in 'Free Beauty, Dependent Beauty and Art', *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 21, no. 1 (Spring 1987), pp. 89–99.

BOOK REVIEWS

Art and Desire. A Study in the Aesthetics of Fiction
By BRIAN ROSEBURY. Macmillan 1988 pp. 266. £29.50

IN A key passage in this book, the author contrasts his beliefs about the role of literature with those of I. A. Richards. The differences between them are important and profound, involving questions of language conventions, of meaning, and emotion. Yet in the end they are kindred spirits. For both, literature is an instrument for the evocation and rearrangement of emotions; truth, such truth as there is in literature, is subordinate to affective potency In both authors the spirit, if not the values, of Plato have survived

This kind of view inevitably pits the author against powerful and influential opponents, chief among them the Leavises. Brian Rosebury refers to the Leavisite position as 'moral realism', a set of critical practices based upon the principle that, as he puts it, 'the pursuit of literary discrimination is identical with the pursuit of moral wisdom' (p. 76) At the centre of his case against this principle is the following argument. Many literary works are stories or fictions, which may or may not correspond to real events and states of affairs. If they do not so correspond they do not affect our moral judgements. If they do so correspond, we must already possess a sufficient knowledge of the real world to know that the correspondence exists But if we are already familiar with the real world, we can base our moral judgements upon this familiar knowledge, and do not need the additional help of stories to generate such judgements. His conclusion is that, 'We assess the moral realism of a novel by applying to it criteria externally derived, it cannot itself directly enhance our moral insight' (p 79).

Whatever about the formal validity of this argument, it seems to me materially wrong, since we *can*, in fact, derive our moral judgements from fictions. Examples of this are exceedingly numerous, from the satires of Swift to the parables of the New Testament. It may be said that these yield up their moral harvest only in so far as they are believed to 'correspond' to real life. But this would already be a substantial concession by Rosebury And in any case we should never forget what Oscar Wilde said about nature imitating art. Real life is random and chaotic; fictions teach us how to interpret it. The Athenians acquired their moral sense from Homer and the great tragedies.

Moral realism is not the only position that Rosebury examines, for he is interested in any literary theory or critical practice which might give birth to objections to his own views. Most of the book, in fact, is given over to this consideration, and it is in consequence one of the best surveys of current Anglo-American literary criticism that I have come across A chapter is devoted to what is called 'historical realism' —that is, the view that literature embodies and communicates knowledge of the world Another chapter considers the view that literary criticism should concentrate upon the language in which literature is couched rather than its effects upon the reader. Yet another chapter examines a set of objections connected with the alleged affective fallacy, in particular the view that emotional responses to literature are too varied and too individual to constitute an adequate focus for critical discourse.

All of these matters are treated with consummate dialectical skill and a complete mastery of both their theoretical and practical aspects. Rosebury himself advocates an 'affect-conscious' criticism. This is a literary criticism in which the features of literary works are described and assessed with reference to the effects, specific or cumulative, direct or indirect, that they produce in the reader 'The essential methodological point', he writes, 'is to put forward affects as *explanations*, not as *evidence*' (p. 154) That is, the critic should not argue that, because a certain passage produces a certain effect, it must therefore possess a certain feature.

Rather, he should first refer to an observable feature of the passage, and then argue that it possesses this feature in order to produce the relevant effect. The critic's task, Rosebury holds, the task that is specifically his, is to study the transaction between the composition and the reader. All critical analysis should subordinate itself to this end, just as in our response to literature we subordinate its truth claims to its emotive power

Rosebury consistently writes of the 'affects' rather than the 'effects' of literature, and this because it is the emotions that literature evokes which specify, for him, both the function of literature and the object of literary criticism He refers to the emotions in question as 'desires', and it is in this connection that the book is least satisfactory, for there is little attempt to analyse or explain desire. We are told that desire refers to 'all the delicacies of attraction and aversion possible to the human mind in its intercourse with the world' (p 14), and is exemplified in ambition, lust, fear, and gregariousness. Some other examples are aspiration, anxiety, approval, indignation, love, regret, and acquisitiveness. He sometimes refers to desires as 'appetencies', and in one place identifies them with I A Richards's 'impulses' (p 140). But none of this is of much help, and indeed one would hope that Rosebury would not employ the stimulus-response psychology that Richards used to define an 'impulse'

It is Rosebury's view that the function of literature is what he calls 'the quickening of desire'. Since the desires are called forth by fantasy, rather than actual experience, they are not and cannot be satisfied; and this, he claims, explains the unrest that literature produces in us At the same time, we value the desires for their clarity and intensity, and also because the literary work provides us with a model or paradigm of control over them. 'The painfulness of quickened desire is compensated for by a sense of having briefly escaped that uncertainty of emotional direction and control which accounts for a good deal of the anxiety and dissatisfaction of daily experience' (p 117)

The book deals almost entirely with literary fiction, and to this extent it is misnamed However, Rosebury believes that his theory of the function and value of fiction, in terms of the quickening of desire, can be extended to all literature and to all art He does not, unfortunately, pursue these claims in detail, and it does not seem to me that they would be easy claims to defend. In fact, some of his arguments relating to historical realism and moral realism lose much of their force in the case of non-fictional literary works Furthermore, I am not sure that his distinction between literary and non-literary verbal conventions—namely, that in one case emotion is subordinate to truth claims, whereas in the other truth claims are subordinate to emotion—can be sustained, or is even plausible

There is a great deal, in short, that I disagree with or would like to see discussed at greater length On the other hand, the book is written with great skill and precision, and raises central issues about literature, literary theory, and critical practice There is an exemplary discussion of *Wuthering Heights* in the last chapter, and an appendix on the justification of criticism The main thesis of the book, and the various objections to the thesis, are presented with force and accuracy. It is, in sum, and irrespective of whether one agrees with it or not, one of the best books on literary criticism that has appeared in recent years

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Fiction and Emotion: A Study in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Mind By BIJOY H. BORUAH. Oxford U P. 1988. pp. 133 £17.50

IN DEFENDING Shakespeare against the criticism that he shows no regard for the dramatic unities of time and place, Dr Johnson holds that 'the spectators are always in their senses, and know, from the first act to the last, that the stage is only a stage, and that the players are only players ' Having made the point, Johnson realizes that it raises another issue 'It will be asked,' he notes, 'how the drama moves, if it is not credited ' This is the question that Bijoy Boruah sets out to answer in *Fiction and Emotion* The problem he is concerned with is generated by a cognitive account of emotion, an account that originates with Aristotle (of whom there is surprisingly little discussion in this book) and which holds that belief is conceptually (and on some views —including Boruah's—causally) necessary to

emotion Thus central to fear is a belief that I am in some way threatened or in danger; pity necessarily involves a belief that the object involved is in some sense the victim of misfortune However, as Dr Johnson points out, in responding to fiction we are typically aware that what we are responding to *is* fiction. I do not believe that Anna Karenina or the vampire exist, thus I cannot believe that the former is driven to suicide nor that the latter threatens my jugular. How then can I pity Anna or fear the vampire?

After an outline and defence of the cognitive account of emotion, Boruah moves on to a discussion of Colin Radford's now notorious view that we are *irrational* in being moved by fiction. Boruah takes Radford's charge to be that we are irrational in being so moved to *emotion*, and argues, I think correctly, that as such the charge is misconceived if I do not believe that the object in question suffers (or threatens me), the question is not whether my pity (or fear) is *irrational*, but rather whether my response is one of *pity* or *fear* at all Boruah offers this simply as a *reductio* of Radford's position, but it deserves serious consideration. We can be moved without being moved to emotion, perhaps our feelings for and about fictional characters are *not* properly characterized as emotions In failing to consider this possibility, Boruah fails to get to grips with the charge of irrationality, for our feelings for fiction may be irrational, even if they are not irrational *emotions*

Boruah goes on to consider the 'Reformist Theories' of Eva Schaper and Kendall Walton, so described because they 'reform the notion of belief so as to establish that fictional emotions are caused by beliefs characterized in a special way' (p 51) 'Reforming the notion of belief' is a bit strong; Schaper argues that our emotional responses to fiction are founded on 'second-order beliefs' about the content of a work of fiction; Walton that they are based on beliefs about what is 'make-believedly' the case Boruah's major criticism of these theories is that 'second-order beliefs are not causally efficacious', they are 'mere recognitions on our part that, fictionally, something or other is the case And mere recognition is not enough causally to explain why we feel any emotion towards fiction' (p. 64). However, to the extent that my 'second-order' belief that Shylock is a victim of injustice can be construed as 'a mere recognition that, fictionally, something is the case', my belief that many Chinese are victims of injustice can be considered as 'a mere recognition that, actually, something is the case' And the claim that 'mere recognition is not enough causally to explain why we feel any emotion' applies as much to the latter as it does to the former. What makes the latter belief 'causally efficacious', if it is, is the fact that in some way or other I *care* that the Chinese are suffering injustice; and nothing that Boruah says here suggests that I cannot *care* about what happens to Shylock To be sure, the fact that we can care about fictional characters is puzzling, but it's not obvious that it is any more puzzling than the fact that we can care about actual people

Boruah turns next to Roger Scruton, whom he rather quaintly calls 'the Radical Theorist' (reserving the label 'Conservative' for his own theory) He takes Scruton's position to be that the emotions we experience in responding to works of fiction are founded on imagination, construed as a kind of 'unasserted thought', rather than on belief. Again, Boruah's chief complaint is that this kind of thought lacks the causal force required to produce an affective state in us; a criticism which is unsurprising but hardly convincing given his astonishing construal of imaginative or 'unasserted' thought as 'characterized by a total indifference to what it refers to, or to what it might be about' (p 94) Furthermore, Boruah's overriding concern with the causes of our affective responses to fiction leads him to underestimate the complexity of Scruton's suggestion that these responses constitute 'imagined emotions' rather than emotions proper; a suggestion about the nature of the responses in question which calls for rather more discussion than Boruah gives in noting that there may be 'a significant phenomenological similarity between the two cases of emotion', so that 'Even when a fictional emotion does not force itself upon us with great intensity, it is still a genuine emotional response and not just a fake simulacrum of a real-life emotion' (p 91)

'Having recognized that neither the reformist nor the radical campaign is able to provide the causal conditions needed to explain the occurrence of fictional emotions', Boruah suggests,

'we might feel inclined to have recourse to a conservative policy.' Having seen it, I don't Essentially, Boruah's view is that 'while the role of the existential belief in a particular real-life emotion is replaced by the role of the imagination in the case of the fictional counterpart of that emotion, the regulative, paradigmatic function of the evaluative belief is not superseded by any other attitude of mind in the fictional case ' Explaining this, Boruah asks us to consider the somewhat implausible case of 'a fear produced by the sight of an enraged lion depicted in a painting or a film' The spectator, he suggests, does not believe but rather imagines that there is a lion standing before him However, 'it is on the basis of his knowledge about the strength of such an animal and its likely behaviour towards human beings in certain circumstances that he perceives the lion as a "dangerous object". He does believe it to be a threat to his life' (p 100) If you'll believe that, I suppose, you'll believe anything

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The Nature of Aesthetic Qualities By GORAN HERMERÉN. Lund U P , Sweden (Distributed in Britain by Chartwell-Bratt, Bromley) 1988. pp 294 Paperbound, £19.95

PROFESSOR HERMERÉN begins by taking as a case study the Portinari Altar by Hugo van der Goes, to be found in the Galleria degli Uffizi in Florence From the copiously quoted works of the many who have written about this painting over generations he culls the examples of aesthetic qualities that he wishes to categorize and analyse About these qualities he asks such questions as 'What are the defining conditions of aesthetic qualities?', 'What is the ontological status of such qualities?', 'Are ascriptions of such qualities to things objective or subjective?' and 'What methods do we have for determining whether or not a thing has such qualities?' It will be obvious that what is intended is a thoroughgoing account of the 'ontological and phenomenological status' (p 267) of these qualities.

Before I come to my discussion of that account I would remark that this book is an enviable piece of scholarship which moves easily between the literature of art history, the psychology of art, philosophy in general and the philosophy of art in particular. The reading is strikingly catholic in taste, including as it does writers in Eastern and Western Europe, Scandinavia and the English-speaking world. The book is also written with a clarity that makes for easy reading

I intend no criticism when I say that what is offered is a general and not a detailed map of the logic of aesthetic qualities. The consequence is that readers will want to use this book as a base from which to fan out over the issues that Hermerén raises I mention some, and only some, examples of places where the discussion deserves amplification

First, Hermerén writes 'on the other hand, aesthetic characterisations can also be applied to much outside the realm of art' (p 11) Indeed they can, but this raises the question· which use of the aesthetic vocabulary is primary? is it its use to talk about works of art (its use to talk about natural objects being derivative from this, as seems to be asserted by Savile in *The Test of Time*), a thesis examined by Nick Zangwill, this Journal, Summer 1986) This question cannot be peripheral to our understanding of the notion of the aesthetic

Again, Hemerén writes. 'There are, as Ted Cohen has suggested, many terms about which one may feel uncertain as to whether they are to be regarded as aesthetic or non-aesthetic' (p. 49) This much-cited observation was offered by Cohen in the course of a criticism of Sibley's attempt to draw a distinction between an aesthetic and a non-aesthetic use of terms and is related to a criticism of Sibley, mentioned by Hermerén on p 63, that that attempt involves a circularity' in the definition of the term 'aesthetic' But, as Sibley has pointed out in a note to the new edition of a book of readings in aesthetics edited by Dickie, Sclafani and Roblin, no attempt at definition was ever intended. His intention was to appeal to a distinction which he hoped the reader would merely recognize, since the ability to recognize it constitutes a datum-point for the account of the relation between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic that he wishes to offer Moreover, the correct reply to Cohen is that it may well be impossible, shorn of any context, to say whether a term such as 'hygenic' is being used aesthetically or non-aesthetically

Given a context, however, that unclarity might evaporate. (Consider 'the food inspectors think this stove is hygenic', said by the head chef of La Gavroche and 'A bit hygenic' said by an art critic of an abstract chrome sculpture.)

These examples have to do with comments Hermerén makes *en passant*. One other is more central. In Chapter 10 Hermerén asks about the 'methods used by art critics and art historians to support or criticise aesthetic attributions' (p. 240). This otherwise illuminating and sound discussion, however, never quite comes clean on the question: what is the relation between the attribution of an aesthetic quality to a picture or part of a picture, and the remarks about the colours, lines and shapes on a canvas that are offered as part of the project of bringing someone to see the presence of that aesthetic feature? Hermerén writes: 'Try to point out the features of the work that in your view at least partly explain why the work has these qualities (i.e. the features that are responsible for—or cause, etc—these qualities' (p. 267). Here there is an important question about the word 'explain', which oscillates in Hermerén's discussion between 'explain' in the sense of 'give the explanation for', and 'explain' in the sense of 'justify'.

Let us begin by noting that once a person *has* seen an aesthetic feature (and this is, on Hermerén's account, a matter of *perceiving* something), then one may be able to explain how the artist gave the work that feature by showing how, say, that artist placed a certain colour patch in a certain position. This is not, however, to give a reason that is logically guaranteed to produce the perception that that aesthetic feature is present, and is not, in that sense, a method of securing assent to the truth of one's aesthetic ascription by *reasoning* someone into a perception. For, in that sense of 'reason', there are no reasons for perceptions. One can have a reason for believing that a composition is balanced, but one can no more have a reason for *seeing* that it is (as opposed to going to see, or looking to see that it is) than one can have reason for seeing that the sky is blue. (Though, of course, if one can see that the sky is blue, that can be a reason for believing it is.) Explanations in this case come after the fact of perception and cannot be a logically guaranteeing method of securing perception. Yet it seems to be a method of reasoning someone into something that Hermerén wants. For he writes 'it is possible to give good reasons for a statement in the sense that these reasons make it reasonable to believe that statement without assuming that the statement follows deductively from those reasons' (p. 248). But this gives the deck a false shuffle. The question, on Hermerén's own terms, is 'can there be methods for bringing about perceptions by reasoning?', not 'Can there be reasons we can give someone for believing *statements* about the aesthetic qualities of a picture?' There are, indeed, such reasons e.g., 'competent critics claim that quality to be present'. So, although there might, indeed, be ways of trying successfully to get someone to see something, these will not be *reasons* for seeing it, for such there cannot be. The problem is the slipperiness of the word 'reason'. Consider the difference between '*the* reason (explanation) why it is balanced is this patch of red in the corner' (which presupposes that we can see the balance and does not give us, what is not possible, namely a reason for seeing that balance): and 'My reason (justification) for saying that it is balanced is that I know it is by Rembrandt (which might report the conclusion of a piece of, shaky, inductive reasoning)'. It would, however, be odd to say 'My reason for *seeing* it is balanced is . . .'.

I should not like it thought that these comments undermine my opinion of this work. Its other merits apart, parts of it are very good. I have in mind, in particular, the discussion in Chapters 8 and 9 of the pros and cons of the vexed question of the objectivity of aesthetic qualities. Terms such as 'subjectivity' are, alas, nowadays thrown about with all the abandon, and more than the lack of direction, of confetti at a wedding. That being so, it is a pleasure to read someone who actually spells out the details of the arguments that might be deployed in support of various positions, and who gives so lucid an account of what we are to make of such arguments. I shall have no hesitation in having my students read this material, which is clear, sensible, acute and, to my mind, convincing.

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Aesthetic Reconstructions: The Seminal Writings of Lessing, Kant and Schiller By ANTHONY SAVILE. Aristotelian Society Series, Vol. 8, Basil Blackwell 1987. pp 254. £25 00

ANTHONY SAVILE has a knack for titles that set one thinking After *The Test of Time* (1982), we now have *Aesthetic Reconstructions* This tempts one to write an essay on the hermeneutics of retrieval I shall resist the temptation but for a few words. Savile has chosen three classics in philosophical aesthetics, Lessing's *Laocoon*, Kant's *Critique of Judgement* and Schiller's *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man*. One might wonder why these texts need reconstructing when we have the originals and standard translations into English. We haven't lost them, have we? Not exactly. But the texts as they stand, Savile claims, have 'very sealed surfaces'. They are hard to penetrate, even for attentive readers They were written 'within a set of presumptions and in a language that repels rather than invites engagement of the critical intellect' So the modern reader needs help to bridge the gap between the world of the texts and ours. The texts were meant for different audiences, directed to readers who could be presumed to share the authors' presumptions. Savile, except for a few passages in the foreword, is silent on the multiple and tantalizing assumptions here compressed So we must let the book speak for itself and see whether it can help the student who is baffled by the texts as they stand A reconstruction, one gathers, presents a text's argument structure while critically assessing it. The reconstructed texts, then, are texts as read by Savile, reconstructed arguments are arguments as formulated by Savile who often supplies suppressed and missing premisses If what the main arguments are supposed to be cannot simply be read off the texts as we have them, a commentator obviously has considerable scope to roam, and to engage with what he constructs from the texts

Savile brings to bear a full arsenal of modern techniques on what he lays bare. The arguments gained and probed are often processed in logical form, fashionable in some quarters, i.e , abbreviated in symbols and supplied with quantifiers, brackets and double brackets The reader who is irritated by this, and who may also not have got over the problems triggered off by the book's title, may wonder whether the processing does, or is meant to, contribute to restoring to the reconstructions something of the contemporaneity of text and audience that was lost in the scaling process of history.

Savile charts a way through the *Critique of Judgement* that claims to present the most important arguments of Kant's aesthetics. The line of reasoning, Savile suggests, best comes into focus when we construct how Kant might have reacted to Hume's essay 'Of the Standard of Taste', and to its unsuccessful quest for the empirical principles of taste In the first of three Kant chapters Savile concentrates on the meaning and force of the Kantian question, 'How are judgements of taste possible?', granting it the centrality it has traditionally been assigned. The Analytic of the Beautiful yields the argument stages in the four defining moments that jointly identify the taste judgements A Copernican answer is outlined in the second Kant chapter, dealing with legitimizing arguments taken from the deduction The chapter heading, 'Cognition and Taste', helps us to keep in mind the contrast Kant here needs to elaborate Taste judgements are indeed possible when understood in the wider economy of the mental life as Kant analysed it A third Kant chapter is devoted to showing that aesthetic discourse is not only possible but actual, actual 'in the sense of being immune to common forms of scepticism'. Here Savile's strategy is to move from the possession of a common sense as a constitutive principle of experience postulated in the deduction, to common sense as a regulative principle and taste itself as a faculty to be acquired Under the title 'The Aesthetic Ought and the Acquisition of Taste', the argumentation considered central to Kant is completed.

What Savile reconstructs in these chapters will not convince everyone as being attributable to Kant That is so because it is a particular reading of a text acknowledged by all scholars to be opaque and in need of interpretation. In Kant's case we are fortunate to have a number of modern interpretations available that claim to have laid bare pathways through Kant's aesthetics. Savile does not enter the arena of confrontation with other writers on Kant, though he acknowledges their existence and his divergence from all of them His reconstruction

must stand as one among several. Like other readings it has a claim on our attention because the wool gathered for elaborate knitting is clearly gathered from Kant Whether the garment better fits Kant and our present intellectual needs will have to be tested against other available charts of the same territory.

Schiller's *Aesthetic Letters* more readily fit Savile's idea of a classical text needing reconstruction so that it can be studied by readers whose interests lie in philosophical aesthetics In two chapters, 'Beauty and the Ideal of Man' and 'Aesthetic Education and Social Character', Savile gives his reading and assessment of Schiller's main thoughts He retains Schiller's threefold perspective on beauty—aesthetic, moral, political—and brings them to bear on the concern with beauty as 'a necessary condition of man's existence' (10th Letter) He then constructs an argument for Schiller that facilitates transition from the core of the Letters to the later ones in which the 'state of beautiful semblance' stands for a vision of man's social character and moral developmental capacity These chapters, when read in conjunction with the translation, by Wilkinson and Willoughby, of the Letters themselves (OUP, 1957) go some way towards demystifying Schiller's formidable battery of concepts. On the other hand, they also add difficulties the reader of the Letters alone would not have been aware of. That is again due to Savile's sustained effort to go beyond exposition to engagement with the text As an exercise in mainly practical philosophy, this often and naturally resists clarification by theoretical reasoning

The inclusion of Lessing as one of the three authors chosen for illumination is to be greatly welcomed. There is a marked gap here in commentaries on the literature of philosophical aesthetics, especially in English. Savile sets out to fill this gap with a cascade of philosophical argumentation. I soon lost my grip on it, finding it difficult to recognize what I remembered from Lessing in Savile's writing I reminded myself of the prefatory warning that a reader not familiar with the texts should not attempt the reconstructions. Heeding the warning, I reread Lessing's *Laocoon*. I came away impressed anew by Lessing's masterly prose, the immense knowledge displayed and, most of all, the level of sophistication presupposed in his readers I also came away bemused What were the main argument lines in the text? Already I was very receptive for any help I could get with sorting out the riches I had re-viewed after many years of believing that the *Laocoon* was one of my cultural possessions Savile seemed to have convinced me that I had been left with a 'very sealed surface' indeed, and I submitted to his guidance But first I had to relegate to the background large chunks of what I had just been reading Lessing's preoccupation with iconography, in particular with establishing that the sculptured group representing Laocoon and his sons in the deadly embrace of the serpent could be dated by applying his own critical principles, was of less importance than these principles themselves Much of the essay is devoted to showing that the sculptured group excavated in Renaissance Rome was later in origin than Virgil's *Aeneid* in which the figure of the priest Laocoon is poetically represented as crying out in agony. We now know that Lessing was wrong in the dating. But that does not by itself invalidate the critical principles developed to distinguish between different arts of representation. It is these principles Savile selects for reconstructing the core of Lessing's philosophical aesthetics as we have it in the essay

Lessing met the dogma of then contemporary theory, encapsulated in the Horatian 'ut pictura poesis', head-on and mounted a many-pronged attack on it. Savile reconstructs this as Lessing's 'anti-transparency' argument Several versions of it, diversely supported, are tried out and put through their paces In order to show that the Horatian tag wrongly insists on the complete transparency of the media of representation, Lessing has to provide reasoned and well-supported arguments yielding nothing less than that the representing arts are not only constrained by their media in *what* they represent, but that the different representing arts are also constrained by their media *in different ways* The essay's subtitle, 'On the Limits of Painting and Poetry', points up the contrast between Lessing and his Horatian opponents

It is clear that Lessing thought he had mounted a successful refutation Here Savile goes beyond merely providing illuminating commentary; his eventual concern is the defensi-

bility of the arguments by which Lessing arrives at his repudiation which is at the same time a defence of media-constrained representation In three chapters Savile builds up Lessing's arguments and refines them again and again. As long as he can, he defends the strategies he attributes to Lessing; but then the scope widens when the last of the three Lessing chapters, 'Transparency and Imagination', finds that the carefully constructed arguments do not in the end prove what they set out to establish. The perspective Savile allows himself here gains from his own passionate concern with the beautiful in all the arts. From it he wrestles a conception of the imagination that significantly advances upon the eighteenth-century understanding. Savile comes into his own with this subtle (but also excruciatingly difficult) defence of the powers of creative imagination capable of transcending the limitations apparently imposed by the media of representation Savile, the philosopher of aesthetics, confronts one, critically engaged with his reconstructions.

I salute this philosopher. An uncompromising critical intelligence in action is in evidence in all three parts of this book, on the aesthetic thought of Lessing, Kant and Schiller The method chosen does not make for easy reading, nor does it allow shortcuts. It puts formidable obstacles in the way of a reader who expects simple solutions, and such a reader should be warned off. The serious student of aesthetics will find the journey under Savile's guidance rewarding, and the rigour of approach stimulating. The approach to the texts as reconstructions may provoke protests, but that, *pace* Savile, may only go to show that the challenge of a text has been accepted

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R. G. Collingwood A Bibliography. The Complete Manuscripts and Publications, Selected Secondary Writings, with Selective Annotation. By DONALD S. TAYLOR Garland Publishing. 1988. pp 279 $40

THIS BOOK will prove invaluable for anyone with a serious interest in Collingwood's philosophical work. For those with particular interests in art and aesthetics the book's attraction lies in the fact that the author's concern is especially with the philosophy of art and history and the relations between them: the 'selective annotation' of the title 'attempts to illustrate the development of Collingwood's thinking on art and history' The annotations in the bibliography serve to exemplify the very interesting thesis which the author develops at length in the excellent introduction, to the effect that Collingwood's thought on art and history grew closer together until in the 1930s it 'merged into a theory in which the interpretation and understanding of art became yet another instance of imaginative re-enactment' There is not enough space in this review to examine this thesis, but it is my belief that the author is on the right track here, and that (at the very least) it has the considerable merit of avoiding the one-sided interpretation of Collingwood's philosophies of history and art which have plagued the critical literature for so long and prevented a rounded and undistorted picture of Collingwood's philosophy from emerging

Since Collingwood's unpublished manuscripts were made available in the Bodleian Library in 1978 many people have read them, and many are now beginning to use them and refer to them in books, articles and theses: this bibliography provides a service both to those who have, and also to those who haven't, read the unpublished MSS to the former it serves as a checklist and reference; to the latter it serves as an introduction to the wealth of material now available which is altering our view of the nature and significance of Collingwood's work as a philosopher.

The book is divided into two main parts—writings by Collingwood and writings about Collingwood The first part commences with the unpublished manuscripts (which constitute the single largest section) and proceeds through published books, essays in philosophy, essays in archaeology and Roman Britain, and reviews and translations The second part consists of two sections, the first on books and collections of essays, and the second on essays and reviews. It is perhaps the details of the unpublished material that is likely to be of the greatest interest, especially for those who have not yet had the opportunity of investigating them for themselves

Taylor's practice of selective annotation is

particularly useful when employed on an item with which the reader is unfamiliar, *especially* if it is a paper, review or essay on the philosophy of art or history However, I must admit that I found the practice has its drawbacks: first, it seems odd to annotate at length well-known works by and on Collingwood For example, I cannot be the only person who finds a summary of *The Principles of Art*, or *The Idea of History*, or Alan Donagan's *The Later Philosophy of R. G Collingwood* tedious; not because the account is in any way lacking, but simply because the material is familiar and because the amount of space devoted to such annotation tends to obscure one's search for less well-known material. Secondly, when using the section devoted to unpublished writings, the principle of selective annotation tends to intrude by making certain manuscripts appear to be more significant than perhaps they are From the point of view of the author's thesis the significance is there, certainly; but from the point of view of a reader who does not share the same concerns it is disconcerting to find, for example, merely a bare two-line reference to *The Function of Metaphysics in Civilization* when the entry for *The Principles of Art* is given 11 pages. It must be admitted that this merely reflects the author's stated purpose, his avowed aim being to concentrate on the writings on art and history; but none the less there are occasions on which the impression is given that one item is of far greater general importance than another, where in fact the amount of space assigned to it indicates only that its content is of interest to the author, and not its relative significance in terms of Collingwood's philosophical development. This is perhaps not so important with the published works as they are generally known, but with the unpublished manuscripts people may receive an incorrect impression about the relative importance of certain pieces of writing. The reviewer would have found the Bibliography more manageable and easier to use if the author had given us a straight bibliography with the annotated material forming a separate section. This would have necessitated a small amount of repetition, but it would have allowed the reader to choose whether to pursue the development of Collingwood's views on art and history or simply to use the bibliography as a straightforward work of reference. My fear is that the book is trying to do two jobs at once—to act as a bibliography and to propound a thesis—and that this dual role interferes with it performing either function as effectively as otherwise it might.

The book is generally well printed and accurate, but there are a few errors, omissions and typographical errors it is perhaps worth mentioning

(1) Some of the manuscripts can perhaps be dated with a little more certainty than the author allows: for example, he dates *Art and the Machine* to 1926, which is reasonable; but he gives no date for the two drafts of *Economics as a Philosophical Science* one of these is a draft of the article as published in 1925, and the other is clearly a preliminary working of the same material. The evidence for dating these MSS to 1925 is rather stronger than the evidence for dating *Art and the Machine* to 1926.

(2) Taylor describes *The Function of Metaphysics in Civilization* as 'Metaphysics' and states that it is part of *An Essay on Metaphysics*. This is inaccurate and misleading. The interesting point about this MS, it seems to me, is precisely that it is *not* a part of *An Essay on Metaphysics* but an early draft of what later became that book. There are many interesting differences between the MS and the book. for example, in the manuscript Collingwood does not distinguish between relative and absolute presuppositions (he did so first in *An Autobiography*, p 67) where the 'absolute' is placed in inverted commas). Collingwood at this earlier date uses the terms 'presuppositions' and 'metaphysical propositions' interchangeably and also states that only a proposition can be presupposed, whereas in *An Essay on Metaphysics* he states quite categorically that 'Absolute presuppositions are not propositions' (EM, p 32).

(3) In discussing *Ruskin's Philosophy*, Taylor uses the term 'absolute presuppositions'. Collingwood himself does not use the term here, and it is misleading to imply that he does

(4) Taylor has overlooked one or two items. (a) *Ruskin and the Mountains*, *Oxford and Cambridge Mountaineering Journal* (1921), reprinted in *Oxford and Cambridge Mountaineering* (Cambridge: Marshall, 1921); (b) *The Shooting of Speech* (which is of interest from the point of

view of aesthetics) in *The Fothergill Omnibus* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1931), (c) review of M J. Oakeshott, *Experience and its Modes*, *Cambridge Review* (16 February 1934), (d) translation of B Croce, *Introduction to Eighteenth Century Aesthetics*, *Philosophy*, IX, (1934), pp. 157–67; (e) the date for the review of Vernon Blake's *Relation in Art* is *Oxford Magazine* (24 February 1927), (f) *Ruskin's Philosophy* (reprint, Chichester Quentin Nelson, 1971).

(5) Michael Krausz's name is misspelt on page xii; the date of Collingwood's death is incorrectly given as 1942 on page 1, page 71 'Can History be Impartial?' should be 'Can Historians be Impartial?'

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Concepts and Presuppositions in Aesthetics By RANJAN K GHOSH Ajanta Publications, Delhi 1987 pp 152. Rs 60

FIRST, A caveat for all those readers who may turn to this book, the sixth in the *Ajanta Series on Aesthetics*, in the hope of gaining an insight into Indian art and aesthetics Ranjan Ghosh, who is both an aesthetician and a practising painter (and, I assume, responsible for the beautiful but uncredited painting on the front cover), has set his latest book firmly within the Western analytic tradition, as its workaday title suggests. Furthermore, for the most part, his arguments are illustrated with examples drawn not from Indian but from Western art, even in the chapter on 'Defining Art' where he proclaims that 'Whatever the theory, nobody denies the paradigmatic character of the well-known works of Manet, Cézanne, Picasso, Seurat, etc etc ' (p 99)

Having said that, this book is, in its own way, a very thorough one, patiently and doggedly working away at some of the most intractable problems that confront aesthetics—at any rate, 'aesthetics' as it is conceived within the Western analytic tradition The opening chapter on 'The Concept of Intention' illustrates this well, with its carefully drawn distinction between causal and teleological accounts of how a work of art comes into being, leading to the conclusion that artists may often be in no better a position than the rest of us when it comes to trying to discover their intentions within the finished work of art Ghosh's account of aesthetic pleasure, 'the unbounded joy of realization', likewise sets out with great care a very dynamic account of aesthetic experience based upon the richness of possibilities opened up by the work Thus he describes the process, in a way that is reminiscent of Kant's account of the endlessly evocative 'aesthetic idea': 'With every new potentiality coming to light (or actualized) *some other* potentialities begin to lurk in the background' (p 31) A 'bad' work of art is then interestingly defined by Ghosh not in terms of an aesthetically unpleasant experience but rather as something which simply does not give us *any* aesthetic experience because it contains no 'possibilities' (p. 36)

Ghosh does seem to come unstuck, however, in his attempt to characterize the kind of experience which he takes to be at the very heart of our acquaintance with art, namely 'that private, uncommunicable core of my experience—the realized or experienced object' (p 63) Unfortunately for his analysis, Ghosh's blindness to Wittgenstein's well-known strictures on the unintelligibility of logically private worlds, let alone their communicability, leads him to assert, as if it were quite unproblematic, the notion that 'the aesthetic object is *private* but our *talk* about it involves the use of public signs or language' (p 115) This unfortunate way of putting the distinction recurs in several guises throughout the book, as in his two senses of 'experience', namely the private, 'e' type experiences of the individual work of art, and the public, 'E' type experiences of classes of works of art (p. 32). The former notion in particular seems to owe something to Susanne Langer's non-propositional account of how we experience the work of art, as may be seen in the following mystifying account that Ghosh offers us of such individual 'intuitions': 'By "intuition" here, I mean that the work is seen as something significant not in the sense of its "having" any meaning but rather as what *itself* is significant' (p 124) But what *can* 'significant' mean in such a formulation?

It comes as no surprise, then, to discover that Ghosh finds the problem of 'aesthetic judgement' (divided, in Chapter Three, into public 'w' types and private 'e' types) to be a particularly intractable one for, in his own words, 'the

hard core of aesthetic experiences being "private" to every individual, the judgements made on their behalf can never claim to have as their foundation logically objective criteria' (p 58) His conclusion that our disagreements over 'e' type judgements are therefore 'irresolvable in principle' (p. 72), quite apart from the unacceptable premiss from which it follows, shows no awareness of the important work done in this area by writers such as Sibley, particularly as regards the delicate but none the less rational relationship that seems to hold between 'primary' and 'emergent' features of the work of art.

In his final chapter on 'Commitment, Art and Society', which is very much concerned to defend the autonomy of the 'art world', Ghosh argues that no work of art *has* to have 'a social programme' (p. 139), which is true, but then goes on to assert that 'the relation between art and society is a contingent one rather than one of necessity' (p 140)—a highly dubious claim, but one that must, of course, follow inevitably from his insistence on placing an irredeemably 'private' experience at the heart of the aesthetic realm

This problem apart, much of the book is written in an admirably tenacious way, although I do have one final quibble which is that Ghosh's constant resort to logical notation strikes me as often quite unnecessary, as, for example on page 145: 'Let us say, W is the work of art and Z_1, Z_2, Z_3, Z_4 . etc are *possible* aesthetic objects'. In fact, not only unnecessary, but positively soporific Zzzzzzzzz!

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A is for Aesthetic: Essays on Creative and Aesthetic Education. By PETER ABBS The Falmer Press. 1989. pp. 188. £8 95, clothbound, £20 00.

THE IDEA of aesthetic education, as distinct from education in the individual arts, began to emerge at the end of the 1960s Herbert Read had touched upon the idea in *Education Through Art* in the early 1940s but it was Louis Arnaud Reid in this country who pursued the idea of the aesthetic as a mode of knowing and understanding involving all the arts. Reid's prime target was the classification of knowledge as it had been formulated over the previous twenty years or so by educationists such as P Hirst and R. S Peters which in Reid's opinion laid an undue emphasis on discursive or propositional kinds of knowledge to the detriment of 'feeling' and intuition. Subsequently the argument has broadened to embrace the empty materialism of modern science-based industrial society, Modern Art, which came under attack as expressing the nihilism of much contemporary life, the policies of the present government and the schools themselves, once praised as the embodiment of a new enlightenment, now castigated as instruments for the further advance of materialist values

Peter Abbs takes up the idea of aesthetic education and charts the disenchantment with modern society and Modern Art which began to take hold as the 70s proceeded into the 80s. He puts forward arguments supporting not only Reid's and formerly Langer's and Cassirer's views of the value of the arts but offers also suggestions about an alternative approach to the arts in education and how it might be mounted.

Peter Abbs writes from a literary position in which there are echoes of Richard Hoggart, F R. Leavis and the two cultures debate, David Holbrook, Raymond Williams and that institutional view of English literature which would claim it as the dominant influence within English culture Although concerned with the arts collectively there is little in this book about the visual arts, except a somewhat selective condemnation of Modern Art, and little also about music The argument here rests on a notion of art as symbolic with interpretable meanings. Some of these meanings are accepted as wholesome and life enhancing, others are dismissed as destructive. The job of the teacher, according to the writer, is to discriminate between these polarities, giving to the idea of aesthetic education a strong instrumental bias in the direction of a transformational view of art.

The symbolic nature of works of art is given dominance in this view and possible counter-arguments are passed over in order to get on to the educational arguments which comprise the main substance of the book The result of this approach is that insufficient acknowledgement is given to ways by which works of art gain meaning. Some works of art, for example, are born out of a conscious wish to communicate

definable meaning but not all of these are good on this account. Some have no appreciably symbolic content but have had meaning and significance thrust upon them over time. Those of both kinds that survive to be continuously valued are skilful, inventive and imaginative and these are their only common factors To concentrate on the symbolic aspect of art invariably leads to an overemphasis on meaning over significance (understandably so within educational circles) and an insufficient recognition of the tragedy of art, a necessary accompaniment to our feelings of delight in its skill and inventiveness, that there may be nothing behind the mask.

There is a general disgust throughout the book with modern life and a dismissal of those industrial, economic, scientific and technical developments which support it. In distancing himself from all these aspects of contemporary reality the writer hints that such a pronouncement of anathema is a necessary first step towards a proper understanding and appreciation of art. But is it possible as a teacher to maintain such a view? Only, one supposes, by keeping away from schools as they are at present constituted.

A is for Aesthetic is the second in a projected series of ten books which will eventually cover all the arts, but by setting the agenda for discussion of the aesthetic in education it may not appeal to those artists/teachers who take a less forlorn view of contemporary society or a less stringently critical attitude to Modernism than Peter Abbs takes It is a pity that he seems to be putting himself on the side of certain fashionable critics of modern art and architecture whose critical shallowness often matches the intellectual dreariness of the worst of Modernism.

In practical terms the effectiveness of aesthetic education will be judged, and can only be judged, by the artistic quality of the art produced, that is by standards of skill, inventiveness and imagination At some stage criticism, theory, philosophy and belief, vision even, must be translated into discernible knowledge among pupils and students The laudable aims of aesthetic education will come to nothing unless its protagonists can demonstrate how the standards of teaching in the arts can be enhanced. It does not help, of course, to have a government which seems indifferent to the cultural importance of the arts in education and in the community at large

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What Is Art For? By ELLEN DISSANAYAKE. University of Washington Press. 1988 pp 249 $20.00.

ELLEN DISSANAYAKE's book is an examination of art as a behaviour. This ethological approach does not consider qualitative questions of aesthetics but is limited to a descriptive account which will be 'a useful exercise in a field that is already confusing enough and could perhaps benefit from a different and clearly defined approach' (p. 10). The task, then, is to describe a behaviour which can be identified as art in all human societies and which can be shown to be beneficial for the biological fitness of the human species.

Ms Dissanayake recognizes that many will feel uncomfortable with a biobehavioural approach to questions concerning human nature and so her first chapter is a careful discussion of what can and what cannot be claimed by ethologists and sociobiologists. Human beings differ from other animals in that they 'fashion' their world but we can acknowledge the existence and strength of culture without dismissing the influence of evolution and in particular natural selection on the way we behave. At the same time it must be remembered that many emotional experiences cannot be adequately described or accounted for in biological terms.

The book proceeds first by presenting a kaleidoscope of instances which are given the name 'art' in various diverse societies and then examining some functional explanations of what art is for. Neither of these lines of enquiry provides the common denominator which Ms Dissanayake seeks in order to uphold the thesis that art is universally necessary and has selective value She then examines the notions of Play and Ritual emphasizing the social importance and metaphorical nature of each and pointing to the similarities these activities have with art. From a consideration of the contexts in which art occurs, Ms Dissanayake draws the conclusion that there is a tendency that underlies the arts in all their manifestations. 'I call this

tendency "making special" and claim that it is as distinguishing and universal in humankind as speech or the skilful manufacture and use of tools' (p 92).

Having identified the tendency to make special, Ms Dissanayake goes on to examine the biological endowments, tendencies and potentials which the human species has which enable us to elaborate instinctively acquired behaviours such as Play or Ritual. These include such things as speech, symbolization and ordering. She then discusses the human appetite for intensity of feeling and how this can be satisfied in aesthetic activities, reasoning that art, in making socially important activities gratifying, has selective value in evolutionary terms.

The final chapter of Ms Dissanayake's book deals with the change from traditional or primitive forms of society to that of modern Western civilization where social unity gives way to individualism and increasing objectivization of a world in which 'truth is replaced by interpretation; universality, by point of view' (p. 188).

What Is Art For? is a thoughtful and extremely well-researched text. Ms Dissanayake has lived in Sri Lanka, Nigeria and Papua New Guinea and draws on her own experience of different cultures as well as bringing together examples of artistic behaviour from diverse sources. Her book goes a long way towards dispelling some of the myths which have grown up around biobehaviourism (although I suspect some readers will still feel uncomfortable with some of the examples of animal behaviour given). Overall, I find her account of how art may have evolved as a behaviour convincing. Problems arise, however, in the application of such a theory in the field of philosophical aesthetics. Ms Dissanayake states from the outset that she is not writing as a philosopher yet she does hope that her thesis will provide clarification for aestheticians Her work is largely based on an analysis of behaviour in primitive societies and she concludes that art in the modern world has come to have a much more complex and rarefied meaning than it had formerly. The biological approach is not concerned with value judgements. Yet the question of what we are doing when we make aesthetic judgements and why it is that we are willing to call certain artefacts works of art and not others is of central importance to philosophers. Ms Dissanayake does suggest that it may be possible through ethological investigations to show the selective value of certain configurations, proportions and representations over others thus accounting for why we find some things beautiful and not others but this is outside the present scope of ethology and is a much more controversial project.

The concluding section of the book echoes other commentators on the 'Post Modern' experience in its portrayal of a fragmentary society in which the search for deeper meaning and a common understanding often goes unrewarded. Ms Dissanayake writes, 'Can a society survive whose only commonly agreed upon belief is that no commonly agreed upon belief is universally applicable and defensible?'. Her own suggestion is to look back to our 'human nature' which is universal. However, it is difficult to see how much content could actually be given here. What we hold in common as human beings may be little compared with our cultural differences Nevertheless, many important questions are being raised in this book which, as significant as they are for the biologist, are intimately connected with aesthetics, politics and many other fields in which the nature of the human species is considered

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Human Agency: Language, Duty and Value. Philosophical Essays in Honor of J. O Urmson. Edited by J DANCY, J.M E. MORAVCSIK and C. C. W. TAYLOR. Stanford U P. 1988 pp 308. $35 00

Of the fourteen papers in this Festschrift for J O. Urmson, only three strictly pertain to the concerns of this journal, although the others —on Urmson's views on duty, obligation and language—are of considerable interest. as is Urmson's own contribution, a discussion of the nature of knowledge and understanding, taking Prichard as its starting point. The volume also contains a useful introduction to its themes by one of the editors, together with a bibliography of Urmson's writings. However, this review will focus on the strictly aesthetic papers, since each is of a very high standard.

The first, by Bruce Vermazen, grows directly

from Urmson's seminal 1957 contribution, 'What makes a situation aesthetic?'. One aspect of Urmson's answer had focused on *aesthetic satisfaction*, and this is Vermazen's target For satisfaction is too easily treated as 'emotional or psychological reaction' (p. 202) A review of cases and considerations convinces Vermazen that, instead, satisfaction is 'at bottom a logical state of a person' (p 202) By this he seems to mean that satisfaction-conditions in this context will be internally connected to the object of one's satisfaction, rather than merely causally connected. Yet how are such internal relations learned or acquired? A complexity here may be the historical specificity of the aesthetic 'criteria' by which objects are found satisfying Indeed, whether or not a particular consideration is an *aesthetically relevant* one might even differ in different historical periods The view seems to be that we simply learn to find such objects aesthetically satisfying Thus any more specific answer will involve a sustained case-study approach (of a kind surely congenial to Urmson) but with the additional dimension that any answers are not once-and-for-all Hence there can be no universal or omni-temporal account of aesthetic satisfaction: 'the aesthetician's subsequent attempt to discover principles governing the fieldwork data will be frustrated' (p. 208). This pleasing historicism, with its clear indication that aesthetics needs (and often lacks) a sense of history, offers a challenge to much established writing on aesthetics And seeks to do so in a way which emphasizes that peculiar mixture of the affective and cognitive characteristic of the experience of art. These are important ideas for any aesthetician to address

Another set of important considerations is that advanced by Peter Kivy in 'Live Performances and Dead Composers'. Kivy develops ideas which must surely interest Urmson, rather than directly addressing Urmson's own writings A key question is: can we find a genuine constraint on performance (in this case, of musical works) which does justice to the intuitively plausible idea that authentic performances must respect the author's intentions or wishes? And of course this is of importance given, say, modern decisions as to the appropriate tension on the strings of the violin—and more so, the development of instruments (both new instruments and new versions of old instruments). Kivy confronts Monroe Beardsley's discussion of these issues: in particular, Kivy argues that we cannot give a clear general sense to the idea that one always prefers the *best* way to play a piece of music, even when this diverges from that *intended* by its composer For even if we refused to perform Beethoven's symphonies at the tempos implied by Beethoven's own metronome markings, 'because they are impossibly bad tempi. But no-one is likely to admit, without a fight, that those really are the tempi Beethoven intended' (p 224).

Kivy argues that, as a matter of fact, composers' intentions are considered by performers but, more importantly, that they *should* be Yet how can this be? How can the wishes of the *dead* be binding? This is clearly one aspect of a more general issue, and Kivy answers it using ideas from T Nagel's paper on death. that 'we can and *do* have obligations to dead people' (p 232) Yet do we have such obligations to dead composers in respect of the performance of their works? Kivy's answer is *yes*: 'we have real obligations to the interests of the dead' (p. 236) But this answer is moderated once we recognize that, while our obligations to (for example) Stamitz may involve giving 'his music a hearing from time to time' (p. 233), we are not thereby required to play him as often as Haydn or Mozart So acknowledging the obligation is not accepting a perfectly *uniform* debt

Yet what *are* we to make of these 'posthumous contingencies' (p 235) of which a composer cannot be taking account? An example (Kivy's) how about playing Bach's 'The Art of Fugue' with a quartet of kazoos? The contention that Bach might have fallen in love with these instruments, had he heard them, Kivy dismisses as an example of the 'unscrupulous ways of applying' (p 236) his idea that the *spirit* of works (and composers' intentions) can be preserved in playings on instruments unfamiliar to them, although he acknowledges that (unobjectionable) playings on a modern replica of a baroque organ seem—as a matter of consistency—open to the same objections What Kivy's work here certainly illustrates, at the least, is how wide of the mark are the sorts of simple-minded conceptions of artists' intentions which once dominated the literature of aesthetics

Kendall Walton's 'The Presentation and Portrayal of Sound Patterns' is the only paper previously published; but that was a much earlier version, in a less accessible place. The theses here, reminiscent of Kivy, are typically bold: that musical works are not *just* sound patterns, but rather 'a set of sound patterns plus the circumstances that go into determining how its performances are to be heard' (p. 257). This means that a performance aurally indistinguishable from, say, a Chopin Prelude, might still fail to instantiate that Prelude—for example, if played on a synthesizer: for performances 'are to be heard as *piano* performances' (p. 257) Walton's argument exploits the fact the virtuosic or heroic qualities of music are qualities *of it*, and not just of a particular performance (or the playing of a particular performer. Thus here are the sorts of things which *adequate* performance must 'make manifest' to the listeners Among Walton's targets are those who hold that 'sound events' (p. 243)—that is performances—are the basic objects of musical attention, rather than 'sound patterns'—that is, works To argue in this way is, for Walton, to overrate performers at the expense of composers, whose job becomes simply to provide recipes, which are then interesting or not, depending on how they are played. Here the virtuosic elements are relegated to the performance—perhaps even to the performer! If Walton's conclusions about the nature of music are right, then this position must be wrong.

This sort of argument is of a piece with Walton's well-known contentions concerning the importance of *categories* of art: that failure to locate works of art in their category will lead one to misperceive them This means, of course, that some of the *crucial* artistic properties will not be directly perceptible—at least, to the uninformed eye. The same sort of point is here elaborated in respect of, first, a particular case (music) and, second, the *identity* conditions for works, rather than simply critical judgements on them Like Kivy's, this is a virtuosic piece of philosophy, which repays careful study

The sub-section of the book which contains Vermazen, Walton and Kivy also has a paper by Ted Cohen. Subtitled 'Beginning Questions', it seeks to examine the complex relationship between sport and the aesthetic, although it officially looks at the much simpler question of the art/sport relation. There is much interesting exploration here, but it would have benefited from a sense of the extensive debate around these issues—for example, the debate in this journal. As such, it is (at best) a very little beginning.

Its cost may deter some purchasers of this volume. This will be a pity, as it is a collection of considerable interest and challenge, well produced: a collection worthy of Urmson's contribution to philosophy and to aesthetics most particularly.

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King Vidor, American By RAYMOND DURGNAT and SCOTT SIMMON. California U P. 1988 pp. 382. $32.50

As THE authors comment, 'a full-length study of Vidor's work is astonishingly overdue' (p. vii) If his films are less regularly seen than those of his approximate contemporaries in Hollywood, one explanation may be this lack of sustained critical work, a lack which this volume seeks to remedy The key to the book is revealed in its subtitle: that Vidor is 'an American'. As the authors conclude, 'He sought to ally what is ferocious with what is generous in the American ethos' (p. 324) It is this, the authors comment, that 'interests, moves, convinces' (p. 324) them. That is to say, they see Vidor's work as exemplifying certain tensions inherent in American art, and perhaps in American life. But these are not merely the individual problems for this particular man, King Vidor. Rather, they result from 'his encounters with cultural agendas—in this case, Hollywood's and America's' (p vii). To understand such encounters we are presented with discussions of almost all of King Vidor's films, in chronological order. Further, the text provides a complete 'filmography'.

This book is a 'good read'; but not an easy one. It is full of references to major novels, to the works of other film makers, and to internal details of others of the King Vidor films discussed here This makes it difficult to follow at times, and certainly richly textured. One is obliged to return again and again to the filmography to locate the present discussion in the context of other works. Even the detailed discussion given of each of the films leads to a

bewildering array of information being available to one at any particular time Not only are major films introduced with a plot summary, but the detailed analysis of their 'point' or 'meaning' is elaborated with reference both forward and back. As the authors say in their preface, they are convinced that the detailed analysis of film requires one to have available the actual film itself. Still, this book attempts all that can be done in the two-dimensional medium, elaborating comments with well-chosen stills.

Methodologically, this is a complicated text, not least because it nowhere lays out its methodological concerns The 'preface' (especially pp vii–viii) includes a vigorous rejection of many predominant traditions in 'academic film culture' structural linguistics, semiotics, Lacanian psycho-analytic theory are all dismissed in the versions typically applied to the understanding of film. What they are to be replaced with, of course, is not stated but merely elaborated throughout the examples in the text. And a focus for the understanding of Vidor's work is his life so that we are given a break-down of phases of his work, in chronological order, in Chapter 1, and that chronology provides the structure for the central chapters of the book. But this is not mere *auteurism*· for it is the 'cultural agendas' onto which artists' lives impinge which allows the film maker to be 'a spokesman, constructed lucidly, frankly, in the light of what his "unknown friends" in the audience will find of interest' (p ix) So the concerns are with both Vidor's American-ness, and with the uniqueness of his vision

One of the authors should be familiar to readers of this journal as a sensitive reviewer of books on film, and other matters This book displays the sensitivity and good sense which one might have expected It is a text which deserves, and repays, a detailed reading by those interested in the study of film.

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Literary Interpretation. Current Models and a New Departure By TORSTEN PETTERSEN Åbo Academy Press, Finland. 1988. pp 132 Paperbound, no price given.

PETTERSEN is concerned with the logical status of interpretative statements about works of literature He identifies three basic views about the matter First, there are those (such as M. C. Beardsley) who think that such statements are 'logically analogous to descriptive statements referring for instance to physical objects They are in principle true or false ' Second, there are those (such as Joseph Margolis) who think that such statements 'include substantial elements which cannot be reduced to description; they are therefore neither true nor false, but more or less "adequate" or "plausible", or the like' Third, there are those (such as Stanley Fish) who think that, independently of interpretation, there just is no work of art; 'the work is created by the interpretation' (p. 13 f).

How is one to decide between these three sorts of theory? Pettersen's strategy is to attempt to identify a clear issue about which they deliver different views, and assess the adequacy of these views What he focuses on is the issue of the compatibility or otherwise of divergent interpretations The three sorts of theory have something different to say about the phenomenon of divergent interpretations. According to the first, there can be acceptable divergent interpretations, but only (leaving aside rare cases of clear ambiguity) in the sense *either* that these will be combinable attempts to illuminate different aspects of the work (p. 13) *or* that they will proceed from different basic assumptions (Marxist and Christian, as it might be) so that the incompatibility 'is transferred to the assumptions which may be considered to precede the act of interpretation' (p. 71). This Pettersen calls the 'Complementarity Thesis' According to the second sort of theory, logically incompatible interpretations may, on occasion, be fully acceptable And according to the third, 'the whole question is misleading. Because the work is no fixed entity, there is, so to speak, nothing for interpretations to be incompatible about' (p. 13). So if we knew what to think about apparently acceptable, but also apparently incompatible, interpretations, then we should know what to think about the wider issue

Pettersen's approach is to show that there can be acceptable but incompatible interpretations, not by arguing for this in an abstract way, but by actually taking a work and giving such interpretations So almost a quarter of his book is

devoted to the text of Gray's 'Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard', followed by an account and evaluation of the interpretations of Roger Lonsdale, Howard Weinbrot, Richard Logsdon and George Wright In Pettersen's view, these are all acceptable interpretations

In the following chapter he tries to show that, contrary to the Complementarity Thesis, these interpretations cannot be combined The work is not ambiguous in the relevant sense Nor do the interpretations proceed from different basic assumptions This, he thinks, destroys the Complementarity Thesis, and the general model of interpretation of which it is a part

The possibility of such divergent interpretations is explicable given the third of the views mentioned above. But Pettersen thinks that there are reasons for rejecting this view In particular, he thinks this view cannot accommodate the fact that 'some interpretations are considered more satisfactory than others, and some downright unacceptable' (p. 77), nor can it accommodate the fact that 'it is possible to persuade someone to abandon his interpretation by pointing to parts or aspects of the work which it cannot accommodate' (p. 80)

This leaves us with theories of the third kind, and Pettersen's view falls into this category. His starting point is the view of Margolis (in Chapter 7 of *Art and Philosophy*) according to which interpretations do not aspire to be true or false, but merely 'plausible'. And just as two irreconcilable predictions about the weather may both be plausible (though they cannot both be true) so too can irreconcilable interpretations of a literary work. This view enables us to hold *both* that there can be rival acceptable interpretations of a work *and* (since plausibility is a function of evidence, which in this case is a matter of the features of an independent text) that criticism is an objective, rational business

Margolis, as Pettersen points out, does not really explain *why* it is that literary interpretations aspire only to plausibility In Pettersen's view, this is because interpretation is normally concerned with inferring what he calls 'implications' from a text; and an implication is an 'attitude, injunction or conception of the world which, according to common usage and interpretive conventions, a person can be said to convey consciously or betray inadvertently by his use of certain words' (p 86) Since the number of implications which a word sequence may have is indefinable, it is always possible to put forward new interpretations of a literary work But, on the other hand, since conventions of usage establish limits on what implications words can carry, we have some objective criterion for incorrectness.

How far this interpretation is the 'new model' announced in the title of the book may be left to the reader to decide (though Pettersen himself says that his basic idea 'is not original as such' (p 87)) How useful is his general strategy? Its main contribution is the attempt by example to demonstrate that there really can be rival acceptable interpretations, and I found this convincing; but then, as it happens, I needed no convincing. Those who do may well find this part of his book a useful challenge.

ANTHONY ELLIS

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The Depictive Image Metaphor and Literary Experience By PHILLIP STAMBOVSKY University of Massachusetts Press 1988. pp. 156. £13 40

I HAD not realized that the standard schoolroom introduction to metaphor comes straight from Aristotle: 'an elliptical simile, a *comparison* of things without the use of "like" or "as" '. But the Philosopher's analysis of metaphor as comparison, transfer, substitution and analogy, germane though it has been to many subsequent theories, does not come out very well in the kind of critical examination given it in the first chapter of *The Depictive Image* where a wholly different approach to metaphor is advocated and exemplified

The book is an enquiry into literary metaphor. Phillip Stambovsky's aims are to clarify how metaphor communicates meaning and to develop a theory from actual experience of metaphor, a procedure which, he says, few writers on metaphor have attempted. He first examines a range of views of what metaphor is and what it does He then presents his own theory which he describes as a depictive one in which the depictive image is to be understood 'as a field phenomenon whose form is not definitely delimited by any sort of structure, linguistic or otherwise' (p 95).

The description of metaphor as 'a field phenomenon' liberates Stambovsky from the task of elucidating a single principle or definition capable of embracing all the utterances we regard as metaphors. It also provides him with a ground from which more formal and definitive theories, including Aristotle's, appear somewhat limited or truncated. In his own, phenomenological, account he asserts the primacy of what he calls 'presentational awareness' in the literary experience (p. 7). Presentational awareness, he explains, 'is intuitive and thereby of epistemological primacy' (p. 7). He derives a philosophical foundation for his theory from three of Alfred North Whitehead's notions: presentational immediacy, causal efficacy, and symbolic reference. Very roughly, presentational immediacy refers to a complex perceptual and evaluative grasp of something, and causal efficacy is an awareness of the relationships of things to ourselves. Symbolic reference is the mode of connection between these two forms of perception, it is 'the interrelation between presentational immediacy and causal efficacy' (p. 6). The claim is that our manner of apprehending metaphor is a sophisticated compound of these three ingredients. Literary experience is 'an organically unified, processive mode of aesthetic perception'. It is 'as active and transformative as perception itself involving conformation with the text to the degree that the text influences the literary reader's way of apprehending meaning so as to "narrativize" (dramatically to charge, as it were) conscious awareness' (p. 66). The depictive image is constituted by this kind of literary experience.

Stambovsky does not want to maintain that the depictive image—the metaphor—is an exclusively visual image. He cites e. e. cummings's lines, 'my father moved through dooms of love/through sames of am through haves of give . . ', suggesting that they defy visualization. (I am not sure that they do; not, at any rate, until one reaches the last three words.) In an endeavour to explain how conceptual understanding is built into the presentational immediacy of literary experience he quotes a passage from Flach: '[the] intuitive image [and here Flach refers specifically to metaphor] expresses nothing else than a system of conceptual relationships which are grasped while the subject sees them as determined relationships between sensory data' (p. 76). Stambovsky also cites Sartre and Cassirer in support of the view that—if I have understood aright—the depictive image is apprehended within a context of meaning that is inseparable from its presentation, a presentation that determines its intelligibility. A metaphor is embedded in a theme from which its richness derives, its drama is enacted in one's consciousness.

The Depictive Image is a tenacious and detailed investigation of metaphor. Its method is clearly proclaimed and its development proceeds systematically. It does not shirk the task of carefully trying to analyse particular experiences of metaphor. Yet I have to say that I found much of the writing, and the thought, laboured, repetitive and abstruse. Points and observations are often cast in language of great complexity that sets the cells of the head tingling with the effort of comprehension. I found myself paraphrasing, almost translating, many sentences. Here are two examples that are characteristic of the book's style: 'Significant depiction subsumes the denotative sense of description terms by keying, and thus relativizing, the patterns of relationships that they depict to the presentationally immediate literary context that occasions them' (p. 88), 'To assert that through presentationally immediate descriptions and depictions the literary reader participates in the process of vision that literary works articulate implies that, insofar as any discernible object is conceptually suggestive or emotively evocative in a given literary context, the suggestions or evocations are, for literary experience, *intrinsic* to the object' (p. 67).

Such diction and such a style, it seems to me, are justified only if they serve to reveal a finer, more perspicuous view of a matter. If they do not do that one finds oneself in a state of disappointment. This book is certainly not without considerable merit but I came away from it without the kind of insights augured by its undeniably scrupulous and scholarly approach.

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F. R. Leavis. By MICHAEL BELL. Routledge 1988. pp 152. £25 00; paperbound, £8.95

F. R. LEAVIS's work tended in the past to provoke extreme reactions: it created disciples on the one hand and aroused deep antagonism on the other. In recent years, with the ascendancy of theory-based critical approaches, a development Leavis would have abominated, he has been largely ignored. Michael Bell is an admirer of Leavis, though he is no disciple, and his aim in this book is to show that Leavis's critical position is a powerful one that cannot be easily dismissed. Bell suggests that the polarization of opinion which Leavis created while he was alive has prevented his work being properly understood.

Leavis has often been seen as continuing the Arnoldian critical tradition, and Bell gives due acknowledgement to this. But he argues that less obvious affinities should be recognized. 'To understand Leavis, or the significance of Leavis, we need to see him not just as the inheritor of the Arnoldian critical endeavour but also as the English equivalent of the continental phenomenological tradition' (p. 35). For Bell the question of language is fundamental to any understanding of Leavis. He connects him with modernism, especially 'its resistance to the fallacy of paraphrase' and its 'sense of the privileged and irreducible nature of poetic utterance or symbol' (pp. 15, 16), but he lays the greatest emphasis on Leavis's links with Heidegger on the question of language.

Bell argues that Leavis's concern with 'life' is fundamentally similar to Heidegger's concern with 'being'. Both Leavis and Heidegger are anti-Cartesian in that they desire to break down the dualism between consciousness and the world. They see poetry as 'not just a specialised use of language but rather its most primordial, world-creating instance . . . It is simply language in its most pregnant, authentic and creative uses . . . [Heidegger] is careful not to identify poetry with thinking . . . And yet both poetry and thinking are fully performing their own functions only when, as he says, they "neighbour" each other' (p. 40). Bell compares this Heideggerian view with Leavis's emphasis on literary language as 'enactment', which he defends against those who claim that this is a fallacy: 'The register of language in use implied by the term "enactment" remains elusive of generalised or analytic definition partly because it is not contingent upon a literalistic imitation. It is strictly an *effect* of the expressive context as a whole rather than a separable phenomenon that can be adduced as the expressive *cause*' (p. 43). Bell also sees Leavis as being in fundamental agreement with Heidegger on the impersonality of the greatest literature since language 'is the possession of an historical community', and is thus not individual expression of ideas but 'the index, and means, of our grasp on experience both individually and communally' (pp. 52–3).

Bell argues that critics of Leavis have failed both to understand adequately the philosophy of language which underlies his criticism and to appreciate the effectiveness of his critical discourse. Terms such as 'maturity', 'sincerity', or 'life' are used in a special sense but unlike more abstract terms they also retain their ordinary meanings. Bell believes this gives Leavis the best of both worlds rather than leading his critical discourse to fall between two stools. Thus 'sincerity' is not in contradiction with the emphasis on impersonality since the impersonal is 'a quality achieved *within* and through personality. Impersonality, in this conception, is not the minimum but the maximum degree of personality' (p. 64). The literary artist Leavis admires is 'so totally given to the work as to be transformed into its dramatic medium' (p. 65).

One of the merits of Bell's study, however, is that unlike committed Leavisians he does not apply Leavis's critical principles in Procrustean fashion by asserting that all writers who do not conform to them are inferior. Bell recognizes that writers such as Fielding, Sterne, or Joyce 'play with the mimetic possibilities of language but precisely their self-consciousness in doing so inhibits that sense of writing for, and learning from, the language that Leavis identified in Blake or Lawrence' (p. 124). These writers, and others such as Milton and Proust, will be judged adversely if Leavisian concepts such as 'maturity' and 'sincerity' are applied rigidly to them. Bell believes Leavis's critical principles have validity but he is against erecting them into an inflexible system which devalues writers who belong to a more self-conscious, playful tradition of writing than the writers Leavis admires. Allowance must be made for special cases who can be defended on different grounds,

but 'even when [Leavis's] specific judgements seem inadequate, [they have the capacity] to quicken our perception of the order of significance in which literature is to be read' (p 129)

Since the book is primarily a defence of Leavis's criticism there is little engagement with certain fundamental objections that have been made to his work. Thus there is no direct confrontation of Chris Baldick's claim in *The Social Mission of English Criticism* that a right-wing political ideology underlies Leavis's critical position, and Bell's comparison between Leavis and Heidegger, though intended to defend Leavis, could be used to reinforce Baldick's view in the light of recent revelations concerning Heidegger. A related objection is presented in the introduction to this book, where Christopher Norris employs the critical theory of Paul de Man to attack Leavis's effort to fuse ethics and aesthetics: 'What is at stake in Leavis's pedagogic enterprise is precisely that potent "aesthetic ideology", that desire to elide differences and pass directly from sensuous cognitions to judgements of value, which marks the widespread resistance to theory in modern literary studies' (p. xiv) It is a pity that Norris did not as general editor adopt a more dialogic policy and allow Michael Bell to see his introduction and reply to it. But despite not engaging in debate on such issues, Bell's book can be commended for demonstrating forcibly Leavis's importance as a critic, and any attack on Leavis that fails to take notice of Bell's arguments is likely to lack credibility

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Paul de Man: Deconstruction and the Critique of Aesthetic Ideology. By CHRISTOPHER NORRIS Routledge. 1988. pp. 218 £8.95; clothbound, £25.00.

BY NOW everyone who concerns themselves with contemporary literary theory has heard the news about Paul de Man's youthful writings, ones which betray a distressing attraction to organic conservative and vaguely anti-semitic ideas. Such ideas were relatively common in interwar Europe, and Martin Heidegger is merely the best known case of intellectual and political collaboration with the perversion of organic conservatism—National Socialism.

Thus Christopher Norris was faced with a difficult task to say the least. From what he says, and from internal evidence in the text itself, the revelations about de Man appeared when he was nearly finished with his study of the Belgium-born critic The problems were twofold: how to square this distasteful evidence against de Man with his obvious admiration for the Yale critical theorist and, second, how to incorporate the revelations into the text itself? Norris has succeeded reasonably well in resolving both of these problems, even if at times his account of de Man flirts with special pleading

More relevantly for literary theory and intellectual history, Norris is forced to abandon two positions which have stood at the centre of deconstruction and post-structuralism. The first position which Norris must jettison is the indifference, bordering on contempt, for psycho-biographical explanations as of any critical importance That is, Norris must grant that de Man's intentions are relevant to an understanding of his writings of the early 1940s and thereafter. By extension, what is true in de Man's case is true in general In addition, though less obviously at issue for Norris, the revelation of the facts about de Man's early writings also forces post-structuralists to admit that not only do conventions—epistemé, paradigms, communities of discourse—determine what counts as a fact or experience, the reverse is also the case—facts and experience can and do modify our interpretative and conceptual schema, often quite radically. In short it is possible to learn something from experience.

On the substantive level Norris wants to emphasize the centrality of three major characteristics of de Man's achievement. First, he stresses the way that de Man continually emphasized that it was neither desirable nor possible to reconcile, to bring into congruence, the central categories of human activity—art and the aesthetic; science and the cognitive; and ethics and the practical In this Norris sees de Man as a Kantian not a Hegelian; and like Theodor Adorno he rejected any identity theory Second, as a corollary to this refusal of dreams of identity, de Man was particularly suspicious of the tendency to privilege the aesthetic at the expense of the practical and cognitive Indeed, this theme of de Man's work grew

in importance after the mid 1950s when he had come to America and in fact represented a departure from his previous work. Again Norris downplays the elements of de Man's work which seem to suggest a deep scepticism about reason and rationality and which stress the way rhetoric undermines logic, rather, de Man emerges as a kind of Enlightenment thinker *malgre lui*, a defender of an ascetic and rigorous mode of *Ideologiekritik*. Finally, the historical and biographical dimension to this account is supplied by Norris's claim that de Man's critical *Kehre* in the mid 1950s and subsequent work up to his death in 1982 were Aesopian attempts to exorcise the aesthetic organicism which had so attracted him as a young man and which had led to his flirtation with organic conservatism and a certain form of national socialism.

If we draw back to assess Norris's analysis of de Man, several observations come to mind. Norris is a lucid and persuasive explicator of de Man's work. Indeed, I came away from Norris's book more persuaded of Norris's stature as a theoretical critic than of de Man's. Put another way, I don't think de Man can stand the extended scrutiny that Norris thinks he deserves. This is inadvertently reflected in the text where Norris constantly moves away from de Man and/or seems to use him as a stalking horse for issues about which de Man had little or nothing to say. Where even Derrida's sternest critics must grant his genuine status as a thinker, de Man comes across in his writings and in the passages analysed here as an interesting, sometimes stimulating, but essentially literary critic and not a lot more.

But what attracts Norris to de Man (as opposed, I think, to Derrida) is de Man's 'rigor and consequential argument'. Norris continually tries to stress de Man's links with what might be called the 'Enlightenment' as opposed to the 'Nietzschean' left or the 'pragmatic' centre. Indeed by emphasizing the centrality of the tension between reason and emotion, logic and rhetoric, meaning and intention, philosophy and art, existentialist and deconstructionist elements in de Man's thought, Norris pushes deconstruction towards Frankfurt and away from New Haven, towards Critical Theory and away from Pragmatism.

All this is to say that Norris wants deconstruction as filtered through de Man's exemplary cast of mind to entertain the impossible dream of Reason and Truth as opposed to rhetoric and opinion. The problem is that he never gives a hint of a way to talk convincingly of what Reason might be or mean and to what Truth might refer. Thus Norris's work represents, I think, a sophisticated and often appealing normalization of deconstruction, a way of making deconstruction safe for right-thinking progressive academics. Indeed much of what drives Norris's work is the desire for firmer foundations for his political and moral positions. But though he is a perceptive (and also at times unfair) critic of Pragmatism, the only justification I can see for his 'confidence in reason' is ironically a pragmatic one—that it is 'good in the way of belief'. That is, we need a concept of reason in order to make our criticisms of society and culture stick. Put another way neither the Pragmatists nor Norris has a transcendent source or ground for their positions which are historical all the way down. The Pragmatists admit as much and then see, not always satisfactorily, what can be done. They, just as much as or more than Norris's de Man or Adorno or Derrida, are heirs of the Enlightenment. Finally the fight Norris keeps picking with the Pragmatists illustrates what Freud called 'the narcissism of small differences'. There are plenty of other matters that could profit from Norris's keen theoretical and moral intelligence.

RICHARD H. KING

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THE TWENTY-THIRD National conference of the British Society of Aesthetics will be held at College Hall. Malet Street, London from 14 to 16 September 1990. To make offers of papers and for further information please write to the Honorary Secretary, Richard Woodfield, whose address is given on the inside front cover of this number.

British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol 30, No 2, April 1990

THE EDUCATION OF TASTE

Alan H. Goldman

I

WHEREIN LIES the value of educating aesthetic taste? Why should we include in public school curricula courses designed to teach children to appreciate fine music, paintings and poetry? The answers given by art educators in justifying their programmes often involve extravagant claims relating their curricula to broad educational goals. Some of the simpler answers are problematic as well. It is worth raising the question again for the light that attempts to answer it throw on the nature of art itself.

The most straightforward answer is seemingly obvious. There is much pleasure to be derived from appreciation of fine art works, and so providing students the means to appreciate them will make their lives more enjoyable later on. But this answer itself raises two further questions. First, does a person's overall aesthetically derived pleasure typically increase when that person is trained to appreciate the 'higher' as opposed to 'lower' art forms? Second, does appreciation of the 'higher' forms really depend on a person's being educated to appreciate them? Clearly a third question is implicit here as well, namely: in what sense are the 'higher' forms higher? The issue of requiring or even encouraging aesthetic education is tied also to the question of whether certain sorts of taste in art are objectively better than others.

We may look first at reasons for answering our further questions negatively. In regard to the second, we may point initially to the many beauties and aesthetic pleasures whose appreciation and experience need not be taught, at least not in schools. Almost everyone can appreciate the beauty of a spectacular sunset or aesthetically enjoy watching a colourful sports event. Even the appreciation of fine paintings or music need not be mediated by conceptualization or explicit understanding of their forms and meanings. Viewers of the movie *Elvira Madigan* could hear the beauty of the background music even if they could not so much as identify it as composed by Mozart and Vivaldi. For many listeners, simple exposure to Mozart or Vivaldi suffices to produce aesthetic pleasure; for many others, rudimentary history and theory of music will not suffice.

More broadly, certain theories of aesthetic response and evaluation suggest that aesthetic education is irrelevant to the appreciation of beauty or the derivation of pleasure from experiencing art or literature. If beauty is a real property, it nevertheless must be a relational property. Calling an object

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beautiful not only ascribes a property to the object itself, but invariably expresses approval and pleasure derived from its appearance. Both sides of this relation are captured by holding that an object's being beautiful is its being such as to produce pleasure in a subject who experiences its other aesthetic qualities (grace, balance, and so on). These other aesthetic qualities in turn supervene on certain non-evaluative formal properties of the object. According to most theories of this sort, subjects need not be conceptually aware of those formal properties that produce their pleasure, need not be explicitly aware of those non-evaluative properties as such.

Pleasure itself is a subjective response; the experience that produces it may be ineffable; and the art work that produces that experience will be unique in those properties that ultimately underlie its aesthetic evaluation. According to some aestheticians, the latter properties must be wholly contained in the work itself, so that contemplation of it as detached from all relations to other objects must be capable of producing a positive aesthetic response. All these features of the aesthetic encounter suggest that learning general truths about art works will be irrelevant to the appreciation of particular works. Just as there can be no formulae for producing great works, and no strict principles to apply in evaluating them, so there can be no general propositional knowledge that will guarantee their appreciation.

Added to this suggestion may be a democratic demand that works be accessible to those who might experience them, that truly beautiful works be immediately pleasing to the ear or eye. Such immediate pleasure might even be diminished by careful formal analysis of a work's structure. Not only will general descriptions of other works in all likelihood prove to be irrelevant to the uniquely produced effect of a presently contemplated work but analysis of that very work might be counter-productive to the derivation of aesthetic pleasure from it (we may call this the '*Educating Rita* effect'). Dissecting a work analytically may alienate the analyst from the work's expressive effects, especially from the expressive tone of the whole. The initial charm of a work to an innocent eye or ear (let us accept this notion for the sake of the argument), sometimes deeply poignant, may be lost under more critical scrutiny, which may distance the subject from the aesthetic experience. This is not to dismiss the value of critical scrutiny or of its communication in educational settings; it is only to call into question the location of that value in a greater quantity of aesthetic pleasure it might be alleged to afford.

So far I have raised doubts concerning the contribution of aesthetic education to the amount of pleasure derived from appreciating fine works of art. It may be granted nevertheless that mere exposure to fine art of various types increases the probability of further exposure, and hence of further enjoyment. The schools can at least provide such exposure, in history if not in theory of art courses. Regarding this justification, however, there is first the question whether the opportunity to view fine art exists amply outside the classroom. A survey of

concert and museum goers could determine how many first came to appreciate art in the classroom.

There is also our earlier question, to wit, whether training people to appreciate fine art might not lessen their appreciation of more popular cultural forms. Again in the absence of empirical evidence in the form of polls, it seems intuitively likely that those indoctrinated in the appreciation of classical music will derive less pleasure than do others from listening to the simpler kinds of rock and country music. How this trades off in terms of overall quantity of aesthetic pleasure seems at best indeterminate. Certainly many devotees of the popular forms seem as ardent in their pursuit of its enjoyments as are classical music lovers. The same may be said of pulp fiction readers and collectors of contemporary tropical seascapes.

Perhaps the obvious move at this point in attempting to justify the education of taste is to distinguish in Millian fashion between quantity and quality or type of pleasure. The pleasure derived from pulp fiction or country music might be said to be superficial even if plentiful for devotees, while those afforded by fine art are in some sense deeper. Of course, that sense must be specified. Presumably we will do so according to the fuller sources of the pleasures or enjoyments, which can be differentiated in at least two ways.

First, true beauty may not be always as immediately perceptible as was suggested above. The pleasure produced by its apprehension may not be the automatic response envisaged by the British Empiricists, but rather, as Kant thought, might involve the full play of cognitive faculties in some way. Again, that way must be spelled out if the argument is to be plausible; otherwise, the claim of truer beauty or deeper enjoyment could be held to reduce itself to an expression of mere taste. We must resist perfectionist appeals to what is more worthy of attention from the higher human faculties unless we can indicate how those faculties operate on an object that merits their attention.

Second, there might be aspects of artistic merit other than beauty, the apprehension of which requires effort and knowledge on the part of the subject. Even if beauty can be apprehended immediately, its apprehension does not exhaust artistic value. Appreciation of additional value might require knowledge of the history that defines the relation of an art work to its tradition, or of the conventions through which a work represents or expresses content to its audience. Once more the application of such knowledge and effort in apprehending the merits of a fine art work might afford a deeper sort of enjoyment than the mindless, escapist pleasures derived from more popular entertainments.

If either or both of these claims are true, and if students can be trained through exposure to paradigms, or through development of the relevant cognitive capacities and acquisition of the relevant knowledge, to appreciate fine art, then such training can be justified as a means to the deeper sort of enjoyment.

II

Before pursuing this line of argument further, I turn to a simpler justification suggested by the possibilities just indicated. The more common justification of educational programmes and curricula appeals simply to the knowledge to be gained. Education is to impart knowledge sufficient to make true judgements at increasing levels of complexity in areas of interest. Perhaps aesthetic education simply provides the knowledge necessary for truly describing and evaluating works of art. Since art works are significant cultural products, this argument for including art education in the curriculum would differ little from the justification for teaching history or philosophy. The justification here, however, would first have to answer the doubts raised earlier relating to the uniqueness of art works and the ineffability of experiences of them that would ground evaluations. It would also have to answer to even deeper doubts regarding the semantic status of descriptions and evaluations of art works, the claim of such assertions to truth.

The first problem to note here is that descriptions of art works typically involve or imply evaluations. Both teachers and critics use descriptive terms that are also evaluative: one describes the grace of a Botticelli, the originality of a Kandinsky, or the expressiveness and structural perfection of Bach. Of course, the very choice of works to teach is fully value laden; the terms that the teacher then uses to describe these works both reflect and mould those choices. Such evaluative terms, we noted, refer to relational properties of the objects, their capacity to elicit personal responses that are themselves reflective of taste. When we say that an object is beautiful, for example, we may assert merely that it produces pleasure in those who share our taste.

Disagreement in the ascription of such properties is prevalent even among the educated. What is powerful or intense to one critic may be strident to another; what is graceful to one, is insipid to another; what is both unified and complex to one, may be monotonous or jumbled and inscrutable to another. Some may argue that certain judgements are beyond controversy. No one who appreciates music, it can be claimed, could doubt the genius of Mozart. But I have heard one (British) critic lament the vulgarity of Beethoven's appeal to emotion. Can we not then imagine one who might decry the sentimentality of Mozart's slow movements or his use of clichéd classical forms?

If critical description is typically evaluative in this way, and if evaluations involve personal responses that express tastes which vary even among experts, then how is aesthetic education any more than the imposition of the taste of the teacher on the students? Indoctrinating students into sharing the values of the status quo or of the teacher may be beneficial to those who already share those values. For one thing, it encourages the production of further works of art that express them. But it lacks independent justification that might appeal to those who question such values.

If, as the aesthetic theories mentioned above imply, evaluating art works amounts to reacting with personal pleasure or displeasure, then how can such personal reaction be correct or incorrect? If such normative semantic claims are out of place here, then what is lacking is precisely a non-relative claim to truth or knowledge that could be imparted through education in the description and evaluation of art works. It is questionable whether the subjective responses that underlie aesthetic evaluations can be taught. If they can, then the justification for doing so will not appeal to knowledge required for true judgement. The problem now is not that knowledge fails to determine or influence such judgements, but that no such judgements can be held to be true.

One might object that we can teach students how to interpret art works rather than to evaluate them. But again the close connection between interpretation and evaluation, and the possibility of incompatible interpretations of the same works, negate the appeal to value neutral truth and knowledge here. Evaluation clearly depends on interpretation. But the fact that how one interprets a work will determine how one evaluates it simply argues once more for the relativity of evaluation. The most plausible interpretation of interpretation, I believe, reinforces by explaining the evidence that works of art of sufficient complexity support differing and incompatible interpretations. If there typically are such interpretations, none of which is falsified by the work itself, then none can be held true. Then the truth of evaluative judgements that depend upon interpretations is again called into question.

The nature of interpretation of art works, both literary and non-literary, is, of course, itself contested, although it seems clear at least that interpretations fall somewhere between descriptions and evaluations. Descriptions would include specification of the formal elements of non-literary works, and specification of language used with standard meanings for literary works. Interpretation on my view consists in providing the best explanation for the use of these elements in the works. Such explanation, however, is not causal, but accounts for the roles of various elements in serving the aim of creating aesthetic value, or an artistically or aesthetically good work. Being charitable to the artist, we accept the interpretation or explanation that makes the work as good as it can be, although such charity sometimes involves overriding the artist's own intentions.

Interpretation therefore works from explanations for the presence of elements in the work to an explanation for the work being overall as it is. This brief description of the interpretative process, especially in light of its subordinating interpretative explanations to the goal of maximizing aesthetic or artistic value for the work, may seem to indicate that there is one best interpretation for many or most works, one which makes the work seem artistically best. But several considerations indicate that this will not be so.

First, we said that interpretations explain the presence of various elements and their roles in relating to other elements so as to create artistic values. But

different elements can be emphasized by different interpretations, and the relations in question may be purely formal, representational, expressive, or historical. Clearly there will be room here for explanations that maximize artistic values in different ways.

Second, the connection between interpretation and evaluation now becomes closer still, no longer a one-way dependence. Remember that the relevance of the claim of one correct interpretation for our argument is that this interpretation could support one evaluation, which could then be held to be the correct or true one. Aesthetic education could then train students to make correct evaluations and evaluative descriptions, and this knowledge of art works would be similar to knowledge of other historical and cultural products imparted in the curricula. But now that we see that the one correct interpretation is supposed to be the one which maximizes artistic value for a work, we are back where we began in trying to answer objections to this justification for aesthetic education. If evaluations are relative to taste, then correctness of interpretations will be also.

The extent to which different critics and teachers emphasize different relations of the elements within art works—their formal, representational, expressive, and art-historical functions—will determine how they interpret and appreciate the works in question. If incompatible evaluations among experts, given all reasonable constraints, imply lack of truth values for their evaluative judgements, the same is true for interpretations. Reasonable interpretations are constrained on my view by the elements to be explained, but this constraint fails to determine uniquely correct interpretations, and so cannot be used to support the idea of true evaluations. Aesthetic education cannot enable students to make correct evaluations if no evaluation is correct or incorrect.

Perhaps, if there are no true evaluative descriptions of art works, there are nevertheless universally good-making characteristics that constrain evaluations. If evaluators must count certain features of works positively (and their contraries negatively), then perhaps we can speak of making evaluations correctly, if not of correct or true evaluations. Aesthetic education might then teach students to describe and evaluate art works correctly. But this hope notoriously fails as well for reasons indicated above, namely, the uniqueness of art works and differences in taste even among the educated.

To say that each art work is unique is in itself not very informative, since the same may be said of each object (at least each concrete object). The point of emphasizing uniqueness in art works lies precisely in the lack of general principles linking non-evaluative properties to evaluative properties or evaluations. Features of works interact and combine in unique ways to make them valuable. An element, such as a musical phrase or coloured shape in a painting, that is valuable in its context would likely not be so in other contexts. This characteristic of art works leaves open the possibility of (second-order) properties of whole works that count only one way towards evaluations. Such,

according to Monroe Beardsley, are the properties of unity, complexity, and intensity,[1] and such may be also properties as power, gracefulness, or balance.

The latter properties, however, may count always positively only because they are themselves evaluative, because ascribing them already expresses approval on the part of the critic. As noted above, what is intense or powerful to one may be strident to another. The same non-evaluative properties can elicit ascriptions of unity or monotony, complexity or inscrutability. If Beardsley's properties are ascribed non-evaluatively, then they do not always count positively, even when combined in the same work. Some contemporary music pieces could be described as complex in their mathematical variations on sequences of tones, and as unified and intense in their atonal harmonies, and yet (let's face it) they sound simply awful. Music that sounds awful or monotonous is no better aesthetically for being complex, unified, and intense. Interesting aesthetic principles would have to link non-evaluative to evaluative properties, but these cannot be found.

One might object along Wittgensteinian lines that aesthetic value concepts, such as 'beautiful', must have public criteria for correct ascription. These terms are learned by reference to perceptible objects and properties. If they are applied consistently, as they seemingly must be in order to be understood, then how can there not be rules that link the perceived properties to use of the value terms that determine their correct use? Surely there is a difference between using such terms correctly and using them incorrectly, even if there is significant disagreement in their particular applications. The answer to this objection is that one learning such terms learns that they express evaluations. We use the term 'beautiful' when we want to express strong approval of an object's look, not simply when certain non-evaluative properties are present. The expressive function can generate use sufficiently consistent over the community to allow for common understanding.

We are left with the admission that the point of aesthetic education cannot be to teach students to make correct evaluations of art works, or even to evaluate correctly. A last hope in this direction is to attempt to separate description from evaluation, so as to teach the ability to describe features of art works correctly. No one can doubt that teaching must involve true descriptions of some sort, but questions and problems beset this proposal as well. First, we noted that the very choice of works to include in the curriculum clearly involves evaluation, so there is the question of why students should learn to describe certain works or types of works rather than others. We return here to the question of 'higher' versus 'lower'. Second, if it is the experience of great works that is valuable, if this value underlies the choice of those works over others, and if this valuable experience is therefore what is to be described, then teachers face the problem of the ineffability of aesthetic experience. How can one describe adequately the experience of the opening bars of Mozart's Fortieth Symphony or of Beethoven's Sixth? How can one capture the tone or feeling expressed or

evoked? Descriptive language is so impoverished here that why should we not simply let the students hear the music for themselves? True description alone, so feeble compared to the works themselves, cannot be our educational goal.

III

There are now several threads to be followed from the first two sections in constructing the proper justification. Before doing so, I shall mention some other approaches that, like the main ones so far canvassed, do not work.

Some attempted justifications are too narrow. I admitted above that it is in the interest of the educated to educate others likewise in matters of taste. If successful, this perpetuates the type of taste taught, so that performers, producers, and artists will continue to cater to it. It also generates more overt forms of public support for art, education being a slightly subtler form. But groundless perpetuation of the status quo is just what critics of aesthetic education typically charge. Hence this line of argument plays into their hands rather than answering them.

Neither can we argue simply that those who have experienced higher and lower art forms prefer the higher, nor, more simply still, that those who have had aesthetic experience of great works find it good or valuable. The former claim is not universally true. If it were, one might wonder why we need aesthetic education to generate the preference. The latter sort of claim is true of those who have had mystical religious experiences as well, yet it provides little justification for training others in the schools to have them.[2]

More commonly, proposed justifications are too broad and lacking in supporting evidence. Such arguments appeal to the general development of cognitive and/or affective faculties allegedly facilitated by learning to appreciate art works. On the cognitive side, it has been argued, for example, that the non-conceptual structuring involved in aesthetic perception and appreciation aids in conceptual development, and even constitutes a necessary base for that development.[3] A similar and more common claim is that learning to experience art more fully enables us to experience in general more fully, to concentrate more on the objects of our attention, bringing more personal associations to them and apprehending their relations more comprehensively. I cannot find the evidence to support such claims. In its absence, it does not seem to me intuitively that listening to symphonies, for example, alters my perception of ordinary sounds in the street or office, except perhaps to make them sound worse by contrast.

We find parallel and equally unsupported arguments that appeal to the development of our emotional, affective, or moral capacities. One author claimed recently that aesthetic education cultivates moral sensitivity, specifically the ability, required by both morality and aesthetic appreciation, to empathize imaginatively with unique individuals.[4] However, the evidence for such transfer of this ability, if indeed it is the same ability involved in both realms, is once more lacking. If artists and critics manifest the deepest capacity

for aesthetic appreciation, then the historical record on the link with morality is ambiguous (as it seems to be for all other professions as well). For every Verdi there seems to be a Wagner, for every Dickens or Zola, an Ayn Rand. Perhaps, as folklore has it, there is a tendency among the artistic towards non-conformity with dominant social mores, but such deviance obviously falls both above and below the usual standards.

It can be claimed more plausibly that literature in particular contributes to ethical education. Some literary works depict morally charged situations in all their nuances and so expand readers' experiences of morally relevant properties, experiences from which moral reasoning optimally proceeds. But the ethical edification from such works does not vary directly with their artistic merit. Hence the goal of moral education does not warrant the choice of literary works to teach based on literary worth, which is the basis for aesthetic education in this area. In any case, this justification does not extend to the non-literary arts, with which we are primarily concerned here.

IV

I suggested in the first section that the justification of aesthetic education must appeal to the deeper sort of enjoyment and experience, involving the cognitive capacities fully, that confrontation with great works of art affords. In expanding briefly on this suggestion, we must face the facts noted earlier that aesthetic experience is often to some degree ineffable, that formal analysis of art works can alienate one from that experience, that there are no principles (only paradigms) to guide us in the choice of works that are great and worthy of sustained attention, no principles that tell us infallibly what to look for in great works, and that even experts will disagree interminably in aesthetic evaluation. We must say how enjoyment of great works is deeper and how we can teach students to appreciate such works in light of the serious limitations just mentioned.

The first point to note here is that the absence of principles infallibly linking non-evaluative properties to positive or negative value does not mean that there are no generally value creating characteristics. There are in fact relations among elements of art works, and between those elements and experiences and objects outside them, which generally have positive aesthetic or artistic significance for those who appreciate them, and which therefore constitute reasons for aesthetic evaluations. Certain sorts of relations typically elicit judgements of value, even though they do not always contribute in one direction to the value of the works in which they are found. We can certainly point verbally to such relations, to direct attention towards them, however ineffable may be the total experience that results from their apprehension. Learning of them, having one's attention directed in this way, can then enhance one's appreciation of the works.

The relations in question are of three sorts: formal, referential (representational and expressive), and historical. Those formal relations that often create

aesthetic value include integration or coherence, balance, economy, complexity. Expressive and representational qualities that often add to artistic value include power, intensity, subtlety, pathos, imaginativeness, humour. Historical relations may constitute an art work's originality, its transformation or reworking of a tradition or part of a tradition.

Appreciation of the formal relations requires the ability to discriminate and connect elements within a work. For painting and music this is a perceptual ability enhanced by repeated encounters with the same and similar works and capable of being facilitated by verbal guidelines. Appreciation of expressive and representational aspects of art works can require knowledge of those conventions through which these functions are achieved within particular genres. The referential relations in question may be only partly conventional, but they may also include formal relations as elements and so require learning even when not conventional. The appreciation of art historical merit clearly depends on knowledge of the tradition, hence upon learning and education. Even novel and unique works derive their novelty from the traditional conventions from which they depart. Understanding their originality requires grasping the traditions that they modify or break.

Thus some but not all of the aesthetically and artistically significant relations among elements in art works and experiences are apparent in the works themselves; and even those that are may require training to see or hear. One need not conceptualize these relations as such, but doing so informs one of what to look for in a given kind of work, and perception that is guided in this way is capable of grasping finer detail and structure. The requisite skills, of course, vary from genre to genre. To appreciate fine music one must grasp melodic lines and variations, rhythms, harmonic tonalities and progressions, modulations, and the broader forms that combine melody and harmony (fugue, sonata form, theme and variations, etc.). Appreciation of paintings requires recognition of structural relations among colours and shapes, styles, conventions for symbolization or expression, and the historical development of all these. Explicit recognition of such conventional forms as sonnet in poetry or sonata in music can guide expectations and make the structure of a work more intelligible and open to perception.

We can compare the effects of conceptual knowledge on the perception of sports events and art works. In watching a football game, a spectator who does not even know the rules will miss much of what is going on and much of the enjoyment as well. He can see a catch but not a first down, a kick but not a field goal. Somebody who knows not only rules but strategies will see much more. He or she can see a receiver circle under the zone when the defensive backs drop into a prevent defence, while the spectator who knows only the rules might see the first down but not what led up to it. The novice may be just as caught up in the excitement, but the expert's appreciation of the game is more detailed, and his or her enjoyment is therefore richer or deeper.

The appreciation of music, for example, bears some similarities and some differences. Since there are no constitutive rules (or only those barest rules that define a musical performance), enjoyment and appreciation do not require conceptual understanding. One need not know the harmonic categories of tonic, dominant, and subdominant in order to experience the tension and resolution of a progression of chords related in those ways. But just as knowing the typical strategies of a sport allows one to anticipate and so to perceive the fine details of plays, as well as to appreciate novel departures from those usual strategies, so being able to conceptualize formal structures in music alerts one to expect and so perceive in greater detail both standard forms and deviations. One who knows the history of the classical symphony and development of the sonata form can better appreciate the greatly expanded development section of the first movement of the 'Eroica Symphony'. One who knows the *Marriage of Figaro* appreciates its quotation in *Don Giovanni*. One who knows the history of the struggle to capture depth on two-dimensional canvases better appreciates the significance of flattened surfaces as a comment on painting itself in some twentieth-century paintings.

In order for conceptual knowledge to enhance the appreciation and enjoyment of art, one must reach the level of analytic ability and familiarity with particular works at which one's knowledge of the forms, conventions, and relevant history can inform and guide one's perceptions of the works without intruding into awareness and so alienating that awareness from the works themselves. But this level can be achieved with sufficient education and practice, so that what may block aesthetic enjoyment at first may later enhance it. One who must concentrate on hearing the variations on a theme may not enjoy the piece as much as the naïve listener who does not even know that they are variations; but one who can hear them right off as variations will better appreciate their subtlety and ingenuity, and this appreciation may be itself a source of enjoyment.

Granted, then, that the education of taste is possible despite the many problems noted earlier, and granted that such education can foster the appreciation and enjoyment of fine works of art whose detailed perception requires skill and training, the question remains why this enjoyment is to be preferred over the simpler entertainments that require no training. The answer lies in the richness of the experience informed by all the significant relations mentioned, and in the satisfaction that successful full use of the cognitive faculties provides. Apprehending formal, referential, and historical relations in the same works makes for very rich perceptual experience. Finding an intelligible structure in a complex work of art is as cognitively satisfying as is solving any intellectual puzzle. Appreciating a work's originality satisfies in much the way that the perception of novelty in itself generally pleases and refreshes. And the expressive and representational features of works allows for the exercise of the imagination and affective faculties. The full play of all these cognitive and

affective capacities intensifies those experiences that result and makes them particularly satisfying.

The main and final point of aesthetic education, then, is not knowledge in itself or knowledge required to make correct evaluations, but the preparation of the faculties for intensely meaningful and enjoyable experiences of art works that can afford them to those trained to appreciate them. Disagreement among expert critics is not a problem for this justification, as long as all who are educated can enjoy and positively evaluate some forms of art. An added benefit is the self-understanding of what causes one's enjoyment and appreciation of particular works. Another is that appreciation of the finer points of technique and style allows one better to enter the world of the artist himself, to perceive the subject-matter and the set of artistic problems solved by the work as he perceived them. Once one recognizes the greater value inherent in fine works of art, one then will want to understand the works, one's own reactions to them, and the experience of their creators for the sake of that understanding. But, beyond appeal to knowledge for its own sake, since we can justify so much of the subject-matter taught in schools only in terms of its very indirect and long term instrumental value, the contrast with aesthetic education, linked so directly to more deeply enjoyable experience, is striking.

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[3] Bennett Reimer, 'The Nonconceptual Nature of Aesthetic Cognition', *Journal of Aesthetic Education*, 20, 4 (1986). 111–17

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HAVING BAD TASTE

Theodore A. Gracyk

'Many people are introduced during their formative years to what critical tradition regards as the best in art and show no taste for it in later life. The majority, having opportunity to enjoy the world's splendid works of art, prefer to give their admiration to trash.'[1]

I

CENTURIES OF wisdom say that there is no disputing taste, yet we persist in criticizing the taste of others. Most people are only too happy to accuse others of having bad taste. There are two prevailing views regarding claims that some people have bad taste. On the one hand, we have the view that taste is idiosyncratic response and entirely relative and capricious, so such judgements are never true. On the other hand, we have the standard account of taste developed in the eighteenth century, which holds that there is an absolute standard of taste. People can therefore be divided into those with good taste and those with crude, vulgar, or bad taste. The truth, I propose, steers a course between these two extremes, where the dependence of taste upon aesthetic education provides the key to this middle ground.

Suppose you visited my house and noticed that my sofa is covered in orange naugahyde and that over it hangs a reproduction of *The Last Supper* on black velvet. You might later tell someone that I have bad taste. However, it is not my aim to show that someone who owns or likes such things has bad taste. Rather, I wish to focus on the possibility of ever justifying a claim that someone has bad taste, of the form 'so-and-so has bad taste'.[2] Judgements of this sort are common enough; let us call them BT. I think that insufficient attention has been paid to the complexity of the evaluative component of BT, to *what* it is that is evaluated here.

It is generally agreed that BT evaluates a personal reaction made on the basis of direct experience. In short, someone can only have bad taste in matters of personal response. As Eva Schaper puts it, 'we think he has taste [or doesn't] only if we believe that what he says arises from his own experience and is not parrotted or feigned. It is, of course, not just a matter of what people *say* . . .'.[3] Besides what people say, we might claim BT based on what they choose to own, or go out of their way to experience. Taking any of these things as evidence of bad taste assumes that the person so judged thereby demonstrates an enjoyment of aesthetically deficient material. Admiring *Titus Andronicus* sug-

gests a failure of taste, yet someone with good taste might sit through a performance owing to an interest in Shakespeare, or because it is required in a college course on Shakespeare. However, suppose you catch me heading for the local cinema to watch the latest Rambo film. I do not go because my going is coerced or because, say, I am interested in studying the film editing of the action scenes. Rather, I go because I enjoy a film loaded with blood and guts. When you subsequently learn that I despise the work of Truffaut and Bergman, you will probably question my taste. Similar examples are easily generated in other areas, as when people are accused of having bad taste because they prefer Norman Rockwell to Manet or Rembrandt, or because they prefer Elvis Presley crooning 'Love Me Tender' to a performance of a Mozart aria.[4]

But in any of these situations, a favourable response is not sufficient for BT, even when it is a favourable response to what is aesthetically deficient. A positive response is only evidence of one's *taste* when it is symptomatic of one's *preferences*. We often find ourselves enjoying a film that we know is not particularly good, where the enjoyment is consistent with our preference for something better. One might enjoy the taste of a commercial frozen pie that has been defrosted in the microwave, all the while thinking that it would be better to have a home-made pie prepared with fresh ingredients. Preference for one thing involves a conscious rejection of some other; discrimination must occur, where one thing is chosen over another based on objective qualities or features known by the person to be present and to be more enjoyable than alternatives. Because preference involves discrimination, a personal reaction displays taste only if the reaction involves judgement. In short, taste requires preference, and not merely a favourable response.[5]

Thus, Joseph Margolis is mistaken to suggest that taste and personal preference have only a 'contingent relationship' with judgement.[6] Arguing that any defence of taste is 'incommensurable with the mere having of taste',[7] Margolis seems to hold that BT is justifiable only to the extent that it describes someone's taste, never to the extent that it challenges that taste. Although BT is sometimes meant as a descriptive remark, such cases are not very interesting, and Margolis does not do justice to the complexity involved when BT evaluates someone's taste.

Generalizing, most 'objectivist' aestheticians agree with Margolis. Demanding an objective basis for all aesthetic evaluation, they relegate preferences and dislikes to the realm of the idiosyncratic and subjective, and so dismiss them as irrelevant. However, it is not true that our taste, like our eye-colour, is unrelated to our judgement.[8] If taste were a personal fact in the manner of eye-colour and height, taste would likewise be explicable but unjustifiable. But tastes would also be distributed throughout the population as evenly as height and eye-colour. (Indeed, tastes would be more random than eye-colour, unless it turned out that our preferences are genetically determined and thus inherited.) But tastes are not distributed evenly throughout the population; brown-eyed girls

are born according to a fixed pattern and are to be found throughout the country and in every social class, but we have quite a different pattern when it comes to a preference for Manet over Norman Rockwell. The very meaning of 'she has taste' calls attention to the fact that tastes form rough patterns according to time, place, social class, and so on. Were this not so, we could not make sense of histories of taste (think how absurd it would be to work on the *history* of eye-colour distributions). Because taste has a history, it can be neither idiosyncratic nor completely determined in the ways that objectivists contend.

In evaluating a person's preferences, any claim BT involves two very different evaluations, making BT more complex than the evaluative claim that *Titus Andronicus* is a poor play. BT requires both a judgement about the object someone likes and a judgement about their competence as an aesthetic judge of that object. Specifically, whoever asserts that someone has bad taste must judge that person to have misjudged the object. In the standard account of the eighteenth century, it was held that the majority of persons, the 'vulgar', were incapable of a discriminating perceptual judgement. This failure of taste was sometimes attributed to an inborn defect of sensibility, or to the corrupting influences of common life. More recently, aesthetic sensitivity to perceptual qualities has been emphasized by Frank Sibley and Guy Sircello.[9] But this emphasis on the non-cognitive aspect of taste obscures the degree to which BT judges someone's competence in making aesthetic discriminations and hence judgements. Therefore, it is appropriate to explore the connection between taste and judgement.

II

Suppose that we could equip a computer with an algorithm for determining the aesthetic value of any given work, so that the computer could tell us the precise merits of each of Shakespeare's plays.[10] While it would *evaluate* good works, would anyone think that the computer has good taste? Certainly not. Nor would a computer that valued *Titus Andronicus* over *King Lear* have bad taste, although it would have a defective program. Having taste depends not merely on one's evaluation, but also on *liking* and *preferring* the best works. Computers have no taste at all, so we must not equate taste and judgement.

The point is rather obvious: there is both a judgemental and a hedonic element to taste. But the further point is that, as an evaluative judgement, BT claims that certain objects should not be enjoyed or, if enjoyed, not preferred; it is not merely that they should not be evaluated in a certain way. If taste were simply a matter of noting aesthetic excellence or failure (with enjoyment an irrelevant byproduct), BT would only require that the person mistakenly interpret the art work. However, those who prefer Norman Rockwell to Manet do not typically misinterpret the Norman Rockwell (although they may not 'get' the Manet). They like the stories that can be read from Rockwell's illustrations and paintings, and they identify with his traditional values and his sentimentality.

When it comes to recognizing what is and is not there, people with a taste for Rockwell understand and correctly interpret his work. (Were their preference not directed towards genuine qualities of the objects, we would not have a case of their personal response and would not even have a case of taste.)[11] Those with supposedly better taste regard Rockwell as beneath discussion and critical attention, and would typically say that there is 'nothing there'. In short, those who have good taste are the poorer critics here; dismissing the work out of hand, they cannot find its merits at all.

But on the assumption at issue, that bad taste depends on a failure of judgement, those with good taste therefore have bad taste, too. More to the point, when those with bad taste restrict their judgement to their sphere of preference, they have good taste. The only way to give meaning to the notions of good and bad taste is to see that BT evaluate preferences, not just judgements. This point would also be obscured if we equated enjoyment and preference.

I doubt if anyone believes that our aesthetic lives would be complete if we either made informed evaluations of art, without ever enjoying art, or enjoyed art in the absence of all judgement. Yet both situations occur, so the relationship between judgement and enjoyment is not one of strict necessity. Our choice (between treating people as if they were unfeeling computers or as if they were responding without judging) is a false dilemma. Let us consider the two ways that knowledge and enjoyment diverge, contrasting such situations with cases involving taste.

On the one hand, judgement requires background knowledge about the object, but knowledge does not itself create our preferences. Someone may 'get' twelve-tone music, knowing quite a bit about the history of music and understanding what has been accomplished. It does not follow that the person ever wants to hear it. They might go out of their way to avoid listening to Schoenberg, while enjoying Mozart tremendously. On the other hand, there are our initial encounters with works of a given kind, as when a child sees a play for the very first time, or an adult admires something from a very foreign culture. In such cases, prior to acquiring any background information, we often enjoy the aesthetic experience (this is what Kant calls a 'pure' judgement of taste: Francis Hutcheson and other inner 'sense' theorists reduced all aesthetic experience to such situations). This gap between education and enjoyment is captured by the cliché, 'I don't know much about art, but I know what I like'. This cliché, like many clichés, contains a germ of wisdom; this one holds that an understanding of art is not itself preferable to the enjoyment of art and that, given a choice between mere understanding and untutored enjoyment, people choose the latter.

When enjoyment occurs without understanding, as when an infant takes pleasure in the graceful movements of a colourful mobile above the crib, it demonstrates nothing about the child's taste. Independent of past experience, education, or long-term memory, the enjoyment is without discrimination or

preference. Yet because knowledge does not itself create preference, knowledge is not sufficient for preference or taste. At most, we can conclude that knowledge is necessary before enjoyment counts as preference, so education (in the broadest sense, encompassing all relevant past experience) differentiates mere enjoyment from enjoyment evidencing taste.

A preference for better material presumably follows from proper education, an assumption that seems to underlie the emphasis on historical appreciation in the curriculum of so many university art and music courses. Good taste is developed by learning *consciously* to make the discriminations necessary to specify what aspects make an object aesthetically good or bad, where one's enjoyment is grounded in the process of identifying the good and bad features of one's preferences. As Roger Scruton notes, enjoyment is not related to taste as a mere accompaniment of one's experience. Instead, one's pleasure is 'directed outwards to the world' and towards the object of one's attention. Informed attention, focused by education, provides an aesthetically rewarding experience of the object. One's education alters one's experience of what is to be found in the object, 'and with the change in experience comes a change in preference and hence a change in taste'.[12] In other words, education refines one's experience and so one's natural likings become preferences for specific objects. Given sufficient education, we become articulate about our preferences and our attention is guided by what we correctly understand about the objects. In contrast, bad taste is tentatively to be regarded as enjoyment grounded in ignorance or in a malfunction of normal aesthetic responses.

Such an account makes the connoisseur or educated critic the paradigm of good taste. When discussions of taste were in their heyday, in the eighteenth century, it was commonly argued that taste is 'corrupted' in most people, so only a small group of qualified judges can adequately determine which objects are aesthetically good. Anyone who differs from the taste of these judges has bad taste.[13] Anyone whose preference runs to the naugahyde couch or to reproductions of *The Last Supper* done on black velvet has bad taste, because connoisseurs abhor such things. This view is hardly a historical relic, as many recent discussions of aesthetic value demonstrate.[14]

The standard account then continues more or less as follows. While taste begins with a natural disposition to respond to objects favourably or unfavourably, possession of good taste depends on subsequent exposure to aesthetically excellent material, so that one develops a discriminating eye or palate or whatever. One's natural intuition must be sharpened by practice or it will prove untrustworthy or will even be perverted into bad taste by the contingencies of life. The price to be paid, as C. J. Ducasse points out, is that good taste 'also makes impossible the aesthetic pleasures which none but aesthetically less sensitive souls can taste'.[15] One risks losing one's taste for Norman Rockwell's sentimentality when one learns to take pleasure in Manet. (This loss is approved by Hume as the removal of 'false relish'.) Unfortunately, there is such a thing as

over-refinement, producing figures such as Bernard Berenson, who boldly claimed that Chinese art is of interest solely for its landscapes.[16]

Such an approach has the advantage of allowing individuals to recognize their own bad taste, because people can easily recognize their own deviance from an identified body of experts (e.g., professional critics). Such a justification is analogous to admitting that one is mistaken in believing that the earth is flat once one encounters contrary expert testimony. One can likewise recognize one's own bad taste without oneself knowing what's so bad about naugahyde couches. This process is humorously captured in Evelyn Waugh's *Brideshead Revisited*, in this exchange: ' "Charles," said Cordelia, "Modern Art is all bosh, isn't it?" "Great bosh." "Oh, I'm so glad." ' Worried about her own taste, Cordelia takes comfort in Charles's evaluation.[17]

A second advantage is that education is viewed as necessary but not sufficient for good taste. Confirmation that the education has paid off in good taste depends on the *consensus* of competent judges; if we constantly found rampant disagreement among judges with similar education, we could no longer assume that education facilitates the true appreciation which underlies good taste. To borrow an example from Michael Slote, we *expect* people to prefer Mozart to Bruckner after they have long-term exposure to both composers.[18] Because education can facilitate a consensus of taste, we have empirical confirmation that taste differs from mere enjoyment owing to what we *know*, and this epistemic component is evaluated as a factor justifying BT.

Among eighteenth-century aestheticians, the consensus of competent, educated judges is stressed by Hume and Kames. Yet their contemporary, Alexander Gerard, argues that 'general approbation' is no standard at all except for modern works in a specific culture, and the taste of the cultured few is not the standard of taste so much as it is the starting point for finding the principles constituting such a standard.[19] Kant and (more recently, along Kantian lines) Mary Mothersill are justifiably sceptical about any principles of taste which can be articulated in propositional form. None the less, Gerard is correct in so far as the consensus of connoisseurs must be taken as a standard for a limited range of art. To this point we now turn.

III

On the standard account, identifying the connoisseur or educated taste provides indisputable cases of good taste, and those whose taste differs have bad taste. However, two considerations undercut this strategy.

First, the *fact* that a select, educated group prefers specific works might allow us to discover the principles of *their* taste, but nothing has yet justified the superiority of such tastes. The question of value has been sidestepped, as critics of Hume frequently note.[20]

Hume attempts to resolve the issue of value by noting that the competent judge is someone with 'good sense' who 'must preserve his mind free from all

prejudices', and who places 'himself in the same situation as the audience, in order to form a true judgement'.[21] Notice that Hume's idea of freedom from prejudice is quite different from the non-cognitivism of Hutcheson or Clive Bell. For Bell, anything more than 'a sense of form and colour and a knowledge of three-dimensional space' destroys the impartiality of judgements about visual art.[22] For Hume, prejudice is removed only by gaining appropriate knowledge, as a prerequisite to enjoying the correct aspects of the object. Otherwise, our enjoyment is superficial or an irrelevant coincidence.

In recognizing that appropriate knowledge distinguishes taste from enjoyment, we see why identification of persons with good taste cannot tell us who has bad taste. Inundated since birth with our native culture, it is difficult really to appreciate the art of foreign cultures. Defending his hasty dismissal of 'exotic' Oriental art, Berenson recommends that we refine our knowledge of our own artistic tradition, because 'the visual art of a people [cannot] be fully appreciated without an intimate acquaintance with its language, literature, thought and history'.[23] Although he demands education about too much, Berenson's basic insight is correct. Good taste depends upon adequate knowledge of a specific tradition. Most people tend to increase their knowledge and competence about traditions which are already most accessible and familiar. In her analysis of connoisseurs, R. Meager treats the resultant narrowness of connoisseurship as a matter of psychological fact.[24] But our difficulty in appreciating unfamiliar traditions is not merely a psychological fact; it is a consequence of the cognitive contribution to taste.

In facilitating a preference for objects of superior value, education does not simply remove prejudice. (This is the point which Hume ignores but Gerard recognizes.) As education refines one's taste, it tends to harden our initial preferences into prejudice and dogma. This is my primary criticism of standard accounts of taste; training, education, and knowledge instil as much prejudice as they mitigate.

First, prejudice underlies our choice of which audiences to join, since we cannot profitably join them all. Someone who tries to become educated about everything will be a perennial dilettante. While taste requires knowledge, the choice to acquire that knowledge must be guided by something other than one's good taste. Although personal likes and dislikes, 'natural potentialities and tendencies',[25] social factors, and various contingencies all influence and partly explain which traditions someone pursues, it neither follows that taste is a purely subjective response nor that it is decisively determined.

Second, critics debate the importance of various aspects of art works. Monroe C. Beardsley proposes that the three objective reasons for valuing a work are unity, complexity, and intensity.[26] Connoisseurs presumably offer an empirical test for determining whether he is correct. However, Beardsley himself recognizes that the objective reasons must be determined independently for each art form, because different arts exemplify the universal in different ways. So we are

not surprised to learn that poet Charles Baudelaire could find no aesthetic merit in photography.[27] Baudelaire's knowledge of poetry and painting did not prepare him to appreciate photography.

Philosophers are no better off. While R. G. Collingwood saw the merits of the modernist movement in literature (he had no difficulty with James Joyce, T. S. Eliot, or Gertrude Stein), in the 1930s he still denied that any art could arise from 'the gramophone' or 'the cinema'. On logical grounds, his argument against records and film equally damned modernist authors, who were no less separated from their audience than were jazz musicians in a recording studio or filmmakers on a Hollywood soundstage.[28] Already knowledgeable about literature, Collingwood knew how to assimilate new movements in poetry and fiction, but he did not understand how film and recorded music could establish an audience–artist relationship. He mistakenly assumed that recorded music is an impersonal and thus defective presentation of a live performance. Films were viewed as mechanically recorded plays. Faced with something new, Collingwood overlooked its newness and seized upon a genuine but partial resemblance. Ignoring the manner in which recording creates its own art forms, Collingwood could only regard film and recorded music as flawed and disagreeable versions of something else. This mistake is common, but seldom discussed.

This narrowness of taste does not merely arise between distinct arts. Even within one art form, say music, different styles and genres demand a distinct education.[29] Knowledge of eighteenth-century chamber music is not very helpful when one first encounters twelve-tone serialism or nineteen-forties bebop. When Western music scholars have studied the traditional musics of West Africa, they have imposed European concepts of basic pulse and metre (together with measures and bars) on the African rhythms. One scholar was then surprised to discover the widespread presence of rhythmic unevenness and irregularity in African music, and postulated an African 'tolerance' for it and an unconscious ability mentally to correct these unintentional irregularities.[30] But the cultures in question do not employ the Western notion of linear time, and some scholars therefore suspect that there is no rhythmic irregularity to 'correct'. We misunderstand and distort traditional African music in assimilating it to our Western convention of constructing rhythms from short, repeating, even patterns.[31] African music is also misunderstood by Westerners who think it deficient in melody, owing to our familiarity with a convention of not employing 'percussive' instruments to play melodies.[32]

Even within one art in one culture, failure of comprehension and a corresponding evaluative dismissal is frequent with the development of new styles. We can hardly blame the jury of the Paris Salon for rejecting Manet's *Déjeuner sur l'herbe* in 1863. Manet had explicitly rejected the conventions of his day and had then offered his work to judges who represented the status quo. But by the same token, there is no reason to suppose that Manet would have appreciated the paintings of Jackson Pollock. To appreciate a work, as opposed to merely

having a reaction, one needs to know about *its* tradition and not just some general information about music or literature or painting or, worst of all, 'art' in general. If someone has a favourable response to a Jackson Pollock but knows nothing about abstract expressionism, the enjoyment is merely that, untutored enjoyment, and is not a preference and does not indicate taste.

Because we are cognitively finite beings, with a limited range of knowledge owing to our limited experience of the world, and with a limited scope of comprehension, we must give up the false ideal of critics who are equally adept at judging any work of art. Evaluation and interpretation are two elements of a single process, a process that has no hope of success without an adequate body of knowledge backing it.[33] Once someone acquires substantial knowledge about a preferred movement or genre in a specific art, it becomes increasingly difficult to appreciate unrelated areas, even within the same art.[34] It is typical to lose the ability to learn foreign languages as we become older, and it becomes particularly more difficult, for instance, to learn Japanese if one does not already know another Oriental language. The same holds for artistic traditions. (As E. H. Gombrich points out, there is a real sense in which each artist's style is a distinct 'vocabulary' which audiences must learn.) Most trivially, the barrier against understanding diverse styles arises because time spent learning about one reduces the time that can be spent learning about another. Moreover, the investment of effort in one tradition, stemming from non-rational preferences and contingencies, creates a specialization in which one's pleasures are so dependent upon the specific features of that style that it becomes increasingly difficult to achieve a comparable richness of experience further afield.

I am not saying that someone *cannot* appreciate unrelated fields, say both Mozart and bop. However, to the extent that one fruitfully attends to the objective features of the music as the basis for preferring these types of music to some others, let us say Wagner and rock music, one's discrimination and enjoyment depends upon one's awareness that Mozart and bop are quite different types of music. Each involves its own principles of organization and merit, and anyone who listens to Charlie Parker as if bop were a Mozart piano concerto isn't listening to Charlie Parker. The lesson to be had here is that someone who dismisses Wagner for not being Mozart is making a sort of category mistake; someone's good taste in the cases of Mozart and Parker does not demonstrate good taste in *music*. Even if they knew quite a lot about Wagner's music (although we must wonder how much someone who dislikes Wagner can really know about Wagner's music), their taste lies elsewhere and their preference proves nothing about the superiority of Wagner versus Mozart. To suppose otherwise is to make a hasty judgement in which one fails to note that the information informing one's taste in the one area does not transfer from that tradition to another. Even knowing that this is so, it is no small feat to keep it in mind in everyday life.

For a moment, let us pretend that there is no barrier to appreciating unfamiliar

traditions. Why should anyone bother to extend their taste? Even if there were neither epistemic nor psychological barriers to doing so, it would be counter-productive to approach all art with the same spirit of openness and interest. Some of our richest encounters with art come from our repeated return to the same works (e.g., to a favourite symphony or painting), and our aesthetic lives would be impoverished if we tried to adopt the same attitude to all good art that we come across. On a visit to the National Gallery, it would be foolish to divide one's afternoon among *all* the rooms, or even among a set of unrelated rooms, if one's taste runs to Italian Renaissance painting. What is accomplished by conscientiously viewing Velasquez and Turner while avoiding the works that you prefer and understand? Part of being an educated viewer is knowing what speaks to you, what you prefer, and having the good sense to pursue it. There is reason to broaden our tastes when greater satisfaction can be achieved elsewhere, but there is no reason why everyone should work to possess the same catholic taste.

Good taste involves partiality, as a personal acceptance of and immersion in a tradition. Thus, acquired prejudices cannot be readily abandoned when one is faced with a new tradition. Just as we do not have a personal relationship with everyone we meet and are not expected to treat strangers with the preference appropriate to friends, it would be absurd to expect someone with developed taste to respond to all art, even all masterpieces, with the same accommodation.

To summarize, no person has universally good taste. Taste involves viewing works in relation to a tradition of related works. Genuine preference and discrimination are grounded in knowledge about the tradition.[35] Different arts and traditions involve distinct conventions, and our mortality and cognitive limitations preclude becoming highly informed in many areas. Because artistic traditions embody distinct conventions, increasing knowledge in one area becomes a genuine liability when viewing other traditions, and we end up disliking and dismissing works through misjudgement. We might therefore conclude that everyone has bad taste in some areas for some arts. But that makes BT uninformative and pointless as an evaluative judgement. The following conditions seem more appropriate.

At best, one would be justified in holding that some person, X, has bad taste only if all four of the following hold: (i) there are connoisseurs for the specific tradition in question; (ii) X systematically prefers works other than those admired by the connoisseurs, even when directed to those features which connoisseurs find most rewarding; (iii) the works preferred by X are preferred on the basis of personal experience of them; and (iv) X has appropriate education about that tradition to understand what connoisseurs look for and value in works in that tradition. In other words, someone has bad taste only if relevant education does not lead them to a consensus of judgement with connoisseurs of that tradition. These four conditions (or others very like them) appear to be necessary and sufficient for holding BT as an evaluative judgement.

Given this analysis, suppose someone has seen many Norman Rockwells, knows why some are better than others, has limited experience with French painting of the last century, and prefers almost anything by Rockwell to Manet's *Déjeuner sur l'herbe*, regarding it as a vulgar and inept work. Manet admirers would be mistaken to accuse the Rockwell enthusiast of bad taste. Having good taste in the 'wrong' or inferior tradition does not itself count as bad taste, so two persons could like the same seriously flawed work and yet only the better informed of the two might have bad taste. BT is justified only when education does not facilitate a preference for superior items within the relevant style or tradition. However, there are probably very few people whose preferences do not evolve with their increased ability to make educated evaluations.

IV

While our preferences are not completely determined by our backgrounds, education's contribution to taste dictates that different groups should be expected to have different tastes. None the less, persons of lower social standing are frequently accused of bad taste for having perfectly understandable and justifiable taste given their background. People who admire Mozart's operas and who have no interest in rock music tend to denigrate those who care only for rock, just as it is often assumed by wine connoisseurs that they have better taste than beer drinkers. However, we have seen that BT is not justified unless there is reason to regard the preferred material as deficient in the judgement of connoisseurs of that tradition or area. But when the connoisseur of Mozart sneers at the taste of someone who prefers Elvis Presley, they do so despite the fact that those who know a great deal about rock music think highly of Presley.[36] How can the lover of Mozart justify BT? By the fact that they dislike rock music? But that is no justification at all, because their own preference for Mozart makes their judgement about distinct musical traditions unreliable. Yet when someone *is* an *aficionado* of naugahyde furniture, rock music, or Norman Rockwell, that person is precisely the one whose taste is impugned. In such cases, BT must involve the additional assumption that one artist, style, genre, movement, or art is superior to another.

Many or even most cases of BT depend on just such an evaluative comparison between distinct traditions or types of art or areas within an art. We frequently dismiss the taste of those who see no merit in works which we have the background to understand and enjoy, and we dismiss their taste even when it involves an educated preference for the better works in the traditions which they prefer. Our justification for believing that our taste is superior to theirs depends, then, on the comparative superiority of one tradition over another.

We might, for instance, rank one tradition over another because of their relative instrumental values in fulfilling some assumed goal of art. However, if art history teaches us anything, it is that different arts and different artists within

a single art can have diverse, even conflicting goals. Suppose we locate the value in some valuable reaction or response in audiences. But if that is all that Vermeer, Manet, and Mondrian have in common, then one painter is no better than another provided each delivers the response in those who've learned to enjoy the work of that artist. As a means to a valuable response, Norman Rockwell may be more valuable than Manet, and *King Lear* may be no better than a comic book. This question is strictly empirical and, if Tolstoy is taken seriously, it would be decided in favour of those art forms which appeal most immediately to the 'vulgar' masses. We have simply returned to the earlier point that a more refined taste is not necessarily a superior taste, but may only reflect a difference of taste. Purely instrumental value seems a poor basis for comparing distinct arts and artists.

Perhaps we can rank whole traditions by appealing to objective, non-instrumental, rules which hold of all the arts, and we can show that one tradition embodies these rules more fully than do other traditions. We might, for instance, agree with theorist Ernest Ansermet that tonality is essential to good music, so Stravinsky's atonal compositions cannot be any good.[37] A preference for atonal music would constitute bad taste. But tonality is not a feature of any art except music, so Ansermet would also have to show that tonality (but not atonality) is a way in which music specifically manifests some of the general rules of good art. Even if Ansermet could make such a case, such standards would still leave unsettled the question of which of two bodies of tonal compositions was superior. If someone likes Stravinsky's tonal work but dismisses Mozart's work as old hat, refusing even to give it a chance, there is still no basis for thinking that this person has bad taste. So even if universal criteria can be found to hold for all good art, and if we can determine for specific arts which rules embody those universal criteria, it still does not follow that someone has bad taste when they prefer something other than the established masterpieces of that art.

As a last resort, we might compare our evaluations of individual works, and because Elvis Presley's best are inferior to Mozart's best, we might decide that Mozart is superior to Presley. Besides the serious difficulty of such comparative evaluations,[38] and the immense calculations required, our comparisons of whole bodies of works generally depend on hindsight. (Time, of course, divorces art from its original culture and so is equally an aid and a hindrance to critical judgement.) We may think that Shakespeare is infinitely superior to comics, but we must wait until the genre of comics has run its stylistic course. However, we have no a priori reason to think that comics cannot transcend their humble surroundings to be recognized, like Shakespeare's plays, as something better than lowbrow entertainment. We may doubt that comic books will ever be recognized as high art, but then cinema hardly heralded its creative possibilities in the early days of film.

In conclusion, I hope to have demonstrated the modest point that many or

most claims that someone has bad taste are unjustified. Dismissal of taste because of the genre or type of art will only be justified if we can make sense, not merely of evaluative comparisons of individual works, but also of comparisons of whole styles, genres, and arts. While I do think that such comparisons are sometimes justified, I see no easy or obvious explanation of what it involved. The topic calls for greater attention. In the meantime, we might return to Cordelia and Charles in *Brideshead Revisited*, and accept what Cordelia wants Charles to deny, namely, that we shouldn't try to criticize what we don't understand.[39]

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[1] H Osborne, 'Hume's Standard and the Diversity of Aesthetic Taste', *British Journal of Aesthetics* 7 (1967), p 56

[2] Joseph Margolis notes the alternative wording of so-and-so 'has no taste' to mean 'has bad taste'; Margolis, *The Language of Art and Art Criticism* (Detroit: Wayne State U.P., 1965), p 121.

[3] Eva Schaper, 'The Pleasures of Taste', in *Pleasure, Preference and Value*, ed. Eva Schaper (Cambridge U.P., 1983), p. 40.

[4] This is not to say that someone who admires the work of Norman Rockwell or Elvis Presley necessarily has bad taste but only that a preference for them is often taken as evidence of bad taste However, if my arguments are correct, it should be quite difficult to present an example of an art work, the enjoyment of which always counts as bad taste

[5] This requirement is stronger than recognized by Schaper, who ties taste to what one 'takes pleasure or displeasure in', and Margolis, who equates taste with 'mere likes and dislikes'. See Schaper, 'Pleasures of Taste', p 42, and Margolis, *Art and Philosophy* (Atlantic Heights, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1980), p. 220.

[6] Joseph Margolis, *Art and Philosophy*, p. 218

[7] Margolis, *Language of Art*, p 128.

[8] Margolis claims that 'we cannot justify our taste as we cannot justify our age or eye-color', *Language of Art*, p. 126.

[9] Frank Sibley, 'Aesthetics and the Looks of Things', *The Journal of Philosophy* (LVI (1959), pp. 905–15, and Guy Sircello, *A New Theory of Beauty* (Princeton U P., 1975).

[10] The idea of such a machine is defended by George Stiny and James Gips, *Algorithmic Aesthetics* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1978).

[11] Kant spends much of the 'Analytic of the Beautiful' in *The Critique of Judgement* supporting this point; see Schaper, 'The Pleasures of Taste', particularly pp. 45–8.

[12] Roger Scruton, 'Architectural Taste', *British Journal of Aesthetics* 15 (1975), pp. 302 and 308.

[13] E.g., Hume, 'Of the Standard of Taste', and Lord Kames (Henry Home), *Elements of Criticism*, 4th ed. (Edinburgh. 1769), 2 vols , ch. XXV.

[14] Examples are T. R. Martland, 'The Arts Do, What, for Whom?', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 41 (1982), pp. 187–94, and Bertram Jessup, 'Taste and Judgement in Aesthetic Experience', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 19 (1960), pp. 53–9 The idea of the connoisseur also underlies Frank Sibley, 'Aesthetic Concepts', *The Philosophical Review* LXVII (1959), pp. 421–50; reprinted in *Philosophy Looks at the Arts*, 3rd ed , ed Joseph Margolis (Philadelphia Temple U P., 1987), pp. 29–52

[15] Curt J Ducasse, *The Philosophy of Art* (New York Dial Press, 1929), p 282.

[16] Bernard Berenson, *Aesthetics and History* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co, 1948), pp. 262–3.

[17] Evelyn Waugh, *Brideshead Revisited* (Boston Little, Brown and Co, 1945), ch. 5, p 152.

[18] Michael A. Slote, 'The Rationality of Aesthetic Value Judgements', *The Journal of Philosophy*, LXVIII (1971), pp 831–9. A similar idea underlies Martland, 'The Arts Do, What, for Whom?'

[19] Alexander Gerard, *An Essay on Taste*, 3rd ed (Edinburgh, 1780), pp. 236–48.

[20] See Noel Carroll, 'Hume's Standard of Taste', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 43 (1984), pp. 181–94, and Peter Kivy, 'Hume's Standard of Taste: Breaking the Circle', *British Journal of Aesthetics* 7 (1967), pp. 57–66. The criticism of circularity applies equally to Gerard, Kames and Burke.

[21] In his 'Standard of Taste', Hume also mentions 'good sense', but his characterization is so vague that virtually every rational person can be assumed to possess it

[22] Bell, *Art* (London· Chatto and Windus, 1949), pp 27 ff.

[23] Berenson, *Aesthetics and History*, p 263

[24] R. Meager, 'Connoisseurship', *British Journal of Aesthetics* 25 (1985), pp. 137–52.

[25] Sibley, 'Aesthetic Concepts', in *Philosophy Looks at the Arts*, p. 47

[26] Monroe C. Beardsley, 'Reason in Aesthetic Judgements', in *Introductory Readings in Aesthetics*, ed. John Hospers (New York, 1969), pp. 245–53; Monroe C. Beardsley, *Aesthetics*, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis Hackett, 1981), pp 462–70

[27] Douglas Davis, 'Introduction', *Photography As Fine Art*, ed. Bryan Holme (New York, 1983), p 7.

[28] R G. Collingwood, *The Principles of Art* (Oxford U.P., 1958), ch 14, p. 323.

[29] See Aaron Copland, *What to Listen for in Music* (New York: McGraw-Hill, Mentor Books, 1957), particularly ch 16

[30] Gerhard Kubik, 'Transcription of African Music from Silent Film. Theory and Methods', *African Music* 5 (1972), p. 33

[31] Alan P Merriam, 'African Concepts of Time-reckoning', in *Music East and West*, ed Thomas Noblitt (New York: Pendragon Press, 1981), pp 423–41, and Hewitt Pantaleoni, 'Three Principles of Timing in Anlo Dance Drumming', *African Music* 5 (1972), p 62

[32] John Schaefer, *New Sounds· A Listener's Guide to New Music* (New York Harper & Row, 1987), pp. 147–50.

[33] Recent defenders of this view include Jenefer M Robinson, 'Style and Significance in Art History and Art Criticism' *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 40 (1981), pp 5–14, and B Jessup, 'Taste and Judgment in Aesthetic Experience' Jessup mistakenly holds that good taste must be 'broad' and 'will find pleasure in a Japanese landscape as much as in a typical homeland scene', pp. 56–7.

[34] Ducasse stresses that the connoisseur is always confined to 'some particular aesthetic field', but he offers neither arguments for nor explanation of such limitations. Ducasse, *Philosophy of Art*, p. 281

Peter Kivy has suggested that anyone who 'finds *King Lear* without merit' can be suspected of being irrational. I suggest that Kivy is too harsh; such a person is probably quite ignorant, not irrational. See Peter Kivy, 'Aesthetics and Rationality', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 34 (1975), pp 51–7.

[35] *down beat* the jazz magazine, runs a regular column called 'Blindfold Test' Jazz records are played for musicians, who evaluate and comment upon the recordings without benefit of any information about what they are evaluating. The test is an interesting manifestation of the sort of competence I have in mind; even when the judges hear unfamiliar recordings, they display a remarkable success at determining the musicians playing the piece, its composer, and the influences on the musicians and composer.

[36] E g , Allan Bloom's bitter words about rock music in *The Closing of the American Mind* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), pp 68–81 I have heard sentiments such as Bloom's at conferences on philosophy of art.

[37] See Michael Krausz, 'The Tonal and the Foundational: Ansermet on Stravinsky', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 42 (1984), pp. 383–6. Krausz's attack on Ansermet's criticism of Stravinsky supports the argument of this paper.

[38] E.g , Bruce Vermazen, 'Comparing Evaluations of Works of Art', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 34 (1975), pp. 7–14.

[*] Many of the ideas developed in this paper first arose in conversations with Todd Matzner, Dana Hutt, and Timothy Gracyk. I thank them for sharing their time and insights. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at California State University, San Bernardino, and Moorhead State University, Minnesota. I thank both audiences for their comments.

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SCHOPENHAUER'S ACCOUNT OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

T. J. Diffey

I

FIRST I shall outline some aspects of Schopenhauer's account of aesthetic experience[1] of representational art; then I shall say something about the influence of this account in Anglo-American aesthetics since the Second World War, when analytic philosophy began to turn its attention to aesthetics, or at any rate about the influence of what is analogous to Schopenhauer's position, even if not always derived from him as a direct influence. I shall conclude with some comments about those problems which the Schopenhauerian legacy has bequeathed to aesthetics.

The supreme fact about life according to Schopenhauer is that it is dominated by will; and the importance of art lies in the rare capacity it has to escape from this domination.[2]

> If, raised by the power of mind, a man relinquishes the common way of looking at things, gives up tracing, under the guidance of the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, their relations to each other, the final goal of which is always a relation to his own will; if he thus ceases to consider the where, the when, the why, and the whither of things, and looks simply and solely at the *what*; if, further, he does not allow abstract thought, the concepts of the reason, to take possession of his consciousness, but, instead of all this, gives the whole power of his mind to perception, sinks himself entirely in this, and lets his whole consciousness be filled with the quiet contemplation of the natural object actually present, whether a landscape, a tree, a mountain, a building, or whatever it may be, inasmuch as he *loses* himself in this object . . . *i.e.*, forgets even his individuality, his will, and only continues to exist as the pure subject, the clear mirror of the object, so that it is as if the object alone were there, without any one to perceive it, and he can no longer separate the perceiver from the perception, but both have become one, because the whole consciousness is filled and occupied with one single sensuous picture; if thus the object has to such an extent passed out of all relation to something outside it, and the subject out of all relation to the will, then that which is so known is no longer the particular thing as such; but it is the *Idea*, the eternal form . . . and, therefore, he who is sunk in this perception is no longer individual, for in such perception the individual has lost himself; but he is *pure*, will-less, painless, timeless *subject of knowledge* (1, p 231)

In ordinary life, according to Schopenhauer, 'we consider things, as a rule, merely in their relations, consequently according to their relative and not their absolute nature and existence' (3, p. 133).

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> But what kind of knowledge is concerned with that which is outside and independent of all relations, that which alone is really essential to the world, the true content of its phenomena, that which is subject to no change, and therefore is known with equal truth for all time, in a word, the *Ideas*, which are the direct and adequate objectivity of the thing-in-itself, the will? We answer, *Art*, the work of genius. It repeats or reproduces the eternal Ideas grasped through pure contemplation, the essential and abiding in all the phenomena of the world . . . (1, pp. 238–9)


'The common mortal', so Schopenhauer claims:

> is . . . not capable, at least not continuously so, of observation that in every sense is wholly disinterested, as sensuous contemplation, strictly so called, is. He can turn his attention to things only so far as they have some relation to his will, however indirect it may be. Since in this respect, which never demands anything but the knowledge of relations, the abstract conception of the thing is sufficient, and for the most part even better adapted for use; the ordinary man does not linger long over the mere perception, does not fix his attention long on one object, but in all that is presented to him hastily seeks merely the concept under which it is to be brought, as the lazy man seeks a chair, and then it interests him no further. . . . The man of genius, on the other hand, whose excessive power of knowledge frees it at times from the service of will, dwells on the consideration of life itself, strives to comprehend the Idea of each thing, not its relations to other things . . . (1, pp. 242–3)

States of willing are essentially painful in character. Schopenhauer held that willing arises from want, that a wish ceases when it is satisfied but that this does us no good, since 'for one wish that is satisfied there remain at least ten which are denied' (1, p. 253). Moreover, the desire 'lasts long', satisfaction 'is short' and a satisfied wish 'at once makes room for a new one . . . No attained object of desire can give lasting satisfaction, but merely a fleeting gratification' (1, p. 253). Thus, 'so long as we are the subject of willing, we can never have lasting happiness nor peace' but 'without peace no true well-being is possible' (1, p. 254). This is the ground of the famous charge against Schopenhauer of pessimism, notwithstanding, so his critics complained, his rather cheerful life-style.

The 'real end of paintings', according to Schopenhauer, 'as of art in general, is to make the comprehension of the (Platonic) Ideas of the nature of the world easier for us . . .' (3, p. 197). In aesthetic perception, whether as artist or spectator, we forget our individuality and become the pure subject of knowledge, and then, 'we are only that *one* eye of the world which looks out from all knowing creatures, but which can become perfectly free from the service of will in man alone' (1, p. 256).

If 'I contemplate a tree aesthetically', Schopenhauer says, '*i.e.*, with artistic eyes, and thus recognize, not it, but its Idea, it becomes at once of no consequence whether it is this tree or its predecessor which flourished a thousand years ago, and whether the observer is this individual or any other that



lived anywhere and at any time' (1, p. 271). But anything considered in its application to useful ends, anything which 'serves the will and not pure knowledge' ceases, Schopenhauer says, 'to be art in our sense' (1, p. 276). 'Everything is beautiful only so long as it does not concern us' (3, p. 136), he proclaims, and later: 'To be of no use belongs to the character of the works of genius' (3, p. 154). Such in brief outline, then, is Schopenhauer's account of aesthetic experience.

II

Although Schopenhauer is rarely named in the literature of Anglo-American aesthetics written since the Second World War, there are nevertheless surprising echoes to be heard of the Schopenhauerian position just outlined. Take for example the influential paper by Stuart Hampshire: 'Logic and Appreciation'.[3] Hampshire does not mention Schopenhauer's name but the view of aesthetic perception which pervades his argument is Schopenhauerian.

The gist of Hampshire's argument is this: aesthetic judgements are not comparable in purpose with moral judgements and there are no problems in aesthetics comparable with those of ethics. 'A work of art is gratuitous', that is, it is 'not *essentially* the answer to a question or the solution of a presented problem.' A spectator attends, say, to a work of art for the sake of its intrinsic qualities. Unlike an action a work of art is self-justifying; it bears its justification on its face. Works of art may be regarded as free creations, 'to be enjoyed or neglected for what they are'. An art critic 'is a mere spectator and he has the spectator's total irresponsibility; it is only required that he should see the object exactly as it is'. A critic for example does not have to say what should be in the work of art that he is criticizing, whereas a moralist, if he criticizes an action must also say what instead of the offending action should have been done. What the critic has to do is to lead people to look at the work of art, to see it as individual and unrepeatable.

'The spectator-critic in any of the arts', Hampshire says, 'needs gifts precisely the opposite of the moralist's; he needs to suspend his natural sense of purpose and significance.' But to 'hold attention still upon any particular thing is unnatural; normally, we take objects—whether perceived by sight, touch, hearing, or by any combination of the senses—as signs of possible actions and as instances of some usable kind; we look through them to their possible uses, and classify them by their uses rather than by sensuous similarities. The common vocabulary, being created for practical purposes, obstructs any disinterested perception of things. . . . Nothing but holding an object still in attention, by itself and for its own sake, would count as having an aesthetic interest in it.' Hampshire speculates about what the language of 'a colony of aesthetes' would be like; such people would be 'disengaged from practical needs and manipulations'.

Aesthetic judgement answers the question: 'What pattern or arrangement of

elements is there to be seen, when one attends to the thing carefully and disinterestedly? . . . The picking out of the elements and of their pattern, in defiance of habit, and practical interest, is a work of practice and skill; . . . Anything whatever may be picked out as an object of aesthetic interest—anything which, when attended to carefully and apart altogether from its uses, provides, by the arrangement of its elements and their suggestion to the imagination, some peculiar satisfaction of its own. An aesthetic judgement has to point to the arrangement of elements, and to show what constitutes the originality of the arrangement in this particular case.'[4]

It must be obvious from my outline of Schopenhauer's aesthetics just how Schopenhauerian Hampshire's account of art and the perception of it is. In Hampshire's view, for something to be an object of aesthetic interest it must be held still in attention and for its own sake. This is a difficult thing to do for it runs against all our practical interests and habits. In Schopenhauerian terms, it amounts precisely to a suspension of the ordinarily dominant principle of life, the operation of the will.

However, although the Schopenhauerian element in Hampshire's account is immediately striking, there are some significant differences, which are less obvious but more interesting. First, Hampshire's account, unlike Schopenhauer's, is in no way Platonist. In Schopenhauer's aesthetics two ideas are intimately connected: namely that aesthetic perception is concerned with seeing the object as it is, independently of any will or desire, *and* that to perceive a work of art is to perceive something akin to a Platonic form or idea. It is this latter notion which in Hampshire's account has completely disappeared, and for that matter from contemporary aesthetics generally. It is not hard to see why. Whatever Plato's forms are, they could not be objects of perception. Perception, which for Schopenhauer offers escape from the will to some more enduring reality, for Plato is fraught with illusion and unreality. In very general terms: where Plato distinguishes between perception and conception to the metaphysical detriment of perception, Schopenhauer distinguishes between the common state of affairs in which perception is in bondage to the will and the liberation which comes from that species of perception which is freed from such servitude.

Hampshire takes it for granted that because aesthetic satisfaction is grounded in non-instrumental perception it cannot consist in anything else; not for example, as Schopenhauer claims, in the apprehension of Ideas. Here Kant's influence is much deeper than Schopenhauer's. So in place of the perception of Platonic Ideas which Schopenhauer offers us, Hampshire's aesthetes are concerned with what pattern or arrangement of elements they can find in the object of aesthetic perception, when that object is thrown out of gear with any practical interests they may have.

Hampshire's aesthetes perceive particulars, whereas Schopenhauer's perceive ideas. Hampshire's aesthetes remain individuals, moreover, each in a Lockean

manner seeking to communicate by means of language that which he or she has seen in the privacy of his or her own mind and which is not normally spoken of. For apparently that which we normally speak of is that which engages our practical interests. Schopenhauer's aesthetes, on the other hand, in the act of aesthetic perception lose their individuality to become pure subjects of knowing. And the object of their knowledge is the essential and no longer the particular. But on Hampshire's account, the object of aesthetic experience is not an object of cognition; there is no knowledge but rather the activity of perceiving pattern or design which lies beyond the reach of conceptualization. Again the Kantian influence is evident.

Hampshire's account is also more Kantian in another respect; namely that it seems to make it only contingently the case that we take an aesthetic attitude to works of art. In the Kantian tradition, the aesthetic attitude may range over any object, whether or not a work of art. For it is notoriously known that many things besides works of art are beautiful and scarcely less often remarked that many works of art fail, at any rate in the more obvious sorts of beauty. In Hegel's aesthetics the work of art is necessarily and not contingently the object of the aesthetic attitude. In the Hegelian tradition, to regard something which is not a work of art aesthetically, say a rose, to take one of Kant's examples, is to regard the rose as if it were a work of art. In the words of Richard Wollheim, who in this respect is a modern Hegelian: 'This, of course, is not to deny that we can regard objects that have not been made as works or art, or for that matter pieces of nature that have not been made at all, as though they had been: we can treat them as works of art'.[5]

Schopenhauer does the apparently impossible and falls here somewhere between the Kantian and the Hegelian positions, which is to say that he does not notice any problem. He begins with the Kantian position by developing his account of aesthetic perception with an example which is not a work of art, or not ordinarily so, namely a chair. He also uses other non-art examples, such as that of a tree. However, he soon passes on, without any sense of encountering differences which need to be respected, to talk of the work of art as materially reproducing the Platonic Idea, and ends up, almost in an aside, in the Hegelian position, when he remarks: 'if, for example, I contemplate a tree aesthetically, *i.e.*, with artistic eyes' . . . (I, p. 271).

On the question of the relationship between works of art and the aesthetic attitude, then, Hampshire is Kantian, whereas Schopenhauer's is a somewhat eclectic position somewhere between Kant's and Hegel's. Kant's account privileges the aesthetic attitude and allows it to range freely over nature and art, though making some significant distinctions between the two; Hegel privileges art, while Schopenhauer starts with an account which conjunctively allows the aesthetic attitude to range over both art and nature but which then settles down to confining its attention to the work of art as expressive of Platonic forms or ideas. This question of how the relationship between art and the aesthetic is

properly to be understood is now one of the problems in aesthetics urgently in need of resolution.[6]

The most striking difference between Hampshire's position and Schopenhauer's, however, concerns the place of language in each account. Hampshire sets himself the task of explaining how his aesthetes could develop a language to communicate to one another the nature of the visual pattern each has perceived, given his assumption that language no less than perception has developed essentially to discharge the practical business of life. Schopenhauer's aesthetes, on the other hand, are assumed to be enraptured in the enjoyment of ineffable experiences making quite unnecessary any discourse with themselves and others. In any case, 'All primary thought', he claims, 'takes place in pictures' (3, p. 141).

III

Another good example of the doctrine that aesthetic perception is non-instrumental in character is to be found in John Hospers's book, *Meaning and Truth in the Arts*,[7] where he describes the aesthetic experience as separated:

> from the needs and desires of everyday life and from the responses which we customarily make to our environment as practical human beings. Ordinarily we perceive a chair simply as something to sit on, a murky sky as a forecast of rain, the sound of a bell as the signal for 'dinner' or 'guests' or 'time to get up'. But the esthetic attitude can occur only when this practical response to our environment is held in suspension. We may take pleasure in regarding the sky as a mass of shifting forms and shades of color, and not merely as an indicator of weather changes; we may contemplate with a peculiar delight entirely divorced from practical considerations the spectacle of a building burning at night, the flames rising into the dark sky and illuminating the faces of the awed spectators. On these occasions we are perceiving something 'not for the sake of action, but for the sake of perceiving'.[8]

On this account it becomes problematic to explain how works of art, *if* they are the object of the aesthetic attitude and *this* is what the aesthetic attitude is, could ever have been taken with the seriousness we ordinarily give them.

Schopenhauer's own theory escapes this difficulty, since his doctrine of non-instrumental perception is not the entire story but merely the first part of an account which goes on to treat the object of aesthetic perception not as some unconceptualizable pattern, arrangement or design perceived for its own sake but as a Platonic Idea. This may be problematic *metaphysics* but it comes to grips with the problem of explaining the importance of art better than the rather stripped-down view of the aesthetic which we have inherited.[9]

Hospers too is plainly aware of the somewhat attenuated view of the aesthetic his preliminary account would seem to leave him with. Accordingly he seeks to thicken it, not as Schopenhauer does by locating Platonic forms in works of art

as the object of non-instrumental perception, but by distinguishing two senses of the aesthetic: a thick sense and a thin sense:

> When the painter views from a distance the New York skyline as an interplay of lines and spaces, colors and volumes, he would generally be said to be contemplating it esthetically; but what of his attitude when he contemplates it as a center of seething humanity with all manner of conflicting purposes and ideals, or as small bits of animated matter darting about, crowded together in an area infinitesimally small when compared with the vast reaches of the universe? What of the artist who observes the green field not in terms of arrangement of balancing masses or shifting color-patterns but as an expression of the life of simple people, or of what we may roughly call 'pastoral quality'? All but the most sophisticated 'purists,' I think, would agree that both are esthetic; but there is certainly a difference between these last-mentioned examples and the others.[10]

Hospers says that certain purists declare 'that strictly *esthetic* appreciation occurs only when we are concerned with surface- and form-values'. However, he seeks to thicken up this account of the aesthetic by introducing a distinction between two senses of the word 'esthetic'. The aesthetic purist is concerned with surface-values and form-values, and this is to be concerned with the aesthetic in what Hospers, intending no criticism, calls the 'thin' sense of the word. But there are also what he calls 'life-values' to be considered. 'When we contemplate a painting as something more than a set of relationships of lines and colors, when we enjoy the mood it conveys or the light-values presented in it, or the "sadness" of a piece of music, or the character-study in a novel, or the love-emotion in a poem, I suggest that this kind of experience, depending on previous experience of life, to which the "purists" would deny the title "esthetic" at all, be called the *thick* sense of "esthetic" '.[11] Some works of art are then said to be aesthetic in the thin sense, such as those of Botticelli and Matisse, while others, such as those of Rembrandt and Van Gogh, are said to be aesthetic in the thick sense.

The philosophically interesting point about this, I believe, is that in seeking to give a thicker account of the aesthetic than our scaled-down inheritances from Kant and Schopenhauer will permit, it is as if Hospers has only the resources of the aesthetic itself to call upon. Or more precisely, he must draw his distinctions within an autonomous domain, precisely because the metaphysical extravagances of Schopenhauer or the Christian faith of Kant can no longer be relied upon culturally or philosophically to give any backing to the aesthetic; which thus finds itself somewhat stranded in a glorious—or unintelligible—isolation. For we are much further along the road of aesthetic autonomy than either Kant or Schopenhauer were and it is this which is so apparent in the arguments of Hospers and of Hampshire.

Schopenhauer's aesthetics attains its 'thickness' by depending on metaphysical assumptions alien to contemporary academic philosophy: namely that peace of mind is intrinsically the best state of mind to be in or to have, and that to have

perceptual knowledge of the forms of nature is instrumental to securing this peace of mind by setting aside the urgencies of will and desire. Thus artist and audience are permitted a momentary glimpse of that peace which can only permanently be found in nirvana, if we are ever enlightened enough to escape from the rounds of rebirth, that is, from the machinations of the will.

Our contemporary conception of the aesthetic attitude is apparently much more evidently influenced by Kant than by Schopenhauer. Nevertheless this maintains Schopenhauer's emphasis on non-instrumental perception while quietly dropping his views of the work of art as a sort of Platonic idea and of course the oriental assumptions upon which Schopenhauer's account is ultimately grounded. But our contemporary conception of the aesthetic also gives us an attenuated version of Kant, for he too has a thicker account of the aesthetic than we do. His fault, however, is that where Schopenhauer is too oriental, Kant is too Christian for contemporary philosophical taste. For what is not often sufficiently understood about our contemporary aesthetic theories is that they are expected to operate within a totally secular view of the world.

IV

The differences between Kant's aesthetics and Schopenhauer's are interesting in themselves and in their implications for aesthetics today. Given Schopenhauer's self-proclaimed discipleship of Kant, it is piquant that there should be any significant differences, but differences there are. Let us begin with what Schopenhauer himself says they are and then move on to those which he does not acknowledge. Schopenhauer, then, says of *The Critique of Aesthetic Judgement* that Kant: 'does not start from the beautiful itself, from the perceptible and immediately beautiful, but from the *judgment* of the beautiful, the so-called, and very badly so-called, judgment of taste. This is his problem. His attention is especially aroused by the circumstance that such a judgment is clearly the expression of something that takes place in the subject, but yet is just as universally valid as if it concerned a quality of the object. It is this that struck him, not the beautiful itself. He starts always merely from the assertions of others, from the judgment of the beautiful, not from the beautiful itself' (2, p. 154). So of course does the work of the post-war phase of Anglo-American aesthetics.[12]

There are three principal differences between Schopenhauer's aesthetics and Kant's which Schopenhauer does not himself call attention to. First, Schopenhauer's aesthetics is cognitivist and Platonist, whereas Kant's is anti-cognitivist and, in an attenuated sense, subjectivist. Secondly, Schopenhauer drops the demand that aesthetic response must be the personal response of the spectator-subject. On these two points recent aesthetics has largely followed Kant and ignored Schopenhauer. Thirdly, Schopenhauer ties the aesthetic much more closely to art than Kant does.

There is, moreover, a big difference between Schopenhauer's and Kant's

positions in metaphysics which accounts for some differences between the aesthetics. Thus, for Kant, the will is not some painful life-force or metaphysical condition but is to be understood as practical reason and as such the ground of the moral life. So the aesthetic for Kant is not superior to what *he* conceives of as the will but falls somewhere between the delightful (namely that which gratifies) and the good. Delight and aversion, which Kant distinguishes from the will (understood as practical reason), Schopenhauer, more in the manner of Hume and the British empiricists generally, treats as the motivating power of the will. But at least both are agreed that the aesthetic does not reside *here*.

For Kant, the beautiful is that which pleases apart from a concept. And for Schopenhauer too the ideas that are the objects of aesthetic contemplation are not concepts, but neither do they operate in the manner claimed by Kant for aesthetic experience. Rather, for Kant we have in the beautiful not the perception of some essential form or idea but the intimation of purpose, finality or design in the thing judged to be beautiful. Yet this purposefulness is more properly felt than perceived, and for all the reasons set out in the First Critique certainly cannot be conceptualized. Thus, for Kant, to judge that something is beautiful is to feel as if it had purpose or design where the nature of these in the particular instance cannot be asserted or affirmed, whereas for Schopenhauer, on the other hand, the aesthetic lies not in something that is felt, but in the perception of an atemporal object such as the Platonic form of tree. In such 'perception' if, balking the metaphysical difficulties, this is what it is, anything pertaining to purpose has been dropped.

Kant's whole philosophy, on the other hand, not to speak merely of his aesthetics, is anti-Platonist. The First Critique establishes that space and time are the necessary conditions of perception; therefore it would be impossible to have a perceptual experience of an atemporal object, such as a Platonic Idea of tree. Thus for Kant art is not the apprehension of some sort of Platonic world but that which, like beautiful natural objects, appeals to the subject's sense of pleasure by calling into free play the faculties of understanding and imagination which ordinarily are harnessed to cognition. In other words, Kant stresses the subjective side of aesthetic experience, the play of mind of the aesthetic spectator. Minds structured for cognition are the precondition of aesthetic experience but on the Kantian view there is no object of aesthetic experience in the sense, as there is for Schopenhauer, of there being some sort of Platonic idea known in the will-less perception of aesthetic experience.

Thus for Kant works of art may give intimations of the transcendent but, contrary to Schopenhauer, they certainly cannot reveal, present or portray it. In any case, for Kant the beauty of nature is superior to the beauty of art, whereas for Schopenhauer, I have suggested, there are no significant differences, aesthetically speaking, between art and nature. The artist transcribes to the work of art those Platonic ideas which he or she has seen in nature for the benefit of the spectator unendowed with genius. And though in the perception of the

sublime the spectator may have his or her sense of self overwhelmed and as if annihilated, in the perception of the beautiful, by contrast, for Kant the spectator remains conscious of the fact that he or she is exercising taste. But to plume myself on my taste as I contemplate the beauties of, say, Poussin is precisely not the way, as Schopenhauer would insist that in aesthetic experience we do, to lose all sense of self.

V

What is still alive in aesthetics is Schopenhauer's account of aesthetic perception in terms of its non-practicality or non-instrumentality. Interest here is in the 'whatness' of things, as opposed to any concern with their whys and wherefores. What has been stripped away in our own day is the context in which Schopenhauer advanced this view, namely his metaphysical doctrine of the will in terms of which his aesthetic theory is given point or sense. His doctrine of sufficient reason or theory of what constitutes an explanation against which aesthetic experience is to be contrasted as non-theoretical and non-conceptual, and his Platonistic thesis that the object of aesthetic perception is an Idea and not a particular have also disappeared from the contemporary scene.

This leaves us with the difficulty that we no longer have the means of explaining what the significance of aesthetic experience is. For Schopenhauer aesthetic experience is instrumentally good for the peace it momentarily brings in a world whose main feature is pain and suffering. For us on the other hand to whom as philosophers this sort of thing may not appeal, aesthetic perception has to be taken as self-evidently good or intelligible. We are simply forced back on the claim that it just is good to appreciate the appearance of things for their own sake.

It is particularly easy here to slide between the terms 'art' and 'aesthetic', but how to understand the connection between art and the aesthetic was not a problem for Schopenhauer, since, as we have seen, he seeks to give an integrated account of the two. But it is a problem for us because in effect we have thrown away Schopenhauer's Platonist philosophy of art while keeping only his account of aesthetic perception in terms of its non-instrumentality.

Another way of putting this point is to say that on Schopenhauer's full theory we can see what the aesthete's motive for contemplation is, namely the search for some kind of transcendent experience to ease the discontents of ordinary life. We may not like this and we may think that art engages other motives, or that transcendent experience is no more self-justifying than the experience of surface pattern or design. But at least Schopenhauer attempts some sort of explanation as to why the aesthetic should interest, whereas on Hampshire's account, for example, we just have to accept his colony of aesthetes as a going concern, without any explanation to hand for why anybody should wish to behave as these colonists do. The difficulty here is not, as Hampshire would have it, simply that language, fashioned for practical purposes, makes the aesthete's task

difficult. The deeper difficulty is to see why the task should be carried out at all.

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REFERENCES

[1] I shall concentrate on the account Schopenhauer gives in his great work, *The World as Will and Idea*, but only selectively I say nothing about his theory of music Nor is this the place to give a comprehensive account of his philosophy, in particular his metaphysics, though the aesthetics is closely related to, if indeed not derived from, the metaphysics.

[2] Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*. Translated into English by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp (London, three vols, 1909), Vol. 1, p. 199 Henceforth all page references to this work are given in parentheses in the text.

[3] First published in the *World Review* in 1952 and reprinted in the seminal anthology, *Aesthetics and Language*, edited by William Elton (Basil Blackwell, 1959), pp 161–9.

[4] Hampshire, op. cit., in Elton, quotations taken from pages 162–8.

[5] Richard Wollheim, *Art and its Objects* (Cambridge U P., revised edition, 1980), section 42.

[6] On this question see Bohdan Dziemidok, 'Controversy about the Aesthetic Nature of Art', *British Journal of Aesthetics* (Vol 28, No 1), Winter 1988.

[7] John Hospers, *Meaning and Truth in the Arts* (Hamden, Connecticut, U S.A : Archon Books, 1964; first published 1946, University of North Carolina Press).

[8] Hospers, op. cit., p 4 This is pure Schopenhauer, although Schopenhauer's name never appears in the book where instead we find the more familiar names of the tradition. authorities such as Edward Bullough.

[9] Hospers of course does not remain with this bare commitment to non-instrumental perception but adds a further element to his account too: namely in addition to the experience of aesthetic surface values there is also, he claims, the experience of aesthetic form. Such form is not Schopenhauer's Platonic form but signifies such things as the balance and symmetry of objects arranged in space Hospers, op. cit., p. 9.

[10] Hospers, op cit , pp. 8–9.

[11] Hospers, op. cit , pp 13–14

[12] Schopenhauer says later that: 'By far the best part of the "Critique of Aesthetical Judgment" is the theory of the sublime. It is incomparably more successful than that of the beautiful' (2, pp 155–6), which, given a renewed contemporary interest in the sublime, is of particular interest.

This paper is an extensively revised version of a lecture given in March 1988 to a day-meeting jointly organized by the Goethe Institute of Amsterdam, the Nederlandse Studiekring voor Esthetica and the University of Amsterdam to commemorate the bicentenary of the birth of Arthur Schopenhauer. Versions have also been read to the University of Sussex Philosophy Society; the 1988 Annual Conference of the British Society of Aesthetics; the Polish Philosophical Society meeting at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, University of Gdansk; the University of Exeter 11th Creative Arts Summer School, Dillington College, Ilminster; and the University of Kent at Canterbury Philosophy Society.

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ARTIST–WORK–AUDIENCE: MUSINGS ON BARTHES AND TOLSTOY

Lucian Krukowski

ONE REASON why the concept of art is unruly is that it easily breaks into three parts; these are: 'artist', 'work', 'audience'. To be sure, few agree about the identity or relation of these parts, and one or more parts are regularly banished for irrelevancy only to be reinstated when a weakness in a companion augurs a change in the ruling theory. As with other trinities, one may have one's favourites—one may, e.g., champion creating over appreciating, or deny them both for the sake of form—but at times of conceptual duress, it is good to know that the alternatives are around. Of course, there are some who would like to get rid of all the parts or, ecumenically, to regard them as equals. But either of these is hard to do because, as in other revolutions, those who join together in the streets come to sit apart in the chambers and mistrust each other, and the struggle for dominance begins again. Except for the most hardened dualists, casting art as a tripartite affair should come as no surprise. Taken informally, it is properly Hegelian in generating momentum as well as in fitting the ancient aggressive logic of 'scissors, stone and paper'. It also fits well with recent theories, especially of those who take as an artistic mission the denigrating or disowning of parts other than the one with which art is truly concerned.

In the present paper I do not attempt to justify this tripartite schema; I take it as a given.[1] However, for the sake of what follows, two points should be made. (a) There is no theoretical bias built into the array of parts; each part embraces a multitude of viewpoints—the location of dominance having little to do with the particulars of its content. However, a historical lineage can be developed for each part from which a 'meta-content' might be extracted. (b) The specific names designating these parts are not crucial: 'Artist' can be replaced by 'author', 'work' by 'piece', 'audience' by 'spectator' or 'reader', and so on without compromising the triad. Often, however, a particular choice of name—say, 'scriptor' over 'author'—reveals a doctrinal value indicating a preferred relationship between that part and the others.

My limited concern here is to show how my schema can be used to understand some theories of Roland Barthes, specifically, theories that lead him to tilt this schema in favour of the polemical position of 'audience'. To illustrate my point (a) above, I first contrast Barthes with another more traditional figure, Leo Tolstoy. I claim that while Tolstoy also champions the audience, he does so for very different historical and normative reasons than does Barthes.

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In considering Tolstoy's views, one might at first believe that his conjunction of expression and Christian virtues seeks to undermine 'art work' through an alliance between 'artist' and 'audience'. Taking the brotherhood of man to be of more consequence than aesthetic entities (his own included), he treats the art work as a mere conduit through which the 'infection' of a populist Christianity would be transmitted from the artist to the social order. The sincerity and emotional depth of the artist are conjoined with the innocence and receptivity of the audience. They come together in a 'common'—in the sense both of 'mutual' and 'classless'—understanding.[2] Put this way, his thesis provides one of the strong arguments for 'intentionality' in interpretation, and thus seemingly champions the artist as the immediate source of normative value—the work being merely a means of transmission, and the audience only a generalized beneficiary. But I suggest that Tolstoy's real target is neither formalism nor spectator aesthetics. He takes aim, rather, at a certain construal of the artist–audience relationship, that of the 'professional' serving the 'societal élite'. Tolstoy's socialist theories are at issue here: art that caters to decadence—notwithstanding any formal virtues it might have—must itself be decadent, and so must the artist who provides it. The artist *qua* professional is in thrall. His artistic 'intentions'—the purported base of his expressiveness—do not count for appreciation because no one really wants to know. What does count for professionalism is expertise and manner. Content is worked out in negotiations, and commissions define and circumscribe expression. Within this agreement, formal virtues are free to develop.[3]

Given his dislike of his own socially stratified culture, and having himself as an exemplar, one first expects that Tolstoy would find both his social aims and his own sense of 'artist' more compatible with the notion of 'expressive freedom'. This notion, when coupled with Tolstoy's social programmes, would also be compatible with a new equivalence between artist and audience, one calling for a transaction between them—a theoretical and normative pact—that would relegate the art work to the tertiary role of doing what it must to keep matters clear. If the artist is seen here as the originary source of the 'infection'—the values to be transmitted—it seems to follow that 'artist', for this theory, is the dominant member of the triad. But I believe this conclusion to be a mistake. Tolstoy, as Plato, has a deep suspicion of private sentiments: for both, the value is in what is expressed and not in the exercise. Tolstoy makes no inference from the quality of expression to its content—although he does make the reverse inference. There is no romantic 'cult of the individual' here. Rather, the exercise of artistic freedom is understood in the theological sense of conformity with revealed truth: one is not free when one errs—only capricious. Granted, Tolstoy's artist can be viewed as a social (if not artistic) advance over the status of 'professional' in that autobiography, belief, and sincerity do count for him. But these count only as testimonials to the wanted ideal—not as its determinants. It is true that artist and audience are joined in a social contract

effected by the transparency of the art work and agreement about the moral will. But this contract requires a surveillance across the bridge of the work, meant to ensure both rightness of artistic sensibility and of its issue. As the audience is both the reason for, and, through its intrinsic 'goodness', the determinant of the articulated ideal, it includes the artist within it. The audience that Tolstoy denounces for its élitism and decadence, when viewed through our tripartite schema, is the dominant member of that (decadent) aesthetic. The audience Tolstoy favours—his 'masses'—simply replaces that first audience in this schema and, thus, remains dominant in his own aesthetic.[4]

For Roland Barthes, the audience is also dominant. But the context of his assault on the other two categorial parts is as unlike Tolstoy's as is the nature of the part he champions. Barthes is certainly not a utopian, although he and Tolstoy would probably share certain social values. He is, if anything, a latter-day stoic. His audience (here, 'reader') is not collective; it is the singular one of individual sensibility, and its primacy is based on the value of autonomous interpretation—or 'reading'. This value is threatened by the persistence of the artist's (here, 'author's') claim to be the voice of the work, and the work's claim that its meaning is exhausted when its author's intentions are revealed. The presence of the author makes the work dependent in that it is formally circumscribed by the sufficiency of that presence. The reader is also dependent as only those interpretations that are consistent with authorial meaning will do. Thus neither work nor reader are autonomous.

There are extra-artistic reasons here—as there are with Tolstoy—for Barthes' dislike of this turn of theory. He locates this presumption of authorial dominance in certain of its social extensions (he calls them 'hypostases') which collectively constitute the substratum underlying the concept of author; they are that realm of pre- or non-textual 'meanings' that give rise to the degraded species of author as 'person'. Barthes finds this author-person (pun unavoidable) in the popular media consorting with rock stars and politicians and so exemplifying 'the epitome and culmination of capitalist ideology'.[5] This alone seems to provide grounds for Barthes to call for—or, circumspectly, to notice—the death of this author. One consequence of the void this death creates is the emergence of a new author, one that Barthes calls a 'scriptor' and locates entirely 'within' the text—thereby eliminating the possibility of contamination by hypostasis.

This depersonalization of author into scriptor is evidently to be taken in a positive sense—both socially and aesthetically. But the new entity, bearing as it does a promise of autonomy for another part—the reader—invites some scrutiny. One comparison that suggests itself is with 'scribe': the one who writes down what Pharaoh says. These two—'scriptor' and 'scribe'—share a sense of passivity; the scriptor has no interests to put forth, and the scribe takes care to hide those he may have. But Barthes' scriptor has no Pharaoh, nor is there a suggestion that one will soon appear. If the 'author-person' is the 'culmination' of capitalism, is the 'author-scriptor' capitalism's last dregs—or

the phoenix flower of a new order? I suspect that Barthes thinks the former—for last dregs, like sediment in good wine, can be enjoyed. There is no revolution here. The death of the author-person is not sudden; it is a lingering one—a wasting away in which the pretensions of personality come to reveal themselves and then fall away. Barthes mentions the underestimated pleasures of perversion and the qualities of friendship—perhaps these serve as substitutes for the excitement of searching the work for its author. I am enough of a Hegelian to suspect that author-as-scriptor has a historical chance at being an adequate account of the writing of what Barthes calls the 'bourgeoise decomposition' —whether he means this as prediction or ideal. But to return to my comparison: another characteristic of both scriptor and scribe, in addition to passivity, seems to be an 'indifference' to the causality connecting source and consequence. Indifference is a peculiar version of the 'timeless present' and is thus a mark of Stoicism—which I have suggested typifies Barthes. Stoicism, as we know, is a philosophy linked to late cultures, and its doctrine of indifference can be seen as a defence against futility. It is a doctrine one would gladly reject at any prospect of regaining one's own youth, but which one retains if the prospect is only to become as the youths of one's old age actually are. The scriptor, by virtue of depersonalization, is a stoic who has defeated time. For others (the reader perhaps), the decomposition proceeds slowly and this provides that certain 'ease' which is Barthes' preferred state. But the scriptor's time is not the 'time of one's life' but the time of writing, and, as Barthes puts it: 'Every text is eternally written here and now'.[6] The scriptor always means what he writes, as he originates with the text. There is nothing—no independent 'authorial' meaning —that struggles to be expressed through the text. Writing, meaning, and scriptor are all a fact, indeed, the same fact. The Stoic rejects the linkage between possibility and preference; the external world of pity and blame is as much to be avoided as is the internal world of hope and despair. If the Stoic is thus indifferent to consequences, there being no good grounds for preferring one to another, so the writing of the scriptor is indifferent to interpretations, for there are no good reasons why any one interpretation should be taken as better than any other.

Barthes has been linked to the thesis that the author's death corresponds to the critic's birth: the 'critic as artist'; 'theory assuming the status of its subject'; 'language become the world'. But I believe this to be wrong—it is too aggressive, too programmatic for Barthes. He defends his autumnal enjoyment against this codification as well. The new 'collective' order in which language would be 'exterior, motionless and dogmatic' is also an enemy: language reified, language become Pharaoh—the dominance of the work through its emissary, the critic. When we look at the transition Barthes makes in the first part of the schema we are using, the transition from 'author' to 'scriptor', we find that there is a parallel one in the second part—the transition from 'work' to 'text'. As Barthes describes it: 'A text is not a line of words releasing a single "theological"

meaning (the message of the Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash'.[7] The author is the 'past' of the work; the scriptor is the 'present' of the writing. As with all his moves, Barthes does not take this replacement as a victory but as an 'uncovering'. Peeling off the historical layers in the third schematic part, what is uncovered is the 'reader'—and Barthes makes the further distinction between reader and critic. The critic is actually child of the author *qua* 'person', and their familial complicity shows a historical progression. In the earlier form, the author—in the fullness of infatuation with self—shapes the extension of life and loves into the intension of the work. Each work 'holds' the author's meaning—or some of it, for there is more in a life than can be compressed into a text. So it is the critic's task to interpret all the texts—the 'life's work'—to get at the life. But we have found that as author-persons proliferate over time, interest in their lives wanes, and aesthetic value migrates elsewhere. It is then recognized that there is more in a work than can be referred to its author's life. A new alliance can now be forged between work and critic. But if the critic is indeed the author's issue, there is an inheritance provided: the twin concepts of domination and closure. The formalist attack on intentionality is a helpmate here, for the ascendency of the critic over the work is based on the thesis that the value of the work rests in language rather than in its author, and that the determination of such value is the provenance of the critic. This thesis, however, does not undermine the entities involved, it merely transfers power—closure is maintained. So there still are good and bad works as there were before, but now the critic not only knows but makes the difference. Yet, whether aesthetic value here is construed as 'in' a work, or as 'put in' by the critic, it remains objective and is thus a property of things rather than concepts. As such, it is to be guarded as one does one's other possessions—and this is also the critic's provenance.[8]

Surely, for Barthes, the audience as 'critic' is as much part of the 'bourgeoise decomposition' as is the author as 'person', and both need waiting out—not so much to be vanquished as studiously avoided. So let us see where this brings us. Barthes replaces 'critic' with 'reader' who joins with the other surrogates, 'scriptor' and 'text', in a new triad. This triad, unlike the other, is one from which all contention has disappeared for it has the characteristic that its parts, while there for inspection and enjoyment, will merge with each other at the slightest provocation. Saying this, however, seems to deny my original statement: that 'audience' is dominant in Barthes' theory. In one sense it is a denial—in the specific sense that Barthes rejects dominance as a relationship and, thus, supervenience as a method. In another sense, however, reading only becomes possible when the concept of 'work' expands to include everything that can be read as 'text', and that is possible only when texts become actions in the eternal present: 'writings'. To see the world as text in this inclusive sense is a child's view, and a child's response is play.[9] This is also the reader's response, but it must be properly understood: a child's play is serious; it is not 'childsplay',

but a response in kind to a world that 'has play', a response that puts that world together. Barthes' reader does the same with writing. As Barthes puts it: 'The reader is the space on which all the quotations that make up a writing are inscribed without any of them being lost; a text's unity lies not in its origin but in its destination'.[10] The notion of a space in which past voices come together is not an image of dominance, but it does contain an ontological claim: scriptor and writing, in discarding author and work, lose concreteness; in themselves they are little more than judgements on the despotism of their sources. But as inscriptions—as particular readings—they (re)gain the existence that art requires.

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[1] This paper is part of a larger work-in-progress where a justification of this schema is attempted.
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[3] Ibid., Chapters VII–VIII, pp 184–96.
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[5] Roland Barthes, *Image, Music, Text* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), p. 143
[6] Ibid., p. 145
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ONCE IS NOT ENOUGH?

Michael Wreen

ALTHOUGH NOT always an issue accorded a great deal of attention by philosophers, the individuation of works of art has certainly come to the fore in the last twenty years or so. Along with it, and with special thanks to Arthur Danto, have come what many take to be two related issues, namely whether art has any intrinsic connection with the perceptual, and what, if anything, the relation of art and the aesthetic is. The last of these issues won't even be broached here; the second will be more brushed against than wrestled with; and, sorry to say, even the first, the individuation of works of art, won't be treated with anything like completeness. Still, I think the paper may be of some interest.

The sole object of my concern will be a single case, one involving (supposedly) two perceptually indistinguishable literary works: the *Don Quixote* of Miguel Cervantes and the *Don Quixote* of Pierre Menard. The case has its origin in fiction, in a short story by Jorges Luis Borges, the well-known Argentine writer, but it's Danto who has brought it to the attention of contemporary Anglo-American philosophers. Danto thinks it shows that two literary works can be perceptually indistinguishable and yet be two, not one, in number, and that the concept of art has no intrinsic connection with the perceptual. While not doubting the first of these claims (I do have serious doubts about the second), I'll be arguing that the case of Pierre Menard provides no evidence for it. That is to say, I'll be criticizing Danto's argument for the numerical distinctness of the *Quixotes* and, more positively, arguing that the details of the case require us to infer the existence of a single work.

I

Danto begins chapter two of his book *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace*[1] by addressing an issue he identifies as 'the identity of an artwork' (p. 33). The closely related issue of the individuation of works of art is also discussed by him, however, and is in fact really more the object of his attention than identity *per se*. Or at least so it seems to me. Be that as it may, it'll certainly be the main object of my attention.

That there could be two numerically distinct works of art that share all their perceptual properties has already been shown in the first chapter of his book, Danto thinks, but the examples used there to prove as much involved paintings, and the point is a general one, holding across the arts, for all the arts. It 'was first recognized . . . in connection with literary works by Borges, who has the glory

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of having discovered it in his masterpiece, *Pierre Menard, Symbolist Poet*' (p. 33).[2] In Borges' fictional piece—for 'Pierre Menard' is a work of fiction—Menard, a turn-of-the-century failed academic and symbolist poet, undertakes the task of writing a new *Quixote*, one word-for-word identical with Cervantes' original *Quixote*, but not thereby numerically identical with it. Before his death, he succeeded in producing only two chapters and a fragment of a third, Borges tells us, but, for the time being at least, we can ignore this detail and imagine, as Danto does most of the time, that he finished the job and produced an entire *Quixote*.

II

Do we really need to consider this case at all, though, someone might ask. After all, Borges' story is a work of fiction and his main character, Menard, thus the fictional author of a further fictional work, the *Quixote*. Fiction folded in fiction is too far afield for fair philosophy to fathom—so it might be argued, the point being that Danto's discussion is of no philosophical moment because itself philosophically ill founded. Why? Because Cervantes is a real man, Menard merely a fictional one; and Cervantes' book a real book, Menard's only fictional. The things being compared are categorically different, ontologically speaking, and so any philosophical moral drawn from a comparison of the two—and especially any ontological moral drawn theretofore—is methodologically unsound. A careful discussion of the differences between, say, the billhook that Clym Yeobright uses in *The Return of the Native* and the one that Walter Weber uses in his garden in Willingboro is, as far as *Consumer Reports* or, more to the point, ontology—even the ontology of garden tools—is concerned, simply beside the point. The procedure is methodologically flawed from the start, and the results worthless. For a philosopher to treat Menard as similar in kind to Cervantes, and their literary fruits likewise similar in kind, is methodologically flawed for the same reason. Methodologically, it's on a par with a biologist treating unicorns seriously, and including a careful discussion of them, and of differences between them and, say, zebras in a biology text. Mythological creatures have no place in a biology text; mythological authors and texts no place in a philosophical one. Thus while comparing and contrasting the real and the fictional may be fun, and may even be imperative in interpreting fiction itself,[3] the procedure is clearly wrongheaded if the objective is philosophical truth.

So runs the argument against taking Danto's discussion seriously. But while its force must be admitted, I still think that the man should be allowed to pitch the game. Comparing apples and (not oranges but) imaginary oranges may be off-limits for the produce industry and for good ontologists of all stripes, but a gentle re-interpretation of what Danto is about will return him to the mound, I think, and remove any suspicion that methodological spitballs are being thrown. For Danto's real point, at least as I read him, is that we should consider

the Menard case as if it really happened, or at least could have happened, and to forget its fictionality altogether. The suggestion, in other words, is that we 'bracket' the fact that the case is a fictional one, with Menard a fictional author and 'his' *Quixote* a fictional work, and think of it simply as hypothetical. Hypothetical cases, even very far-fetched ones, are a staple of philosophy, and not in the least methodologically suspect—witness Thomson's plugged-in violinst, Wiggins's transplanted brain, Gettier's Mr Nogot, and Hume's famous key, to cite only four examples. Such cases show us the limits of our concepts, even if nothing remotely like them ever occurs or even could occur, physically speaking. Although care must be taken in using them, and although they aren't the be-all and end-all of philosophy, they can still tell us a great deal about the morality of abortion, the nature of personal identity, the definition of knowledge, or the objectivity of aesthetic evaluation. Danto's suggestion, then, is that we think of the Menard case this way: 'Suppose there were a man, Pierre Menard, and suppose that he . . .'. So read, categorical differences between the real and the fictional evaporate, and Menard and his *Quixote* stand before us, ready to instruct us in ontology.

Danto having been defended on that point, we can return to the case itself to ask, would Menard's really be a new *Quixote*, one numerically distinct from Cervantes'? Danto's own answer is unequivocal: it certainly would be.

> The two works identified by Borges, that of Cervantes and that of Menard, would generate classes of indiscernible copies, the one class copies of the work of Cervantes, the other copies of that of Menard: but these would be copies of different, even importantly different, works, though nothing would be easier than to mistake a copy of Cervantes for a copy of Menard. Two copies of the Cervantes work are copies of the same work, as are two copies of the Menard work; but a copy of Cervantes and a copy of Menard are copies of different works, though they look as much like one another as do paired copies of the same work. (p. 34)

But since perceptually indistinguishable or orthographically identical books are usually instances of the same work, the question that immediately arises is, 'What makes them copies of *different* works?' (p. 34). Danto's answer is that:

> It is a consequence of a theory of Leibniz that if two things have all the same properties they are identical, and that identity indeed means that, for every property F, *a* is identical with *b* in case, whenever *a* is F, so is *b*. It must follow that if the works in question have all the same properties, they must be identical. But Borges' point is that they do not. They have only in common properties that the eye as such might identify. So much the worse for the properties that meet the eye, then, in individuating works of art.

What properties don't they share, then? Lots, apparently. For clarity's sake, let me number them.

> [1] Borges tells us that the *Quixote* of Menard is infinitely more subtle than that of Cervantes, while that of Cervantes is immeasurably more coarse than its counter-

> part. . . . [2] Cervantes 'opposes to the fiction of chivalry the tawdry provincial reality of his country'. . . . Menard on the other hand [*on the other hand!*] selects for his reality 'the land of Carmen during the century of Lepanto and Lope de Vega'. . . . [3] Menard was perhaps making an oblique characterization of *Salambo* as a piece of historical fiction, [but] no such intention would have been possible for Cervantes. . . . [4] 'The contrast in style is also vivid', Borges writes: 'The archaic style of Menard . . . suffers from a certain affectation. Not so that of his forerunner, who handles with ease the current Spanish of his time'. [5] Had Menard lived to complete his [his!] *Don Quixote*, he would have had to invent one character more than was required of Cervantes' fancy, namely the author of the (so-called uniquely in Menard's case) 'Autobiographical Fragment'. And so on. (p. 35)

What we learn from all this is that literary works 'are in part constituted by their location in the history of literature as well as by their relationships to their authors. . . . You cannot isolate these factors from the work since they penetrate, so to speak, the *essence* of the work' (pp. 35–6). Although he has more to say about 'Pierre Menard', this is Danto's main argument about Borges' story, and so it'll be the main object of my critical attention here.

III

In order to show that the works are numerically distinct, Danto appeals to a principle of Leibniz, usually called The Identity of Indiscernibles, in conjunction with a number of claims concerning specific property differences between Cervantes' work and Menard's. The Identity of Indiscernibles is basically that if an object, x_1, and an object, x_2, share all their properties, then they are numerically identical. As Danto puts it: 'if two things have all the same properties they are identical, and . . . identity indeed means that, for every property F, *a* is identical with *b* in case, whenever *a* is F, so is *b*'.

There are basically two problems with what Danto says about The Identity of Indiscernibles. The first is that the principle is used uncritically by him, while its truth, or at least its truth as a logically necessary principle, has been questioned by a number of philosophers. From Kant onwards, doubts have been raised about it.[4] More importantly, however, even if the principle were true and uncontroversial, its use is out of place here. The reason for this is that Danto argues about Cervantes' and Menard's *Quixotes* this way: (1) If all the properties are shared, then the objects are identical; but (2) not all the properties are shared; (3) therefore, the objects aren't identical. Such an argument commits the fallacy of denying the antecedent.

What Danto evidently needs is not the Identity of Indiscernibles but the Indiscernibility of Identicals, the principle that if an object, x_1, is identical with an object, x_2, then x_1 and x_2 share all their properties. The Indiscernibility of Identicals would allow his main argument to be a valid *modus tollens* instead of an invalid denial of the antecedent. Better still for Danto, the mistaken objections of a few to The Indiscernibility of Identicals aside—mistaken because they're based on confusing the principle in question with the principle of substitutivity

or referential transparency ('Co-referential terms can be substituted for each other *salva veritate*')—The Indiscernibility of Identicals is a true and uncontroversial principle. With this correction in place, then, we can go on to look at the second stage of Danto's argument, the stage in which he claims that, on my count, there are at least five properties that Menard's and Cervantes' works don't share.

IV

There are basically two grounds on which the second stage of Danto's argument could be challenged. First, the specific property differences alleged could be questioned. One could go down his list item by item, showing, in each case, that there is no good reason to think that the works differ. Unless each and every supposed difference can be shown doubtful, however, Danto's conclusion would remain intact, since, on The Indiscernibility of Identicals, even one difference would suffice to show the works distinct. The first ground on which Danto's argument could be questioned, then, is an inherently weak one, even if it's in principle capable of showing the argument defective.

More important, it's largely superfluous in light of the second major ground on which the argument could be challenged. For if the works really are identical—and anyone who would seriously challenge the second stage of Danto's argument would probably think as much, else he or she wouldn't challenge it in the first place—then there should be good reason for thinking as much. If that reason is produced, the list as a whole can be disregarded. Attention to particular items wouldn't be needed, since the identity of the works would guarantee that any alleged difference between the two isn't a real one. An explanation of why someone would think that the alleged property differences obtain would still need to be given, however. This second major ground, then, is a much stronger one, one that doesn't require attention to each and every item on Danto's list, but one that does require that a strong argument be given for thinking the works identical. As I think the works are identical, I'll be advancing an argument—I hope a good, strong one—for just such a conclusion. I'll also be offering, in the last paragraph of this paper, a brief explanation of Danto's mistake. Before I do, though, I'd like to employ the first critical strategy mentioned above not to challenge Danto in any major way but to explore certain philosophically interesting issues in the near vicinity.

One very curious feature of Danto's list is that only one item on it, the first one, concerns a property difference between the works of Cervantes and Menard. Every other item concerns a property difference between Cervantes and Menard, the two men. Danto's implicit assumption, I suppose, is that such differences are readily translated into differences between the works, or entail corresponding differences between them. I'm not sure that that's really so. In particular, it seems to me that the fourth one doesn't. The fact that Cervantes handles the Spanish of his time, the late sixteenth and early seventeenth

centuries, with ease, while Menard doesn't handle that particular brand of Spanish with ease, doesn't mean that the style of Menard's *Don Quixote* is affected, while Cervantes' isn't. Psmith, a character in a number of P. G. Wodehouse's novels, handles the particular brand of English he speaks with ease, but his speech is affected none the less. And even if Psmith didn't handle it with ease but with great and grave difficulty, his speech would still be affected. The affectation or lack of affectation of a piece of prose has nothing to do with speaker or writer ease.

Second, consider the second item(s) on Danto's list. Properly translated into supposed differences between the works, the properties in question are *being about the land of* Carmen (had by Menard's work but not Cervantes') and *being about the tawdry provincial reality of seventeenth-century Spain* (had by Cervantes' work but not Menard's—I ignore the indexical element in Danto's original statement, since, Danto notwithstanding, it's not essential). I don't see how the two works differ in respect to such properties. If Cervantes' work describes Spain, and Spain is the country Walter Weber hates most, his work is about, to that extent anyway, the country Walter Weber hates most. The fact that Cervantes didn't know Weber is irrelevant. Cervantes didn't know Aldous Huxley either, but his *Quixote* has the property of being believed by Aldous Huxley to be an extremely boring book. By the same token, if Menard's book is about the land of *Carmen*, so is Cervantes'. Likewise, but for a slightly different reason, if Cervantes' book is about the tawdry provincial reality . . ., so is Menard's, since both evidently concern certain aspects of life in seventeenth-century Spain. Item(s) two, in other words, doesn't (don't) belong on such a list even if the works are, as Danto thinks they are, numerically distinct.

V

But the most interesting question is whether there is a good reason for thinking that Danto's list can be ignored altogether, for the reason mentioned earlier, namely that there is good reason for thinking the works identical. On the basis of what Danto says about Menard, I think there is.

Danto claims that two works are distinct because they differ in properties, and he says that they differ in properties because they were written 'at different times by different authors of different nationalities and literary intentions' (p. 35). If they were written by two different authors—and, for the case at hand, that's the really crucial element among those just mentioned—then the works are indeed two. But if they were written by one and the same person, then not only does Danto have no reason for thinking the two distinct, but there would be good reason for thinking them identical. And in the sense of 'write' in question here, there's good reason for thinking that the two were written by the same man, namely Cervantes. I say this because it seems to follow on Danto's own reading of the story. Basically that reading is this.

Cervantes produced a text, *Don Quixote*, which was read some centuries later

by Menard. A number of years after reading it, Menard produced a text word-for-word identical with Cervantes', one that he even called *Don Quixote*. That alone lets us know, in Danto's words, that Menard's book was no 'miracle of coincidence: [for] the pre-existence of Cervantes' work enters into the explanation of Menard's'. In fact, not only had Menard read Cervantes, he was 'conscious of his predecessor as predecessor', which is to say that it isn't as though Menard produced a text which, when he was producing it, he had no idea it had any connection with Cervantes'. He knew that he had read Cervantes and intended to produce a book that resembled Cervantes' word for word, from beginning to end. As Danto says, 'Menard did not *discover* that what he had written was word for word what Cervantes had set down. His aim was to recreate a work already well known to him' (p. 36). So, it's not just that Menard had read Cervantes; he knew the work well, and acted as he did with an intention to re-create it. Last, saying that Menard did not discover that his and Cervantes' texts were identical suggests one or both of two things. Either (1) the book Menard wrote was, at least in part, written from memory, or (2) Cervantes' text was Menard's literary touchstone, in that he didn't consider a chapter, paragraph, sentence, or whatever finished until it matched Cervantes' exactly: only then, after checking Cervantes, would he know that he had written what he wanted to.

VI

Danto claims that Menard's book would not be a forgery, quotation, imitation, repetition, or copy of Cervantes', but an altogether new book. Granted, as described, it's not a forgery or quotation. Still, given the description of the circumstances under which it was produced, I think that Danto's other claims here are false. First, it certainly looks as if Menard was imitating Cervantes, for he was deliberately patterning the writing in 'his' *Quixote*, right down to the last detail, on Cervantes' *Quixote*, even if he was doing so *post* compositional *facto*. Cervantes' text, after all, was Menard's standard for the successful completion of his task. Second, and again respecting imitation, even while he was composing 'his' *Quixote*, Menard deliberately patterned his writing on Cervantes' other works. This we know because in the story Borges tells us that Menard steeped himself in Cervantes' other writings before undertaking the *Quixote*. Next, Menard evidently repeated Cervantes' text, especially those parts, if any, produced from memory, but the others as well, given his use of a checking procedure to make sure that what he wrote matched Cervantes exactly. Finally, a case could be made for Menard's copying Cervantes' book, given his conscious knowledge of the work, his intention to duplicate it ('recreate' it exactly, as Danto says), and, once again, his checking procedure. Add that large portions were produced from memory, and he certainly was copying, it seems to me.

Two reasons might tell against the copying charge, however. (1) The

Quixote's being 'well known' to Menard—and Danto supplies no descriptive details beyond the words 'well known'—might not include his *initially* producing even parts of it from memory. Since the concept of a copy requires that there be relatively direct and accurate transmission from original to copy, if relatively accurate memories of Cervantes' exact words weren't in Menard's mind as he composed, Menard wouldn't have copied. (2) His check on Cervantes' text occurred, in each case, after, not before, his production of the part checked. Thus, for the reason just specified, if this is *all* Menard did, he didn't copy Cervantes' book.

But these reasons don't rebut the copying charge. The first shows only that Menard *may* not have *initially* copied—a possibility I'll grant. But even granting it, the second reason, respecting *post facto* checking, would seem to entail some production from memory on Menard's part anyway, since after having once checked, gotten wrong, and then gone back to the drawing board,[5] Menard would have retained some memory of the relevant portions of the *Quixote*, and what he retained undoubtedly would have strongly influenced his next draft. Since it looks as if there had to be fairly extensive production from memory no matter what, the copying charge is sustained.

The importance of the preceding is this. *If* Menard's book is a copy of Cervantes'—and a person can copy a book even if, for whatever reason, he labours under the delusion that he's creating a new work—then by both Danto's (p. 36) and my reckoning, the books are identical. But even if it's not a copy, strictly speaking—even if Menard didn't produce anything directly from memory, and even if, *arguendo*, he somehow produced an exact duplicate of Cervantes' text the first time he tried to write such a duplicate—even if that were so, the resultant product would still be close enough to a copy to inherit our intuitions respecting copies. For even if the term 'copy' is out of place, Menard produced a text word-for-word identical with Cervantes' from an intention to produce a text word-for-word identical with Cervantes' and used, as a *post facto* criterion for completion of his task, word-for-word identity with Cervantes' text; and in fact the result was word-for-word identical with Cervantes'. This is very close to a statement of necessary and sufficient conditions for intentional, accurate copying, the only condition missing being the one respecting accurate causal transmission mentioned two paragraphs back. As such, my intuition, even in the *arguendo* circumstances envisaged, is that Menard produced no new book at all. His book looks a whole lot like Cervantes' for the simple reason that it is Cervantes'. Thus it has no properties different from Cervantes', and none of Danto's alleged differences are real differences.[6]

But what does Danto's list capture, then? Nothing at all? Is it simply an egregious mistake on his part? No, I don't think so. What at least part of his list captures are differences that would exist between Cervantes' work and a new book, one word-for-word identical with it, if that new book were written, in the important sense of the term,[7] in the beginning of the twentieth century. If

there were such a book—and it is possible that there should be one—at least some of the items on Danto's list would be applicable. But that book wouldn't be Menard's.[8]

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REFERENCES

[1] Arthur Danto, *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace* (Harvard U P., 1981). Subsequent parenthetical references to Danto are to this work

[2] There's something wrong here In English the title is 'Pierre Menard, Author of the *Quixote*'; in Spanish, the language of original composition, it's 'Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote'. Except for Danto, no one that I know calls it *Pierre Menard, Symbolist Poet*. Since Danto provides no references for his title—and indeed no references to any text by Borges—I can only conclude that he got it wrong Incidentally, while I'm chiding Danto over such matters, it should be mentioned that despite Danto's misleading suggestion, 'Pierre Menard' is a short story, not a book, and certainly not, as also seems to be suggested by the context and the use of such words as 'discovered', a piece of non-fiction. The suggestion that it's a book is abetted by Danto's calling it a masterpiece, but is there in the first place because of his mispunctuation of its title. Italics are reserved for book titles, quotation marks required for short stories

[3] I have in mind here what Monroe Beardsley calls 'elucidation' See his *Aesthetics. Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism*, 2nd edition (Indianapolis, Indiana Hackett Publishing Company, 1981), pp. 242–7, for an explication of the concept.

[4] See, for example, Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, section 13; Bertrand Russell, *The Principles of Mathematics* (Cambridge U.P., 1903), p. 452 (it seems to be Russell that Danto is drawing upon more than anyone else); Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, translated by D. F. Pears and Brian McGuinness (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1961), p. 52; Max Black, 'The Identity of Indiscernibles', in his *Problems of Analysis* (Ithaca, New York. Cornell U. P., 1954), pp. 80–92; Gustav Bergmann, 'The Identity of Indiscernibles and the Formalist Definition of Identity', in his *Metaphysics of Logical Positivism* (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), pp. 268–76; A. J. Ayer, 'The Identity of Indiscernibles', reprinted in his *Philosophical Essays* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1963), pp. 26–35; N. L. Wilson, 'The Identity of Indiscernibles and the Symmetrical Universe', *Mind* 62 (1953) 1, 506–11.

[5] Borges makes it clear that Menard produced numerous bad drafts which he destroyed before producing a good draft Incidentally, Borges never says that the *Quixote* was well known to Menard, though he does say that Menard had read the book, had re-read certain selected chapters of it (which he didn't try to duplicate), and knew its place in the history of literature.

[6] Nelson Goodman and Catherine Elgin, in 'Interpretation and Identity: Can the Work Survive the World?', reprinted in their *Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences* (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1988), esp. pp. 61–3, apparently don't think that Menard's book is a copy of Cervantes', but they agree with me that Menard produced no new work distinct from Cervantes'. Their reason for thinking so, however, is very different from mine They take a text to be an inscription in a language, and identify a work with a text. Hence, since Menard's text and Cervantes' text are identical inscriptions—the notion of an inscription being a purely syntactical one—in the same language, they are the same work. For reasons that can't be gone into at length here, I don't think that this will do. For a hint at why, see the next paragraph; and for an extended but diffuse argument to the contrary, see Danto, op cit , especially chaps 1 and 2

[7] In the sense of the term in question, writing requires that a text originate with an author. It doesn't preclude being influenced, however.

[8] My thanks to Nancy Davlantes, T. J. Diffey, James Petrik and Walter Weber for useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Weber's dogged insistence on several points is especially appreciated.

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PSYCHOMACHIA IN ART FROM PRUDENTIUS TO PROUST

M. J. Jackson

FROM THE early days of Christianity the life of the Christian has been seen as spiritual warfare against external and internal enemies. Christian asceticism, the discipline of the internal life of the Christian, has employed the allegory of warfare to stimulate imagination and obedience.

Prudentius, the late Latin poet and hymn-writer, gave the title 'Psychomachia',[1] spiritual warfare, to a poem which much influenced mediaeval poetry and art and which can be shown to have echoes in more recent literature.

Emile Mâle's *L'Art religieux du XIIIe siècle en France*[2] is a convenient guide to Prudentius for it traces the literary and pictorial development of the psychomachia from Prudentius to the great cathedrals of mediaeval France. In Book III, 'The Mirror of Morals', Mâle notes that the order—nature, knowledge, virtue—in the *Speculum majus*[3] is that of Pascal's three worlds, the world of material things, the world of mind and the world of love.[4] The idea of an inner battle is a fundamental one in Christianity. 'Psychomachia' recounts the battle of the Virtues and Vices in Virgilian verse, with 'the armies of the Virtues and the Vices confronting each other, while from the ranks champions come forth, challenge one another according to the rule of epic poetry, and engage in single combat'.[5] First Faith (*Fides*) overcomes Idolatry (*vetus Cultura deorum*), then Chastity (*Pudicita*) defeats Lust (*Libido*) and Patience (*Patientia*) triumphs over Anger (*Ira*) and so the story continues until the final triumph of all the Virtues.[6] Other writers handle the theme, for example, the *De conflictu vitiorum et virtutem*, attributed to Gregory the Great.[7]

When it comes to the representational art of sculpture changes take place. On the walls of the Romanesque churches of the twelfth century the Virtues, formerly the warrior maidens of Prudentius, become Frankish barons, 'clothed in coats of mail, wearing helmets with nose-pieces, and carrying the large triangular shield and the long sword of the first crusade'.[8] Examples are at Aulnay in Poitou.[9] The Gothic artists of the thirteenth century carry forward some of the imagery of Prudentius but institute more changes. They concentrate not so much on the battle itself as on the victory won by the Virtues. Images other than psychomachia are entertained; the ladder of Virtue and the trees of Good and Evil appear. The Romanesque sculptor shows the Christian life as conflict, while the Gothic sculptor proclaims: 'The life of the Christian in

whom virtue reigns supreme is peace itself, it is already rest in God.'[10] Mâle continues with an interesting review of the Virtues and Vices of the Gothic cathedrals of Paris, Chartres and Amiens with particular emphasis on and illustration of the Amiens sculptures.[11]

The Amiens sculptures were part of the *Bible historiée* of Amiens, on which Ruskin's book had appeared by 1885.[12] Proust had begun his work of translating Ruskin's *Bible of Amiens* when Mâle's *L'Art religieux* came into his hands soon after publication in 1898. Proust's translation contains, in addition to Ruskin's text on the Amiens Virtues and Vices, his own introduction with a section upon them[13] with use of Mâle's comments.[14]

A la recherche du temps perdu, Proust's great novel,[15] contains psychomachia and indeed can be seen as a psychomachia but the reader will not find it simply by looking at the churches described in the novel, although there are hints to be found there. The painter, Elstir, in opening the eyes of the narrator to the glories of Balbec Church calls it 'tout un gigantesque poème théologique et symbolique que vous avez là' (I.841). The passage on Saint-André-des-Champs mentions stories going back to Virgil taken up by the mediaeval sculptor and speaks of Camus's boy, Théodore, as a mediaeval figure, representing in himself both Virtue and Vice, virtue in deference and consideration towards the sick Tante Léonie (I.151), and vice as Gilberte in later life admits (III.694). The psychomachia enters *A la recherche* from another source, Giotto, but Ruskin is the link. In the year before his visit to Venice and Padua in 1900 Proust had seen in Ruskin's *Fors Clavigera*[16] illustrations of Giotto's Virtues and Vices in the Arena Chapel of Padua, the Capella degli Scrovegni. One of Proust's writings in homage to Ruskin who died in the same year, 'Pélérinages ruskiniens en France', ends with a fine comparison of Ruskin with Giotto's Charity.[17]

Giotto was held in high regard by Proust and much worked upon.[18] In a paper entitled 'A ajouter à Flaubert', only published in the Pléiade edition of *Contre Sainte-Beuve*,[19] Proust compares Flaubert's original contribution to language and grammar to the impact upon the history of art of the painters, Cimabue and Giotto, producing a 'révolution de vision' (et) 'de représentation du monde'.[20] In one of Proust's *Lemoine* pastiches, published only in 1953, in the style of Ruskin, Giotto has a place as the lengthy title reveals: 'La Bénédiction du sanglier. Etudes des Fresques de Giotto représentant L'Affaire Lemoine à l'usage des jeunes étudiants et étudiantes du Corpus Christi qui se soucient encore d'*elle*, *par John Ruskin*'.[21] When in *A la recherche* there were plans to visit Florence the narrator constructs a vision of the city in terms of Giotto (I.389), while the Giotto photos given by Swann also inspired dreams of Venice (III.394). Albertine and her friends are 'une procession sportive digne de l'antique et de Giotto' (I.807).

When *Du Côté de chez Swann*, the first volume of *A la recherche* was published in 1913 the chapter headings of the two volumes to follow in *A la recherche* were printed opposite the title page. The second of these, *Le Temps retrouvé*, had

among its chapter headings 'Les "Vices et les Vertus" de Padoue et de Combray' as well as the final chapter heading 'L'Adoration perpétuelle'. Painter reconstructs the likely contents of the Vices and Virtues chapter: the narrator's visit to Venice and reflections on the Padua frescos, which were reduced in the later enlargement of the novel.[22] The chief references to Giotto's Virtues and Vices occur mainly in the early part of the novel in the Combray section.

It is Swann who gives the narrator photos of the Virtues and Vices for his schoolroom at Combray, although Swann does not include in his gift the pictures 'des fresques qui retracent l'histoire de la Vierge et du Christ' (III.648). It is Swann who calls the pregnant kitchenmaid Charity: 'Comment va la Charité de Giotto?' (I.80) he asks. This question leads into the narrator's reflections on the realistic, earthy character of Giotto's Virtues, 'ces vierges fortes et hommasses, matrones plutôt, dans lesquelles les vertus sont personnifiées à l'Arena' (I.81), as well as on their concentration on what they are doing without showing outward expression of the virtue they incarnate. Charity appears to have no thought of charity in her energetic and somewhat coarse face. The symbolic actions performed by the figures demand their total concentration and effort. Charity tramples earthly pleasures under her feet as if treading grapes for winemaking and hands her heart to God like a cook passing up a corkscrew from the basement to the floor above (I.81), while Envy, among the vices, with a serpent in her mouth is like a medical text-book illustration of cancer of the tongue (ibid.). In the case of Charity the narrator comments that Giotto is right. As he comes to know active charity he finds its incarnations in persons who have:

> un air allègre, positif, indifférent et brusque du chirurgien pressé, ce visage où ne se lit aucune commisération, aucun attendrissement devant la souffrance humaine, aucune crainte de la heurter, et qui est le visage sans douceur, le visage antipathique et sublime de la vraie bonté. (I.82)

Psychomachia as inner conflict is hinted at in the persons, seen by the narrator at mass in Combray and outwardly symbolizing Justice, many of whom he supposes already to be enrolled 'dans les milices de réserve de l'Injustice' (I.82). Françoise combines in herself charity and cruelty, finding subtle means to prevent any assistant establishing herself in the house. The kitchenmaid, *la Charité de Giotto*, had to leave as a result of being frequently made to prepare asparagus which brought on asthmatic attacks (I.124).

Elsewhere Giotto is drawn upon. M. de Palancy's monocle at Mme de Saint-Euverte's is compared to 'cet Injuste à côté duquel un rameau feuillu évoque les forêts où se cache son repaire' (I.327). Albertine playing diabolo is like Idolatry with its small idol held on a string (I.886). The narrator thinks of the figure of Sleep projected in his own sleep as an allegorical figure of Giotto, especially as Envy with a serpent in her mouth (II.146). His inability to move or speak in his sleep leads him to this thought.

The significance of psychomachia in *A la recherche* is best brought out by J. Theodore Johnson.[23] His starting point is Ruskin's own description of the Arena chapel in *Giotto and His Works in Padua*: 'the walls of the chapel are covered with a continuous meditative poem on the mystery of the Incarnation, the acts of Redemption, the vices and virtues of mankind as proceeding from their scorn or acceptance of that Redemption, and their final judgment'.[24] Johnson distinguishes the two programmes of frescos, that of the Virtues and Vices at the bottom and that of the bands above. The latter has at the top, proceeding from left to right, the story of the Virgin's parents and the early life of the Virgin, while the life and passion of Christ occupy the middle and lower bands. Here the viewer is privileged to look up at the divine drama of redemption. In Johnson's words he is 'a privileged observer of the working of divine order, both of time past in the biblical events and of future time with the Last Judgement'.[25] With the Virtues and Vices the viewer is in a different position, no longer the awed observer of a divine drama unfolding from panel to panel, but caught in the crossfire of the psychomachia itself. The Virtues and Vices are at his level, they face each other across the chapel, their conflict is fought out in him:

> As the spectator leaves the chapel, he must move between these figures and pass under the Christ Judge of the Last Judgement. Following the traditional iconographic pattern, the Vices and Hell are on Christ's left, or in this chapel, the windowless north wall; the Virtues and Heaven are on his right, the south wall whose light illuminates the chapel.[26]

Johnson comments on the concrete reality of these figures painted in their *trompe-l'oeil* marble and makes the observation that they belong to Giotto's unique vision, which supports Proust's view that each artist creates his own world. He adds that:

> the visit to the Arena chapel in the Spring of 1900 undoubtedly reinforced what by then had become a Proustian motif: access into the artist's inner world (as well as our own) is gained when we have before us a second work by that artist; entering a room full of an artist's work is a privilege tantamount to possessing his personal vision.[27]

In his second publication Johnson takes up the question of allegorical interpretation. He compares the psychomachias of Amiens, Padua and *A la recherche*. At Amiens the spectator is not engaged, he observes. At Padua, as we have seen, he is engaged in the conflict. The conflict takes place in him. In the novel the reader is certainly engaged but in a complex way. The psychomachia is at work here in the immaterial realm of time. 'Vous savez', Proust is reported as saying in the interview with Elie-Joseph Bois, '*Swann* expliqué par Proust', 'qu'il y a une géométrie plane et une géométrie dans l'espace. Eh bien, pour moi, le roman ce n'est pas seulement de la psychologie plane, mais de la psychologie dans le temps'.[28] For example, the kitchenmaid seen as Error—she cannot make

hot coffee—lights up 'involontairement la supériorité de Françoise, comme l'Erreur, par le contraste, rend plus éclatant le triomphe de la Vérité' (I.82). But at the same time 'les vertus de Françoise cachaient des tragédies d'arrière-cuisine, comme l'histoire découvre que les règnes des Rois et des Reines qui sont représentés les mains jointes dans les vitraux des églises furent marqués d'incidents sanglants' (I.122).

The mediaeval method of exegesis was to work at two main levels by extracting first the literal sense, *sensus literalis*, and then the spiritual sense, *sensus spiritualis*. The spiritual sense was then subdivided into the allegorical sense, the moral sense and the anagogic sense.[29] In considering these senses Johnson takes the magic lantern scene and applies the various senses. The literal sense is the showing of the magic lantern from time to time at Combray so that the narrator could see the pictures and learn the stories of Golo and Geneviève de Brabant and of Bluebeard. The allegorical sense expands, in his view, throughout the novel. For example it makes Golo an 'essence immatérielle'. The magic lantern:

> à l'instar des premiers architectes et maîtres verriers de l'âge gothique . . . substituait à l'opacité des murs d'impalpables irisations, de surnaturelles apparitions multicolores, où des légendes étaient dépeintes comme dans un vitrail vacillant et momentané. (I.9)[30]

The magic lantern is a model of the artist at his work, creating his own world. It is also a model of the novel itself. Proust as novelist is creating 'impalpables irisations . . . surnaturelles apparitions' in the spirits of his readers.

The moral sense is there from the beginning. The crimes of Golo cause the young narrator to 'examiner ma propre conscience avec plus de scrupules' (I.10). These are no doubt childish faults which he contemplates, but things get worse and he forgets his discoveries at Combray. The name of Guermantes becomes an idol. Before the revelation of his vocation the narrator appears to have forgotten his intellectual sins. *Le Temps retrouvé* recalls the narrator to his task. He has to gather the 'instants précieux et immatériels retrouvés en lui-même' into a work of art. 'Pendant que le foyer de l'esprit brille encore en lui, le Narrateur doit exploiter sa carrière intérieure, où il trouvera les blocs pour ses travaux d'architecte et les minerais pour ses travaux de maître-verrier'.[31]

In the Middle Ages the anagogical sense related the text to God, but in Johnson's view the anagogical sense of *A la recherche* relates the text to the Spirit. 'Le roman-cathédrale se place sous le signe de l'Esprit.'[32] Thus Johnson concludes that in the psychomachia of *A la recherche* each reader is both scene of battle and combatant. The moral mirror of the *roman-cathédrale* is not for the purpose of observing the actions of others but for self-examination. Johnson also adds that the vocation discovered in *Le Temps retrouvé* is not only that of the narrator but of the reader of the work. 'Ce que nous n'avons pas eu à déchiffrer, à éclaircir par notre effort personnel, ce qui était clair avant nous, n'est pas à

nous' (III.880), which is a good summary of the purpose of the Mirror of Morals and of the hoped-for outcome of the conflict of the Virtues and Vices.

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[1] Aurelius Prudentius Clemens, 348–c.410; familiar hymns are the Christmas processional hymn, 'Of the Father's love begotten', and the Epiphany hymn, 'Earth has many a noble city'. For 'Psychomachia' see *Patrologia* Vol. LX, pp. 19–90; a later edition of 'Psychomachia' with a French translation is in *Oeuvres de Prudence*, edited and translated by M. Lavarenne (Société d'Edition 'Les Belles Lettres', Paris, 1948), tome III, pp 47–82

[2] 2 vols. (Armand Colin, Paris, 1958) (1st edition 1898).

[3] The *Speculum* is largely the work of Vincent of Beauvais and appeared in the middle of the thirteenth century. Mâle points out that its thought belongs to the Middle Ages as a whole

[4] *The Gothic Image*, English edition, translated by Dora Hussey, of *L'Art religieux*, 3rd edition (Fontana Library, London, 1961), p 98. This English edition was first published under the title, *Religious Art in France· XIII Century* (Dent, London, 1913)

[5] *The Gothic Image*, p. 99

[6] p 100

[7] p. 101.

[8] p. 102.

[9] See Raymond Oursel, *Haut-Poitou Roman*, La Nuit des temps 42 (Zodiaque, Paris, 1975), pp 305–31.

[10] *The Gothic Image*, p. 109.

[11] pp. 109–30

[12] *The Bible of Amiens* appeared at intervals between 1880 and 1885. December 1880 part i, November and December 1881 pts ii and iv, August 1882 pt iii, and June 1885 full edition It was to have been the first part of *Our Fathers have told us*, intended to include sketches of Christian history and architecture based on various local centres, but only a few other chapters were written. The photographs to accompany the volume included four plates to illustrate the Virtues and Vices on the Central Porch, considered in chapter IV, paragraphs 39 to 41.

Plate XIV		*Plate XVI*	
1A	Courage	7A	Faith
1B	Cowardice	7B	Idolatry
2A	Patience	8A	Hope
2B	Anger	8B	Despair
3A	Gentillesse	9A	Charity
3B	Churlishness	9B	Avarice
Plate XV		*Plate XVII*	
4A	Love	10A	Chastity
4B	Discord	10B	Lust
5A	Obedience	11A	Wisdom
5B	Rebellion	11B	Folly
6A	Perseverence	12A	Humility
6B	Atheism	12B	Pride

See *The Works of John Ruskin*, edited by E. T. Cook and Alexander Wedderburn, Library Edition, vol. XXXIII (George Allen, London, 1908), p. 179

[13] *Contre Sainte-Beuve*, with *Pastiches et mélanges* and *Essais et articles*, edited by Pierre Clarac and Yves Sandre (Gallimard, Paris, 1971), pp. 95–8. Proust's translation, published by *Le Mercure de France*, appeared in 1904. Bergson presented it to the Académie des Sciences morales et politiques in a short but favourable report on 28 May 1904 (*Contre Sainte-Beuve*, p. 720)

[14] See footnotes on p 96 on Rebellion and on p. 97 on Charity.

[15] The references to *A la recherche* are from the three volume Gallimard Pléiade edition edited by Pierre Clarac and André Ferré (Paris, 1954) The excellent revision by Terence Kilmartin of the Scott Moncrieff English translation appeared under the title of *Remembrance of Things Past* in three volumes (Chatto and Windus, London, 1981, and Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1983).

[6] See *The Works of John Ruskin* edited by E T Cook and Alexander Wedderburn, vol. XXVII (1907).

[7] *Contre Sainte-Beuve* pp. 443–4. Proust adds in a footnote to his introduction to *La Bible d'Amiens (Contre Sainte-Beuve* p 97, note **) Emile Mâle's distinction between Giotto's Charity and the Amiens Charity: 'La Charité qui tend à Dieu son coeur enflammé . . est du pays de saint François d'Assise. La Charité qui donne son manteau aux pauvres est du pays de Saint Vincent de Paul'. Ruskin had made the same distinction in words which Proust recalls in his tribute to Ruskin.

[8] J. Theodore Johnson, Jr. in 'Proust and Giotto: Foundations for an Allegorical Interpretation of *A la recherche du temps perdu*', *Marcel Proust: A Critical Panorama*, edited by Larkin B Price (University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Illinois, 1973), has useful information on the work Proust did in his *Cahiers* on Giotto, pp 195–7.

[9] Ms Cahiers XXIX, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, folio 43–5. The *Contre Sainte-Beuve* editors give it the date of 1910, p. 860.

[10] *Contre Sainte-Beuve* p. 299.

[21] *Contre Sainte-Beuve* pp. 201–5 The pastiche appeared in *La Nouvelle nouvelle Revue Française*, Paris, 1 October 1953 The title is in the style of Ruskin's title page of *Our Fathers have told us*, see editors' comments, *Contre Sainte-Beuve*, p 817

[22] *Marcel Proust* (Peregrine, Harmondsworth, 1977), vol. II, p 234

[23] See Reference 18 for 'Proust and Giotto' and also 'Marcel Proust et l'architecture III La Conception du roman-cathédrale', *Bulletin des Amis de Combray et de Marcel Proust* (Paris, No. 26, 1976), pp. 247–66.

[24] 'Proust and Giotto', p. 169

[25] p. 170

[26] Ibid.

[27] p. 172

[28] *Contre Sainte-Beuve*, p 557.

[29] 'Marcel Proust et l'architecture', p. 258

[30] See also Johnson's 'La Lanterne magique: Proust's Metaphorical Toy', *L'Esprit Créateur* (Laurence, Kansas, vol. XI, Spring 1971), pp 17–31.

[31] 'Marcel Proust et l'architecture', p. 260.

[32] Ibid.

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LISTENAIRES: THOUGHTS ON A DATABASE

Gordon J. Giles

I WOULD like to introduce a group of databases which I established in 1987.[1] They contain the responses to a set of four questionnaires which were administered in Lancaster, High Wycombe and Novara, in Northern Italy. I have called these questionnaires *Listenaires*, both for ease of reference and because those who took the tests responded while they listened to particular pieces of music. Each Listenaire was slightly different, and was aimed at different groups of people, although each Listenaire tested for the same kind of response. The aim was to collate and record people's emotional, image and colour response to given extracts from the 'serious' repertoire. Each Listenaire did this in a different way, though, so I shall deal with each test separately.

It seemed to me that we commonly describe music in terms of some kind of emotional content, and yet there was so much debate as to what was meant by *emotional content*. I never expected that the tests would yield a total agreement, and they certainly did not, but I did expect there to be some *kind* of agreement. I included questions about the images presented by works of music because I have often heard people claim that music makes them *see* things. I thought it might be interesting to see if there were any similarities in people's responses. I included questions about colours because I considered it to be unexplored ground. Many people later said that they were not used to visualizing colours; others that they found it rewarding; others that they always did it. I would say that these three comments alone justify testing for colours.

Most of those tested were schoolchildren between the ages of 13 and 16, and all the tests were carried out in a classroom environment. Few of those tested (excepting the University Music students), were familiar with the kind of music used—although they were almost certainly familiar with the contemporary 'pop' scene. People have asked me why I did not use more 'popular' music in the tests: the reason is that I did not want many of those taking the tests to be familiar with the music used. Another important disadvantage of 'pop' music is that it invariably has lyrics—words associated with the music which could easily cloud attempts to decide what the 'music' was about. There is undoubtedly scope for the same kind of tests where 'popular' and vocal music is concerned, but I did not attempt to deal with more than the 'serious' music repertoire.

The First Listenaire was administered to pupils in Lancaster schools, and also

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to a group of University music students. Five extracts were used, but were not chosen by me. These were:

Extract 1 Beethoven, 5th Symphony, 1st movt. (Exposition)

Extract 2 Mahler, 3rd Symphony, 1st movt. (Introduction)

Extract 3 Vivaldi, *The Four Seasons*—'Spring', 1st movt. (Exposition)

Extract 4 Beethoven, 6th Symphony, 5th movt. ('Shepherd's Song of Thanks after the Storm')

Extract 5 Schoenberg, *Verklärte Nacht*—Depiction of the Woods (Opening)

The test lasted about twenty minutes and (as for all the Listenaires) the same cassette tape was used each time the test was administered.

For the first three Listenaires, five emotion-terms were offered to those taking the tests. For the first two Listenaires, these terms were to be ranked on a scale 1–5, with a '0' option if the term was considered to be irrelevant. For the Vivaldi extract, for instance, the terms given were JOY, HOPE, DESPAIR, DEFIANCE and PEACE. From the data we have we can see that 78% rejected DEFIANCE completely, by awarding the rank '0'. 78% also gave the term JOY first ranking. 77% rejected DESPAIR, while HOPE and PEACE were considered to be '3' and '2' respectively, by 45% and 42% of the respondents. We may say, I think, that there is an agreement that the opening of the *Spring* concerto is not despairing, or defiant. Using the data in this way, we can make similar kinds of statements about the other extracts.

What we have done so far has been relatively simple though, for by synthesizing groups of results we can detect other agreements. For Mahler's 3rd Symphony, for instance, the terms ANGER and POWER were both offered to the respondents. 54% of them ranked POWER first, while 25% gave it second, thus suggesting that 79% felt that POWER was the most important or second important emotion. 46% put ANGER second, and 21% put it first. Since I was using a database, I could ask how many people ranked ANGER and POWER first and/or second. 82 people put ANGER and POWER first and/or second, which amounts to 67% of the respondents. This is, of course, only an example of a question we might ask.

We can also ask questions about the colour and image responses. These were not acquired through a 'multiple choice' method—the respondents were asked to write down whatever occurred to them as they listened. This, in fact, is true for the first three Listenaires. The data does not betray the freedom which they had, however, for there are still large areas of agreement. 50% described the Mahler extract in terms associated with WAR, and another 18% associated it with DEATH through their descriptions. 51% described the COUNTRYSIDE in response to the Vivaldi extract. The responses to the *Pastoral Symphony* were varied, however, with maximum agreement at 9% (for COUNTRYSIDE images).

I had to derive some kind of image essence for the responses but the complete listings from the database give the responses in more detail. We can detect an agreement over images, just as we could with the emotion-terms. If we look at

the Vivaldi extract again, we find that there are three predominant kinds of image: COUNTRYSIDE (51%), DANCE (25%) and SPRING (11%). Thus 87% associated the extract with lively images, which may be linked in some way. We may even want to say that these images are *happy*, if we consult the database, which reveals that all of those who put the emotion-term JOY first or second (110 people—92%) gave an image which matches the three kinds I have mentioned.

For the colour responses, the same freedom was allowed, and the results are similarly useful. Where two colours were offered, I recorded both, but very few people did offer more than one colour. 82% of respondents to the Schoenberg extract offered GREY or BLACK. The most popular colours for the extracts were as follows:

Beethoven 5th	BLACK
Mahler 3rd	BLACK
Vivaldi Spring Concerto	YELLOW/ORANGE/GOLD
Beethoven 'Pastoral'	GREEN
Verklärte Nacht	GREY and BLACK

The pieces used in the First Listenaires are rather well known. Certainly the Beethoven and Vivaldi extracts were known by a substantial majority of hearers. Only 4% (about 6 people), did not know the Fifth Symphony extract, for instance.

The same is true for the Second Listenaire, which was a replica of the First Listenaire, although I translated it into Italian and had it administered in a school in Novara. Just over 60 pupils did the test (about half as many as did the test in Lancaster), but their answers can be easily compared with the Lancaster results. BLACK and WAR emerged as the most popular colours and images for Beethoven's Fifth Symphony and also for the Mahler extract, just as they did in England. It is easier to indicate differences between the sets of results, because there was much agreement despite any cultural and geographical differences.

PINK was the most popular colour for the *Pastoral* extract; and DANCING and THE COUNTRYSIDE swapped popularity as images for the Vivaldi extract. Otherwise the rank orders of colours and images were almost identical. In the later Fourth Listenaire, I did some correlation tests with the data—here it was not necessary, because the similarities were so obvious.

With the Third Listenaire I deviated a little from previous practice. Instead of selecting emotion-terms to go with pieces already chosen, I kept the same terms, but changed the music. The music chosen was more obscure than for the First Listenaire. The extracts used were:

Extract 1 OLIVJER MESSIAEN, 'Dieu Parmi Nous' (God among us) from *La Nativité du Seigneur*. (Toccata section)

Extract 2 ALBAN BERG, Marie's death, from *Wozzeck*. (Act III, 1—crescendi on 'B')

Extract 3 CARL REINECKE, 'Undine' Flute Sonata, Finale (Closing theme)

Extract 4 DMITRI SHOSTAKOVICH, *The Gadfly*—Film Music—Romance (latter half)

Extract 5 IGOR STRAVINSKY, *The Firebird*—Ballet, Lullaby. (First theme, second theme and first theme recapitulation).

Exactly one hundred people did the test at Brenchwood School in High Wycombe. The same was asked of the respondents as in Lancaster and Italy, so the results are of a similar kind. There was one modification to the form of the test, however, in that the ranking system was improved. Rather than rank the terms, respondents were asked to mark each term out of five. This entailed an inversion of the previous range of responses. Now the response '1' became a low score, and '5' high. Previously it had been the other way round.

The Messiaen extract yielded no positive response—it appeared that none of the terms offered were appropriate. The reason for this was revealed in a later test, which indicated that the most appropriate emotion-term would have been FEAR, which was not offered for selection. 80% gave POWER '4' or '5' for the Berg extract, while JOY and LOVE were rejected. 84% gave DEFIANCE a mark of '4' or '5' in respect of the same extract. We might say, then, that there is an agreement that this extract is defiant and angry. 64% said that the flute sonata was predominantly PEACEful.

The images did not provide such a strong consensus as they did in other tests. NATURE stands out for the flute sonata, and the Messiaen seemed to conjure up images of CHURCHES. This was the only extract, incidentally, which prompted images of the instrument on which it was played. 16% visualized an organ when hearing the piece. No one visualized a flute or violin for other extracts.

The colour results were not as clear-cut either, although there was agreement. The Messiaen drew responses of BLACK (57%), and the Berg 30% BLACK. The Stravinsky, like the Schoenberg extract, was predominantly GREY and BLACK. No more than one third of the respondents were familiar with the pieces used, so it might have been that they found it hard to visualize images and colours for music they had not heard before.

The Fourth Listenaire was very different from the others. Only seventeen people did it, and they were Philosophy students at Lancaster University rather than schoolchildren. The Fourth Listenaire attempted to discover whether the results of the earlier tests could be produced using a different method. For this test, the emotion terms were not offered for selection—the students could write what they liked as far as emotions were concerned. But, contrary to previous tests, they had to select a colour and an image from the most popular ones given in earlier tests. When the results were collated, I was thus able to compare the results of two separate tests, and using a correlation formula, determine whether the sets of results were the same or not. For reasons of time I only used eight of the original ten extracts. I dropped the two best known—the Vivaldi concerto and the 'Pastoral' symphony.

The correlations which I made showed that the students selected colours and

images with much the same preference as those who did the First and Third Listenaires. Correlations fall in a range from -1 to 1, where '1' represents an identical set of data; '-1' a perfect inversion or opposite. Only three correlations emerged as being less than 0.5. The Reinecke extract yielded a completely inverse correlation—what was most popular in the Third Listenaire was least popular in the Fourth Listenaire. The images for *Verklärte Nacht* were only 0.1 correlated, and the colours for the Shostakovich extract came out at 0.25. This is not a bad figure, but is poor compared to the 0.7s and 0.8s which regularly came out for other extracts. I have mentioned the exceptions; on the whole the colour and image results from the Listenaires compared were very similar indeed.

The emotional responses do not lend themselves to correlation quite so easily. I gave each emotional response a number initially, which denotes a classification, and which also relates to one of the terms offered in the earlier tests. Thus, where a response to Beethoven's Fifth Symphony was JOY, the number '5' was given, since that is the original emotion-term which related to the response. In one sense, then, I tried to classify the emotion-terms, such that they can be compared with the earlier Listenaires. The following is a listing of all the responses for the Fifth Symphony.[2]

Emotions offered in response to Beethoven's 5th

5	PASSION/EXULTANCY	
3	POWER	
3	VIOLENT/EXCITING	The terms given in the
–	FEAR	First Listenaire were:
3	STRUGGLE	
2	FOREBODING ANTICIPATION	1 HOPE (2nd)
–	FEAR	2 DESPAIR (2nd)
1/5	ENTHUSIASM	3 DETERMINATION (1st)
–	SUSPENSE	4 PEACE (0)
–	NERVOUS	5 JOY (0)
1/5	SENSE OF MAJESTY	
3	POWER	
5	IMPETUOSITY	
5!	JOY	
–	TENSION	
3	ANGER	
1	EXCITEMENT	

In this Fourth Listenaire, three people offered emotions of FEAR or TENSION. These had not been available for selection in the First Listenaire. I mentioned earlier that the results for the Messiaen organ extract in the Third Listenaire were

not very positive. When this extract was used in the Fourth Listenaire, none of the new emotions corresponded to any that I had given in the Third Listenaire. The emotions of FEAR and CONFUSION emerged as being popular, however, so we might conclude that the emotion-terms offered for this extract in the Third Listenaire were inappropriate.

It was not necessary to apply mathematical formulae to the sets of emotional responses, because the similarities can be detected easily. While the emotion-terms were not selected in exactly the same order of preference as those which were freely given, it is significant that the same terms were freely given. This suggests that many of the terms offered in earlier Listenaires were at least appropriate. Where a term was rejected in the earlier Listenaires, we do not find it at all in the Fourth Listenaire. For instance, no one suggested DEFIANCE, LOVE or JOY for the Berg extract in the Fourth Listenaire, and we find that these terms were all rejected in the Third Listenaire. POWER and ANGER did crop up in both tests, but the Fourth Listenaire revealed that emotions of FEAR are also important.

It is also possible to correlate the Italian results with the Lancaster results. Using a method of weighted averages, I determined an average response for each emotion given in any of the first three Listenaires.

Initially, an average response is taken by multiplying the response by the frequency of the response. For instance, if we take the term 'Hope' for Beethoven's Fifth Symphony in the test, then there are six possible answers which each individual could give. Each of these possible answers is multiplied by the number of people who actually chose that answer. These six possible ranks which were offered were offered on a scale of 1–5, with a zero alternative to represent 'irrelevant'. For the purposes of this analysis, we must replace zero with the figure '6', and call it 6th rank. The frequencies of response for 'Hope' in the Beethoven 5 extract were as follows:

Term	*Rank*	*Frequency*
HOPE:	1	11%
	2	19%
	3	31%
	4	16%
	5	8%
	6 ('0')	15%

The frequencies are multiplied by the rank, and then totalled, thus:

$$(1\times11) + (2\times19) + (3\times31) + (4\times16) + (5\times8) + (6\times15) =$$
$$11 + 38 + 93 + 64 + 40 + 90 = 336$$

In order to get an 'average', we must divide our total figure by 100, which in this case gives us 3.36. Thus we can say that the average rank for 'Hope' for the Beethoven 5 extract was 3.36.

Using this method we can determine which emotion-term was most popular overall. The Italian and Lancastrian results were almost identical; in only two cases did two sets of figures differ by one whole number. In any case, we can use the average of the two sets of results to give an overall view of an emotion-term's popularity for the combined Listenaires. In Lancaster, for instance, we find that the average rank for DESPAIR in the Vivaldi extract was 5.51. In Italy, the corresponding rank was 5.70, and the average of these is 5.60. These are fine details perhaps, because we can easily see from these figures that the term was firmly rejected by both groups.

From these figures we may wish to make statements about the emotions of given works of music. From the data I have, I feel able to make the following statements about the pieces used:

1: The exposition of the first movement of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony is determined (expresses determination).[3]
2: The opening of Mahler's Third Symphony is powerful (expresses power).
3: The first movement (exposition) of Vivaldi's Spring concerto from *The Four Seasons* is joyful (expresses joy).
4: The 'Shepherd's Song of Thanks' from the finale of Beethoven's Sixth Symphony is serene (expresses serenity).
5: The opening of Schoenberg's *Verklärte Nacht* is lonely (expresses loneliness).
6: Messiaen's *Dieu Parmi Nous* is not hopeful, peaceful or joyful.
7: The extract from Berg's *Wozzeck* is full of (expresses) anger and power.
8: Reinecke's 'Undine' Sonata, closing bars, is peaceful (expresses peace).
9: Shostakovich's 'Romance' from *The Gadfly* is full of love (expresses love).
10: The Lullaby from *The Firebird* by Stravinsky is lonely (expresses loneliness).

It will be realized that important questions in aesthetics come to bear in a consideration of this data, and I wish to mention briefly some issues which I find interesting.

Any body of empirical data throws up important questions about objective judgements. Frank Sibley has written about objectivity and aesthetics, and I think that the Listenaires can be used to defend such claims as he makes.[4] In the same way as Sibley claims an objectivity for colour judgements of objects, there can also be an objectivity for the description of emotional human behaviour. There is, I think, a carry-over to music, that is, there can be the same objectivity for emotion terms as applied to music as there can be for emotional terms applied to human behaviour. Whether we take a view such as Hanslick's,

whereby 'musical' emotions are distinct from 'human' emotions, or a view which goes so far as to say that music contains or expresses 'human' emotions, we can carry-over from 'sadness of a person' to 'sadness of a piece of music'.

Sibley relies on an agreement for his account of objectivity—an agreement among those of maximum discrimination. This is not merely élitism, for Sibley's point is that the agreement precedes the comprehension of that which is agreed upon. Just as we call people who cannot distinguish red from green, *colourblind*, we call those who cannot appreciate emotional behaviour *immature*. If we apply this in a musical realm, we may find that there are people who are inexperienced musically—who cannot detect an emotional quality, just as they may not be able to appreciate that someone feels depressed. This is to say that someone may be mature enough to detect manifestations of emotion in human behaviour, but he or she may not be sufficiently mature 'musically' to be able to appreciate that Vivaldi's *Spring* Concerto is joyful. This is to imply that there is something extra involved in the appreciation of 'musical' emotions. If one cannot appreciate a person's sadness, it is unlikely that one will be able to appreciate that same emotion if and when it occurs in a musical realm. The ability to appreciate emotion in a person does not entail the ability to appreciate emotion in music, although it does aid such appreciation. It would seem to follow that the ability to recognize an emotion in music presupposes the ability to recognize that emotion in a person. That some people are emotionally immature *may* account for some of the respondents to the Listenaires who disagreed with a larger body of opinion.

The issue of agreement is important because Sibley's account of colour-judgement relies upon it. I believe that there are levels of agreement. We may all agree that grass is green, and we would probably be surprised if someone called grass 'red'. But I may call it 'olive', while someone else may call it 'avocado'. I propose that disagreements on such a specific level are not disagreements which hinder an account of objectivity. Such argument on the specific level supposes agreement on the broader level—that is to say that we cannot argue about an object's being 'olive' until we agree that it is 'green'.

The same might be said about emotional behaviour. We may agree that someone (or a piece of music) is 'sad' but we may dispute the use of the term 'melancholy'. One of us may have a clear idea of what 'melancholy' means but another person may not have come across such an emotion before. That person can be called inexperienced or immature; just as the person who cannot discriminate between different colours may be called colourblind. The person who is immature can gain experience and learn to recognize melancholy when he or she comes across it. The person who is colourblind has no such potential.

I have dealt with the emotional implications of the Listenaires, mainly because I think they are more significant. There are problems with the colour and image-responses, which I shall mention in conclusion.

We do not generally use colour-language when we describe pieces of music.



and the fact that we get positive results from the Listenaires does not mean that the extracts have colour-qualities which we fail to detect under normal circumstances. We could just as easily ask people to write down a time of day of which a piece reminds them. The subsequent fact that 25% say that Beethoven's Fifth Symphony is 'late afternoon' would not make it so. The ascription of colour terms is not something we normally do, and so the results we have do not tell us a great deal about the music used.

There is certainly a consensus among the image-responses but the consensus is not quite like the consensus we can acquire for colour or emotion judgements. We cannot isolate the music as a stimulus for the image-responses nor can we be sure whether the images are offered sincerely or not. Since the images cannot be said to reside *in* the music, we have difficulty accounting for agreements and explaining disagreements. We do not encounter the same kind of problem for emotions, because it is not necessary that we *feel* the emotion we attribute to the music—we only have to recognize it. The image, though, is not *in* the music—is not *intrinsic*, because we *have* to visualize the image in order to know what it is, and this suggests that the music *stimulates* an image, or series of images, rather than *presents* them. Allowing for this, we might say that there is a high frequency of image-responses pertaining to a particular notion (e.g., *war* or *dancing*), but, at present, we cannot account for such a consensus of opinion in the same ways in which we can account for agreement over our attribution of colour or emotion terms to objects or behaviour.

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REFERENCES

[1] Where such a large body of data is involved, the potential for commentary is vast. I have highlighted the implications of this data which interest me. Copies of the data can be obtained from The School of Independent Studies, Lancaster University, Bailrigg, Lancaster, LA1 4YN or from the author

[2] *Power* and *Fear* appear twice because two people wrote it down independently.

[3] I have not distinguished between *containing* and *expressing* emotion at this point. My views on this will become clearer a little later

[4] Frank N. Sibley, 'Colours', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1967–8; 'Objectivity and Aesthetics', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Vol., 1968

An earlier version of this paper was given at the XIth International Congress in Aesthetics, held in August–September 1988 in Nottingham. I would like to thank Frank Sibley, Colin Lyas, Vernon Pratt and Laszlo Halasz for their comments, and Guido Fregonara for his help in Italy.

BOOK REVIEWS

Analytic Aesthetics. Edited by RICHARD SHUSTERMAN. Basil Blackwell. 1989 pp 198. £25.00

IN THE sense of the ancient Chinese curse, these are interesting times for analytic philosophy. Many of its tenets and assumptions are being questioned and by the same token those, too, of analytic aesthetics. Hence several of the essays in this important collection, which has been substantially enlarged and revised since its original publication in *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, deal largely with broad philosophical themes without ever seeming irrelevant. The review will try to follow their good example.

To ask for a definition of analytic aesthetics is to ask a philosophical question. The book does not attempt a definitive answer, and nor shall I. It is worth recalling, however, the kind of project undertaken by a Beardsley or a Sibley in order to appreciate the force of present-day criticisms.

Analytic philosophy's fundamental distinction between first- and second-order disciplines was reflected in Beardsley's attempt to produce a philosophy of art criticism. (Note how aesthetics was confined to philosophy of art.) For his part Sibley scrupulously analysed in the manner of Austin and Oxford ordinary-language philosophy the terms and predicates used by critic and spectator. Both he and Beardsley wished to show how aesthetic judgements could be supported with reasons (which in this sense might be termed 'objective'), however much they may have differed in what they took to be the underlying *logical* structure of those judgements. That art criticism had such a structure neither seemed to doubt. The task of conceptual analysis by analogy with chemical analysis was to reveal the hidden internal structure; the crucial point being that it was there to be unlocked. These are the sort of assumptions and methods which are being criticized and I now turn to the criticisms.

In his excellent editorial introduction, Shusterman expresses doubts as to whether it is possible any longer to maintain the analyst's implicit 'ideal of neutral analysis'. Faced with a plurality of present-day critical practices, we cannot claim transcendental privilege for any one practice (pp. 14–15).

At a deeper level, Wolterstorff argues that the Beardsleyan approach was not as neutral as it may have appeared. In his view, an 'ideology of Romanticism' influenced both first-order art criticism *and* second-order analysis. Of the two the second seems the more controversial claim. 'Analytic philosophy of art', he asserts, 'has for the most part been a species of Romantic philosophy of art' (p. 38). Owing to its failure to examine ideas in a historical context, analytic philosophy never rid itself entirely of Romantic assumptions. In particular it retained as excess baggage closely related notions of the autonomy of the art work and disinterested contemplation.

Wolterstorff is especially hard on the second doctrine. He makes short work of writers who claim that art is 'useless' and that it should be contemplated in disinterested fashion. The first claim is patently false (which has never stopped anyone from making it). It should be noted, however, that the doctrine of disinterested contemplation does not entail such a claim and may have greater resources than Wolterstorff allows. (See Bourdieu's contribution also which gives a sociological account of how the aesthetic attitude developed as part of the historical evolution of art's institutions.) It is harder to comment on Wolterstorff's main thesis that Romanticism has greatly influenced our ways of thinking about art and shaped analytic aesthetics. To get to grips with this, we would need a more adequate definition of Romanticism than that provided. Even if he should prove to be right, this would not in itself settle whether or not we ought to modify our beliefs. The relation between the origins of a belief and the correct-

ness of a belief is not a simple one—a point not lost on Wolterstorff

There is yet a deeper level at which analytic aesthetics is questioned, though strictly speaking these criticisms are levelled at the analytic tradition itself. Again Wolterstorff can be our guide In his view, we have on the one hand analytic philosophy which is broadly Kantian, and on the other hand its contemporary critics, some of whom are Hegelian One of the leading critics, Rorty, is identified as a 'pragmatist-Hegelian' Wolterstorff recaps Rorty's narrative of the analytic tradition; a narrative based upon Quine's and Sellar's well-known criticisms of the movement's purported doctrines or 'dogmas' (e g , the synthetic/a priori distinction) What Rorty wishes to show is how rationality and epistemic authority are to be explained 'by reference to what society lets us say, rather than the latter by the former' (p 49). Hence the rules of a language game cannot be 'grounded' in a reality we apprehend. To put it crudely, reality is not 'transparent'; nor is it something 'given' which we structure in terms of our concepts The upshot is that there are no forms of knowledge or statements which enjoy cognitive privilege.

Wolterstorff rejects this narrative. He offers us a Realist narrative as an alternative which is not couched in terms of the Kantian/Hegelian dialectic so characteristic in his view of modern philosophy For the Realist, he writes, 'the basic picture is not that of taking something as so-and-so, i.e , conceptualizing something as so-and-so [a Kantian approach]; but rather, that of *recognizing* something as what it is—becoming acquainted with it'. The Realist, he adds, 'holds that when we believe, there is something which is the object of belief—a state of affairs And he holds that some of the states of affairs which we believe to be the case are in fact the case' (p. 54).

The question to be asked of Wolterstorff's Realism is how different it is from that espoused by Oxford ordinary-language philosophers. The route by which he arrives at it may be very different (no Clapham omnibus), the destination, though, has a somewhat familiar look How we answer my question will depend in part on how accurate a description we think Rorty and others have given of ordinary-language philosophy. I have my doubts, but this is a question best left to the historian of modern philosophy

Margolis, too, wishes to reform analytic philosophy and aesthetics, seemingly along Realist lines (p. 171). There is not space enough to examine his arguments, but it is one of his simplest remarks that unerringly finds its target He writes: 'the analytic tradition has tended to impoverish itself by a kind of increasing suicidal neglect of the leading themes of cultural life—*a fortiori*, of the leading themes that inform the world of the arts' (pp 162–3)

My only criticism of this very interesting, wide-ranging collection of essays is that it does not indicate the achievements of analytic aesthetics (p. 1) Not too much should be made of this as the book succeeds in its more important objective of improving our understanding of the nature of its subject. Collectively, the essayists, whether they belong to the analytic tradition or stand outside of it, make a powerful case for re-shaping the discipline. Shusterman puts the matter well when he remarks that analytic aesthetics may henceforth have to take 'a more activist and interventionist role in the contest over the nature of art and art criticism' (p. 15) Analytic aesthetics can no longer afford, if it wishes to remain an intellectual force, the luxury of behaving as if it were a privileged spectator.

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Imaginary Relations Aesthetics and Ideology in the Theory of Historical Materialism By MICHAEL SPRINKER. Verso 1987 pp 302 Paperbound, £9.95.

THE APPLICATION of the various doctrines of historical materialism to questions of aesthetic theory has not been assisted by what Sprinker calls Marx's 'notorious observations' on Greek art in the Introduction to the *Grundrisse*. It is doubly unfortunate that for some these observations have proved an insuperable barrier to the further exploration of materialist aesthetics. In this wide-ranging, even eclectic, text Sprinker has provided a service in displaying the wealth of material for which such a methodology can provide a key and, also perhaps necessarily, distinguishing the multifarious strands of post-Marxian materialism. That the eclecticism of

the survey sometimes veers towards an unstructured presentation of material, with little apparent connection between the ten chapters, is perhaps indicative only of the range of subject-matter which the author submits for our inspection.

The book is in two parts, Part One, 'Aesthetics and Ideology' and Part Two, 'Marxism'. The five chapters devoted to the relationship between aesthetics and ideology discuss Ruskin, Henry James, Hopkins and Nietzsche, the poetics of reading and the legacy of Chicagoan literary criticism. The five chapters of Part Two comprise discussions of Fredric Jameson's 'historicism', the connections between Althusserianism and Sartrean existentialism, the historical determinism of Perry Anderson, Paul de Man, and Althusser and materialist aesthetics. Clearly, this is a wide-ranging programme and Sprinker is often at pains to acknowledge this. The interesting discussion of Paul de Man's theory of language (a 'steady, silent, anti-Marxist polemic . . .' according to Terry Eagleton) is called by the author an 'inexplicable detour' in his itinerary, a slight apology which presumes the existence of a clear line of argument. It is not immediately obvious on a first reading of this densely packed book what this argument may be, over and above the general recommendation that historical materialism has been under-exploited as a methodology for aesthetics. Part of the problem, albeit an unavoidable one, is that earlier versions of seven of the nine chapters have appeared earlier in various journals. This common method of book construction can offer a disjointed narrative to the reader and, if not persuaded by the applicability of materialism to aesthetics, some readers may experience simply a disconcerting tendency to change the subject under discussion. That said, it is possible to delineate two directions in which Sprinker directs the reader. He wishes to advance understanding beyond the initial materialist premiss that 'the ideological features of literary and philosophical texts are manifested in their linguistic and conceptual structure' towards some explanations for what Althusser calls the 'quite specific relations' between art and ideology. Sprinker criticizes much Marxist literary criticism for not advancing beyond 'familiar forms of ideological critique' and proposes a further inquiry into language and the structure of texts. It is into this discussion that the chapter on Paul de Man's linguistic theories is placed and in a sense it is the *most* interesting chapter in the book since it marks a point of advance from the parameters of bourgeois aesthetics variously investigated in some of the other chapters. Such a 'turn to linguistics' is hardly surprising in generally philosophical terms but is a genuinely productive 'detour' in terms of aesthetic theory Since de Man's death in 1983 there has been a growing awareness of the validity of his project to link a political theory to an aesthetic ideology, and Sprinker does well to review his work in this light. For the reader less persuaded by the methods of materialism, however, it may seem that a choice is being set up between history and language as the key mechanism of an aesthetic ideology. Certainly, in bourgeois aesthetic theory, the tendency has been to consider the production of art objects and institutions in *isolation* from the economic and political forces generating the 'real foundations' of social life. Thus, the prevalence of an uneasy coexistence of a sociology of economic life with a psychology of artistic life has of itself contributed to the mystification of the notion of art production as Art According to this line of thinking, the sociology of art may justifiably comment on, say, the musical institutions of north Germany in the early eighteenth century but in attempting to say anything further to 'account' for the music of Bach its spade is turned and idealist recourse is made to concepts of 'genius' and the like. Sprinker wisely notes that orthodox Marxism itself has not helped here, often considering history itself, that product of ingenuity and will, as a work of art. The concentration on the linguistic structure of art works as 'carriers' of ideological messages need not, following de Man, preclude a prior acknowledgement of the political dimension. Neither need it lose sight of the life-enhancing, even life-changing, potential of the aesthetic dimension. In an illuminating chapter on the damage we do to Henry James by 'monumentalizing' his novels, Sprinker tacitly acknowledges that a detailed knowledge of the economic conditions of pottery production is not necessary for an appreciation of the tragedy

of shattering the 'golden bowl' of art. If Sprinker had been writing a single thematic text, this interesting idea would I am sure have been explored further, and with profit There is running through the book a commitment to explicating the ideas of Louis Althusser and this provides Sprinker with what may be considered a second line of argument. In essence, a linguistic turn for materialist aesthetics is insufficient for a fully *comprehensive* understanding of the empirical linkages between productive mechanisms of economic and aesthetic modes of reality appropriation, and a further advance towards a consideration of questions of epistemology is required Sprinker's commitment to the Althusserian notion of over-determination enables him both to praise and criticize orthodox Marxist literary criticism for unmasking the ideological sources of literature while failing to 'gain significant purchase on literature as a distinct, semi-autonomous social practice' As he says, 'while it is certainly true that literary texts produced in capitalist societies are marked by and have generally promoted ideologies serving the interests of the bourgeoisie, it is less certain that the specificity of literature is susceptible to description in terms of a univocal ideological effect' (p. 238). It is possible that some readers will wish to accept Sprinker's methodological recommendations while not wholly accepting the recommendation of an Althusserian conclusion He seems aware of this possibility in his comments on the final chapter, 'Imaginary relations: Althusser and materialist aesthetics', indicating a way of reading his book without entirely accepting its Althusserian conclusions 'What can be stated with a certain degree of confidence is that the purview of the aesthetic as a category within historical materialism is considerably greater than has generally been supposed, extending beyond the relatively confined subject-matter of the fine arts to economic (and other) theory, thus to the very mechanisms of knowledge production itself. My own path to this conclusion has proceeded via Althusser's writings on art, but there would be other possible routes to follow' (p 5). This is a generous statement and Sprinker has certainly succeeded in indicating both the wealth of material and the fineness of detail to which a materialist aesthetics can direct our attention. The Althusserian advance from linguistics to epistemology is, undeniably, one way forward from this general recommendation. It could be argued that a close reading of Foucault is another, or for students of aesthetics with a distrust of 'grand narratives' the trenchant comments of Lyotard on the post-modern linkages of aesthetics and morality offer alternative suggestions for understanding why, if as materialist aesthetics recommends, art and economics 'are one' in their origins they nevertheless retain at the point of perception a stubborn independence It would be interesting to follow the linguistic path a little further and to investigate the form of language/form of life argument. Aesthetic questions are, after all, not merely objects of attention for Marxist theoreticians Aesthetic considerations are or should be crucial and even paramount in deciding how our lives are lived and in determining what a good life is. Much could yet be made of Wittgenstein's observation that 'ethics and aesthetics are one'

Michael Sprinker has written a detailed text which will be of interest and use to students of aesthetic theory who wish to advance their understanding of the explanatory potential of a materialist aesthetics in general and of the Althusserian version in particular. The arguments are not assisted by the book's essay style although this does provide for a display of the wide-ranging material which a materialist aesthetics can encompass. There is no bibliography, and this is a pity It would have been useful to have had some of these acknowledged 'other routes' more clearly signposted.

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The Iconography of Landscape Essays on the Symbolic Representation, Design and Use of Past Environments. Edited by DENIS COSGROVE and STEPHEN DANIELS Cambridge U P. 1988 pp 318. £30 00.

THIS STIMULATING collection of papers, first presented at a conference on iconography in historical geography in 1984 (except for the contributions from Woolf and Harley), vindicates the interdisciplinary approach to an exciting new departure in landscape studies. The landscapes dealt with here are cultural images,

fabricated on canvas, paper or on the ground itself to represent, structure or symbolize surroundings. As such, a pleasing array of contributors from geography, fine art, literature, history and anthropology can unravel the interconnections between place, the actors and their encompassing socio-economic structures. Although the papers are all concerned with historical subject-matter, the lessons are also there for the reader living in a contemporary world 'saturated in reproduced images' (p. 6).

The contributions inevitably scatter with different degrees of affiliation around the main theme of the book. The editors have generally been able to avoid repetition, whilst allowing different views to emerge. One additional job they might have taken on, however, would have been to weave the contributions together, and to tease out comparisons and contrasts in their short introductory chapter. To give one example of the need, one could cite the contribution by Prince on 'Art and agrarian change, 1710–1815' and compare it with Cosgrove's 'The geometry of landscape: practical and speculative arts in sixteenth-century Venetian land territories'. In the former Prince makes the point that agrarian change was virtually ignored by painters in their concern to portray an unchanging, nostalgic Georgian landscape where there was no room for the modern and the technological. In the case of late-Renaissance Venice, however, Cosgrove demonstrates the strong interleaving of landscape formation (through reclamation) with literary and philosophical ideas which embraced both material and cultural change. The contrasting attitudes may well relate to the differences in time, culture and those facets of everyday life which were deemed sufficiently apt for high art, but readers are left to draw their own conclusions.

Other examples of such contrasts would include the degrees to which, in the vastly different cultures under consideration, art served either artificially to separate landscape from society, or to demonstrate the articulation of social change by and through change in the landscape. Daniels addresses this theme directly in his contribution, but undoubtedly the continuing development of structurationist interpretations of human geography, which have gained more favour since the initial 1984 conference under review here, would benefit from further elaboration.

The range of subject areas is indeed wide. Georgian England is dealt with by Daniels, Lucas (the anti-picturesque in Wordsworth and Clare), Prince, and Fraser (on Joseph Wright, one whose work on science and manufacturing was virtually contemporary with Gainsborough, but radically different in subject-matter and moral overtones). The nineteenth century forms the basis for most of the other contributions, which include a very clear and vibrant account of the formation of an ideology of Northern distinctiveness in the national history of Canada, which this reviewer would have liked amplified. The North in Britain is also well covered by contributions from Pringle on Landseer and the creation of a Highland mythology surrounding Queen Victoria; and by Grant's paper on Egyptian renditions in Scottish architecture as exemplified by the work of Alexander Thompson and stimulated through Egyptian influences within freemasonry. The latter provides an interesting example of the mediation through 'invisible colleges' between landscape and individual —another generalizing theme which could have been tackled by the editors. The symbolic importance of place is dealt with in very different contexts by Harrison who examines the manner in which crowds assembled in English towns, leading to some places becoming 'symbolically charged' (such as St Peters Field after Peterloo), and by Woolf who examines the social meanings and cultural politics surrounding the Paris Opera house, and its role in subsuming the 'spirit of the age'.

One point of some interest for this genre of historical geography is the interpretation of the word 'iconography' itself. Reading this collection, one senses that uniformity of definition is neither forthcoming, nor necessarily desirable. Is it possible to speak of something so broad as a national iconography, such as a 'Canadian iconography' (p. 162) for example? And the contribution by Lewis on 'Rhetoric of the western interior: modes of environmental description in American promotional literature of the nineteenth century' would not easily fit into even a very liberal interpretation of iconogra-

phy, but is actually more concerned with an elaboration of the type of environmental perception study which he has done so much already to popularize. On the other hand, in a very important contribution of fundamental significance for the geographer at least, Harley interprets maps as icons, as value-laden images and as social products for the acquisition of power which (via Foucault and Giddens) legitimize and help in the manipulation of power. Maps, as he points out, are part of the language of power, not protest.

In general this excellently produced collection is to be welcomed as a valuable component in the Cambridge Studies in Historical Geography series. Five years on, many of the authors' ideas will have developed, but as a cross-section of thinking in the mid 1980s this volume will retain its value for many years to come.

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The Whole Internal Universe: Imitation and the New Defense of Poetry in British Criticism 1660–1830. By JOHN L. MAHONEY. Fordham U.P New York. 1985 pp. 166 No price given.

EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY British criticism has always been a vexatious topic for the historian of ideas. The period is rich and lively It is framed by French neo-classicism and German romantic philosophy. It produced a great many critics, some of whom were also poets, some also philosophers, all apparently desirous of defining literature and art in new and more rigorous ways. The result is a wealth of material, most of it attractively written Several of these works had real impact on the taste of their own times and thus have genuine historical significance But when the philosopher or, more precisely, the aesthetic philosopher examines this work and penetrates behind its confident, common-sense surface in search of a coherent and substantial body of opinion, what does he find? Hints, suggestions, adumbrations, tendencies, along with a great many recycled commonplaces and a generally amateurish patching-together of ideas. The style and the terminology, even the material itself, is so consistent that it seems improbable that there is not also a shared intellectual foundation to them, and if there is such a thing it must surely, as a consequence of all the effort put into it, represent a solid contribution to aesthetics But what precisely that contribution was, and the scale of it, remains debatable The most persuasive accounts of the subject that we have are tributes more to the subtlety of their authors than to the cogency of their source material

John L. Mahoney's modest book is another search for that Holy Grail of eighteenth-century studies, a general theme which shapes the critical thinking of the period. His is a modest attempt because he does not set out to explain the whole of the subject but only a particular aspect He has chosen to explore the development of the idea of imitation in the period. Indeed, even that is too broad a description of his purpose, for he focuses on one development of the concept of mimesis, its extension to cover not just the imitation of external appearance but also the imitation of internal experience, or, as he puts it, 'the expression of the inner life with all its nuances' (p. 3). The idea is alluring. Could it be that the period in question is distinctive for a small but far-reaching change in an age-old idea, a switch from the idea of art as imitation of things to one of art as the imitation of the mental impressions of things?

Such a thesis clearly demands careful proof by quotation from a representative selection of critical texts and Professor Mahoney's book certainly tries to provide this. He does not, however, overcome the methodological problem he has set himself in attempting to write a brief study of a wide range of material, as even the arithmetic of the situation indicates. He strives to deal with at least twenty-two authors, each in a separate section, in the space of about 150 pages, giving an average of about seven pages per author. Some get a great deal less than this, others get more, but the most space given to any single author (Coleridge) is only fifteen pages. There is simply not enough room to do more than sketch a critic's main views. What is more, in many cases Professor Mahoney includes a brief biography of the critic, such as any reference work might supply, and thus often wastes a page or two While there is some justification for these biographies in the case of obscure individuals such as Alexander Gerard and Bishop Robert Lowth, there is none surely in the case of, say, Dryden. In addition, while

one appreciates the need for historical perspective, the introductory sections on Plato, Aristotle and Sidney are a page-consuming luxury and yet, of course, hardly long enough to do any sort of justice to their subjects.

The most promising chapter of the book is Chapter 3, 'The Anglo-Scottish Critics and Aestheticians', which deals with a number of British writers, some, such as Shaftesbury and Adam Smith, better known than others. Here one hopes for fresh information and discoveries to support Professor Mahoney's thesis, but unfortunately he elects to discuss the eleven authors dealt with in this thirty-page chapter not as a group but individually, and in an order which is neither explained nor evident. The result epitomizes the failing of the book as a whole, for having worked through these separate accounts of a number of very different writers, dealing with different subjects at different times, and not all of whom seem to have much to say on imitation, and what they do say not always bearing out Professor Mahoney's thesis, one is left with a strong sense of not being able to see the wood for the trees. It is pleasing to see attention paid to so many lesser critics of the eighteenth century, and, as a Scot, I am pleased to see notice taken of so many of my countrymen, and Professor Mahoney's succinct accounts of their views would be a useful introduction to these critics for anyone embarking upon a study of the period, but, although *The Whole Internal Universe* is valuable as an introduction to its subject, it does not reach its stated goal, a contribution to that unified theory of eighteenth-century British criticism which is still so desirable and so elusive

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The Discourse of the Sublime: Readings in History, Aesthetics and the Subject. By PETER DE BOLLA. Basil Blackwell. 1989 pp. 324. £30 00.

As MIGHT be expected, granted the prominence of the term 'discourse' in its title, this book is written from a Foucauldian standpoint It is (mercifully) neither another exposition of Foucault nor a commentary on commentaries on Foucault but an original essay. Using Foucauldian presuppositions and techniques, de Bolla investigates a number of discourses, chiefly but not exclusively prominent in the years 1756–63, with the overall aim of establishing the conclusion that 'the modern subject, the subject generated in, by and through the age of reason, is the result or product of a particular discursive network not uniquely present to the years 1756–63, but largely initiated and substantiated during this period' (pp 5–6). By 'the subject', de Bolla stresses repeatedly, he does not mean a self-conscious individual in the real world, but instead 'a position, a space or opening within discourse' (p. 5).

The central thesis concerning the nature of the change in the subject thus defined which de Bolla seeks to establish is this: that sometime between roughly 1756 and the end of the eighteenth century the subject became autonomous (see e g., p. 290) by contrast to prior conceptions in which the subject's capacity for 'self-determining and self-authenticating was severely limited' (p 149). The argument to establish this view is of some complexity, though its chief stages can be outlined fairly briefly. In Part I, which is concerned with the period of the Seven Years War, it is argued that the autonomous subject is generated by the operation of two important discourses, the first concerning the notion of the sublime, and the second concerning ways of managing the national debt caused by the war In the case of each of these discourses, it is contended, there emerges 'a conceptualization of the subject as the excess or overplus of discourse itself; as the remainder, that which cannot be appropriated or included within the present discursive network of control' (p. 6). Part II of the book deals with three further discourses, those concerning elocution or oratory; perspective theory, and finally reading. In each case, it is argued that these discourses can be properly interpreted as in some sense producing an excess, and it is this excess which in some way generates or becomes the autonomous subject. It is to be stressed that there is no straightforward causal link between the discourses discussed in Part I and those discussed in Part II, i.e., it is not contended (for example) that the discourse on the sublime causally affected the discourses on elocution, perspective and reading. The procedure is rather to 'note connections and overlaps at the constitutive level' (p. 17) of the discourses in ques-

tion. Equally, it is emphasized that the perspective which emerges as a result of this procedure is but one among many which are possible since the network of discourses is not stable at any point in time.

De Bolla's argument invites commentary and criticism on a number of levels. For the present, I will take for granted the truth of three crucial presuppositions: (i) that Foucault's position can be stated in a manner which is other than self-refuting (i.e., because it is itself merely a discourse with no special status with regard to truth), (ii) the structuralist-style assumption that discourses can meaningfully be said to have some sort of autonomy and can coherently be made the subject of verbs of action; and (iii) that some unprecedented change in the nature of subjectivity did take place during the European Enlightenment. Even granted these assumptions, there still remain a number of difficulties in the argument of the book, chiefly centred around the key notion of excess.

If the central thesis concerning the change in the nature of the subject is to be established, it must be the case that, for each discourse examined—and this in effect means for each of the texts examined—the examples given of that discourse must each yield in their analysis the concept of an excess; but it is very doubtful that they will do so. There is room here for only one detailed example of a type of difficulty which recurs in the argument to establish this thesis concerning excess. In his analysis of Burke's *Philosophical Enquiry*, de Bolla contends that this text exhibits an unwanted 'discursive excess' to which Burke gives the name 'power' (p. 66). Burke finds that the discourse he is using produces a 'leakage' which might generate a self-authenticating subject. Since such a subject would be unacceptable for a number of reasons (e.g., politically), he retreats from it and uses an adjacent discourse, that of theology, in which safely to locate any instance of self-authenticating power, i.e., in the Godhead. The real problem with de Bolla's argument is the way in which Burke's text has to be interpreted in order for it to yield the desired conclusion. A typical step in the interpretation is as follows. In the closing pages of the *Enquiry*, Burke offers some general reflections on language, among which is the following: 'there are words, and certain dispositions of words, which being peculiarly devoted to passionate subjects, and always used by those who are under the influence of any passion: they touch and move us more than those which far more clearly and distinctly express the subject. We yield to sympathy, what we refuse to description' (Burke, *Enquiry*, J. T. Boulton's edn., p. 175). De Bolla interprets the last clause quoted as meaning firstly 'we [i.e., the users of language] have feelings far too rich, subtle, etc. to be embodied in a poor medium such as verbal language' and then moves to a second claim that the use of 'we' is 'problematic' since what is in fact going on here is that in some sense the language (as opposed to its users) is 'refusing' to convey the sublime experience—this is one of many applications of presupposition (ii), above. On the basis of these moves de Bolla concludes: 'Something excessive is at work here, since the connections between language and experience, experience and the subject, the subject and language are all put into question, and it is the inadequacy of theory to theorize those relations which is exposed' (p. 65). Even granting that Burke's remark can legitimately be construed in either of the two ways suggested, and granting that some general questioning of the relations of word, self and world is what is under discussion, none of this constitutes a logical justification for the presence of the notion of excess in the conclusion. This style of textual reading is repeated often in the course of the argument, which in consequence does not succeed in establishing the key thesis concerning excess.

Again, it is far from clear that the notion of excess is used univocally throughout the argument. For example, when de Bolla discusses works on the theory of perspective (Ch. 8), he asserts that this discourse 'legislates the space of the body' (p. 198) by attempting to stipulate that the ideal point from which to view a painting is coincident with the point of view from which it is painted, but the theory is faced with the 'excess' of practice, i.e., multiple viewpoints. If this does count as an example of an excess, it is certainly quite unlike the highly abstract, theoretical excess located in Burke's text. (The decision to use works on perspective at all, as de Bolla himself notes on p. 186, is somewhat unexpected. As one might anticipate, the rules

of perspective did not change, and the perspective textbooks of the period therefore form an unpromising illustration for an argument designed to exhibit a radical mutation in the notion of the subject around the mid-century).

Such qualms as are generated by this book are of a logical kind; there can be none at all on the grounds of scholarship The knowledge of the period evinced and the extent of reading assimilated are exemplary, especially in areas often ignored in works on aesthetics (e.g., rhetoric and the practice of reading). The Foucauldian framework is well served by the author's erudition.

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The Origins of Modern Critical Thought: German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism from Lessing to Hegel. Edited by DAVID SIMPSON. Cambridge U.P. 1988. pp. 449. £10.95, clothbound, £30.00

THIS ANTHOLOGY is a selection from the three-volume set of *German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism* which Cambridge University Press brought out in 1984 and 1985 and which will be well known to teachers of literature and aesthetics. It presents in an accessible manner many of the most important texts in German aesthetic and literary criticism from Lessing to Hegel, with the welcome addition of passages from Schiller's *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*. This book includes also selections from Kant, Lessing, Hegel, Schopenhauer, A. W. Schlegel, Friedrich Schlegel, Fichte, Schelling, Goethe, Novalis, Solger and Jean Paul It covers pretty comprehensively what must on any reckoning be regarded as a highly significant period of intellectual development in aesthetics and literary criticism, a period which obviously had an important impact upon the structure and understanding of both Romantic and modern literary theory

David Simpson introduces this collection with a brief yet illuminating introduction, in which he tentatively argues for the importance of this historical period in our grasp of more contemporary concerns. The tentative approach is surely the right one here, since so many writers on this topic just assume that the Lessing to Hegel cultural nexus is crucially relevant to aesthetics in general without actually arguing for that relationship. The judicious selection of texts is itself a great aid to his thesis, although it must be admitted that many students will find it difficult to understand the arguments being presented here unless they are quite sophisticated philosophically. Simpson presents a concise account of some of the main aspects of this period in cultural history and points to the arguments relating to the question of influence which it had on the subsequent development of English literature A comprehensive bibliography will help the interested reader follow up the points which Simpson makes. In general, he stresses those aspects of Romanticism which so strongly marked its origins in Germany, especially the problematic nature of Germany itself as a country and the status of the German language. This led to the construction of a series of dichotomies and contradictions which so clearly differentiate German aesthetics from the aesthetics of classical Greece, for example Hence we get the frequent use of concepts and comparisons between unity/disunity, aesthetics/morality, matter/Geist, society/individual, subjectivity/objectivity and relativism/holism. This set of concepts is in many ways the main contribution which this historical period provided to the development of aesthetics, and is its main claim to be regarded as an essentially modern (or even post-modern!) set of issues and concerns.

One minor cavil Simpson argues quite plausibly that what is represented as Kant's thought in this collection is his critical work, and we might expect a different approach to be followed in his pre-critical thought. He provides a rather unfortunate example to make his point, though, from the *Anthropology*, namely 'the field of our *obscure* representations is immeasurable, while our clear ones are only the infinitesimally few points on this map that lie open to consciousness our mind is like an immense map with only a few points *illuminated*' (Simpson's Introduction, p 17). Simpson thinks this suggests that in the transcendental philosophy Kant is concerned to describe these few points with absolute precision, which he claims gives that philosophy 'a kind of desperate dignity' (idem) Yet in this passage Kant is pointing to the contrast between our clear notions, represented

by mathematical and logical truths, with the great mass of ideas we have about ourselves and our world which are incapable of being perfectly understood, because they include so much from the shifting world of sensations and experiences. These obscure and confused representations reflect the obscurity and confusion of knowledge which is limited to a particular human point of view, and in his critical philosophy he endeavoured to establish what we could be said to know about the implications of having such a limited grasp of reality. The transcendental philosophy is not concerned with the relatively uninteresting series of perspicuous representations which we can construct, but precisely with our concepts of the external world and their justification. In the *Anthropology* as well as in the critical philosophy Kant is very determined to differentiate his position from that of Leibniz.

This is an excellent anthology, and will doubtless be very widely used on courses in literary theory and aesthetics. Much of the material might well intimidate an undergraduate, but it does represent philosophical aesthetics at its most challenging and revealing

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Modern Literary Theory, A Reader. Edited by PHILIP RICE and PATRICIA WAUGH Edward Arnold. 1989. pp 291. Paperbound, £7.95

THOSE WHO still object to the 'new criticism' ('structuralism', 'post-structuralism', 'deconstruction' etc.) on the grounds that it relies upon mystifying jargon might like to consider some of the abstract concepts naturalized by the development of English studies in the 1920s so that they now seem common sense (or at least the common sense of the degree-educated). What exactly is an 'objective correlative'? What is 'tradition'? What precisely is entailed by referring to someone as 'the author' (since it clearly means a great deal more than he or she who held the pen)? And, above all, how would one seriously define the crucial term 'imagination'?

I'm not asking for answers on a postcard because, arguably, none of this matters very much any more (the terms will survive as fossilized relics preserved in quotation marks, 'tradition', 'the author', 'imagination', etc.). As Rice and Waugh say, the founding premiss of their anthology is that over the past twenty years there has occurred 'a major transformation in literary theory which has radically questioned our understanding of "literature" ' (p. ix). There has been a major shift of paradigm for which Rice and Waugh give the appropriate one-sentence summary when they say that 'if contemporary theory teaches us anything it is that the orders of the world are not "natural" but constructed', a conclusion available from both argument and experience which Clov in Samuel Beckett's *Endgame* announced in 1957 when he said, 'There's no more nature' (today he might have said, 'There's no more "nature" '). In North American universities the implications and applications of this conclusion for the study of literary texts have been taken on board and widely put to work. In our own tight little island the consequences have generally been resisted, partly because of a national culture which invented its own account of nature in the seventeenth century and has since forgotten it was ever invented, partly from an institutional situation around higher education which has made it easier to lend virtual half-life to dying 'tradition'.

According to a well-known principle, the older the institution, the less it has been susceptible to intellectual change. Of the twin founts of British academic hegemony, the Cambridge English Faculty, following the MacCabe affair, has pretty well given up trying to live in the contemporary world, while Oxford remains perilously, sometimes bitterly, divided between 'old' and 'new' criticism. Outside, a number of university graduate schools and centres have developed (at Sussex, Essex, Southampton, Nottingham and more recently, Cardiff, Lancaster and Birkbeck) because they have been able to attract funds and students but also because they were often sited in the so-called 'new' institutions envisaged by the Robbins report. Most progress has been made in the newest departments; despite being starved of resources, polytechnics and colleges have pioneered work in theory and literary study and beyond literary studies in the novel areas variously marked out as cultural studies, mass media, communications, film (it is therefore not accidental that Philip Rice lectures in Com-

munication Studies at Coventry Polytechnic and Patricia Waugh in English at Sunderland Polytechnic). Meanwhile, publishers, responsive to somewhat different imperatives, have competed vigorously to build up lists based in the new theory, at Routledge, Macmillan, Blackwell, Harvester, and more recently, Pinter, Unwin Hyman, Edward Arnold (though not always without pain, as some recent events at Manchester University Press have shown).

Students *want* the new criticism (Marxist, feminist, post-structuralist), and the intellectual battle for it has been won But (and this is the purpose of my review of institutions) that victory remains obscure, unseen and unacknowledged because for ten years now the only institutional development in higher education in literature has taken the form of cuts. If we had a progressive government, one committed even to raising the percentage of people in higher education towards the levels of our European competitors, and if new courses were being set up (as they were in the New Universities in the 60s and the polys in the 70s), and if they were to be staffed by bright young things rather than ageing hippies, a recognizably different and very exciting study of literature (and more widely of 'signifying practices') would emerge within a couple of years. Perhaps at that point, since there still remains something of an intellectual 'public sphere' in England, even higher journalism (from *The Guardian* to Channel 4), would become definitely redirected.

It is really in anticipation of such a moment that the Rice and Waugh anthology is launched. For it is founded on the assumption that the terms of the new criticism ('ideology', 'phallocentric', 'the text', and so on) are by nature no more abstract than our old friends, that the new ideas are *teachable*, and that once they have been naturalized into common sense, they pose no greater intellectual problems than the old ones (in some ways fewer, since each has a definable meaning). There are other anthologies (Newton's *Twentieth-Century Literary Theory*, which is broken-backed between pre- and post-60s criticism, David Lodge's *Modern Criticism and Theory*, a pluralist hors-d'oeuvre with a bit of everything) Finally, what may be most welcome about Rice and Waugh's collection is that by including Lacan on the mirror stage, Althusser on ideological state apparatuses and MacCabe on cinematic realism, they reveal a commitment to the specifically English innovations in post-structuralism and conceptualizations of the subject and subject position which many will find especially encouraging because that development keeps a firm hold on the politics of modern literary theory.

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Fictions, Philosophies and the Problems of Poetics. By PETER J. MCCORMICK. Cornell U.P. 1988. pp 351. $17.55, clothbound, $46.75.

IN THIS ambitious work the author has three principal aims: to explore the nature, kinds and roles of several cardinal fictions in the light of contemporary literary theory and philosophical reflection; the consideration of fiction in relation to the issue of relativism and rationality; and a revision to eighteenth-century interpretations of rationality which, in his words, 'make up the stamp of modernity'. One leading contention is that encounter with literary works has far-reaching implications for how philosophy itself is to be conceived

The general strategy consists in the juxtaposition of analytic and hermeneutical accounts. The first four chapters cover some familiar ground. Fictionality and metaphor have long been regarded as test cases for theories of meaning, and the literature on these topics has burgeoned during the last two decades. This may have influenced McCormick's strategic decision to concentrate on speech-act theory in his opening discussion. In consequence much logico-semantical material scarcely achieves passing mention and is rather briskly dismissed Searle's approach, labelled the 'Standard View', is carefully scrutinized and subjected to a series of refinements and revisions The revised version is then put to the test against three specimen passages from Hume, Kant and Hegel. Features of these passages are taken to signal the presence of fictionality, thus supposedly casting doubt on any clear-cut distinction between fictional and non-fictional works. What this analysis reveals, if anything, is that philosophers too resort to literary and rhetorical devices; but it seems question-begging to equate this with fictionaliz-

ing as such After further refinements, the theory is criticized for its narrow conception of truth and reference

What, after all, is the nature of the relationship between literary fiction and truth? McCormick introduces the notion of 'literary implication' which, in his view, cannot be cashed as logical implication, entailment, or as a species of inductive inference. He settles for Peircean abduction combined with a counterfactual account of the relation. This is less than a full endorsement, since he questions the idea of some already available cognitive content independent of what might be generated in particular readings. (The influence of Ingarden is prominent here.)

McCormick produces an interesting discussion of how moral knowledge might be derived from fiction. However, the reader might emerge a little frustrated by the conclusions. First of all, the author opts for the weaker notion of belief rather than knowledge. There is also an uncertainty whether it is being argued that fruitful moral hypotheses can be derived from fiction, or whether the behaviour of characters is to be morally evaluated solely in relation to the norms of the work's community of origin Thus the relationship between Anna and Vronsky in Tolstoy's novel would be judged morally bad by the particular community were the circumstances recounted as fact and not fiction But it would be necessary to make clear whether this communal judgement would issue from antecedently held moral convictions, or from moral beliefs resulting from the transforming effects of the work itself. The latter would seem closer to McCormick's stance elsewhere in the book The claim is that we evaluate works in terms of their 'truth to life' and come to see a moral significance in the type of circumstances depicted because of their relation to real-world problems and tribulations. This links with the much-discussed topic, that of the rationality of our emotional response to fiction. After reviewing some of the work on this issue, McCormick concludes that the best account, canvassed by Peter Lamarque and others, is none the less flawed in virtue of its dependency on speech-act theory and limited notions of reference and truth However, it is not obvious that Lamarque's account is beyond rescue or that McCormick's notion of truth is all that unfamiliar or unorthodox.

The next two chapters, dealing with notions of self and agency, manage to be both wide-ranging and dense. Although literary anchorages are provided in T. S Eliot and Rilke, for the most part the discussion amounts to a sweeping survey of contemporary philosophy of mind. The conclusions (which are in danger of being submerged) are that neither analytic nor hermeneutical accounts can do justice to the subtleties of the chosen texts But does this really dictate that we need a radically new way of doing philosophy as opposed to new and better theories? This ambiguity is not resolved. On the other hand, there are interesting and useful suggestions about the concept of self, and a thought-provoking comparison with the concept of fictional character The final chapter discusses the poetry of Wallace Stevens in an exploration of the idea of reality as itself a special kind of fiction. (Here, as in other places, the atmosphere is thick with Goodman and Ricoeur.) The book concludes with a retrospect, and argument for relativism, and a critique of the 'Lockean' rationality which he claims is in decline. Not everyone will be as sanguine as McCormick at the thought of abandoning an intellectual ethic which includes a regard for evidence, argument and the progressive provision of good reasons, especially when, as he himself freely admits, there is little that can be said about the much prophesied 'post-modern' future.

To say this book is a motley is not to be unkind. It engages with the literary and philosophical issues more thoroughly than many recent contributions and, refreshingly, makes use of lesser-known rather than stock examples, including Korean and Japanese poems. It is safe to say that it will not be greeted with indifference.

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The Idea of Music An Introduction to Musical Aesthetics in Antiquity and the Middle Ages. By HERBERT M SCHUELLER. Medieval Institute Publications, Western Michigan University 1988 pp 515. $19.95; clothbound $39.95.

THIS is a large and ambitious book If admira-

tion is tempered with disappointment, one must at any rate credit the writer with seriousness of purpose and a generous estimate of his readership's powers of assimilation The amount of ground covered, from remotest myth to Ugolino of Orvieto, is impressive; the earliest musical thinkers of any historical substance that are discussed here are Damon (to whom Plato deferred) and Lasos of Hermione. Although a number of fundamental ideas are ventilated, especially in the opening chapters, the book consists essentially of a series of summaries of the musical thought of the most important philosophers and theorists (and of several unimportant ones) during the course of this long period. Little that is of weight has been left unpondered, and the student who is in need of a quick introduction to these writers will certainly benefit, as I have myself.

The chief criticism, however, must be that the connecting thread of an idea of music is soon lost among the welter of detail. It is not at all clear, by the end of this book, what this idea actually was or even on what level the enquiry has been pursued. Was it primarily, for instance, an ethical or a mathematical idea (for it is obvious that it was not an 'aesthetic' one in the nineteenth-century sense)? Perhaps it never could have been demonstrated that one single idea of music shone through during the whole epoch. *Mousikē* embraced a good deal more than the word 'music' does now, and even the *musica* of the Middle Ages, less exalted though it was, could include language (for the sake of its sonorous element) and bodily movement (as a visible expression of rhythm). But it is not made clear whether the enquiry is actually directed towards the meaning of the words from which 'music' is derived, or whether it is an attempt to distil our own 'music' from what is said, in antiquity and the Middle Ages, about the wider concept. One's impression is that the author has not considered this point, since the book constantly flits from one level of enquiry to another

The writer's method, basically a chronological survey, has prevented him from pursuing specific ideas individually down the ages. All theorists derive their concepts from a variety of sources, and in many cases these sources have been mentioned. But the result is a jumble which is only too likely to confuse the student The significance of many ideas might well elude even the most persistent reader because their full genealogy is nowhere set out.

This failure to set out trains of thought is the most serious weakness of a book that by any standards contains an abundance of information Its other major shortcoming is the impression it gives of a certain remoteness from the writings in their original languages. Whenever possible, the author has used a translation—which is fully justified as to quotations in the text—and seems to avoid citing originals at all costs. In a book of this kind, original quotations in footnotes, and details of texts in the bibliography, are a *sine qua non*. Here, they are given only when a translation (in English or German) does not exist (it is puzzling to find, for example, under Aristides Quintilianus only Schäfke's 1937 translation into German; neither Winnington-Ingram's nor Schäfke's texts are given, nor even Mathiesen's 1983 English translation; and this is typical).

The author's remoteness from the original expression of the ideas he discusses is manifest from the very first sentence of his book, where it is a shock to read: 'Greek legend tells us that Harmonia . . . personified harmony and order'. Greek legend can have done no such thing, because Harmonia and harmony are the same word: she was its personification *ipso facto*. Again (page 5), 'It [music] derived its name from *mousikē*, an untranslatable term modelled after the name of the Muses'. One does not need to state the objection to such a formulation; it may be no more than carelessness, but it is disconcerting to find these two instances so early on in the book. My copy is now bespattered with queries as to points of language and substance, and with the correction of errors, large and small. It would be a tedious business, and a misuse of space, to go through them here. There are oddities of nomenclature, such as 'Vitruvius' (Marcus Vitruvio Pollio), 'Cassiodorus' (Favius Magnus Aurelian Cassiodorus)—it is a feature of this book that some, though not all, authors are dignified with an 'original' version of their name in brackets—or 'Johannes of Grocheo'; and there are the strangest revelations of historical naïvety, as when the voice of protest against the discussion of music in the context of moral philosophy was

heard no more after the eruption of Vesuvius ((page 187); as the voice was that of Philodemus of Gadara, who died a hundred years before, the relevance of the eruption is hard to fathom); or when a special point is made of the use of Latin by the Romans 'for the law, both domestic and in the courts, and for both everyday and commercial correspondence' It would certainly have been worth mentioning if they had not used Latin for these purposes, since although Greek was also widely used, Latin was after all their native language.

As I have said, this book does indeed introduce the reader to a large number of authors What it can hardly be said to do is to introduce the subject of musical aesthetics in the chosen period. It is never made clear what this term is intended to mean so far as this book is concerned (and the statement on page 6 that 'aisthēsis meant mental as opposed to physical feeling' does not inspire confidence); as with 'music' the tension between a Greek word and its modern derivative is never satisfactorily resolved. For my own part, I doubt very much whether the term as nowadays generally understood (that is, as a tool for investigating the nature of the impact of music upon the listener) could ever be illuminated by ancient and mediaeval writers. It is only by chance remarks that they reveal that the impact of music might resemble that which we ourselves suppose it to be; when they settle down to discuss 'music' seriously, they become obsessed with ethics, or mathematics, or poetry, or with anything but what we should consider to be the matter in hand. This book ducks a number of basic questions, and the hard work that has gone into it could have produced a very much better one, but a persistent student may yet find in it the key to a garden of thought previously undreamt of, and go on to discover its beauties at first hand.

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Music in European Thought, 1851–1912. Edited by BOJAN BUJIC. Cambridge U.P. 1988 pp. 414. £40.00.

THIS BOOK is the successor to Ike Huray and Day's *Music and Aesthetics in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries*, which appeared in 1981 in the series Cambridge Readings in the Literature of Music, (a series which now also includes volumes on Greek musical writings and Early Christian literature on music). Like these books it assembles a large number of extracts from very varied sources. The advantage of an anthology, as compared with one author's personal statement (and here one thinks especially of Dahlhaus's *Esthetics of Music*, English edition, Cambridge University Press 1982, because of its concern with similar topics), is the emphasis it places on independence of thought- an individual naturally accommodates inherited ideas to personal thought patterns and ways of expression Of course, a danger of partiality remains- one is reliant on the editor for a broad as well as characterful view. The editor's problem is certainly acute in the period covered by this book—one which witnessed a rapid expansion of music's contexts as a subject for discussion, by virtue of the massive changes wrought by scientific investigation and its consequences However, it needs wide sympathies to reflect all this adequately, and it is to Bojan Bujic's great credit that he has controlled the issues so well while casting his net so widely. Doubtless it will come as something of a surprise to the reader anticipating familiar chunks of Wagner and Hanslick to find such attention devoted not only to philosophers with musical concerns but to those whose chief sphere of activity was far from musical, for example Herbert Spencer and Charles Darwin.

About a third of the book (Parts 3–5 from a total of five) emphasizes the influence of new disciplines in one way or another. 'Music and Positivist Thought' contains two major sections dealing with the emergence of the study of the psychology of music and theories concerning music's primitive origins. The wide divergences of emphasis of contemporary opinion are brought out clearly: in the former area as between the more exact scientific response of Helmholtz and Fechner, and the adherents of the theory of 'Einfühling'; in the latter the opposition of Spencer and Darwin in relation to theories of evolution. Part 4 traces the emergence of musicology in its cultural context, as part of what is depicted as a 'bridge between music theory and philosophy', in which the developing sense of German national identity was a powerful drive. It is appropriate to see the

still controversial figure of the German theorist Schenker appearing in this context, the nature of his comments in his early book *Harmony* of 1906 giving a very different impression of his thought than is too often communicated by over-emphasis on the technicalities of his later modes of presentation—and, in turn, reminding one of how much part of a unity were subjects now increasingly treated as separate analysis, aesthetics, criticism, musicology. Part 5 serves to conclude the book with a view of the state of thought in the early years of this century, again showing the contrasts: as between the philosopher Dilthey's attempts at a 'human science' which transcends the divisions between natural and philosophical science, to interpret musical experience (here in connection with Mozart), and the composer Busoni's concern with a vision of a future of new musical scales and music 'restored to its primitive, natural essence'. Such diverse material requires careful introduction and linking and certainly receives it: as well as the valuable biographies one finds in the previous volume, the context is here sharpened by a searching introduction to the sections in which the readings are grouped, as well as pointers to further reading.

But for all the breadth of this field and its anticipation of issues still central to our infinitely more expanded modern study of the subject, it is probably still to the principles underlying thought about the great classic and romantic repertory that the average reader of musical bent will still turn, though they will certainly appear in a different perspective. Perhaps the most challenging response already turns up in the Introduction, on page xii: that the very character of the romanticism we assume in the music of, for example, Wagner and Liszt, was not to be ascribed so much to a climate of romanticism as much as to one of neo-romanticism, a view already familiar from, and ascribed to, Dahlhaus, who devotes an entire chapter to it in *Between Romanticism and Modernism* (English version, Cambridge University Press 1986). 'the musical survival of Romanticism in a positivist epoch'. This observation offers an early pointer to the book's basic preoccupation with how one might conceive of the concepts of form and content and their relation. And in seeking to replace the generalities which so often serve in the attempt to distinguish programme or descriptive music from so-called absolute music, it is the figure of J F Herbart who emerges with a new definition, connecting the philosophical inheritance of Hegel with the (likely) more familiar attempts of Hanslick to purge music of false associations with other arts (however powerful the associations one may bring to them). It seems fortuitous, just at the time when a new translation of Hanslick's *Vom Musikalisch Schönen*) has been published (ed Payzant, Hackett, 1986), this book should serve to place his ideas in such a sharp critical perspective. But the editor's aim is not to oppose Hanslick and Wagner in showing, by statement and implication, how different were the interpretations leading from Hegel's significantly sympathetic attitude to music's place in the hierarchy of arts—taken up in different ways by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, and by Hanslick, but rather to show the connections, especially as they are apparent in the writings of little-considered figures he groups under the title 'The Eclectic Tendency', figures such as Franz Brendel (influential successor to Robert Schumann as editor of the *Neue Zeitschrift für Musik*), and, perhaps especially, Ottokar Hostinský (Czech aesthetician and champion of the composer Smetana), to whose own *Das Musikalisch-Schöne* . . . the editor devotes particular attention.

For all the clarity of its planning, with individual ideas pursued against a background of persistent theoretical concerns, this is not an easy book to absorb; a comparison with Le Huray and Day (even in its abridged version of 1988) shows the increased concern with the abstract which inevitably accompanied music's new status for thinkers of the period. And the extracts are (in the main) considerably longer. In such a field one could always suggest additions, but I doubt, as with the original full version of Le Huray and Day, that the additional material would serve much to change the essential thrust. Unfortunately, the biggest omission lies outside the editor' s control: some evidence, let alone any detailed record, of the likely exchanges between Brahms and Hanslick which would have given so much insight into their respective conceptions of the relation of form

and content, of which Brahms was such a master, and whose example was so important not only to Hanslick but also to Schoenberg (It would be in many ways a complement to Wagner's response to Schopenhauer.) But thanks to this book, one may contemplate the musical implications much more fully than hitherto and gain the fuller perspective on the subject in general which will benefit readers with many different interests in the period.

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Music on Deaf Ears Musical Meaning, Ideology, Education By LUCY GREEN. Manchester U P. 1988. pp. 165. £22.50

ACCORDING TO Adorno, 'one of the tasks of an empirical sociology of music [is] the pointed posing of problems in order to test opinions that have become common property as expressions of a prevailing cultural ideology' (*Introduction to the Sociology of Music*, Continuum, 1976, p. 101). Adorno never undertook the task himself, but twenty years later it is taken up by Lucy Green Following in Adorno's footsteps, she gathers together opinions regarding the style and range of musical syllabuses of 61 co-educational, comprehensive school teachers in Great Britain.

Green criticizes the ideology of contemporary music education and offers an alternative conception. The former she does more satisfactorily than the latter But this is because she says too little about her view What she does say appears mostly in the final chapter, the other chapters are devoted to critique and the reporting of sociological data. A more general problem with her book is its dependence on the ideas of the Frankfurt School. This dependence makes it difficult to assess the book on its own terms. A lesser problem is that the argument and language are unduly complex in parts. Still, the book is stimulating and filled with nice examples.

Although Green confines her empirical study to music education, her conclusions are extendable, say, to media broadcast Her book, therefore, should be of interest to a wide audience. As a general inquiry, she aims to examine the social nature of musical experience Accordingly, her book falls in line, as it is intended to do, with others in the well-conceived series *Music and Society* edited by Wilfred Mellers and Pete Martin

Green commences from the still controversial assertion that a society's beliefs and values reflect patterns of political and economic processes With this in mind she begins an *Ideologiekritik*. An ideology, given her usage, embodies both the conflicts and contradictions and the normative content of the social totality It sustains hegemonic forms of consciousness and fetishism It embodies the tendency to reify phenomena—'to regard the surface appearance of things as their unalterable bases and causes' (p 2). These negative features Green seeks to make explicit by showing 'that [musical ideologies] not only deny the historical specificity and changeability of . musical beliefs and experiences, but that in doing so they . . construct a system for the measurement of musical value' (p 11) But if Green describes an ideology as having negative features, does this imply that, in her alternative view, these features do not appear? She does not tell us whether we should draw this implication, but if we should, this would constitute a departing from Adorno. He did not think a society free of ideology was possible in theory or in practice

Occupying a central position in Green's argument are two concepts of musical meaning—inherent and delineated meaning. To develop the concept of inherent meaning, she fuses complicated ideas about mediation, historicity, structuration, and affect—ideas borrowed from Hegel, Giddens, and Meyer. This fusion I found uneasy, but what finally emerges is the idea that a non-verbalizable but meaningful experience can arise directly from the sounding elements of the music. The heard meanings are inherent The verbalizable meaning of music is, by contrast, delineated This derives from music's extra-musical, social associations As one would expect, Green suggests that it is in virtue of just these delineated meanings that different musics come to be associated with specific social groups and as such come to represent social stratification at large. This argument I found well thought out

Green stresses that inherent and delineated meanings are experientially inseparable They are 'logical moments' of a single experience.

Still, we react differently towards them. Towards inherent meanings we react either with affirmation or aggravation We like or dislike what we hear Towards delineated meanings we react either positively or negatively We approve or disapprove of music's social meanings. This distinction paves the way to a description of a plethora of experiences. Sometimes our reaction to inherent meaning overpowers our reaction to delineated meaning. Sometimes, we find our two reactions compatible—we like and approve of what we hear, other times, they seem irresolvably to clash. It is worthy of note that this whole description of musical experience is given in terms having nothing to do with *Ideologiekritik*. This is a good move, since it enables Green to use the description both in her critique and in the formulation of her alternative conception. Let us look at both in turn.

Musical fetishism, Green suggests, ignores the duality of meaning. Just as economic fetishism occurs when exchange value usurps use value, so musical fetishism occurs when, for example, 'delineated meanings appropriate inherent meanings and become the means through which music appears to . . . communicate its value'. This is the fetishism involved in classical, 'concert' music. Musical fetishism can of course work in ways other than this, depending on the kind of music being experienced. Still, musical fetishism of whatever kind turns upon how we use the relation between inherent and delineated meaning. In the experience of classical music the particular tendency, according to Green, is to underplay delineated in favour of inherent meaning This music, unlike other kinds of music, survives on the basis of its inherent meaning; its delineated meanings are ignored This is not to say that classical music has no delineated meanings Rather, it is taught, performed, and experienced without an expressed desire to legitimate them. This turns out to be the privilege of classical music and evidence of its underlying 'bourgeois aesthetic'

Music education is not free from this fetishism, or so Green argues on sociological grounds. Given responses to questions, such as: Do you teach pop, folk, classical, or avant-garde music?; What are the most important aspects of music education for different types of pupils?, Green shows convincingly that classical music wins hands down. No justification for its use is offered and it is regarded as valuable for *all* pupils. Pop music loses As Adorno once put it, there is an assumption here that 'popular music constitutes the dregs of musical history' (ibid., p. 29). Pop is used as a stepping stone to classical music Other musics—jazz, folk, and experimental music—do badly as well. Green concludes that even if we recognize in principle that 'different musics operate in association with different aesthetics, we still tend to judge them according to the same system of values and that system tends to derive from the classical aesthetic' (p. 110).

Alienation and fragmentation for both teachers and pupils are the results of the fetishism of contemporary music education. What should be done? The solution cannot be to introduce more varieties of music into the syllabus to reflect the recent diversity of musical styles Surface change is inadequate; it simply reinforces prevalent ideology. Rather, Green suggests, we need to change those ideological mechanisms that give rise to undesirable attitudes in the first place We must reconceive the ways 'different musics achieve their values and the mechanisms through which their values are judged' (p. 110).

Green's solution is to educate children in both the inherent and delineated meanings of different kinds of music, since this will open up the possibility of authentic musical experiences. 'When affirmative experience of music's inherent meanings is accompanied by positive attitudes towards its delineated meanings', she writes, 'music then becomes a complete reflection and celebration of the self . . of temporal experience through the relationship between consciousness and inherent musical meanings, and of belief in delineated musical meanings, moving with the self in time and across life experiences as one integral whole. When music is like this, it draws together our world· it *celebrates* us' (p 137). Music will no longer be received (or not be received) by 'deaf ears' but will be listened to with consciousness both of self and of others. It is by positing the other in our listening that we can 'recognize a third being which is both in and for itself and for us, and therefore constitutive of the possibility of other

universes, other world-views, other meanings' (p 144).

That Green concludes her book on this optimistic note is uplifting even if it is not altogether clear what the solution amounts to This lack of clarity stems, first, from the remaining vagueness as to why exactly children and teachers—if indeed they do—have alienated musical experiences? Is their apparent feeling of alienation best understood in terms of underlying ideological forces, as Green suggests? It also stems from a lack of details Take the idea of a system of values. Green has shown us that, despite the negative connotations of an ideology, an ideology still determines a set of evaluative criteria the use of which enables us, for good or bad, to make judgements between different kinds of music It sets up a system of values across the institutional board. Is it possible, however, within Green's expressed alternative, to account not just for the differences among various musics and the authentic experiences associated therewith, but for genuine preferences expressed between them? If each music calls forth its own kind of experience, corresponding to its particular inherent and delineated meanings, what criteria could be used to make comparisons between them? Unfortunately, Green provides no answer to this or to many other similar kinds of questions.

(Note: No index is provided Errata: On p. 21 the musical examples are given in the wrong order, and on p 17 Meyer is given as Mayer.)

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France Baroque. By PHILIPPE MINGUET. Hazan, Paris 1988. pp. 399. 122 col. plates, 567 b & w (plates not numbered) No price given

THE PLETHORA of books seeking to define the Baroque style that has emerged in recent decades offers a bewildering array of signposts. It is, after all, historians and critics who invented the concept and then set the agenda in such a way that contemporary, seventeenth-century aesthetic criticism proves unhelpful. The term 'Baroque' has been applied so widely and so often wilfully to any form of architecture where a restlessness with rule and order is judged prevalent (as in the analysis, for example, of French Flamboyant architecture) that a proper confrontation with seventeenth-century evidence is clouded by prejudice. It is difficult to use a focus of time-scale or ask questions about the style's appropriateness to certain genres of architecture and design in a way that enabled Fiske Kimball, for example, to give us so useful a book on the origins of the Rococo (though, as is noted in this book, Yves Bonnefroy came closest with his *Rome, 1630. l'horizon du premier baroque*). One classic method, exemplified by V.-L. Tapié's *Baroque et Classicisme* of 1957 (inaccurately but of course characteristically translated for the English-speaking market as *The Age of Grandeur*), is to treat the theme in an evolutionary way. Baroque is, by this scheme of things, born in Rome, where it is enervated and encapsulated in Bernini and Borromini, spreads outwards to France, and thence to the rest of Europe and to the colonies, where an inevitable fade out occurs. By contrast, other historians have attempted to analyse seventeenth-century art by a series of cross-sections through it, searching for some inner will to form or spirituality that makes for the essence of this heady scent J. R. Martin's *Baroque* (1977), while not without insights, leaves many a reader ultimately dissatisfied by its uncomfortable juxtapositions, such as attempts to draw together the treatment of light in a great Italian altarpiece on the one hand and a Vermeer on the other

A definition of Baroque offers particular problems for scholars of French art because of the weight of tradition that argues that France used the Italian experience to mould a particular, and highly nationalist, language of classicism. Baroque is often therefore negated, or felt irrelevant in the French context. The sub-text of this is, as for Renaissance studies, the notion that French art refined the Italian raw material into something more intellectually satisfying The legacy of Bernini's visit to France is therefore the indigenous achievements in building on his inspiration, not the inspiration itself Philippe Minguet's book is an extended essay (for the text is no more than 122 pages, liberally interspersed with photographs) on the theme of just that critical history of France coming to terms with Italianism. He summarizes acutely, often amusingly, but never less than seriously, the history of debate of recent years as found in books, articles and conference papers, wherein

the problems have been re-addressed. He admires but by his use of language ultimately scolds Anthony Blunt on the one hand for his 'parcimonie' (in the British Academy Lecture of 1972) and the all-encompassing 'largeur d'esprit' of René Huyghe. Ultimately, in his crucial section tellingly entitled 'Une définition ouverte' (pp. 23–5), he nails his colours to the mast of an essentially open and expansionist approach.

The triumph therefore of this book is the depth of field that it covers for Minguet, though he does not pretend to offer in any sense full biographical surveys, stresses the provincial origins and the later provincial achievements of many leading architects who made their name in Paris. A treatment of French architecture that accepts unquestioningly the centrality and ubiquitousness of buildings in Paris and the Ile-de-France denies us, for example, the amazing stereometry of Jules Hardouin-Mansart's vestibule of the Hôtel de Ville at Arles. The richness of provincial Baroque is fully captured in the later two-thirds of this book by a wide-ranging photographic record, arranged regionally, with especially fine colour plates by the photographer Léonard de Selva. There is a particularly useful section on *Ephémères* (designs for, and records of fêtes, triumphal arches and funerary ceremonial) and on gardens and their monuments. Finally, a selection of texts at the end of the book takes us from Chantelou's Journal recounting Bernini's days in France to the writings of Pierre Charpentrat of the 1970s. Here is a finely edited highlighting of a debate that has become an interesting part of the critical history of style and the fact that all the chosen pieces are French is perhaps apposite in a book which speaks verbally and visually of the particular richness of the French contribution.

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Félix Fénéon, Aesthete and Anarchist in Fin-de-Siècle Paris. By JOAN UNGERSMA HALPERIN. Yale U P 1988. pp. 425 £19.95.

IN AUGUST 1894, the critic Félix Fénéon was one of thirty defendants on trial for anarchist conspiracy. Although detonators had been found in his room at the War Office, Fénéon was acquitted, along with most of his co-defendants. The prosecution had been undermined by his own deadpan testimony, but also by an impressive collection of character witnesses, including Mallarmé, who testified to his gentle and essentially unpolitical nature. Most of them must have known that he was in fact strongly sympathetic to the anarchist cause, but they were almost certainly unaware that he had committed a far more serious offence—the explosion of a bomb at the Hotel Foyot. Ironically, the only person seriously injured in the blast was the poet Laurent Tailhade who, as the newspapers were quick to recall, had defended an earlier explosion with the words, 'What matter the victims, if the gesture is beautiful!'

Fénéon maintained his secret until his old age. André Salmon hinted at it, but Joan Halperin's new book is the first to confirm it publicly. Nevertheless, it is a pity that Professor Halperin chose to begin her book with a 'factional' account of this event, for it strikes the only false note in an otherwise scrupulously scholarly and enthralling narrative.

The bright child of a modest provincial family, Fénéon had arrived in Paris in the early 1880s. Dependent on his War Office salary for a living, he had to confine his literary activities to his spare time. Despite this, he had achieved a sufficient reputation by the age of twenty-five that Mallarmé chose him to publish his first new poem for six years, 'Prose (pour des Esseintes)', in the short-lived but influential *Revue indépendante*.

In 1886, Fénéon joined Gustave Kahn to create the symbolist review *La Vogue*. Typically, it was Fénéon who got the review out on time by going at night to the printers outside Paris to supervise and proof-read. It was also Fénéon who was expected to organize furniture removals for his co-editor, the mathematician Charles Henry, who enjoined, 'Watch over my papers with all the maternal devotion that I know is yours'.

It was precisely this quality of maternal devotion that made Fénéon such a superb editor. When *La Vogue* decided to publish Rimbaud's *Illuminations*, Fénéon tracked down the manuscript, which had been circulating privately, and arranged it for the press. When the separate edition attracted only one buyer, Fénéon prompted public opinion with an important

article on Rimbaud. His scrupulous edition of Laforgue's *Dernier Vers* with its careful record of textual variations was a model for twentieth-century Laforgue scholars.

Editorial self-effacement seems to have answered a deeper need in Fénéon. His friends saw his passivity as enigmatic, the mask of a dandy, and he appears, thinly disguised, in several contemporary novels as a cool powerful presence, the *eminence grise* of the symbolist movement. Fénéon himself did nothing to dispel this image. He cultivated a style he called 'icy Anglo-American comic' and the famous goatee beard gave him a resemblance to Mephistopheles as well as Uncle Sam.

But this was also a man of whom Verhaeren could write. 'I love Fénéon . . . I have seen him blush with pleasure in front of a painting'. His response to painting was sensuous and intuitive; he once urged his readers to visit the Louvre and discover for themselves the '*point sexuel*' of a painting, 'the part the painter has treated with love'. Perhaps, as Halperin suggests, Fénéon used his cool persona and progressive silence to avoid a side of his nature he distrusted as feminine. Like an actor, the character who emerges from this absorbing biography was most fully himself when he interpreted the work of others.

Halperin, author of an earlier volume on Fénéon's art criticism, as well as the editor of his *Oeuvres plus que complètes*, gives an illuminating analysis of the almost mimetic quality of Fénéon's critical language. Describing a Degas pastel of a nude, he invents neologisms—*cucurbitant*, *coccygiennes*—but his syntax remains orderly, almost classical. In response to a Monet seascape, the language becomes choppy, elliptical: 'a faintly green sky with Etesian winds scudding over; on the flank of a cliff, an ocher path; in the distance, far off, Alps of shimmering amethyst'.

Fénéon's use of reflexive verbs irritated Teodor de Wyzewa: 'Why must he see the sky incurving itself, the brushstrokes scattering THEMSELVES, the little boats inverting their own image in the water?' But this was a deliberate elimination of the artist, echoing the rigorous purity and autonomy of Seurat's seascapes.

It is Seurat with whom Fénéon's name as a critic is most closely associated. His account of the theory of optical mixture was based on conversations with the artist in front of *La Grande Jatte* but Halperin suggests convincingly that there was also a tactical purpose behind the tone of voice he chose to use. Phrases such as 'Need one be reminded that . . It is . . generally understood that . . .' and his citations of Rood's equations '50C 50B (mixture of pigments) 47C 49B 4 black (mixture of light)' were designed to flatter the select symbolist audience of *La Vogue* and invite their support for the new art.

Professor Halperin's surefooted account of the tactical manoeuvrings of the avant-garde—which makes one regret the relative brevity of her account of Fénéon's later career, particularly his strategically crucial position at Bernheim-Jeune after 1906—is matched by her sympathy for her subject, the man whom Valéry called 'just, pitiless and gentle'.

PAULINE RIDLEY

The Ecstasies of Roland Barthes. By MARY BITTNER WISEMAN. Routledge 1989 pp 204. £8.95; clothbound, £27.50

ALTHOUGH ROLAND Barthes insisted that critics divulge their system or ideology—the presuppositions, perspectives and prejudices they bring to a work, billing Mary Bittner Wiseman as an 'American analytical philosopher' (xii), doesn't suffice. I mention this only because there is a lot of similarly loose and unhelpful labelling (a plethora of -isms) in this book, a contribution to the series, *Critics of the Twentieth Century*. Wiseman defines and illustrates her terms 'informally' when rigour would be more constructive. It is 'a book of broadly drawn sketches of what my imagination makes out of Barthes' (xiii), which may account for this problem, the book's disparate structure and repetitiveness, as well as the many stimulating passages. There is also a thesis. Wiseman wants to combat two interconnected charges about Barthes' late works: that he occupies a position of 'extreme subjective relativism' (p. 2) and that he becomes a traditional humanist, betraying the revolution of post-structuralism and post-modernism. She attempts to do so by stipulating that his material view of the self, put forward in *The Pleasure of*

the Text and especially his last book, *Camera Lucida*, is 'a humanism which is at the same time a structuralism' (p. 134). She fails to show that what she takes as structuralism—simply a differential theory of meaning—saves Barthes from this first imputation; she fails primarily because Barthes at this stage in his career was not interested in meaning.

Eight essays are divided into three parts ostensibly treating (1) literature, (2) writing and self-identity, and (3) photography and temporal continuity. Two ecstasies are identified in Barthes, 'whose laboratory is himself' (xiii): bliss, which inaugurates a post-structuralism, and madness, which signals a post-modernism. For Wiseman the issue underlying these moves is, how can one create anything new while retaining the best of tradition, how can one bridge the classical and the modern, past and present, presence and absence? And how is criticism and evaluation thereby possible? Barthes, characteristically wanting to have it both ways, finds his utopia in photographs.

In *The Pleasure of the Text* he gestured incoherently at a distinction between 'subjectivity' and 'individuality'. The failure to distinguish between the body of bliss as his 'historical subject' and the body as simply the sign of an individual leads Barthes to unify them in an act of perception that cannot be communicated and which is based on a material view of the photographic referent (person) and reader. Specifically, he 'constructs a definition of the material subject that undoes the familiar logocentric association of the present and the real and re-individuates the subject in terms of its capacity to pattern light and to be itself patterned by the instructions encoded in its genes. What emerges is a new subject . . .' (p. 4). What emerges is a new material subject: the self is reduced to body and light. But if Barthes reduces the past and his mother (the all-important photograph in *Camera Lucida*, which is not reproduced, shows his mother as a child) to particles of light with special affective capabilities, why not sound waves? I offer this equally reductionist account of the 'self' because Wiseman and Barthes often use auditory metaphors to characterize ecstasies—'music', 'noise', 'murmurs', 'voices' (pp. 158, 161, 171). In any case, union between a present self and a past, other self or referent in a moment of poignant madness doesn't equal a new conception of the self.

Barthes is concerned with the magical function of photographs; a photograph serves as a primitive mask or object and is 'literally an emanation of the referent' (*Camera Lucida*, p. 154). Photographs can be tamed by the 'civilized code of perfect illusions' (inscribed in the *studium* of a photo), turning them into art, or confronted by acknowledging their essence—'the wakening of intractable reality' which is magical and spawns ecstasy. This is the *noeme* or essence of photography. The response of the viewer punctured by the *punctum* of a photograph is not bliss (*jouissance*) but rather a private and incommunicado madness. Barthes retrieves his mother's body, but no one else could by looking at the photograph. Thus there are many intractable realities depending on what pierces, if anything does, the looker. Although Wiseman makes no mention of Barthes' most famous and influential position, the death of the author, in *Camera Lucida* he dispatches the photographer by denying that the photographer or any other agent is able to alter the light rays in any way at any time that would effect the *punctum* inscribed in a photograph. If *Camera Lucida* is a 'Cartesian meditation' (p. 182), Barthes' evil demon is not the trick photographer but the tradition which colludes with the spectator to deny magic and madness.

Wiseman implies that structuralism/post-structuralism, modernism/post-modernism, have a monopoly on rejecting the 'classical' or 'Cartesian' 'conception of a unified, centred and centring self' (p. 133). While she sometimes invokes Hume, she ignores Nietzsche in this context, whom Barthes not only read but whom he virtually paraphrases (and quotes outright) in parts of *The Pleasure of the Text*. Structuralism and its revisions come into play since the photograph (or text neutered of language) reads the spectator and thus the boundaries between subject and object are broken down twice. There are two major objections to the structuralist strategy. The first is that Barthes chooses to bracket meaning because of the structuralist and semiotic assumption that artistic meaning is exactly like linguistic meaning. He assumes that the *studium* of the photograph represents a readable code as

in a natural language. A weak version of this view may be tenable, but here it serves as an excuse to elide a shared meaning. Second, breaking down boundaries and rejecting the law of non-contradiction does not result in a radically new conception of the self; the mere confusion of identity questions does not equal a theory of the self. The attempt is not misguided, yet—as Barthes unfortunately had to leave it and as Wiseman construes it—it cannot save him from the charge of subjective relativism. The private space in which Barthes' 'post-modern conception of the self or human subject' arises (p. 2) can only be inferred and taken on faith—it has no discursive content.

Barthes is certainly a humanist in so far as he is interested in people, post-modern in so far as his escape from tradition comes in a moment of *aporia*—victory by confusion. He denies an atemporal essence of human beings, but not the essence of each individual human being. Even if it weren't a throwback, the 'science of the individual' Barthes seeks in *Camera Lucida* is without recognizable form or content. The essence of the photograph is the zero degree of its subject or referent. And one can't argue that intersubjectivity is to be derived from what the looker brings to the photograph, in all the texts that compose the viewer (as Barthes claims in *S/Z*), because this is part of what he identifies as contributing not to the *punctum* of the photograph but to the *studium*, this is what Barthes wants to escape. The word-solipsism of *Writing Degree Zero*—the 'solitary self-containment of each poetic word' (pp. 27–8)—is carried over to individual bodies in *The Pleasure of the Text* and *Camera Lucida*.

Wiseman is never critical of Barthes, and so despite what she says about her own experiments in imagination, she ends up being an expositor. The book's limitations are highlighted by a comparison between Socrates and Barthes in the third essay. Wiseman argues that both were philosophers of culture, gadflies who swam against the tide to urge a revolution in thinking, 'to silence the flutes' of the past and be midwife to the new'. What she downplays is Socrates' ideology and system—the content of his views, he sought change secure in the belief that he was speaking the will of the divine. It is not sufficient to say that Socrates and Barthes refused to inherit and were urging a new viewpoint. If we are to go beyond them, one has to characterize their methods and viewpoints. Killing the father, the author, or the teacher is necessary on the level of desire, understanding them, though part of the same enterprise, is more difficult.

In the end Barthes is no longer an aestheticist; he denies the equation of the text and language with the real. A differential theory of meaning is not useful in understanding the later Barthes because he wants to escape the powers of natural language on which this theory is built. All we are left with are ecstatic, real differences—refusing to inherit and scrambling signs gives us nothing more. Perhaps the photograph is tamed by culture in order for there to be agreement and shared response. This is the urgent issue for criticism and evaluation. Wiseman's Barthes esteems the individual absolutely, which isn't a suspension of any opposition or the destruction of boundaries but merely an endorsement of the previously subjugated term or field. *Pace* Wiseman, Barthes' structural and post-modern ecstasies are idiosyncracies and 'the linguistic turn away from psychology' (xiv) is undermined. However, there remains the paradox that it is Barthes' example which is illuminating and instructive on how to elude the tradition: this is what connects Socrates, Nietzsche and Barthes—their practice as writerly readers and inquisitors. Much criticism of Barthes is left to be done if we are to go beyond Barthes, he certainly warrants it, not least in his later writings.

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Intellectuals in Power. A Genealogy of Critical Humanism. By PAUL A. BOVÉ. Columbia U.P. 1986. pp. 340. $17.50.

THE MAIN theme of this book concerns the relationship between the humanist practice of literary criticism and political power. Put at its simplest, Professor Bové's argument is that the humanism that grounds the teaching and research of English Literature contributes to the maintenance of non-democratic structures both within universities and in wider society. This is then a study in legitimacy, and specifically of the power structures that give rise to the legitimat-

-ing of any given definition of truth in the humanities

Early in the study Bové illustrates this, rather elegantly, with an image from Pound's Cantos. Canto XIII tells of Kung, representative of the figure of an intellectual, who hopes to revise the manner in which his cultural tradition is maintained. He does this by refusing to judge between the various cultural activities offered by his followers This generates an image of co-operation and non-competition. Power is seemingly diffused in a pluralist harmony. In fact, Bové suggests, this gesture entails only the mystification of power The way in which the followers are to remain open to each others' positions goes unanalysed. Competition therefore remains and, further, Kung's judgement (or abstention from judgement) serves to reinforce his own position of power.

Echoes of this structure recur throughout the essay. On the one hand, twentieth-century humanism is seen to be confronted by the proliferation of knowledge and the consequent problem of reconciling competing perspectives I. A. Richards and Erich Auerbach both attempt to establish some unifying methodology. Marshall Hodgson's attempt to leave humanism open to the 'other', in his study of the Orient, is shown to be flawed in so far as his humanism may acknowledge the 'other', but is ultimately incapable of being radically challenged by it. On the other hand, Bové makes a plea for a more thoroughgoing analysis of power, so that its mystifications are exposed. This is the point of genealogy, a technique borrowed from Foucault. The individual influence of various 'leading intellectuals' in the humanist tradition is challenged in so far as they are shown to be responding to, and working within, more fundamental political structures, whether these structures be national (as Auerbach responds to Fascism and the resultant conceptualization of the state) or academic. (Bové's analysis of Auerbach's adoption by American academics, so that his concept of the sublime academic hero might legitimate their own power struggles, is impressive However, Bové's other political analyses are often weak, and his basic assumption that English literature has major significance as training for powerful positions in the economy and polity is not demonstrated empirically.)

Towards the end of the study Bové adopts an image from Kant's *Anthropology* This is less satisfactory than the image from Pound. Kant's *Anthropology* is significant to the definition of humanism, suggests Bové, following Foucault, because it occurs early in the process of defining and so constructing 'man' It is part of the development of the humanist discourse. It sets rules for humanist inquiry, and the goal of perfecting humankind. Bové takes as central Kant's argument that an individual human being is necessarily imperfect, while the species as a whole is perfectible. This inevitably involves reference to the trans-individual structures of culture and the state. Bové quotes at length a passage in which Kant refers to the power of culture to bring even 'ill-natured men' into harmony, so that they curb their own desires, having been made aware of the harm that such desires do to others This is deeply problematic, because in Kant the 'ill-natured man' is one whose sensuous inclinations tend to dominate his rational inclinations Kant may therefore be seen to offer a utopian image of a perfect society, where all citizens will be able to discipline themselves for the collective good Bové, however, by rejecting the utopian element in humanism takes the ill-natured man to represent an individual or group opposed to the present, imperfect, state. Kant's image is then taken to legitimate the existing state in its repression of all opposition. This interpretation distorts Kant's humanism, suppressing its revolutionary potential. Bové does not consider the possibility that culture may have legitimacy over the individual precisely in so far as it embodies knowledge that an individual, isolated and self-interested as it is, could not generate. That existing states and cultures remain tainted by factional interest does not undermine Kant's vision, but makes it critical rather than conservative.

Ultimately Bové's study is disappointing. Its initial onslaught on humanism is not sustained. On the one hand Bové faces an all-embracing humanist tradition that works only within an oppressive political structure, denying the rights of factions within society. On the other, anti-humanism thematizes power, but refuses

to acknowledge the possibility of a resolution of power struggles. No longer motivated by a perfected political future, anti-humanism resigns itself to continuing factional struggle. In compromise, Bové presents Foucault's anti-humanity genealogy seemingly as a method to be used within humanism. Through genealogy humanism continues, although more self-conscious of its potential for political abuse.

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
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
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ANNOUNCEMENT

THE TWENTY-THIRD National conference of the British Society of Aesthetics will be held at College Hall, Malet Street, London from 14 to 16 September 1990. For information please write to the Honorary Secretary, Richard Woodfield, whose address is given on the inside front cover of this number.

British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 30, No 3, July 1990

ARCHITECTURE, PHILOSOPHY AND THE PUBLIC WORLD

John Haldane

> 'When a great man builds he will find little quarter from the public if instead of a beautiful pile, he raises, at a vast expense, such a false and counterfeit piece of magnificence as can be justly arraigned for its deformity by so many knowing men in art and by the whole people, who in such a conjecture readily follow their opinion.'[1]

I

THE STYLE of this quotation indicates its antiquity; though, of course, there are many today who would echo its sentiments. In aligning themselves with the author, however, they might also be victims of a certain irony the character of which I shall reveal shortly.

A contemporary philosopher invited to consider relevant difficulties raised by modern urban redevelopment might think to approach the issues from the direction of either of the now well-established traditions of social philosophy or aesthetics. Among other things, I shall be concerned to suggest that no adequate treatment of the problems is possible unless both perspectives are adopted, or, better still, *merged*. Architecture being the paradigm of a public art, its philosophical examination is an exercise in social aesthetics.

That these matters are currently a topic of considerable public and professional discussion is due in large part to the several widely reported occasions on which the Prince of Wales has castigated modern architects for producing 'gross inhuman monstrosities'. Among the targets of these attacks have been the existing layout and buildings of Paternoster Square (adjacent to St Paul's Cathedral) and proposed designs for the redevelopment of the site. Prince Charles regards both what exists and what has been projected as entirely at odds with the historical character of the surroundings, and in themselves repellent to the search for comfort, delight and inspiration. In these judgements he is joined by many others who likewise look away from Modernist and Post-Modernist styles of building back towards vernacular and classical designs. In the particular case of Paternoster the Prince has expressed a personal preference for the restoration or recreation of pre-existing patterns. In his 1987 Mansion House address he spoke as follows:

> I would like to see the medieval street plan of pre-war Paternoster reconstructed, not out of mere nostalgia but to give meaning to surviving fragments like Amen

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> Court and the Chapter House, now left like dispossessed refugees in an arid desert of God-forsaken buildings. . . . I would also like to see the kinds of materials Wren might have used—soft red brick and stone dressings perhaps, and the ornament and detail of classical architecture but on a scale humble enough not to compete with the monumentality of St Paul's.[2]

II

Before commenting on the merits of the Prince's case it will be as well to recall the point illustrated by the opening quotation, namely: that dissatisfaction with contemporary architecture is by no means only a twentieth-century phenomenon. Remembering that earlier generations have spoken ill of buildings which are now regarded as masterpieces one may then be wary of the danger of slipping into an unobservant and unreflective reactionary stance, uncritically assuming the superiority of things ancient and identifying change with decline. The warning is especially apt given the previous older criticism; for in the same place as he offers it the author also singles out one particular unnamed but easily identifiable City of London redeveloper as having abused his commissions. He writes:

> We have patiently seen the noblest buildings perish (if I may say so) under the hand of one single court architect, who if he had been able to profit by experience, would long since, at our expense, have proved the greatest master of the world. But I question whether our patience is like to hold much longer. The devastation so long committed . . . has made us begin to grow rude and clamorous at the hearing of a new palace spoilt, or a new design committed to some rash or impotent pretender . . . Hardly, indeed, as the public now stands, should we bear to see a . . . new cathedral like . . .[3]

The architect under censure is Wren, the Cathedral is St Paul's and the critic is Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, a writer whose ideas about beauty were of considerable influence in the development of philosophical aesthetics, and yet more widely in the promotion of that ideal of cultivated sensibility among gentlemen of noble birth to which the Prince of Wales is heir. So much for the irony. The point is *not* to side with Shaftesbury, or to suggest that criticism of the new is at any time no more than discomfort with the unfamiliar. Rather, it is a reminder that there may be aesthetic viewpoints from which what we have come to regard as a paradigm of architectural excellence may appear seriously flawed. This, I hasten to add, should not incline one to any simple version of aesthetic relativism. On the contrary, it should encourage us to set aside the too often unexamined, postcard image of great buildings and to ask why they are great and how others could fail to see this. These questions in turn raise others about those buildings which, at best, fail to engage our admiration, or, at worst, actually repel us.

In short, the facts of disagreement should encourage one to investigate the

grounds of aesthetic judgement and the possibilities of establishing *by reason-giving* the superiority of one building or scheme over another. Too often it is simply assumed that disagreement over values within a community is proof of the subjective character of the rival attitudes. What is more rarely noticed is that a necessary condition of there being such disputes is that all parties to them share a common presupposed belief in the objectivity of value.[4]

III

In the matter of the objectivity of aesthetic value the Prince of Wales and the Earl of Shaftesbury are, I think, in broad agreement. But more than this they share a belief in the social importance of good building and in the need for architects to engage the loyalty of the public.

Sadly there can be no doubt that in recent years the social standing of architecture has declined. Indeed, for so long as the many disasters of post-war building remain in place it is unlikely that the architectural profession will ever be regarded with the sort of admiration, respect and gratitude that was its privilege in, for example, the eighteenth century, in cities such as Edinburgh and Bath. A loss of public esteem may have many different causes not all of which need reflect badly on those who suffer it. This said, however, a decline in the *standing* accorded a profession which exists to provide a service to the community suggests, and not just verbally, a decline in the *standards* which that profession offers in its practice. Elsewhere, I have argued that architecture in this century has suffered from the pernicious influence of quasi-philosophical ideas.[5]

My concern here, however, is less with the reductionist aesthetics of Modernist and Post-Modernist architecture than with its neglect of the circumstances of city development; more precisely, with its insensitivity to the community-wide social role of building design, i.e., to the *political* character of architecture. The special interest of the Paternoster affair, therefore, is that it raises, in an acute form, several of those issues which a political aesthetic must address.

IV

The project of inner-city development in a location such as London presents considerable challenges for designers. A concise and sharply focused statement of these difficulties appears in the submission of Arata Isozaki & Associates in the recent competition for a broadly sketched Paternoster redevelopment:

> To respond to a historical building, to adopt the newest technology, to contain both old and new types of office, to attract the interest of tourists, to correspond to the variety of daily commercial services, to achieve the maximum possible volume of space under the restricted limit and so on . . . what has been requested in the

competition brief seems an unsolvable puzzle even within the customary practice of urban design.[6]

In fact, however, the constraints under which the competitors were required to operate were in one respect less tightly drawn than would have been the case a few years ago. As recently as 1984, the City Corporation Planning Committee produced a draft plan for future developments which emphasized conservation and sought to preserve the existing layout and much of the building stock within the City of London. This envisaged reanimating traditional areas of small businesses and blocking the drift towards large-scale redevelopment for offices by imposing restrictions on site amalgamation and changes of use. When the scheme was published, however, it met with considerable opposition from City companies and institutions, and from would-be developers who were looking to create large-scale complexes.

The background to this opposition was the general euphoria in the money and commodity markets at the expected consequences of 'Big-Bang'—the deregulation in October 1986 of security trading. The prediction was that broking firms would expand their operations and that very many new companies would be created. All of which would increase the demand for City sites and, more importantly, for monumental structures built upon them. The alternative picture of the square mile which 'Big Bang' encouraged is of the Capital of the commercial world block-solid with tall large-plate trading halls and screen-to-screen electronic dealing offices.

What, then, was the response of the City planners? In a word: *capitulation*. Within eighteen months the Corporation produced a new scheme which conceded the demands of the markets. Opportunities for large private developments were created by abandoning the protection of the traditional areas of specialist small-scale businesses, by reducing the scope of conservation programmes, by no longer requiring co-ordinated planning on single sites, by increasing plot-ratio allowances and by similar liberalizing measures. The result of this parallel deregulation was as intended. Shortly thereafter, applications were lodged for large single and multi-building developments. Regarding Paternoster, the consortium which early in the same year as the new Corporation report was published had bought most of the leases from the Church (of England) Commissioners then sought to avail itself of the opportunity for intensive development by planning to build a million square feet of office space within the 4·3 acre site. The intention of the original Paternoster Consortium (the site has since changed ownership) was that 850,000 square feet of this created space should be devoted to offices. The consequent competition for a design to these requirements produced the results of which Prince Charles was uniformly critical in the Mansion House speech. As he then expressed it:

I was deeply depressed that none of them had risen to the occasion . . . none

> addressed the primary problems of appropriateness and architectural good manners; none gave sufficient attention to the materials to be used, nor even considered which style of architecture would be appropriate.[7]

Here it is neither necessary nor possible for me to consider in any detail the seven competition entries, though some commentary is appropriate since the plans and accompanying texts exhibit features characteristic of the conceptions of architecture favoured by leading professionals but spurned by the general public and some few traditionalists. Having examined the published proposals, I cannot agree with the Prince that they uniformly neglected the considerations he mentions, or that they produced wholly inappropriate designs.[8] I have already commended Isozaki's acute description of the architect's task. It is disappointing, therefore, that the submitted design should fall far short of its clearly stated goal: 'to discover an architectural form that can accommodate all these functions, activities and contexts at once'. Indeed, I cannot help wondering if there is not some recognition of this failure in the minds of the design group. For whereas the *problems* are clearly and concisely identified, the language in which their 'solution' is described is inflated, pretentious and often vacuous. They write:

> We have designed an arrangement of traditional house-type offices with a hyper conventional space. On the Newgate Street side, a flexible office type with a hyper 'intelligent' space and a rigid façade, homogenous, repetitive. The collision of these two gives birth to the Atrium . . . So the grammar of a new rhetoric for urban design must be adopted.[9]

The capacity to produce intelligent and perceptive descriptions of works of art and architecture is not unrelated to the ability to create them. Accordingly, no one reading such prose should be surprised if the corresponding 'rhetoric of urban building design' is equally crude and ill-conceived. This said, the Isozaki scheme is not entirely without merit. In particular, the varied pattern of incident, interval and allusion is of interest and compares well with the unimaginative and depressing grid plans offered by Foster Associates and by Richard Rogers Partnership, and with the animal-maze *cum* rural open-prison *cum* Japanese factory exercise-yard sketched out by MacCormack, Jamieson, Prichard and Wright.

Both Foster and Rogers seem at best insensitive and at worst wilfully unresponsive to the context in which the site is located. Consider the ways in which they advert to the surrounding historical, architectural and social elements. First Foster:

> Reflecting the geometrical grid of the surrounding urban fabric the new development would be at an angle to the main axis of St Paul's. This would help strengthen the visual dominance of the Cathedral . . . the overall building framework provides a flexible system which can be varied in a number of ways to respond to

> commercial and environmental pressures . . . The buildings terrace downwards from the west to the east responding to the St Paul's heights regulations.[10]

And now Rogers *et al.*:

> In response to the brief we defined a strategy rather than a building design. . . The grid is the ordering principle which sets out the ground rules allowing players freedom to operate within the framework. . . . The final matrix would be formed through an ongoing dialogue with the client, consultants and authorities.[11]

Notwithstanding this explicit denial of any positive architectural intentions, they do allow themselves the opportunity to sketch a few utterly familiar city-complex type structures. What is yet more depressing is the way in which Rogers and Foster limit the concept of contextual engagement, focusing on flexibility to accommodate changing commercial needs and letting this act as the major constraint on architectural form. There is no sense at all of a guiding idea seeking incarnation and of a struggle to resolve the functional aspects in accord with this. Similarly, the interplay with the massive forms of St Paul's is restricted to limitations of *size*. There is simply no attempt to create forms that echo those of Wren's loquacious oratory, or to convey ideas of any relevance to those broadcast from its façade and dome.

Something considerably better in these respects is achieved in the plan proposed by Skidmore, Owings and Merrill who provide views of the Cathedral from framed perspectives within the development and incorporate elements that approximate to some form of architectural continuity. Likewise, Stirling, Wilford and Associates recall earlier city building traditions, if not exactly recreating them, and the proposed loggia screen and cloistered buildings provide an area of mediation between Cathedral and offices.

The scheme which won the redevelopment commission, viz. that by Arup Associates, is something of a curate's egg—good in parts. The most recently published design is a revised version of that originally submitted and bears the marks of adaptation in accord with the preference for traditional styles voiced by the Prince and others. On the one hand, it promises to preserve the picturesque perspective of St Paul's which is a distinctive and much appreciated feature of the existing approach from Ludgate Hill; and the buildings are low-rise, allowing for a roofscape which may yield the impression the Prince envisages of 'St Paul's floating like a great ship on the sea'. Likewise, the planned use of Portland stone and the introduction of a colonnaded crescent, garden courtyards and arcades faintly recalls something of the scheme drawn up in 1710 by Hawksmoor, then Wren's assistant. On the other hand, and notwithstanding an acknowledgement that 'any development must be subordinate and complementary to the presence of this great building',[12] the design is unmistakably Post-Modernist. Unlike the unofficial 'alternative proposal' produced by John Simpson and Partners which aims at a version of Baroque neo-

classicism close to that of the eighteenth century, the Arup plan bears the familiar features of late twentieth-century architectural orthodoxies. The concern with 'authenticity' and 'integrity' expresses itself in, for example, gridded metal-framed canopies in the arcades, supported by steel (?) rods emerging out of free-standing stone pillars; and pole-like, gun-metal columns on the façade of the great crescent bounding the Cathedral Close. In both cases the point is to employ contemporary materials and building techniques and to exhibit this employment in the design. However, the effect of this compromise is uncertainty and confusion.

Earlier, I identified a relationship between the capacities for intelligent description and for skilled architectural design, and this identification is again confirmed in the Arup plan. This begins with the statement quoted earlier: '[that the need to be] subordinate and complementary to this great building . . . *must above everything influence* the scale and design of any new buildings' (my italics). But later they continue: 'To be authentic [the] character [of the plan and the architecture within it] *can only be drawn* from within the sources and the time of the [contemporary] society'[13] (again my italics). This account of the planners' conception is characteristically vague and perhaps it should not be pressed too hard for consistency. Yet it is possible to draw a parallel between the uncertainty of the statement of how old and new are to be related, and the resolution of this task in the design itself. Consider, for example, the colonnade. This ascends on largely unadorned rectangular pillars to the level of balconies from which arise the narrow gun-metal columns, like uprights of scaffolding. At the top of these the entablature is similarly stark with none of the detail associated with the classical orders which the design is intended to evoke. The only feature is a repeating pattern of square recesses created by the gaps left to show the securing plates and other constructional elements. Such is the product of the effort to produce a design 'subordinate and complementary' to St Paul's yet 'authentic to' the present day. At another point Arup writes: 'The creation of colonnaded buildings round the perimeter of the close . . . is very much in line with the ideas proposed by Wren and Hawksmoor'.[14] When one examines the plan itself this account takes on the appearance of disingenuous self-serving rhetoric devised to satisfy the public demand for recognizably traditional building styles of the sort offered in Simpson's unironic neo-classical proposal. Of the latter, however, the architectural commentators have been altogether scathing. The dismissal of what is commonly admired is now a familiar aspect of the architectural establishment. But the reaction on this occasion has been especially sneering. As commentaries in the *Architectural Review* have put it:

> The Paternoster has thus become almost a microcosm in which all the various prejudices and pressures besetting architects today are not just present, but magnified under the microscope of media attention skilfully manipulated by the Prince, 'concerned' critics and various other opportunists. A prime opportunist is John

> Simpson with his 'alternative' proposals in a classical pastiche. Backed by London's evening newspaper and the Prince who has lobbied past and present owners on his behalf, Simpson waits jackal-like to snatch the job from Arup Associates.[15]

and:

> [F]rom conviction or opportunism [Simpson] has designed and effectively publicized the sort of scheme Prince Charles has suggested in his Mansion House speech. It has popular backing because it panders to the present revivalist and anti-Modern architecture mood in Britain and seems to offer a return to an architecture of charm and warmth and detail—qualities most Modernists found too cloying.[16]

So much by way of considered responses in one of the leading journals of architectural reflection. So much also by way of my own commentary on some of the submitted schemes. Earlier, I observed that the Prince views all official proposals as uniformly neglectful of appropriateness and architectural good manners. Notwithstanding that at points I have marked my dissent from this judgement, I do, however, agree with the Prince's criticism of the overridingly commercial character of the brief and sympathize with his disappointment that none of the competitors challenged it, or that having failed to do so they still felt it to be worth competing. This is the issue I want to take up next, and to consider in connection with it the question posed later in the Prince's speech, viz.: 'What place, if any, do [i.e., *ought*] the opinions of the general public have within the legal labyrinth of the planning system?'[17]

V

In turning to the demands of the market, and the status of public opinion, as factors relevant to planning the built environment, it is clear that we have arrived in the sphere of political or social philosophy. Some of the socio-political aspects of urban architecture are immediately apparent. Property may not be theft but it certainly empowers its owners and managers. It also presupposes territory and that again involves powers—of inclusion and exclusion. Equally buildings and the space they occupy are taxable possessions and create legal liabilities. In short, buildings are in the political domain. This provides one ground for the idea of legitimate government regulation of architecture. It is appropriate, for example, that central and local authorities should institute and enforce rules concerning health and safety as these may be affected by building design.

However, these powers are not intended to regulate the *aesthetic* aspects of design or development, and it may seem to many that, for a variety of reasons, it would be an error to try to do so. For convenience, let me first list some relevant considerations and then discuss them.

(1) Architecture *qua* art of building does not fall within the domain of normative socio-political philosophy.

(2) The idea that architecture should be held responsible to the general public involves an illegitimate intrusion into the client/architect relationship which is one of private contract.

(3) Any attempt to restrict or direct urban development is at odds with the principles of liberal democracy.

(4) The attempt to establish and enforce principles of good building design contradicts the creative character of architecture.

Before raising doubts about these claims, let me anticipate a worry that in doing so my aim is to construct an argument for the extensive state control of architecture. That is not at all my objective, nor is it an implication of what follows. The conclusion will rather be that the aesthetics of architecture includes a broadly political dimension out of which proper normative constraints on building design can be extracted. But the logical points of application of the most important and most substantial of these constraints lie within design. Like the moral life, the life of architectural excellence cannot be imposed but only pursued from within by one who makes its values his own.

VI

The first of the listed considerations, that architecture *qua* art of building does not fall within normative socio-political philosophy, is to some extent ambiguous between two interpretations. If the emphasis is stressed on the idea of resisting the claims of public policy it can itself be read as a political thesis for which the second and third considerations might serve as supports or elaborations. However, an emphasis upon the expression 'architecture *qua* art of building' suggests a primarily *aesthetic* reading, expressing perhaps the idea of the autonomy of art or, relatedly, that of the artistic will and imagination, such as is indicated in the fourth consideration. Since the different interpretations of the first statement relate it to the remaining theses, it will be convenient to examine them and let that discussion serve as an examination of the more general claim.

Several of the Paternoster competitors make reference to the way in which the detailed designs of the development emerge from a continuing dialogue between architect and client. McCormack *et al.* for example, under the promising heading, *The Public Domain and the Conventions of Urbanity*, suggest that 'the challenge . . . to reconcile individual building initiatives with a common idea of the public domain' can only be met by establishing some prescriptive conventions: 'We see the need for a kind of constitution, a formal game in which the "players", the *individual architects and their clients* participate'[18] (my italics). The implication of the second listed consideration is that while it might well be appropriate, not to say prudentially necessary, for the designated parties to this constitution to consider how the outcome would be regarded by and bear upon the interests of the public, it would be illegitimate for a third

party acting on behalf of the general interest to restrict the range of possible outcomes (again on aesthetic grounds).

Earlier, I referred to existing health and safety legislation and I take it that, crazed libertarians apart, no one thinks the principle of non-interference is absolute. The question is whether the fact that proposed developments, though 'safe', give offence—or fail to provide aesthetic satisfaction where there is reason to expect it—is a legitimate ground for restriction. This connects with a general issue about liberty and the law, one familiar resolution of which is associated with J. S. Mill's 'harm condition'. In *On Liberty*, Mill writes as follows:

> the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection . . . the only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilized community against his will, is to prevent harm to others.[19]

There is a substantial and conflicting literature dealing with this condition, with what it might encompass and with whether it is correct; but it is possible none the less, I think, to proceed swiftly to a reasonable conclusion concerning the matter at hand. Aesthetically bad architecture is unwelcome—often no less so to those who cannot articulate the grounds of their displeasure than to the informed critic. It is not, however, harmful—in anything other than what would here be an unhelpfully extended use of the term. However, if the aesthetically bad is not harmful it is nevertheless offensive; and as Mill himself seems to have conceded, harm is not the only ground for legitimate restriction.[20] In fact, Mill's concession to the idea that harm is not a necessary condition comes at a point in his essay where he writes:

> [this involves] a violation of good manners and, coming thus within the category of offences against others, may rightly be prohibited. Of this kind are offences against decency, on which it is unnecessary to dwell.[21]

Mill does not explicitly discuss aesthetic offence in the sense appropriate to art and architecture, though it is not implausible to make this connection and, interestingly, the phrase 'architectural good manners' occurs in Prince Charles's criticism of the Paternoster proposals. How, then, might an 'aesthetic offence condition' be formulated? For brevity, let me borrow from a discussion by Joel Feinberg of 'offensive nuisances'[22] (making appropriate modifications):

> *Behaviour provides grounds for restricting liberty if the relevant actions or their products cause aesthetic offence to others: providing (i) that this response is not eccentric (in a non-, or minimally, normative sense) i.e., it could reasonably be expected from almost any person of normal intelligence and sensibilities, chosen at random taking the community as a whole; (ii) that people cannot reasonably avoid the offensive behaviour or objects; and (iii) that those who produce them are permitted an allowable alternative form of expression.*

To avoid misunderstanding let me make two points directly. First, this liberty-limiting principle is introduced by the phrase 'provides grounds for [restriction]'. It is not intended as a sufficient condition for restrictive legislation but only as a type of appropriate consideration the warrant for which lies in the common sensibility of the community whose environment is at issue and in the duty of legislators to protect that community. Second, and following on from this, I have introduced this principle without prejudice to the liberal conception of society. It is compatible with and does not question such assumptions as that human beings are constituted as persons independently of their membership of society and that the function of political institutions, including the law, is only to protect the individuals which compose society without advancing any distinctive conception of how one ought to live. That is to say, even on liberal assumptions it can reasonably be maintained that central and local authorities may regulate building design on aesthetic grounds. Of course, such regulation should be limited and largely negative; prohibitory rather than obligatory. It would also do well to focus on the initial conditions of building, limiting its involvement with the later stages of design—perhaps to the statutory requirement that proposals be submitted to informed public scrutiny and assessment.[23] In connection with the former stage, it may be of interest to quote from a recent article by the architect Leon Krier:

> More than any other building operation in the United Kingdom, the reconstruction of the St Paul's precinct will become symbolic of the civic values which our society upholds or despises.
>
> With the sole exception of John Simpson's plans the competition projects are but architectural expressions of short term interests . . .
>
> Instead of implementing and encouraging the functional zoning of cities, master plans should promote and enforce the correct mix of urban uses; they should not limit the height of buildings but solely limit the *number* of floors, nowhere exceeding five stories. They should not allow plot ratios anywhere to exceed 3 over 1 . . .
>
> . . . Designers and developers will only act responsibly when legislation requires and expects them to do so.[24]

VII

I remarked that the principle of aesthetic offence may be invoked without breaching the requirements of political liberalism as these have been conceived of in the tradition deriving from Mill. (Whether Mill's own offence condition constitutes a break in the structure of his liberal theory is itself a contested issue.) Accordingly, the second and third of the listed considerations have been responded to without challenging their common theoretical presuppositions. However, I want now to suggest that such a challenge can and should be pressed; and, in doing so, to link it with the suggestion that the fourth con-

sideration, involving appeal to the creative character of architecture, rests on similar (and, to my mind, similarly flawed) foundations.

Political liberalism—in its theoretical articulation—is shaped by a systematic account of moral agency, autonomy, responsibility and communal association. In that account, the individual is accorded evaluative priority. The requirements of association, for example, take their justification from the protection of autonomy, while its value is regarded as expressive of agency itself. It is in this connection that liberal theory requires that free persons be regarded as necessarily morally self-motivated, and hence that it prohibits the central institutions of society from promoting any distinctive set of values; other, of course, than those of mutual tolerance. For the liberal, then, there can be no justification for requiring respect for longstanding traditions and customs; and however deeply rooted they may be in the psychology of individuals such features have no *authority* over them.

This separation of psychology from value, of habit from virtue, well suits the liberal conception. Indeed, I think it is probably essential to it. However, it is also misconceived. Consider, for example, the idea of autonomy. As was seen, the liberal regards this as a condition of authentic agency. Hence, he views as objectionable the promotion of customs, or traditional communal values, by means of civic institutions. But this neglects the question: what are the conditions of autonomy? And in considering it one is quickly drawn towards a view which sees customs and social virtues not as unwelcome restrictions on authentic agency, but as preconditions of it.

Not even God incarnate—on one account of this—sprang into being *qua* human with a self-constituted personal identity. The potentiality for personhood is an innate endowment; but personhood itself, and *ipso facto* moral agency, is something into which one grows. It is controversial whether social existence is a strictly necessary condition for this growth. It is not disputable, however, that given actual contingencies the development of human beings towards personhood is dependent upon social conditions. Primary among these are the complex of practices in which existing persons are associated with one another by common values. It is amidst this fabric of collective virtues—of family, school, community and so on—that the emergent person is located. And it is in relation to it that he defines his own identity. Thus, he becomes an agent, one whose choices are guided by deliberation about the value of what has been and the desirability of what might be. Such deliberation is not restricted by common traditions; it is made possible by them.

This suggests a stronger case against the transformation of the built environment where the changes favoured by commercial interests or progressive architects are offensive to the common sensibility of the people at large. To subvert traditional building design on the scale effected by modern urban redevelopment may be thrilling, but this thrill is that of the vandal or the exhibitionist—entirely self-gratifying and offensive (and harmful) to others.

VIII

Put in this way the case may seem incomplete. It argues for popular reconstruction but apparently on socio-political grounds only, without giving any *architectural* motive for favouring tradition.[25] Accepting what I termed the 'social vocation of architecture', an individual might, with some frustration, subject his own revolutionary aesthetic ambitions to the preferences of a slowly evolving common sensibility. But that response fails to apply the argument of defence of custom generally to the case of architecture itself. So applied, the idea of creativity implicit in the fourth of the listed considerations reveals itself to be another expression of the individualist conception of autonomy.

There is not the space here to apply this diagnosis to the history of architectural theory and practice in this century and earlier. I believe, however, that this can be done to good effect. As might be expected, the recurrent symptom of this conception of creativity is talk of the architect as prophet, seer or revolutionary, and this rhetoric is familiar enough to those acquainted with the writings of Gropius, Le Corbusier and other modern masters.[26] Against it, however, stands an older view which sees architectural excellence as arising out of the practice of traditions of building design which are the enabling conditions of creativity. Novelty abandons tradition; originality extends it.[27] As is appropriate in the context, I shall leave the last word on this matter to Sir Christopher Wren:

> An Architect ought to be jealous [i.e., wary] of novelties in which Fancy blinds the Judgement, and to think [of] his Judges as well those that are to live five Centuries after him, as those of his own time. That which is commendable now for novelty, will not be a new Invention to Posterity when his Works are often imitated, and when it is unknown which was the Original. But the Glory of that which is good of itself is eternal.[28]

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AN AFTERWORD

In November 1989 it was announced that the Paternoster Square site had been sold to a British and American developer and that it would be redeveloped in broadly classical style following the original street pattern destroyed in the blitz. Among those commissioned to work on this project is John Simpson.

REFERENCES

[1] Shaftesbury, 'A Letter Concerning the Art, or Science of Design', in Shaftesbury, *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times* (London, 1732); see also, Shaftesbury, *Second Characters or the Language of Forms*, B. Brand (Cambridge U.P., 1914), p. 22.

[2] The text of this speech, entitled: 'The City: "A Stunted Imitation of Manhattan"?',

appears in *Modern Painters*, Vol 1, No. 1 (1988).

[3] Shaftesbury, 'A Letter Concerning Design', op. cit., (1914), pp. 21 & 22.

[4] For a discussion of aesthetic experience and judgement in connection with architecture, see J. Haldane, 'Aesthetic Naturalism and the Decline of Architecture: Part 1: Architecture and Aesthetic Perception', *International Journal of Moral and Social Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1987).

[5] See J. Haldane, 'Aesthetic Naturalism and the Decline of Architecture: Part 2· Form, Matter and Understanding', *International Journal of Moral and Social Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1988).

[6] See *Architectural Review*, Vol. CLXXXIII, No. 1091 (January 1988), p. 27/1.

[7] 'The City', op. cit., p. 31.

[8] For presentations of the submitted proposals of all entrants—save that of the winning competitor, viz., Arup Associates—see, *Architectural Review*, Vol. CLXXXIII, No. 1091 (January 1988).

[9] *Architectural Review*, op. cit., p. 28/1.

[10] *Architectural Review*, op. cit., pp. 24 & 25/1.

[11] *Architectural Review*, op. cit , p. 36/1.

[12] *Paternoster: The Master Plan* (London: Arup Associates, 1988), p. 1.

[13] *Paternoster: The Master Plan*, op. cit., p 8.

[14] *Paternoster: The Master Plan*, op. cit., p. 4.

[15] See Peter Buchanan, 'Paternoster Pressure', *Architectural Review*, Vol. CLXXXV, No. 1107 (May 1989), p. 76

[16] See Peter Buchanan, 'What City? Paternoster', *Architectural Review*, Vol. CIXXXIV, No. 1101 (November 1988), p. 36.

[17] 'The City', op. cit., p. 31.

[18] *Architectural Review*, op. cit., p. 32/1.

[19] John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (London: Dent, 1957), 'Introductory', pp. 72 & 73.

[20] Indeed, nor is harm a sufficient condition for legal prohibition; consider, for example, a sustained campaign of malicious (but well-founded) scandal mongering.

[21] *On Liberty*, op cit.• Ch. 5, p. 153.

[22] See J. Feinberg, 'Harmless Immoralities and Offensive Nuisances', in N. Care and T. Trelogan (eds.), *Issues in Law and Morality* (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University, 1973); see also J. Feinberg, *Offense To Others· The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law* (New York: Oxford U.P., 1985), for a more recent and considerably expanded statement of Feinberg's view.

[23] As things stand at present, the Secretary of State for the Environment is empowered, where he judges it to be appropriate, to appoint the Fine Art Commission, and a Committee of Public Enquiry, to consider a submitted building plan. However Secretaries of State have been reluctant to query submissions on *aesthetic* grounds, presumably judging that to be an inappropriate consideration.

[24] See L. Krier, 'God Save the Prince', *Modern Painters*, Vol. 1, No 2 (1988), p. 25.

[25] Respect for custom is none the less a relevant consideration. As Shaftesbury writes, 'It belongs to men of slavish principles to affect a superiority over the vulgar, and to despise the multitude. The lovers of mankind respect and honour conventions and societies of men', see *Characteristics and Manners of Men* (ed) J. M. Robertson (London, 1900), I, 53; II, 255.

[26] See J Haldane, 'Aesthetic Naturalism: Part 2', op. cit.

[27] For discussion of this theme in connection with Modernism in Fine Art, see J. Haldane, 'The Modernist Fallacy: Philosophy as Art's Undoing', *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, Vol. 5, No. 2.

[28] Sir Christopher Wren, 'Tract 1' from Christopher and Stephen Wren, *Parentalia* (London, 1750).

Some of the material in this essay was originally presented in a symposium entitled: *The Architecture of Urban Design Competitions for London*, organized by the School of Architecture, Polytechnic of Central London and the 9H Gallery in March 1988 and then to a meeting of the Winter Architecture School held in January 1989 at Canterbury College of Architecture. The present version was written in Summer 1989 during the period of a Fellowship at the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities, University of Edinburgh and presented in the Institute's Seminar series. I am grateful to the Director (Professor Peter Jones) and the staff of the Institute and to my co-

fellows, for making my time there both agreeable and instructive, and also to the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland for enabling me to take up this opportunity for research. Another version of the text was given as a lecture at Bowling Green State University, Ohio, in October 1989. I am grateful for the generous hospitality shown me on that occasion.

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PICTURES AND GESTURES

Karlheinz Lüdeking

WHENEVER LUDWIG Wittgenstein considers art, he shows a remarkable tendency to compare it to the gestures of the human body. 'Architecture', he declares for example, 'is a *gesture*. Not every purposive movement of the human body is a gesture. And no more is every building designed for a purpose architecture'.[1] Gestures do indeed belong to the 'purposive movements' of the body, but they are distinguished from other such movements by the fact that they have to communicate something. A gesture would not be a gesture if it had no meaning. And, according to Wittgenstein, the same thing can be said about architecture. Obviously, however, Wittgenstein does not merely wish to point out the semantic dimension of architecture—in that case, he might just as well have confined himself to saying that architecture is a *language*. He would not have had to turn to the analogy between architecture and the *language of the body*. It is this particular analogy, however, on which he places great importance, and with good reason.

Most often Wittgenstein uses the analogy between gestures and forms of artistic expression when he is dealing with music.[2] Thereby his intention is not simply to evoke rhetorically certain parallels between various possibilities of human expression as, e.g., Hegel does in describing pantomime as 'a plastic music of bodily posture and movement'.[3] In contrast to such a parallelism that serves merely as a stylistic device, Wittgenstein always uses his analogy with a clearly fixed distribution of functions. His aim is always to elucidate *music* and his comparison to the language of gestures is always meant to serve the understanding of this phenomenon—and never the other way round. Wittgenstein assumes that we already know what a gesture is and hopes that this knowledge can lead us towards insight into the enigmatic nature of music.

In this vocation the analogy has to serve two distinct goals: on the one hand, Wittgenstein emphasizes that one can contribute to the understanding of a *specific piece* of music by making appropriate gestures.[4] On the other hand, he utilizes the concept of gesture (as in his previously cited remark on architecture) in a metaphorical sense to characterize the peculiar status of *music in general*, so, for instance, when he writes: 'For me this musical phrase is a gesture. It insinuates itself into my life. I adopt it as my own.'[5]

Here it is rewarding to remember how the interest in gestures themselves could 'insinuate itself' into Wittgenstein's life. This interest goes back to an important event in his intellectual biography which is undeservedly neglected

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by most contemporary commentators, who rarely appreciate that the most decisive turn in Wittgenstein's philosophical development resulted from being asked the meaning of a *gesture*. This question was posed by the Italian economist Piero Sraffa, of whom Wittgenstein says in the preface to the *Philosophical Investigations* no less than that he owes him 'the most consequential ideas of this book'.[6] Wittgenstein met Sraffa soon after his return to Cambridge in 1929, and it was primarily Sraffa's criticism that prompted Wittgenstein to abandon the picture-theory of meaning which he had espoused in the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein later portrayed his final turn away from his previous views as a kind of secular conversion. He related that the fundamental error in the conception of the *Tractatus* was suddenly revealed to him when Sraffa asked him how he would, on the basis of that theory, explain the meaning of a certain Neapolitan gesture.[7] The gesture in question was a gesture of rejection and negation which is performed by flicking the back of the hand outwards from underneath the chin.[8]



It is perhaps not immediately clear how the problem of explaining this gesture could have had such far-reaching consequences for the semantic theory of the *Tractatus*. The destructive force of this problem has to do with the fact that, in the context of everyday communication, Sraffa's gesture can easily communicate just as much as a fully articulate proposition. It was a dogma of the *Tractatus*, however, that in every proposition: 'there must be exactly as many things distinguishable as there are in the state of affairs, which it represents.'[9] This correspondence seemed to be an undoubted requirement for the early Wittgenstein, since a proposition can only be conceived as a 'picture of reality' if it exhibits the same 'structure' or 'logical form' as the state of affairs that it depicts.[10] But, although a gesture can obviously have the same meaning as a complete, articulated proposition, it would be absurd to claim that a simple movement of the hand also exhibits a structural correspondence

to the state of affairs that it represents. Thus the meaning that a gesture can convey in certain circumstances cannot rest upon a relationship of resemblance; instead its meaning is exclusively based upon the conventions that govern its use.

But if it can be shown in just one singular case that meaning can be acquired by something that does not function as a picture, one must draw the general conclusion that a relation of structural isomorphism (of whatever kind) cannot provide a necessary or sufficient condition for the constitution of meaning. This implies that the foundation of Wittgenstein's previous theory of meaning has vanished: the meaning of a sign cannot depend on its own internal structure and its relation to the world. Hence even in the case of symbolic forms in which structural conformities clearly play a decisive role—'as when in the law-court in Paris a motor-car accident is represented by means of dolls, etc.'[11]—the resemblance between the representation and that which it represents cannot explain the *semantic* function of the symbols (and their combination).

As it is well known, this insight led Wittgenstein to develop a completely different theory of meaning: what gives a sign its meaning is now no longer a structural isomorphism with the signified but rather the fact that it is used in compliance with a rule that can (in principle) be employed by a community of speakers. This new conception, which was perhaps already anticipated in Sraffa's question, implies that the 'logocentric' perspective of the *Tractatus* proves to be too narrow to provide an adequate theory of meaning. The recognition of isomorphisms between 'logical forms' may very well be the performance of an abstract and in a certain sense even transcendental subject which 'does not belong to the world'.[12] But to follow a rule is something that only corporeal beings can accomplish who are clearly 'in-the-world'. Thus it is not exaggerated to say that for Wittgenstein the central aspect of language moved from the sphere of pure mind into that of the body. And hence it is also hardly surprising that he is even prepared to assent to a dictum of Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*, which he quotes in the following form: 'And mind is also only something at the body'.[13]

According to the views of the mature Wittgenstein, language is always connected with the concrete, physical existence of those who use it. It cannot be understood in terms of an abstract calculus. Rather, language is often nothing but 'an extension of primitive behaviour'.[14] This conception is clearly articulated in a remark from Wittgenstein's latest period: 'I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination.'[15]


Foremost examples of the just mentioned 'primitive means of communication' are obviously those connected directly to the body: facial expressions and gestures. Here we find the origins of language, for which we—with our (more

or less) elaborated verbal language—need 'no apology'. This view shows a striking similarity to the (roughly contemporary) theory of Merleau-Ponty, who also saw the origins of language in the world-disclosing gestures of the body.[16]

Significantly, Wittgenstein begins his *Philosophical Investigations* with considerations concerning the roots of language. In the very first section he quotes a passage from Augustine's *Confessions* in which we are told that a child can only learn a verbal language because it already knows the language of the body. But how could the child acquire this prior knowledge? Here Augustine simply assumes that communication by means of facial expressions and gestures is a natural and universal language which is immediately accessible for everyone without any preparation. This view has always had a great plausibility; not only Augustine but also innumerable other thinkers have adopted it—so, e.g., Schopenhauer, whom Wittgenstein read in his youth.[17]

In modern times, faith in the universal intelligibility of the language of gestures has declined considerably; but it is still alive—as we can observe in a recent case in which communication was not intended with human beings who have not yet learned verbal language, but with beings with whom we have even less (if anything) in common. The case to which I am referring is recorded in the annals of space exploration: when in 1972 the spaceship 'Pioneer 10', which was intended to be the first to travel beyond our solar system, was launched, scientists had attached to it a panel with an outline of two human figures, one of which is raising his right hand to greet possible extra-terrestrial observers. In one of her performances, the American artist Laurie Anderson projected a slide of these figures onto a screen and spoke the following words: 'In our country, we send pictures of our sign language into outer space. They are speaking our sign language in these pictures. Do you think they will think his hand is permanently attached that way? Or do you think they will read our signs? In our country, good-bye looks just like hello.'[18]

Wittgenstein would certainly have applauded these remarks, as he repeatedly stresses that a sign can only have meaning for someone who is acquainted with the role that it plays within a certain 'form of life'. For someone unfamiliar with this role it must remain incomprehensible.[19] With regard to the gesture of raising the arm, however, one confronts an additional difficulty because this gesture can have various (and even contrary) functions even *within* our own form of life. Therefore, one can determine its meaning only in the concrete situation in which it is used.[20] The language of the body, thus, seems to be just as conventional as verbal language. Hence, Wittgenstein says in section 219 of *Zettel*: 'We don't understand Chinese gestures any more than Chinese sentences'. And in the (unpublished) manuscript from which this sentence originates it is preceded by the statement that 'a movement in itself is not a gesture at all'.[21] A movement (or posture) of the body only becomes a gesture if it can be understood as an instance of rule-guided behaviour.[22]



According to Wittgenstein it is, therefore, impossible to assume—as St-Augustine did—that every child is immediately a master of the language of gestures. On this assumption, language acquisition would be described 'as if the child never learned the *language*, thus as if it never learned to think, but only to translate from one language it already knows into another'.[23] However, if understanding the language of gestures can only be the result of a social skill, if some preparation must inevitably precede an understanding of even the most elementary gestures, doesn't this mean that it would be impossible ever to make the first step into language ?

Everyone capable of reading these lines knows that this cannot be so. Although language must indeed always rest upon rule-guided behaviour, such behaviour can very well emerge from its opposite, from purely 'mechanical behaviour', i.e., from the sort of uniform behaviour to which even animals can be 'conditioned'.[24] Human language, too, originates in a sort of conditioning, which only succeeds because, by accident and owing to a particular 'natural history', human beings have the required predispositions.[25] Language acquisi-

tion would, for example, become much more difficult if 'a person naturally reacted to the gesture of pointing with the hand by looking in the direction of the line from finger-tip to wrist, not from wrist to finger-tip'.[26] We thus owe the capacity to learn a language to a set of circumstances that are just as contingent as the fact that it is possible—by means of *gestures*—to train a dog, but not a cat, to fetch a stick.[27]

Reference to such contingent facts, however, can only contribute to an explanation of the fact *that* we can communicate by means of certain signs. It offers no clue as to *how* we actually use these signs.[28] The fact that human beings have certain uniform ways of reacting to their environment and of expressing their inner states by means of bodily movements and facial expressions is none the less an indispensable condition for the existence of certain 'language-games'.[29] And, in the view of Wittgenstein, even the most noble concepts of ethics and aesthetics must in the end rely on this foundation. The words 'good' and 'beautiful', he taught his students, are initially used with the same function as spontaneous expressions of bodily pleasure, and the child learns them as 'a substitute for a facial expression or a gesture'.[30]

Once the importance of gestures had been revealed to Wittgenstein by his Italian friend Sraffa, they obviously began to occupy an important strategic position in his thought. In many different contexts we find him referring to the employment of gestures as counterparts to the usage of even the most sophisticated concepts—such as those used to perform logical operations. Such reference to gestures usually serves Wittgenstein as a kind of anchor that prevents a separation of language from its real base. Gestures are especially suitable for this purpose because they simply cannot detach themselves from the context of their practical employment. Their meaning does not derive from that peculiar *difference* and *distance* from reality which is characteristic for the depictive function of a sign, but rather, from its concrete role *within* reality itself.

This is also the reason why gestures display a vigour that distinguishes them from more abstract signs. A certain 'wild' bodily force animates a gesture even though this force has already been formed into a meaningful shape. The corporeal energy of the gesture never entirely gives way to pure symbolism. Of course, a physical action becomes a gesture only by fulfilling a semantic function; but the meaning of a gesture is still not reducible to a fixed propositional content. Whereas a written sentence always represents the same proposition regardless of its calligraphic execution, a gesture can acquire a completely different meaning even by a minimal variation of its performance. Therefore, gestures can 'surprise' us again and again even if they are well known and well expected.[31]

It would thus be absurd to regard a gesture only as an indifferent, evanescent medium for an abstract denotative relation. It would, however, be equally absurd to take gestures for purely spontaneous (apparently 'natural') expres-

sions of the body.[32] Gestures do derive their communicative *force* from their connection to the body, but they attain to meaning only in the moulding contexts of particular 'forms of life'. This peculiarity of gestures secures them a place on the borderline of the realm of signs where they shift in an area 'between wilderness and civilization'. This ambivalence of gestures is entirely in accordance with a note that Wittgenstein wrote down (probably shortly after his aforementioned exchange with Sraffa) about Frazer's interpretation of archaic rituals, in which he declares that 'what we have in the ancient rites is the practice of a highly cultivated gesture-language'.[33]

Now it is also no longer difficult to understand why Wittgenstein makes similar remarks about phenomena which we, today, assign to the realm of art. One has only to draw certain conclusions from the foregoing considerations about the peculiar status of gestures in order to understand what Wittgenstein means when, for example, he says that a musical theme impresses him like a gesture.

First we must recall an insight already gained in the examination of the episode with Sraffa. One obviously cannot explain the meaning of a gesture by considering it as a likeness of something else existing apart from it. It is this insight that Wittgenstein has in mind when he proposes the following suggestion to translate a familiar way of talking about music in section 610 of the *Philosophical Investigations*: 'I should like to say, "These notes say something glorious, but I do not know what". These notes are a powerful gesture, but I cannot put anything side by side with it that will serve as an explanation'. Wittgenstein takes the manner of speaking, according to which music says or expresses something, to be misleading, because it creates the illusion that the 'something' purportedly expressed must be a distinct entity which might be encountered independently of the music.[34] In this context, the comparison with a gesture thus has the function of showing that the characteristic expression of a piece of music should not be understood in terms of a denotative relation. When someone expresses embarrassment by his gestures, these gestures do not *denote* an independently existing embarrassment but rather *embody* it. And when Wittgenstein writes in the just quoted passage that one cannot always give an 'explanation' for a gesture, he means that one cannot always say *why* just these movements express embarrassment. A remark of Wittgenstein's on the question of what a painting says points in the same direction: 'I should like to say, "What the picture tells me is itself". That is, its telling me something consists in its own structure, in *its* own lines and colours'.[35]

Remarks such as this, however, do not imply that Wittgenstein thought of music and painting as self-sufficient phenomena, the meaning of which must be found exclusively in their own inner structure. His rejection of such a view manifests itself, for example, in the fact that he juxtaposes the previously quoted observation that one cannot always explain the special significance of a

gesture and the question why there is no description for the aroma of coffee. One can no more shed light on the meaning of a gesture by analysing its inner structure than one can elucidate the aroma of coffee by analysing its components. (This insight, too, already arose out of the consideration of Sraffa's gesture.)

What Wittgenstein says about gestures, namely that one only understands their meaning when one is familiar with their role in a form of life, is, in his opinion, also valid in the analogous cases of painting and music. To make this thought plausible he utilizes comparisons not only with the language of gestures but also with that of facial expressions. 'A theme', he observes with regard to music, 'no less than a face, wears an expression'.[36] And significantly, in connection with the question what one might mean when speaking of the 'peculiar expression' of a face (or a work of art) Wittgenstein again returns to the previously mentioned problem of how one can describe the aroma of coffee. For him the parallel between the two questions consists in the fact that an analytic dissection does not help in either case. The matter of importance, i.e., the aroma of coffee or the peculiar expression of the face, can only be grasped by immediate perception of an entire configuration. But at this point the analogy breaks down, for in contrast to the aroma of coffee, the particular character of a facial expression stems essentially from its context: 'A *strong* expression I could easily connect with a story for example. Or with looking for a story. When we speak of the enigmatic smile of the Mona Lisa, that may well mean that we ask ourselves: In what situation, in what story, might one smile like that?'[37]

Again, this reflection accords well with the lesson taken from the story of Sraffa's gesture, the meaning of which was also completely dependent upon its usage in certain 'surroundings'. Modifying a remark of Wittgenstein's, one could say that the movement of the hand that is used in Naples to show rejection and disapproval 'has significance—in these surroundings. The surroundings give it its importance'. And in order to emphasize the conviction that meaning cannot be found in the things themselves, Wittgenstein mentions another example a few lines later by pointing out that 'a smiling mouth *smiles* only in a human face'.[38] It is, thus, not possible to understand a gesture or a facial expression by concentrating on the phenomenon itself and observing it in isolation. Nor is it possible to understand in this way what a painting or a piece of music expresses. This is the reason why, in the case of music, for example, the illusion can emerge that there must be 'a model for the theme' existing previously in reality. But, as Wittgenstein points out, 'there just *is* no paradigm apart from the theme itself'. And it is only slightly surprising that he continues: 'And yet again there is a paradigm apart from the theme: namely, the rhythm of our language, of our thinking and feeling. And the theme, moreover, is a *new* part of our language, it becomes incorporated into it; we learn a new *gesture*'.[39]

In a very similar manner Merleau-Ponty describes the way in which a novel form of expression in art or in the formulation of a thought may strike us. In such cases, the familiar repertoire of symbols is combined in a new and unexpected, and often inexplicable, way to evoke a new thought or a new expression. 'Thought and expression, then, are simultaneously constituted, when our cultural store is put at the service of this unknown law, as our body suddenly lends itself to some new gesture in the formation of habit.'[40]

What a newly acquired gesture expresses can be understood neither in isolation nor in a binary relation but only against the entire background of all known signs and their possible connections; and the same thing holds also for music, that phenomenon which Wittgenstein would like to illuminate with the help of his analogy. 'Doesn't the theme point to anything outside itself? Yes, it does! But that means: —it makes an impression on me which is connected with things in its surroundings—e.g., with our language and its intonations; and hence with the whole field of our language-games.'[41] Wittgenstein also explained the effect of works belonging to other art forms in the same way: 'A poet's words can pierce us. And that is of course *causally* connected with the use that they have in our life. And it is also connected with the way in which, conformably to this use, we let our thoughts roam up and down in the familiar surroundings of the words.'[42]

When the words of the poet move us, our fascination is not, however, owing to our recognition that 'a multitude of familiar paths lead off from these words in every direction'.[43] Nor does the ability to follow any optional number of these paths presuppose that they are all visible to our mind's eye. Hence Wittgenstein emphasizes: 'If a theme, a phrase, suddenly means something to you, you don't have to be able to explain it. Just *this* gesture has been made accessible to you'.[44]

This, of course, does not mean that it would be *useless* to look for an explanation when a poem, a piece of music or a painting (or a simple gesture) suddenly speaks to us. And it is also clear from what has already been said, what, in Wittgenstein's view, such an explanation must look like. It can only consist in giving a deeper understanding of the 'surroundings' in which the phenomenon in question appears. I would like to explicate this (very hermeneutic) principle with reference to a painting by Sandro Botticelli which depicts the Annunciation and which says something and gains its 'peculiar expression' largely because it shows impressive gestures.

Anyone looking at this painting will, without previous knowledge, notice two figures related to one another in a reciprocal play of forward and backward moving, attracting and repulsing, gestures. In order to understand the meaning of this obvious play of gestures, however, it is necessary to have a certain familiarity with the teachings of Christianity. But such knowledge alone will also not yet suffice because there are countless ways of pictorially representing the event of the Annunciation. If one wants to determine why



just *these* gestures have a 'peculiar expression', it is also of no avail to undertake a detailed analysis of the position of the hands—perhaps by means of a grid of co-ordinates.[45] Since one cannot discover the meaning of the gestures by scrutinizing them in isolation but only by examining their place in certain 'surroundings', one will only be able to grasp their specific expression by procuring a deeper understanding of the place that they have in their context.

Such an understanding can, for instance, be provided by reading Michael Baxandall's study on *Painting and Experience in Fifteenth-Century Italy*, which shows that contemporary sermons distinguished various phases of the annunciation and that Botticelli's depiction exhibits clear affinities to the so-called *conturbatio*, the phase of fright and confusion of the Virgin. Also helpful is Baxandall's reference to the manifold repertoire of religious and secular gestures used by actors and orators in Botticelli's time, for without this reference one might have overlooked the fact that Mary's gesture is not only defensive but also inviting. Finally, it is also enlightening to learn about a dance called *bassa danza*, which Baxandall mentions, to sharpen our view for the fact that Botticelli, as it were, has allowed the figures in his paintings to

'dance out' their positions.[46] All these different pieces of information have the effect of placing the optically visible phenomena in new 'surroundings', thus yielding new points of view which allow us to see several facets of meaning. The understanding of gesticulatory forms of expression can thus be regarded as a capacity which Wittgenstein called 'aspect-seeing', for such 'aspect-seeing' consists essentially in the ability to see visual phenomena in certain culturally created contexts.[47]

Now it is conceivable that someone might, on the basis of the aforementioned information, learn to see the manifold meaning of the gestures represented in Botticelli's painting without being especially *impressed* by them. When Wittgenstein, however, ascribes to certain phenomena the character of a gesture, he often also means that these phenomena have a particular significance. This comes out clearly in a passage from the second edition of the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, in which Wittgenstein compares constructions in mathematics and compositions in music and painting with respect to the question of how to explain their respective *point*. 'Often', Wittgenstein answers, 'we may say: "This one corresponds to a gesture, this one doesn't" '.[48] The concept of gesture is obviously used here in an emphatic sense—it is supposed to indicate that certain phenomena have greater plausibility than others.

Moreover, the passage just quoted deals with the antecedent question of why 'a picture that shows two human figures' can, in just this form, 'make such an impression upon us'. If Botticelli's painting (which actually shows two figures) does make such an impression, it would, in Wittgenstein's metaphorical use of the term 'gesture', not only be a picture, but also a gesture. Regardless of the fact that it depicts certain gestures it would itself, as a whole, have the quality of a gesture—or even of a 'powerful gesture'. If this would be the case, however, the remarkable impressive force of the painting could no longer be explained by simply saying that it has found a place in the system of our theoretical beliefs about the life of the bygone ages of the Renaissance. The painting can only have the effect of a 'gesture' that 'insinuates itself into our life' if it exhibits a particularly significant 'pattern' in the 'weave' of *our own* life.[49]

Perhaps Wittgenstein himself would have recognized such a meaningful figure in Botticelli's painting if he had seen it in the light of the following—his own—consideration: 'The purely corporeal can be uncanny. Compare the way angels and devils are portrayed. So-called "miracles" must be connected with this. A miracle must be, as it were, a *sacred gesture*'.[50] Botticelli's painting does indeed represent a miracle, thus a 'sacred gesture', since the moment of the Annunciation is at the same time the moment in which Jesus Christ was miraculously put into the womb of Mary, i.e., the moment when the word became flesh. In this moment the 'purely corporeal', which could—for determinable reasons—appear 'uncanny' to Wittgenstein, is transcended,

removed from the carnal sphere and transformed into a medium of the holy. The body no longer falls prey to sin, but serves, instead, to redeem from sin. The body itself, thus, incorporates the principle of its own transcendence.

This is a process of far-reaching significance for the whole intellectual and emotional attitude of the Western world. A relationship to the body manifests itself here in a paradigmatic way which is ubiquitously present in our culture.[51] Therefore it seems appropriate to take the ambivalent gestures of the two figures in Botticelli's painting as typical instances of those peculiar 'solecisms' of body language which are—according to the analysis of Gilles Deleuze—characteristic of the way in which the body expresses itself in the Christian tradition.[52] Seen in this way, the picture could make the violence felt which the body suffers in subordinating itself to the word, and at the same time indicate the mute pleasure it feels in doing so.

I suspect that Wittgenstein's fascination with the phenomenon of gestures must be seen also in this context. For him, gestures are paradigmatic cases of the transfiguration of an unbridled body into a strong, expressive form. Others, too, have seen gestures in this way. This was the reason for my having chosen a painting by Botticelli in order to clarify a few aspects of Wittgenstein's interest in gestures, for the work of another contemporary of Wittgenstein, for whom the phenomenon of gestures also acquired particular significance, gleaned decisive impulses from the study of Botticelli. I am referring to the art historian Aby Warburg, who, throughout his life, devoted much attention to the way in which expressive gestures and 'pathos formulae' developed in classical antiquity were in the course of time repeatedly appropriated, transformed and filled with new content.

Warburg was interested in these gestures of expression because he descried in them symbols of the subjugation of a demonic nature. The expressive gestures found in visual art were so fascinating for him primarily because they restrain the ominous violence of 'passionate excitement' and transform it into a dignified form. Thus, as long as these gestures do not (as often occurs in the Baroque period) degenerate into merely rhetorical poses, they draw their remarkable emotional power from their carnal and pre-civilized roots.[53] Here, as Ernst Gombrich comments, Warburg saw 'the importance of "Dionysiac" Greek antiquity for our Western civilization. In its myth we find enshrined the extremes of emotion and self-abandon from which modern man must shrink in awe but which, as preserved in the symbols of art, contain those very moulds of emotion which alone make artistic expression possible. Without the primeval passion which was discharged in maenadic dances and Bacchantic frenzy, Greek art would never have been able to create those "superlatives" of gesture with which the greatest of Renaissance artists expressed the deepest human values.'[54]

Wittgenstein would certainly have agreed to this (Nietzschean) conception of art, for he, too, characterizes the successful work of art, i.e., the work about

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which he would say that it has the convincing form of a gesture, in a famous passage as 'a WILD animal: *tamed*'.[55]

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[1] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, trans P. Winch (Oxford, 1980), p. 42, cf. ibid., p. 22 and *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, ed. C Barrett (Oxford, 1966), p. 31 (In my quotations from *Culture and Value* I will follow the translation of Peter Winch, although it could, at times, be better)

[2] This has to do not only with the fact that he was particularly versed in this art form but also with the fact that, according to his own testimony, music invariably produced in his strong kinaesthetic sensations. Significantly, he toyed occasionally with the idea of becoming a conductor. See *Lectures and Conversations*, p. 37 and Georg Henrik von Wright, 'Ludwig Wittgenstein, A Biographical Sketch' in *The Philosophical Review* 64 (1955), p. 531.

[3] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Aesthetics. Lectures on Fine Art*, trans. T. M. Knox, Vol. II (Oxford, 1975), p. 1039

[4] See for example *Culture and Value*, pp 69–70 and Carolyn Korsmeyer, 'Wittgenstein and the Ontological Problem of Art' in: *Personalist* 59 (1978), pp. 152–61

[5] *Culture and Value*, p. 73

[6] Sraffa, to whom Wittgenstein attributes such great influence on his thought, was a convinced socialist He was a friend of Antonio Gramsci (whom he supported during his long imprisonment) and his theoretical work on political economy must—with certain reservations—be placed within the Marxist tradition. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why his influence on Wittgenstein is so conspicuously ignored by many commentators. See *Ricardo, Marx, Sraffa*, ed. E. Mandel and A. Freeman (London, 1984).

[7] See Norman Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir* (London, 1958), p. 69. One may doubt whether this episode really happened as Wittgenstein's romanticizing description would have us believe. But even if we were dealing here with a myth, there remains the fact that it was created and cultivated by Wittgenstein himself.

[8] Cf. Desmond Morris *et al.*, *Gestures* (London, 1979), pp. 170–6. This gesture (which is largely unknown in the English-speaking world) has apparently been used in Naples for quite some time One finds an illustration of it, for example, in Andrea de Jorio's treatise, *La Mimica degli Antichi Investigata nel Gestire Napoletano* from 1832 on plate 21 (figure 2)

[9] *Tractatus*, trans. C. K. Ogden, 4.04

[10] See *Tractatus*, 2.1 to 2.22, 4.01 to 4.021.

[11] *Notebooks 1914–1916*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, entry for 29.9 1914.

[12] *Tractatus*, 5.632.

[13] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Eine philosophische Betrachtung* in Schriften Band 5 (Frankfurt/M., 1970), p. 207 (Translations from this work, which is not yet published in an English version, are my own.) The quotation does not, as far as I can tell, occur verbatim in the cited text. Wittgenstein probably meant a passage from the speech 'Of the Despisers of the Body' in which Zarathustra declares: 'But the awakened, the enlightened man says: I am body entirely, and nothing beside; and soul is only a word for something in the body' See *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth, 1969), p. 61.

[14] *Zettel*, trans. G E. M. Anscombe, § 545; cf. *Culture and Value*, p 31.

[15] *On Certainty*, trans. G E M. Anscombe and D Paul, § 475

[16] *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. C. Smith (London, 1962), Part One, Chapter VI.

[17] According to *Parerga und Paralipomena*, trans E. F. Payne (Oxford, 1974), Vol. II, § 361a, communication by means of gestures is 'natural and original, a true language of

nature', which is certainly not based on 'convention or agreement'. Kant similarly claims —in his *Anthropologie* (A 281)—that there are 'gesticulations determined by nature, by means of which human beings of all species and climates, even without agreement, understand each other'. (My translation.) Cf. also James R. Knowlson, 'The Idea of Gesture as a Universal Language in the XVIIIth Centuries' in *Journal of the History of Ideas* 26 (1965), pp. 495–508.

[18] Laurie Anderson, 'from. Americans on the Move' in *October*, No. 8 (Spring 1979), p. 55. There, by the way, it is erroneously claimed that the panel was mounted on the lunar spacecraft 'Apollo 10'.

[19] See for example *Eine philosophische Betrachtung*, p. 149. Erwin Panofsky, who utilizes the example of the greeting man in order to distinguish between various levels of meaning in visual representations, adopts a similar view. See *Studies in Iconology* (New York, 1939), pp. 3–17. An iconographic study focusing on the depiction of gestures is provided by the book *Giotto and the Language of Gesture* by Moshe Barash (Cambridge, 1987).

[20] Walter Benjamin, too, in his sketch 'Naples' (which was probably written jointly with Asja Lacis) mentions the 'impenetrability' of Neapolitan gesture-language and emphasizes its close connection with the habits of the inhabitants of this 'porous' city, particularly their 'fastidiously specialized eroticism'. See *Reflections*, trans. E. Jephcott (New York, 1978), p. 173.

[21] (My translation.) Cf. Rush Rhees, 'Wittgenstein on Language and Ritual' in *Essays on Wittgenstein in Honour of G. H. von Wright*, *Acta Philosophica Fennica* 28 (1976), p. 452.

[22] Cf. Arthur C. Danto, *Analytical Philosophy of Action* (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 29–30.

[23] *Eine philosophische Betrachtung*, p. 152; cf. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, § 32. Wittgenstein himself occasionally adopted such a view. See *Philosophical Grammar*, trans. A. Kenny, Part I, § 45 and *Wittgenstein's Lectures 1930–32*, ed. D. Lee (Oxford, 1980), p. 67.

[24] See *Eine philosophische Betrachtung*, p. 152.

[25] *Philosophical Investigations*, § 25.

[26] *Philosophical Investigations*, § 185.

[27] See *Eine philosophische Betrachtung*, p. 131.

[28] See *Philosophical Investigations*, Part II, xii.

[29] This applies particularly to statements about subjective sensations, which, according to Wittgenstein, would not at all be possible if there were no characteristic forms of physical behaviour accompanying such sensations. See for example *Philosophical Investigations*, § 142 and the corresponding footnote. An empirical confirmation of the hypothesis that human beings (as well as animals) express their emotional states by means of certain uniform gestures and grimaces—and also react to these in uniform manner—was first attempted by Charles Darwin in his book, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*.

[30] *Lectures and Conversations*, p. 2.

[31] *Culture and Value*, p. 73.

[32] Jean-Claude Schmitt shows in his article, 'La morale des gestes', what sort of efforts were made in antiquity and in the middle ages to form postures and movements of the human body in order to obtain a normative ideal of the correct 'gestus'. *Communications* No. 46 (Paris, 1987), pp. 31–47.

[33] *Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough*, trans. A. C. Miles and R. Rhees (Atlantic Highlands, 1979), p. 10. A similar thought is found in Shakespeare's *Tempest*, Act 3, Scene 3, where a member of the European aristocracy expresses his admiration for the ability of the strange beings which he encounters on the exotic island to conduct, despite their lack of language, by means of gestures 'an excellent dumb discourse'.

[34] Cf. *The Blue and Brown Books* (Oxford, 1958), p. 166.

[35] *Philosophical Investigations*, § 523.

[36] *Culture and Value*, p. 52.

[37] *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, Vol. I, trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe, § 381.

[38] *Philosophical Investigations*, § 583.

[39] *Culture and Value*, p. 52.

[40] Merleau-Ponty, op. cit., p. 183.

[41] *Zettel*, § 175.

[42] *Zettel*, § 155. In the *Critique of Judgement* (A 190–93) Kant describes in quite similar manner the 'ability to exhibit aesthetic ideas', which, according to him, 'can

manifest itself to full extent' especially in poetry. In poetry, this ability manifests itself in the invention of verbal images that 'prompt the imagination to spread over a multitude of kindred presentations that arouse more thought than can be expressed by a concept determined by words.' See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, trans. W. S. Pluhar (Indianapolis, 1987), pp. 182–3.

[43] *Philosophical Investigations*, § 525.

[44] *Zettel*, § 158.

[45] Cf. *Lectures and Conversations*, pp. 38–40. Wittgenstein discusses in this passage among other things Michelangelo's famous fresco in the Sistine Chapel which depicts the Creation of Adam. In this painting the hand of God the Father almost touches that of Adam, thereby building up a magnetic tension similar to that between the hands of the archangel Gabriel and the Virgin Mary in Botticelli's picture. This similarity is owing to the fact that in both cases we witness a penetration of supernatural powers into profane reality.

[46] See Michael Baxandall, *Painting and Experience in Fifteenth-Century Italy* (Oxford, 1972), Chapter II, Sections 5–7.

[47] *Philosophical Investigations*, Part II, xi.

[48] *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Part I, § 171.

[49] *Philosophical Investigations*, Part II, i.

[50] *Culture and Value*, p. 50.

[51] Jean Baudrillard goes so far as to observe the 'transsubstantiation' of the body even in strip-tease shows and he notes that here, too, gestures play a central role. The decidedly slow gestures of the nightclub-performer, he writes, serve to make the banal nakedness of the body disappear and transform it into a sign having its place within a purely artificial (or fictional) system. See *L'échange symbolique et la mort* (Paris, 1976), Chapter IV, Section 3.

[52] See Gilles Deleuze, 'Pierre Klossowski, ou les corps-langage' in *Critique* 21 (1965), pp. 199–219.

[53] Sara Pardo also emphasizes the emotional power of the gesture: 'Un mode d'action au contraire du langage rationnel' in Jacques Arveiller *et al.*, *La communication par la Geste* (Paris, 1970), pp. 47–53.

[54] Ernst H. Gombrich, *Aby Warburg: An Intellectual Biography* (London, 1970), p. 243. Wilhelm Wundt, too, laid stress on the 'wild' roots of the language of gestures in his *Völkerpsychologie*, which was probably known to Warburg (See Vol. I, Part 1, Chapter 2). One of Wundt's examples, which is also mentioned by Gombrich (op. cit., p. 41) is pointing, which is interpreted as a sublimated form of grabbing. Cf. also Gombrich's article 'Ritualized gesture and expression in art' in *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society*, Series B, 251 (1966), pp. 393–401.

[55] *Culture and Value*, p. 37.

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EXEMPLIFICATION RECONSIDERED

Douglas Arrell

ONE OF the features of Nelson Goodman's *Languages of Art* which most excited its early readers was Goodman's ingenious and elegant presentation of the notion of exemplification. Exemplification, Goodman argued, is a previously unrecognized form of reference which plays a central role in our experience of art. Even aestheticians such as Monroe C. Beardsley, who were generally unsympathetic to Goodman's enterprise as a whole, were intrigued by this notion. During the 1970s, however, a number of serious questions were raised about exemplification, and interest in the idea seems to have diminished.

In this essay I shall attempt to resurrect the notion of exemplification, though not in a form Goodman would approve of. It is Goodman's nominalism, I suggest, that has distorted his account of exemplification and laid it open to the objections that have caused it to fall from favour. In this essay, I shall present a non-nominalist version of exemplification.

I begin by distinguishing between exemplification and verbal reference. This necessitates a rather elaborate discussion of the nature of language. I argue that while verbal reference contains two elements, 'linkage' and 'categorical constraint', exemplification—a simpler and more 'primitive' form of reference—contains only one, categorical constraint. I then discuss exemplification in more detail; I explain what I mean by the term 'exemplificatory system', and create some simple examples of such systems. Finally, I consider rather briefly the role of exemplification in the arts.

1. A PLAUSIBLE NON-NOMINALIST VIEW OF VERBAL REFERENCE

The nature of verbal reference is one of the most basic and controversial issues in contemporary philosophy. Obviously, I am not going to resolve this issue in the following few paragraphs. What I intend to do is to provide a very simple model of verbal reference based on the twin assumptions that (a) it makes sense to talk about the intension of a word; and that (b) the intension constitutes in the fullest sense the meaning of the word. I shall also adopt the usage of saying that a word *refers* to its intension. By intension, I mean that which causes us to decide whether a word applies to an object or not; it is traditionally regarded as a list of defining criteria, but my version of it is closer to Hilary Putnam's notion of a 'stereotype'.[1] Obviously, my model will be rejected by those, such as Goodman, who deny the existence of intensions, and those, such as Putnam, who admit their existence but deny that they

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encompass the full meaning of the word. I cannot argue this issue here, and it may in any case be irrelevant to the subject of exemplification; my prime purpose in using this model is to make a distinction between verbal reference and exemplification, a distinction which probably can be made, *mutatis mutandis*, using other models (although not purely extensional ones such as Goodman's).

Let us assume the existence of entities called 'categories'.[2] Categories include what cognitive psychologists call 'schemata', the formatting devices which at some stage in the perceptual process determine how the manifold sensory data obtainable from an object are sorted to form the perception of that object.[3] We perceive the duck-rabbit image as a picture of a duck because we apply a duck-picture category to it; we perceive the same object as a picture of a rabbit when we apply our rabbit-picture category. Categories also include the conceptual categories we apply to objects, as when we categorize a rabbit as a mammal, an action as just, a problem as difficult, and so on. Each of us has a body of perceptual and conceptual categories we can apply to objects; every category—borderline cases aside—seems to us either to apply or not to apply to any given object. Many different categories apply to the same object, and there may be considerable differences in the categories each of us has available to us and in the objects to which they seem to us appropriately to apply; wine-tasters may have perceptual and conceptual categories to apply to wine that we do not have, and hedonists and puritans may disagree as to which moral categories are appropriately applied to wine-drinking. I shall adapt a convention used by Umberto Eco in his *Theory of Semiotics*, and use guillemets (« ») to distinguish words or phrases that name categories.[4] Thus, for most of us, the following categories apply to black cats: «cat», «black», «animal», «soft», «said to have nine lives», and so on.

I assume that the intension of a word is a category; the intension of the word 'cat' is «cat». A distinctive feature of this category is that it applies to all, and only, cats. By my previous assumptions, we may say that 'cat' refers to «cat». If there is anything remarkable in this formulation, it is in the connection it makes between perception and reference. When we perceive a cat, we may apply to it a number of categories, one of which may be the general category «cat». It is precisely this category which is referred to by the word 'cat'. This theory accounts for the fact that the world we perceive seems to be the very one that our words apply to. Note, however, that while every intension is a category, there may be many categories that are not intensions; we may have perceptual or conceptual categories which are not referred to by words.

Words are also objects (or classes of objects), and when we perceive or conceive of a word we must apply to it a category. As with most objects, there are many categories we could apply to the word 'prune', such as «a word», «five letters long», «the word I learned today», «noun», «the word 'prune'», and so on. There is, however, a class of categories which are most often applied to

words; I shall call them 'categories of meaning'. The category most frequently applied to 'prune' by English-speaking readers is «means: «prune» »; French-speaking readers, of course, usually apply to the same object the category «means: «plum» ». «Means: «prune» » is a category linked to another category. When we apply a category of meaning to a word, we link it to another category, which constitutes the meaning of the word. Hence, I shall call this aspect of verbal reference 'linkage'.

As I have said, «means: «prune» » is far from being the only category we could apply to 'prune'; not only could we perceive it simply as being «a word» or «five letters long», but we could also apply to it another category of meaning, such as «means: «plum» ». When we read 'prune' in a text by an English author, however, we have an unspoken agreement with the author that we will apply to it one specific category, «means: «prune» ». It is only because both we and the author agree to apply to words a specific set of categories of meaning defined by the English language that communication is possible between us. I call this agreement to limit our perception of an object to the application of a specific category out of the many that we could apply to it 'categorical constraint'.

Verbal reference involves both linkage and categorical constraint; linkage is what connects the word with its meaning, and categorical constraint is what forces us to make this connection. When we say a word refers to a particular meaning, we mean that it is an object to which we apply a category of meaning, and that there is a tacit agreement whereby we are constrained to apply a particular category to it out of all that might be applied. Without categorical constraint we could choose to apply to 'prune' «means: «plum» », or indeed any other category that seemed to us appropriate. Like Humpty Dumpty we could choose to apply to the word 'glory' the category «means: «nice knock-down argument» ». Lewis Carroll's joke illustrates what it would be like if language consisted of linkage without categorical constraint.[5]

Suppose our perception of a word were governed by categorical constraint without linkage. We would be constrained to apply a particular category to the word, out of all the categories that we could apply to it, but it would not be a category of meaning. Consider this sentence: 'Here is an example of a word: "prune" '. Here the sentence constrains us to perceive 'prune' by one particular category—«a word»—out of the many that apply to it. We could say that 'prune' here *exemplifies* being a word. Exemplification is categorical constraint without linkage.

2. EXEMPLIFICATION

Nelson Goodman illustrates exemplification with the example of an upholsterer's sample of cloth.[6] Such a sample refers to certain of its predicates—such as 'silk', 'red', 'soft'—but not others—such as 'square', 'two inches long', 'made on Tuesday'—even though all these predicates apply to the object.

Exemplification for Goodman is thus reference from an object to one or more of the labels that apply to it. Note that Goodman's nominalism dictates that it is specifically a label—the word 'red', for example—that is the object of exemplificatory reference.

My own explication of the sampling phenomenon would be as follows. We can apply many categories to perceive or conceive of a piece of upholsterer's cloth—including «silk», «red», «soft», «square», «two inches long», and «made on Tuesday». When we perceive the piece of cloth as a sample, however, we have an unspoken agreement with the upholsterer to apply to it certain categories (including «silk», «red», and «soft») but not others; that is to say, we submit to categorical constraint.

It might seem that there is little difference in the two versions of exemplification, that mine is merely a non-nominalist equivalent of Goodman's. In fact, the two formulations have several quite different and quite important implications. First of all, Goodman's theory demands that every exemplifier must have a label; my theory assumes merely that every exemplifier must have a category that applies to it. Thus, while it would be difficult for Goodman to explain how a piece of cloth could, for example, exemplify a very subtle shade of red for which we have no English word, for me any shade we can perceive can be exemplified. Secondly, Goodman's theory of exemplification implies a kind of linkage between the object and the label. In fact, Goodman conceives of the relationship between the two as simply a reversal of verbal reference (or denotation); whereas denotation links a label to an object, exemplification links an object back to a label. My theory of exemplification, on the other hand, makes it very clear that whereas verbal reference involves linkage, exemplification does not; a word refers us to a category that does not apply to it (normally), while an exemplifier constrains us to apply to itself one or more of the categories that do apply to it. A word connects us with something else, while an exemplifier simply limits the way it is to be perceived.

One of the major criticisms made of Goodman's argument that works of art exemplify their expressive properties was that it denied the 'immediacy' of our experience of art.[7] When we perceive joyful music, we seem to perceive the joyfulness directly; but Goodman's theory seems to imply that we first perceive the music, and then make a connection with a predicate: 'Ah, yes, this refers to "joyful" '. Introducing this element of linkage seems to many critics unnecessary, and a falsification of our experience of art. My theory of exemplification, however, makes it clear that we can say a work of art exemplifies certain qualities without implying that our perception of them is any less direct than is our perception of unexemplified qualities. The difference between perceiving a painting as being blue, and perceiving it to exemplify being blue, is simply that in the first case we choose to notice its blueness rather than some other quality, while in the second case we are constrained by the exemplificatory situation to notice its blueness. The actual experience—the perception

of the painting as blue—is precisely the same in both cases; it consists in the application of the perceptual category «blue» to the painting.

It is perhaps a moot point whether exemplification is appropriately called a form of reference at all. To most people, the term 'reference' implies some form of linkage; when a symbol refers to something, it makes a connection between itself and something else. According to my view, exemplification does not make a connection between the exemplifier and something else; the exemplifier simply limits the way it is to be perceived. On the other hand, like reference, exemplification clearly serves a communicative function; if both upholsterer and buyer agree to constrain their categorization of the sample in the same way, the sample communicates to the buyer very clearly the properties of the cloth he or she is ordering. On balance, it seems to me reasonable to continue to talk about exemplificatory reference; but one must expunge from one's mind any notion that reference necessarily involves linkage.

Exemplification may be considered a primitive form of reference. At first the baby cries as a result of being hungry; crying is a symptom of being hungry. Very soon, however, the baby cries to communicate that she is hungry; the parent recognizes that a certain cry exemplifies «a symptom of hunger», a symptom which the baby may not actually be experiencing as powerfully as she implies she is. Animals also communicate through exemplification; the dog standing by the door is exemplifying «about to go outside», and the bark draws attention to the exemplifier. When human beings learned to communicate verbally, they did not abandon exemplification; they merely added linkage. 'Prune' exemplifies «means: «prune» », in that English-speaking readers are constrained to apply this particular category to it. Exemplification often involves considerable guesswork; in many contexts, it is difficult to decide precisely which particular category is being exemplified, out of the many that could apply to the object. One advantage of verbal language is that the precise category referred to is usually much more clearly defined. But in some contexts exemplification is capable of more precise communication than is verbal language, as the following section will show.

3. EXEMPLIFICATORY SYSTEMS

Perhaps the most serious criticism of Goodman's theory of exemplification has been of his failure to clarify what he means by 'exemplificatory systems', the systems which determine which of their predicates objects exemplify.[8] Most critics have assumed that an exemplificatory system would be something like a language, with a set of rules linking exemplifiers and their referents, and a set of rules governing relationships among exemplifiers. If the arts are governed by exemplificatory systems, we should be able to write exemplificatory dictionaries and grammars for them. Not only does Goodman fail to do this but most critics don't believe that it would be possible to do it for any of the arts.[9]

Here again, we can see how the element of linkage in Goodman's account of

exemplification has created problems. If exemplifiers were linked to predicates in the manner Goodman describes, there ought to be exemplificatory dictionaries and grammars. If exemplification is merely a matter of categorical constraint, however, then it is clear why these do not exist. Dictionaries list words and the categories they are linked to, while grammars describe how the relationships of words in a sentence further determine their linkages. If exemplification does not depend on linkage, exemplificatory dictionaries and grammars are impossible.

According to my theory, what Goodman calls exemplificatory systems are simply systems of categories; for most exemplification, they are the systems that determine our everyday perception and cognition. Human cultures consist of elaborate systems of categories. Within a culture there are many subsystems of categories, some associated with certain bodies of knowledge, such as biology, others with particular practices, such as wine-tasting, or particular sub-cultures, such as teenage gangs. Exemplification takes place when someone presents us with an object which strongly evokes a category from a system we share with him; the effectiveness of the exemplification is enhanced if there exist conventions within the system which indicate when exemplification is likely to occur, and what sort of categories are likely to be exemplified. For example, an illustration in a biology text exemplifies categories in the system of knowledge called 'biology', a system shared by author and reader; conventions of biological illustration—such as arrows or captions—help us to identify precisely which categories are being exemplified.[10] There is no lexicon containing a list of symbols referring to a list of categories; there is simply a body of categories which apply to biological objects, and conventions for drawing them to our attention.

While most systems of categories involved in exemplification are simply those used for everyday perception and cognition, there do exist some systems of categories which exist solely to serve exemplificatory communication. The clearest example of these is the system of phonemes in a language. When we hear a series of sounds which we identify as English words, we are constrained to apply to these the limited number of categories of the vowel and consonant sounds of English; if we think the same sounds are French, we are constrained to try to apply a different set of categories. These particular systems of categories are used to apply to verbal sounds and nothing else. I shall reserve the term 'exemplificatory system' for systems such as these, which are reserved specifically for exemplification.

A simple way of creating exemplificatory systems is through a process which might be called 'differentiation'. Consider the following object:

1. 

(a)

What does it exemplify? We might guess at «square», since in our culture this seems the most distinctive category evoked by the object. But actually, the object, presented out of context, might exemplify any category that anyone could apply to it. Now consider the following sequence of objects:

2.



(a) (b)

Here, most people would decide that object (b) exemplifies being «black». This is still a guess; it might be «dark», or «full» (as opposed to empty), or various other possibilities. But the choice is much more limited, thanks to the fact that the second object clearly differs from the first with respect to one particular property, colour, which is therefore drawn very prominently to our attention. Contrast this sequence with the following:

3.



(a) (b)

Here, most would decide that object (b) exemplifies «square». There are many other ways that differentiation can be used to create exemplifiers:

4.



(a) (b)

5.



(a) (b)

In sequence 4, we conclude that the second object exemplifies «relatively large», while the identical object in sequence exemplifies «relatively small».

6.



(a) (b)

7.



(a) (b)

The second object in sequence 6 exemplifies something like «having a top left corner», while the second object in sequence 7 exemplifies «not having a cross on top».

These sequences create the most elementary exemplificatory systems, consisting of only two contrasting categories. Obviously, as the sequence becomes longer the number of categories in the system increases. Sequence 8 creates a system of three categories:

8.



(a) (b) (c)

This must be contrasted with the system created by 9:

9.



(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

Note that even though the last objects in sequences 8 and 9 are identical, and they both exemplify their colour, they in fact exemplify different categories. In the system created by sequence 9, the categories of colour are more finely divided than they are in sequence 8; object (c) in sequence 8 exemplifies «grey», while object (c) in sequence 9 exemplifies something like «medium grey». If we continued sequence 9 further, we could exemplify very minute differences in colour, differences which we would find it very difficult to name verbally.

The systems created by sequences embodying differences in more than one property become increasingly complex:

10.



(a) (b) (c) (d)

Here, object (d) exemplifies «square, white, and relatively small». If the sequence were extended, intricate complexes of features could be exemplified.

The above sequences indicate how exemplificatory systems can be created by differentiation; they also illustrate how this kind of system could occur 'naturally', without the need for anyone to stipulate explicitly that exemplification is occurring or what an object exemplifies. The possibility of extending the sequences indefinitely makes clear the high degree of refinement and complexity such systems could achieve.

4. EXEMPLIFICATION IN ART

To say a work of art exemplifies its expressive or aesthetic properties is simply to say that it constrains us to perceive it by a particular system of categories—the system under which it is perceived to exhibit those properties. We can say that parts of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony exemplify joyfulness because the work constrains us to perceive them as joyful; someone unfamiliar with western music who perceived them as incomprehensible noise would be perceiving them incorrectly, just as a Frenchman who perceived a series of English vowels as badly pronounced French ones would be perceiving them incorrectly. The exemplificatory theory of art is thus essentially a communication theory; the composer creates the music to exemplify certain categories, and if we fail to apply those categories to it, we miss the point of the music. But to talk of 'languages' of art is misleading; to reiterate, there is no linkage in exemplification, and hence no grammar or vocabulary of an art form. Music is not to be regarded as a symbol referring—in the usual sense—to an emotion. Music simply, for whatever reasons, evokes certain emotive categories; the referential element lies solely in the fact that there is a constraint to apply a particular set of emotive categories, a constraint which does not exist, for example, with respect to natural objects. There is no 'correct' set of categories to apply to the nightingale's song, although different cultures may choose to regard it as exemplifying certain (widely differing) qualities. There is, however, a correct set of categories by which to perceive a Beethoven symphony; we may disagree as to what they are, but we at least do agree that «incomprehensible noise» is incorrect.

Some works of art exemplify categories taken from the cultural and subcultural systems of the society in which the artist lived. Anyone sharing in these systems knows what they exemplify, whether they have had any experience of art or not. A good example of such a work might be *Robinson Crusoe*,

which Defoe designed to be understood by the ordinary English reader of his time. The work doesn't seem to demand familiarity with any specifically novelistic system; indeed, most of its original readers did not know it was a novel, but read it as non-fiction. Other works of art seem to exemplify categories that exist in a special system unique to the art form to which they belong. These art forms are, in other words, governed by their own exemplificatory systems (in my sense of the term). Classical music has one such system—or family of systems. This system has to be learned by experience of the art form itself.

It seems to me very probable that traditional systems of artistic exemplification—such as those of pre-modern classical music or classical ballet—are created through a process of differentiation like that illustrated in the last section. Traditional art forms evolve step by step, as innumerable small changes in technique and artistic 'vocabulary' are introduced. Artists in these forms see themselves as catering to an audience who will perceive their work using an accepted system of categories. In order to create something new for this audience, artists must limit themselves to variations on the old; that is, each new category must be clearly differentiated from a category already existent in the system. The new category then becomes the basis for further differentiation by later artists. Thus did classical ballet evolve from the simple court dances of Louis XIV's time to the complex art form of Ashton and Balanchine, who had an infinitely wider array of exemplificatory possibilities at their disposal than did seventeenth-century choreographers.

One of the great puzzles of art history has always been why the pre-modern arts so often exhibit this evolutionary pattern. Thus, one of the questions Gombrich sought to answer in *Art and Illusion* was why Greek sculpture and Renaissance painting evolved so gradually in the direction of realism, when there is evidence that there was often no *technical* reason why individual artists could not have achieved more realistic reproductions of the human body or the visual field much sooner. Gombrich recognized that the evolution towards realism involved 'the gradual modification of the traditional schematic conventions of image making':[11] the reason, I suggest, that artists approached realism in this way is that they were appealing to an audience sharing a body of perceptual schemata which constituted the exemplificatory system of the art form, and new categories could only be created through step-by-step differentiation from the categories already existent in the system. When Constable and the Impressionists jumped to realistic effects which exemplified categories which were *not* clearly differentiated from the categories of the traditional system, their works were rejected by connoisseurs as not art at all.

Constable and the Impressionists represent the beginnings of the modern approach to exemplification in the arts; they began to abandon the traditional exemplificatory system of painting. In most of the contemporary arts, this process has accelerated. How does one determine what categories modernist

works exemplify? Modernist artists are eclectic in the systems they choose to refer to; various cultural systems, the remains of various artistic ones, the systems shared by a small circle of the artist's acquaintances, or even those private to the artist himself or herself, may be involved. Hence, compared to traditional works, modern works are often more difficult to appreciate and there is less agreement among critics as to the categories they exemplify.

There is no space to develop this argument further here. I hope I have at least made a plausible case for the notion that works of art do exemplify the categories we apply to them, and that the stylistic 'languages' of the traditional arts can best be seen as exemplificatory systems created primarily through differentiation.

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[1] See Hilary Putnam, 'Is Semantics Possible?' in *Mind, Language and Reality*, Vol. 2 of *Philosophical Papers* (Cambridge, 1975), pp. 139–52.

[2] They are assumed to be what Hilary Putnam calls 'extra-mental' entities; just as the same program can exist in many computers, so may the same category exist in many brains. See Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History* (Cambridge, 1981), p. 27.

[3] The notion of a 'schema' is particularly well explained in Ulric Neisser, *Cognition and Reality: Principles and Implications of Cognitive Psychology* (San Francisco, 1976).

[4] Umberto Eco, *A Theory of Semiotics* (Bloomington, 1976), p. xi.

[5] See Charles Dodgson [Lewis Carroll], *Through the Looking Glass*, in *The Philosopher's Alice*, ed. Peter Heath (New York, 1974), pp. 193–4.

[6] Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art*, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis, 1976), pp. 52–4.

[7] See, notably, Henning Jensen, 'Exemplification in Nelson Goodman's Aesthetic Theory', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 32(1973), 48–9; also Monroe C. Beardsley, '*Languages of Art* and Art Criticism', *Erkenntnis* 12(1978), 104.

[8] See Jensen, pp. 49–50; Beardsley, pp. 103–4.

[9] See Joseph Margolis, 'Art as Language', *The Monist* 58(1974), pp. 175–8.

[10] I assume that a picture exemplifies some of the properties of what it represents; I argue the case for this in an article, 'What Goodman Should Have Said About Representation', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 46(1987), 41–9.

[11] E. H. Gombrich, *Art and Illusion. A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation* (Princeton, 1969), p. xii.

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KNOWLEDGE OR CONTROL AS THE END OF ART

L. B. Cebik

'THE END of Art', Arthur Danto's now infamous essay title, harbours a crucial ambiguity. Unfortunately, commentators on the essay—virtually all of them critics—have explored only one side of the duality: the death of art.[1] Danto does nothing to dispel this interpretative option as the key one. He tags the essay with Marius de Zayas' proclamation that 'Art is dead'.[2] In *The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art*, Danto characterizes the essay as 'a response to the dismal state of the artworld, for which I sought—and continue to seek—an explanation'.[3]

Yet, a second equally important option lies open for careful reading: art has achieved its end, its goal, its destiny. Danto made this interpretative possibility as clear as the former: the essay 'supposes that its own philosophy is what art aims at, so that art fulfils its destiny by becoming philosophy at last'. He goes on to note that art does other things than just becoming its own philosophy, 'which makes the *death* of art an overstatement'.[4]

Indeed, some of Danto's remarks suggest that art is dying rather than dead. He forecasts (rather than reports for the historical record) that 'the institutions of the artworld—galleries, collectors, exhibitions, journalism—which are predicated upon history and hence marking what is new, will bit by bit, wither away'.[5] The corpus of art may not yet have become a corpse. Alternatively, Danto's view that 'ours is a post-historical art'[6] might equally intimate that the process is more Marxian with its withering away of the traditional historical and economic state.

A Marxian interpretation of art's cold, grey state, however, would not be likely to please Danto, for his historical dialectic is essentially Hegelian. 'The end of History coincides, and is indeed identical, with what Hegel speaks of as the advent of Absolute Knowledge. Knowledge is absolute when there is no gap between knowledge and its object, or knowledge is its own object, hence subject and object at once.'[7] As art becomes philosophy, it fulfils the Hegelian destiny of knowing itself absolutely, of knowing what it is and being what it knows. Art achieves this end without complete self-assurance at first, but soon with perfection.

Norman Miller was perplexed by Danto's predictions, since he noticed no decline in the institutions of art world. 'To my naïve eye, they appear to be more numerous, more robust and powerful than ever.' Conceding only an

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increased artistic self-consciousness, Miller found 'that the *prestige* of art and of artists is higher now than ever before in the history of the West . . .'. Artists may be more irritated by and sensitive to critics, but that seems more a rash on a healthy body than the protest of an incipient corpse.[8]

I am inclined to contest neither Miller's observations nor Danto's characterization of art in its historical outline. That is the course of unenlightening criticism. It is too simple to say that history is not Hegelian, that art shows no progress over the years other than technological advances in the perfection of representation, that art historically shows only differences from era to era. More needs to be said about Danto's latter-day Hegelianism, so radical is his shift from positions of the middle 60s in which he argued in principle against the possibility of grand dialectical historical schemes.[9] In finally succumbing to the lure of Hegel, Danto seems to have bought the entire package, including the forecast for art's role after history, after the attainment of Absolute Knowledge. Art becomes fit only for a pastime, entertainment, or decoration, subservient in this role to other objects. It simultaneously lacks any imperatives, doing what it wants.[10] Unnoticed by Danto, the conflict between subservience and freedom in post-historical art goes unchallenged and unexplained.

What easy attacks upon Danto's Hegelian history of art fail to see, because they do not look, is art as it stands. They fail to see what Danto early on framed as 'artworld': 'an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art'.[11] History and theory, of course, comprise just the sorts of elements a philosopher can most appreciate. They stand seemingly distant from the nubbier and grubbier elements of greed and avarice that inform most social structures within the larger frame of western societies. Theory and history are the ethereal dimensions of a world that functions daily by scrambling for economic success, training new generations of indentured apprentices, contesting power and control within various parts of the structures, and polishing images to attract new converts who have time, energy, money, or just good will to contribute. Little wonder Danto turns Hegelian if all he (and his critics) look at is history and theory.

Artworld is at best an artrealm, a substructure within the overall society or societies of the West. In his own institutional analysis of art, George Dickie tried to focus upon art as an established practice rather than as an 'established society or corporation'. However, he allowed that within the overall institution, many systems existed, each with its own origin and history. Dickie's view, however much larger than Danto's, still restricts itself to those conditions within the institution that show how an object can become a work of art or an aesthetic object.[12] Like Danto, he remains wedded to seeing art through theory, even if only his own, rather than seeing art as the institution itself.

The institution of art—or artrealm—is, as Dickie notes, a collection of systems that bestow upon candidates the status of art works. It is also a set of systems populated by a vast array of people who earn a livelihood from their

efforts. Many of them are committed to one or more of the arts in ways far more like religious faith than is normally required to retain a position or job. Some work at art jobs; others live art. They are the committed. Although some committed members of artrealm have been born into the group, others either work their way into one of the systems or convert to one of them from outside artrealm. The committed have mastered more than the working language both of the art as a whole and of their speciality within the art—be it making materials, arranging exhibits, selling or auctioning works, or raising funds. They have come to see the world through the eyes of art, or better, through the concepts that allow us to view or hear objects or performances as art works. As Karl Mannheim long ago noted, 'We belong to a group not only because we are born into it, not merely because we profess to belong to it, nor finally because we give it our loyalty and allegiance, but primarily because we see the world and certain things in the world in the way it does (i.e., in terms of the meanings of the group in question)'.[13]

Artrealm constantly seeks to expand its membership, One expansionist movement asserts the cultural richness of art and seeks to make it an essential within the educative process through exhibitions, museums, and art educators. The other movement seeks larger, more widespread markets for art works, whether objects or performances, with new jobs for promoters and managers and new buildings for galleries and theatres. Common to both expansionist drives are appeals for funds through legislative appropriations, private contributions, admission charges, and sales of original or copied works.

These truistic remarks on the structure of artrealm have not always been true. The post-Renaissance period has seen numerous shifts in the inter-relationships within the institutions of art. In the late eighteenth century, Robert Burns sought patronage—both jobs and outright gifts—from more affluent friends. Mere affluence, however, did not always suffice during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: patronage required position as well as wealth, although mere riches could purchase the services of lesser artists, especially portrait painters. Far from expansive, the fine arts formed a mostly closed circle of support, production, and payment well into the nineteenth century. With few public exceptions, artrealm belonged to the economically, politically, and religiously dominant classes.

More than Danto's self-knowing present and future art, the fine arts under the patronage system might better qualify as subservient to other objects. Perhaps not until the Romantic era did art, especially the visual and theatrical arts, wrest free of some of the bonds imposed by patronage. Patrons established the subject-matter, set the tone—if not the style—and created the living conditions of art. A rebellious and cagey Voltaire might play the system against itself to secure his own free thought and writing, but such an exception serves only to reveal the system's severest detail. To this day, the institution of

commissions persists, although it now occupies only a fraction of artrealm. As late, or early, as Van Gogh, commissions ceased to support adventuresome artists, who survived by selling works to patron-like dealers, who—for their part—were as apt to pay in supplies as in money.

Facts such as these blunt naïve Hegelian predictions for the future of art. As an institution or collection of systems, artrealm has achieved types of freedom never envisaged by Hegel. It has come to control its own production, distribution, and reputation, as well as theory.

Control of production brings with it different requirements upon an artist than production under patronage. Individual original authorship, the hallmark of post-Renaissance painting and sculpture (with only a few exceptions, such as social realistic WPA statuary), gives way to the artist as personality. Museums look for examples of an artist more than samples from a period or a school, even though the three have begun to amount to the same thing. Thus, Danto should not have been surprised that de Kooning went on painting de koonings and de Chirico de chiricos.[14] Only the personality sufficiently well-established—the paradigm is Picasso—can afford to change methods and styles at will, confident that artrealm will follow willingly.

Imperfectly, but more than ever before, artists control the distribution of their works. Author agents have become the rule rather than the exception, and the system is spilling rapidly into painting and sculpture, whether the agent's role is filled by an employee of the artist or by the management of a sales gallery. The very body of art 'consumers' has changed in this century to include investors and middling-income substitutes for patrons.

Controlling the production, distribution, and reputation of art goes hand-in-hand with controlling its theory. Wordsworth and Coleridge were hardly the first poets to establish the theory of their art in ways critics could not ignore. Eliot and Pound in this century brought the practice full circle by expounding their theories in their poetry as much as in their own criticism. That visual artists should exclude philosophers and debate among themselves their own theories, their rationales or rationalizations, as the case may be, in a time when they feel more than ever that their works are their own—as possessions as well as productions—should strike no one as strange, however their ideas may deserve that label. Little wonder they have lost patience with critics. In many ways, those once necessary arbiters of taste have lost some of their necessity. The trend in criticism grows more academic on the one hand and more journalistic on the other.

Whether art theories are theories in the same way that scientific theories are theories is open to question. It is a relevant question, if scientific theory passes as the model of theory. Anita Silvers cogently posed the question in her examination of Danto's doctrine of end things. Two major differences caught her eye. First, 'the history of art-theoretical stances appears to be cyclical rather than linear. [Art] theories and their associated styles can be expected to recur, to be

recreated or rediscovered or readapted century after century'.[15] As Danto himself suggested, perhaps we do not require centuries to recycle our theories and styles. The emergence of Neo-Expressionism 'awakened a nostalgia', not for the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, but for the 'forties, the fifties, [and] the sixties, all over again'. Danto troubled over the awakening for its materialistic view of art's future: the fine future of art meant 'to buy while buying was possible'. Surely 'art does not have that kind of future'.[16]

Secondly, and more importantly for Silvers, 'in the artworld, individuals directly experience differences in art-theoretical stances, whereas, in respect to scientific theories, the shift from one theoretic stance to another is usually the subject of historical narration rather than direct experience'. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine one returning to a departed scientific paradigm. Precisely the opposite is true of art theories.[17]

Silvers finds these differences compelling, but not decisive. However, she failed to include in her analysis the uses to which art theories are put and within what sort of social frame these uses occur. When Plato and Bacon and Kant spoke of art, their distance from art lent verisimilitude to calling their commentaries art theories in the same sense as Aristotle and Newton can be said to have promulgated scientific theories. In the twentieth century, as artists have come more and more to control their own works, theories have multiplied in a kind of protestant movement in art: every artist his own theorist. As artrealm grows increasingly to ignore externally imposed theories—namely, those generated by philosophers—the difference between the artist's explanation, interpretation, or rationale of his or her work and a theory of art grows increasingly thin. Indeed, if artworld did not require avenues of extensive conversation about art—traditionally, theoretic as well as appreciative and evaluative paths of talk—the need for theory within artrealm might well disappear. An institution in control of itself may control not only what form its products will take, but as well the very need for justifying those products.

A better term for what has formerly passed as art theories is art formulations, the construction of frameworks for perceiving and conversing about art. These willed frameworks recommend and possibly establish common points for thought and conversation. Inherently and constantly controversial in most ages, they fail to achieve the status of paradigms, a term crucial to current understandings of the history of scientific theories. While self-controlling art institutions may dispense with justifications for their methods and products, they may continue to create as often as they please new or altered frameworks for perception and discussion.

The externalization of philosophy (the discipline) from art as it internalizes philosophy (the theory and justification) is but another mark of artrealm's independence and freedom. And just this point brings us full circle back to Hegel or at least to Danto's Hegelianism. For as artrealm develops its own

justifications for its actions, it embodies as much as is sensible of Absolute Knowledge.

In order to understand fully in what Absolute Knowledge consists, we must distinguish that part of artrealm which embodies it. For not all of those in the realm need feel any immediate consequences of art's end. First, we might distinguish between the intimates of art and the followers of art. To the latter, who receive only second hand the theories and frameworks for viewing works and performances, it matters little who controls art theory. As the economic resource for the ongoing existence of artrealm, as art consumers, pilgrims, donors, and bearers of the exoteric knowledge only, art's followers are likely to effect no change in the systems of artrealm.

Art's intimates, however, have a vested interested in the control of art theory, in art esoterica. Some—the artists, first critics, first sellers and buyers—may in the transition from history to post-history be vying for control of art theory, if we are to believe Danto. However, these are not the only intimates of art. As intimate, but not over the same art, are the historians, academic critics, museum curators, and others who preside over, interpret, systematize, and instruct about art past. To the degree that art present (and future) derives its possibility from art past—how we can see and what we can sensibly say about art past—these historical intimates will influence the contest.

In like measure, what we can now see and sensibly say about art will alter what we see and what we say about art past. Danto himself made this latter point indirectly when he pointed out in the *Analytical Philosophy of History* that there are many things we can say about the past that historical actors and their contemporaries could not say about matters of their own time.[18] An even larger thesis is inherent in Danto's Hegelianism in so far as our present historically enriched conceptual scheme permits this age to think, see, and say what to preceding eras would have been unimaginable.[19]

Nevertheless, for want of any sense of urgency in determining who controls contemporary art theory, historical art intimates are less likely to join the fray. They may take a longer view, since ultimately, they will control it. They have only to wait until it becomes part of the past of art.

The post-historical contest, then, turns on the control of contemporary or emergent theory for contemporary or emergent art. If students of the past, who are mostly non-artists and largely non-philosophers, will ultimately gain control of art theory, then the contest seems less than cosmically significant unless one assumes that control of the present implies—directly or indirectly—control of the past. Perhaps one may control the past by making history irrelevant in an ever-present post-historical period. Yet the museums, the academics, and the works persist.

Persistence alone, however, does not determine what we shall see as works, how we shall see the works, or what we shall be able to say about them. In his

reduction of art to gesture and style in *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace*, Danto revealed a despair that transcends the present. It is appealing to liken artistic style to personality, to say 'that what we mean by style are those qualities of representations which are the man himself, seen from the outside, physiognomically'. For the very language of style is largely the language of personality. Like personalities, styles are ponderous, deliberate, anguished, opaque, transparent, pretentious, flamboyant, expressive, reserved, humble, strained, sentimental, bold, carefree, sensitive, natural, scholastic, exuberant, passionate, bombastic, and energetic. However, carrying style too far results in Danto's fatal inference: 'If style is the man, greatness of style is greatness of person'.[20] Great style yields, in our society, the great man as the celebrity.

In the metaphor of physiognomy, style and gesture become one and the same for Danto, as profound or as shallow as the culture demands. Danto's final reckoning of Warhol's 'Brillo Box' reflects vividly his despair at his own culture. The work propounded a 'brash metaphor: the brillo-box-as-work-of-art'. Our resistance to admitting the offering into the artworld Danto ascribes to our confusion, not to the would-be artist's. 'The moment it was possible, something like the Brillo Box was inevitable and pointless. It was inevitable because the gesture had to be made, whether with this object or some other. It was pointless because, once it could be made, there was no reason to make it'.[21] It is an art hollow and without substance. The gesture that need not be done reflects a meaninglessness to existence and the art within it.

Yet, Danto intended the notions of style and gesture to carry a sense of weight. 'The style of a man is, to use the beautiful thought of Schopenhauer, "the physiognomy of the soul" '.[22] Although Danto distinguishes between style and manner, the former original, the latter learned and not necessarily true to the person, it is the idea of human personality that cannot carry the kind of conceptual weight Danto needs. Nor can the notion of the human being as a system of representations or ways of seeing the world. By ignoring the human as doer, gestures become hollow and personalities become shams or veneers. In an honest world of action, gestures are necessary and meaningful, whether one salutes an officer or colleague, greets a brother with open arms, comforts a grieving mother, or strikes out vituperatively at a hated enemy. We may equally reveal or hide the way we see the world in our gestures; the personality we project may be ours or not, especially before those who do not know us well. The hollow gesture may be functional as well as possible and still be hollow.

Thus, to see an art as an inevitable but pointless gesture is to despair, to regard brashness as sufficient entry qualification into artworld. Whether or not the realm of art has reached this point is moot. For Danto, philosophical reflection can explain the phenomenon, but it can no longer control it. Whether or not he wished his final remarks on the brillo-box-as-work-of-art to carry the tone, they hum of philosophical despair.

Despair is not a simple or constant emotional state. It has its moments of silence as well as its bursts of outrage. The latter Danto expresses in his question: 'Who can forget Barnett Newman's cruel *boutade*, flung at, of all people, Susanne Langer: "Aesthetics is for art what ornithology is for the birds" '? That Danto should later interpret the remark as saying philosophy was for the birds reflects the impact of the Newman comment after 20 years, but not its logic.[23]

Like all forms of dying, the dying control of philosophy over art undergoes not only the stage of anger, but as well a stage of denial. The slurried canvases of a Whitney Biennial, 'immense and bombastic, puerile and portentous, shallow and brash' (that word again, a decade later), lead Danto to think that this 'was the way things were supposed to go next'. Instead, there must be a way 'things must have to go'.[24] A Kubler-Ross might well finish this list of stages in Danto's despair over artworld's dying.

Philosophic despair, however, does not necessarily reflect artistic despair. Precisely the opposite is true and magnifies the philosophical despair. Having become the intimate of art and losing that privileged position, philosophy has few choices. The possibilities seem to be despair, rancour, and resentment of and by philosopher-intimates towards an art which ceases to recognize philosophy's authority over theory and hence its position of intimacy. Indeed, how philosophy acquired its authority seems largely a matter of accident.

For art over most of its history seems never to have known it needed a theory, let alone a plethora of theories. Nothing in Plato or Aristotle suggests that they wrote for or to artists. Eighteenth-century German theory treats the aesthetic as a phenomenon among the many demanding the attention of philosophers. Of artists, we expected appropriate manners suitable to court patronage, but not academic erudition. Only with the nineteenth century does an interface between art and philosophy begin to take hold with seriousness, mostly in the form of the artist-theorist on the one hand and philosophic interest in individual works and their interpretation on the other.

More important than a detailed history of theory's relationship to the arts is the phenomenon of awareness within the arts. If art now knows or believes self-consciously—whether or not under the weight of philosophical insistence—that it needs theory, then there should be no wonder that artists themselves should seek to take over the task of making that theory. And what follows is equally natural in human affairs.

One who controls, one who has power, has little need for theory in the traditional sense of explanation and self-justification. Theory has a certain utility for those in power. One controls and uses theory, but is not controlled or used by it. Theory instructs the faithful in how to see, what to see and what not to see, what meaning and meaningfulness to derive from what is seen, what to say to others who see. As such, theory made by artists directs its attention to art followers, not to philosophers. Its style, tone, and content

differ markedly from tradition as it seeks to enlarge and solidify its congregation or market. Its vocabulary will differ from school to school and yet hold enough in common to permit ecumenical art conversations, meetings, conferences, and business. Theory becomes more a litany and a theology than an analogue to scientific theory. It becomes the willed and useful formulation.

Absolute Knowledge, then, is nothing more (nor less) than Absolute Control, that is, self-determination. Art comes not only to create its works and styles and subjects but as well creates itself as art. If Danto is correct that artists have, at least on the leading edge of new art, taken control over theory, then they determine for themselves what art is and shall be. Their chief interest in theory no longer includes the least shred of justifying their beliefs about art. Rather, they need theory only to inform others concerning their decision about what art shall be and what shall be art.

Indeed, at this stage of 'post-historical' art, knowledge as justified true belief becomes logically impossible. Authority replaces justification as the source of knowledge, and if authority offends one's sense of what qualifies to be called knowledge, then the term 'knowledge' may drop altogether from the equation without loss to the practice. Artrealm goes on producing, displaying, interpreting, selling, and preserving art. The realization of art's goal to become philosophy results inevitably in the demise of traditional philosophy of art. That is the irony of both Danto and Hegel: Absolute Knowledge precludes knowledge absolutely.

Danto, of course, knows this, at least to some extent. 'Artmaking is its own end in both senses of the term: the end of art is the end of art. There is no further place to go.' No further historical place, that is, for Danto refuses to let loose of his Hegel. 'Having reached this point, where art can be anything at all, art has exhausted its conceptual mission'.[25] Art can be anything at all, however, only for the disenfranchised philosopher of history, now restricted to the role of bystander. Perhaps even the role of art follower is forbidden to one formerly with power and intimacy. To one born to speak with authority, listening becomes the most difficult of tasks.

For the practising artist, art cannot be just anything at all. It will become what the artist determines it will be. From that perspective, the becoming has the necessity, not of determinism, but of will. Even for Hegel, 'the will's activity consists in annulling the contradiction between subjectivity and objectivity and giving its aims an objective instead of a subjective character, while at the same time remaining by itself even in objectivity', an activity that 'is in essence the development of the Idea'.[26]

Be that as it may, what one with power determines will be follows in reality with necessity—or with failure. The categories of determination as an act or decision follow a conceptual logic quite unlike the categories applicable to determination in the realm of knowledge. The end of knowledge in Absolute Knowledge is not the end of knowing, but the end of the applicability of the

categories of knowledge. Art becomes—or returns to the status of—an enterprise, a praxis, a doing, and its principle categories are those fit to a doing.

Art in control of itself runs risks. In the exclusion of philosophers (and others) from the ranks of determiners of art, artists may grow too self-enclosed, isolated, and insulated not just from philosophers, but from all others. The freedom of self-determination can (though it need not) be self-defeating. To maintain its cadre of art followers, self-determining art must include first critics, first displayers, and first buyers among its intimates. Without these elements, art may shrink its market, its following. A free art must still create the framework of sense and meaningfulness for its followers to adopt if they are to see new art as more than senseless whimsy. The requirements of sense include the generation (or alteration) of concepts and grammar to provide the framework for meaningful statement, question, doubt, and conversation. The language of art, in turn, reveals the process to be social or institutional, however factionated the institution and its sub-systems may become.

That art should be able to accomplish these goals without the 'services' of philosophers seems plausible enough. Most enterprises within society that hold paramount importance in the lives of people have never had recourse to philosophical services. However, philosophers and historians may still have something to do with art, even in a post-historical age.

Historians and philosophers can still trace the course of events and ferret out hitherto unsuspected meanings in art as it passes and is past. In short, philosophy and history can be just philosophy and history, and no more. Their tasks would be done without accompanying pretensions of determining for art what it could and should be doing, or of preparing the conceptual background against which art would then do what it logically must. Neither history nor philosophy would be any the less for that, since the task of uncovering, tracing, interpreting, and explaining the significance of events, movements, and eras is what (in part) history and philosophy have been about all along. So long as there are historians interested in art, there will be art history.

The consequence of these possibilities is that we do not live in a post-historical age at all, unless all we mean by post-historical is the present. At most, from a Dantoesque perspective, we are entering (or have entered) a post-philosophical-control era. Philosophers and historians alike must take their place as outsiders to the new art, receiving it as artefact from artists, along with anything else artists choose to provide. The additions may include theories, explanation, manifestos, or titles—or they may not. The litanies of art may eventually discard the categories of theory, explanation, and manifesto to the extent that each of these types of pronouncements responds to a challenge, whether overt or built into the activity. Theories justify; explanations also justify or even excuse. Manifestos typically assert and sometimes justify rebellion. As Camus has noted, 'Despite the fact that this runs counter to the

prejudices of the times, the greatest style in art is the expression of the most passionate rebellion'. Rebellion, of course, equally denies and affirms; only revolution attempts to live upon complete negation, and 'no form of art can survive on total denial alone'.[27] An art that controls itself is neither rebellious nor nihilistic (that is to say, revolutionary, in Camus' sense of the terms). Therefore, it has no need to justify itself, although it may still require texts to teach others how to see and speak about the art.

The result is simply that philosophy, like history, now must look at art from the outside, i.e., as a non-intimate of new art. Although Danto wrote of the philosophical disenfranchisement of art, he ironically bemoans the artistic disenfranchisement of philosophy. The end of history he projects upon art is only the end of a certain philosophical history. If art—art-present—truly controls itself, it is now free to create its own ongoing history. Any remaining tension would exist only between art-present and art-past, to the extent that each is controlled by different groups. What was in question was not Absolute Knowledge, but control, for Absolute Knowledge yields freedom, which is the end of knowledge and the categories of knowledge.

Although we might wish to preserve the rhetoric of Absolute Control, if for no other reason than a sense of symmetry with the idea of Absolute Knowledge, a more accurate institutional analysis would have to insist upon relative control. Artists may be more sensitive than ever to critics and the entire cadre of commentators upon and interpreters of art, but they have not yet eliminated them as functionaries and forces in artrealm. In short, the battle is far from won by art-present. This, of course, presumes that there is a battle: the Danto premiss we have not here questioned. If there is a battle, one would do well to know what sorts of mentalities are engaged: rebels, revolutionaries, or chimeras of either. The answer is not for philosophers but for honest artists to give. But in that answer lies the prognosis for art's survival.

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[19] See, as one example among many, Hegel's remarks on the 'higher right which belongs to the sphere and stage of mind in which mind has determined and actualized within itself the further moments contained in its idea, and it belongs to this sphere as the sphere which is concreter, intrinsically richer, and more genuinely universal'. *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), pp. 33–4.

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[22] Ibid., p. 205.

[23] Danto, *The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art*, pp. x and xii.

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LITERATURE, PHILOSOPHY AND NONSENSE

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IN THIS paper I want to suggest a thesis about the relation between philosophy and literature and I will do this by an examination of the role of nonsense in some of the short stories of the French author Marcel Aymé.

Nonsense became a philosophical category only in the early twentieth century and was first introduced by, I believe, Bertrand Russell with the theory of types. It was the syntactical restrictions enjoined by the theory of types that allowed Russell to charge that many of the assertions of earlier philosophers were not simply false, but in fact made no sense. Nonsense was given a deeper dimension by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* with the distinction between the sayable and the unsayable: nonsense results from the attempt to say the unsayable but, ironically, it was everything of importance in life that he believed to be comprehended under the latter. That aspect of the *Tractatus* was totally missed by logical positivism which sought to use the verification theory of meaning to distinguish the meaningful statements of empirical science from the nonsensical pseudo-statements of metaphysics. Wittgenstein went on to provide a still richer exploration of nonsense in the *Philosophical Investigations* where he locates a craving for nonsense in certain deep aspects of our language and our life. It is this craving that he believes is responsible for much of traditional philosophy which, on his view, turns out to be grounded in conceptual confusion and therefore a kind of nonsense.

Given the fact that a good case can be made that the notion of meaning and all it implies for the distinction between sense and nonsense has been the primary concern of twentieth-century philosophy, at least Anglo-American philosophy, it is surprising that in their aesthetic studies the role that nonsense has played in literature has gone almost unnoticed by philosophers. Lewis Carroll's *Alice* books are, of course, the obvious exception to this, but the attention they have drawn has usually been directed towards picking out the philosophical theses and jokes rather than towards the larger possibilities of nonsense as a literary device.

It may not be so surprising that literary critics and commentators have not seen those same possibilities or have not even been aware of the existence of the kind of nonsense I want to call attention to. To be sure, literature has always recognized a garden variety of nonsense that exploits made-up words, silly situations, and unlikely juxtapositions exemplified by *Jabberwocky*, the

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'nonsense' verse of Edward Lear, and that American folk classic 'I Was Born About Ten Thousand Years Ago'.[1] What I have in mind, however, is rather different from that and can be illustrated by some of the short stories of Marcel Aymé.

Marcel Aymé (1902–1967) has not been widely read in the English-speaking world and very few of his seventeen novels, twelve plays, and eighty-three short stories have been translated into English. Aymé is generally considered to be a writer of what the French call *contes des merveilleux*, tales of the marvellous. What can be categorized generically as the marvellous has long been a staple of French literature. Since at least the twelfth century the literature of France has been populated by sorcerers, giants, ogres, fairies, and strange events. Literary historians have devised a number of ways of sorting out and classifying the various themes of these *contes des merveilleux*. Marcel Schneider, for one, distinguishes between fairy tales, horror tales, and fantasy literature.[2] In slicing up the domain of the marvellous it has not been recognized that one of its sub-divisions belongs to a brand of nonsense. I want to direct attention to the literary and philosophical importance of that brand of nonsense and at the same time to call attention to an interesting author who has unfortunately been neglected by English-speaking readers.

Many of Aymé's stories clearly are *contes des merveilleux*. One of his best known is *Le passe muraille*,[3] 'the man who could walk through walls'. A clerk of modest and regular habits suddenly discovers that he has the ability to walk through walls unhindered. Worried by this derangement in his daily life, he went to the doctor who readily diagnosed his problem and prescribed two powders together with a regimen of overwork that would surely put him to rights again. He took one of the powders but put the other aside and forgot about it. Meanwhile he began to learn that his new talent had certain advantages. He thrust his head through the wall of the office of his tyrannical boss and shouted imprecations at him. After a few repetitions of this the unfortunate man had to be taken to the mad house. He discovered that he could walk in and out of bank vaults and serve himself as he pleased. The headlines soon spoke of little else than the phantom bandit. He entered into an affair with a married woman and found it most convenient to walk directly through the wall into her bedroom. One day he suffered from a headache and so took some headache powders before going off to visit his lady love. Alas, however, it was not only a headache powder that he took, but the forgotten prescription as well. The additional dosage took effect just as he entered the wall and before he emerged on the other side. And he is still there lamenting the untimely end of his career.

And then there is *Fiançailles*,[4] 'The Betrothal'. It seems that a woman had read so much Greek mythology that when her son was born he turned out to be a centaur. The father kept this shame hidden away from public view on his large estate and had him privately educated. One day when luncheon guests

were strolling about the grounds they accidentally encountered the young centaur. The guests had a daughter—the first human female he had seen apart from his mother—and he was immediately smitten with her and she with him. An engagement was arranged on the spot and to celebrate the girl hoisted her skirts, climbed on the back of the centaur, and went for a trot around the estate. Both, needless to say, found the experience rather erotic. He seized the occasion to venture for the first time beyond the walls of the estate. Once beyond the grounds he had his first encounter with the realities of life when a passing policeman gave him a summons for indecent exposure. It was then that he spied a young mare in the pasture across the way. She was the first of her kind that he had ever seen and something deep was stirred in the other half of his nature. He threw his betrothed into the ditch and galloped off with the mare. Neither has been seen since.

Delightful as they are, it is not these stories that I want to talk about, but three others that treat, in a fast and loose manner, of the subject of time. These three are *La carte*, *Le décret*, and *Rechute*.[5] *La carte* is set in Paris during the German occupation. Shortages of nearly everything make life increasingly difficult and it is decided that in the interest of efficiency time, like all else, should be rationed. Ration cards are issued. Strong and productive workers and those in necessary occupations are, naturally, given more days to exist per month than old people and those in less vital capacities. Prostitutes are allotted only seven days per month and Jews, regardless of age, sex, or occupation, are permitted to exist only a half day each month.

There are, of course, inconveniences in the new order brought about by the decree. An old man married to a young wife is in bed when his time period runs out. He returns to existence in the same place as before only to find himself between his wife and her more virile lover. In no time at all a black market in time cards has sprung up. Poor workers sell their cards to feed their families; the wealthy are buying them up and living more than their share. Some are able to amass enough tickets to live forty, fifty, even sixty days a month. Fortunately, however, another administrative decision soon cancels the programme.

The story entitled *Le décret* also begins in wartime Paris. It has long been a custom each summer to set the clock ahead an hour or two to take advantage of the extra daylight but now the authorities decide on a far bolder step. The war has become a terrible burden for all sides and so the warring powers agree—and it is a universal agreement—to set the clock ahead seventeen years in hopes that the war will have been over by that time. Once the decree takes effect it is found that the war is indeed over and fortunately another has not broken out.

The narrator must take a trip to a small rural town to visit an old friend who is ill. When he arrives in the town he is surprised to encounter German soldiers and upon enquiring for his friend is startled to learn that he is still a prisoner of

war in East Prussia. He wonders whether the decree has somehow never been announced in this remote corner of the country but then the truth begins to sink in and he realizes that he really is back in 1942. He returns to Paris to find it in the throes of the German occupation; he returns to an apartment house that hasn't been built yet and he must find his old place; and he returns to children that are still small and two of whom haven't been born yet. He sees people in the streets whose acquaintance he won't make for years. He remembers all the things that are going to happen. Little by little, however, these memories of the future begin to grow dim and before long all is as it was.

Rechute, unlike the other two, is not a story of the occupation. The Chamber of Deputies has just passed the 'twenty-four' law making the year twenty-four months long. As soon as the law took effect everyone found himself exactly half of his previous age. Grandmother who was in her late sixties is now ready to go out on the town. The girl who is the principal character in the tale was eighteen and just engaged to be married; she wakes up to find herself nine years old and her fiancé thirteen. The army is suddenly composed of ten and eleven year olds whose adult uniforms swallow them and who can scarcely carry their automatic weapons. All, however, retain the experiences and habits of mind of their former ages.

The girl's fiancé now scorns the child of nine for, as he says, between nine and thirteen there is an abyss and he reminds her that they are divided by certain physiological realities. Later on, with the aid of her brother, she forces him to reveal those physiological realities which turn out, alas for him, to be in proportion to his scrawny thirteen year old frame. As we should expect, the class of newly created children is restive, there is disorder in the streets, the army of children—let's not say 'infantry'—cannot be relied upon, and eventually the twenty-four law is repealed and all is returned to where it was before.

Unlike the other stories, these three exploit a kind of conceptual nonsense and do not simply trade in fantasy and whimsy. It is the kind of nonsense that results from misusing the word 'time' and its friends and relations by assimilating its grammar to that of some other concept. Thus time is spoken of in the way that we speak of commodities that can be bought and sold, rationed and hoarded, and so on. Or the notion of moving the clock up for summer time is assimilated to rescheduling an event or changing its venue. Or time is treated as if its dimensions were subject to legislation as the dimensions of the football pitch can be changed by action of the rules committee. What Aymé has given us in each of these tales is a *picture* of time, i.e., the word 'time' is incorporated into a series of descriptions that are appropriate only for another notion.

What is perhaps the most familiar picture of time that we often make use of is that of a river upon which our life and the world is carried from past to future. As a poetic conceit this is certainly harmless and sometimes may even be apt. Gripped by this picture, nevertheless, we may be led to push the figure into doing duty for which it was not intended and begin to ask questions about

it that we would ask about real rivers: how fast does time flow and might its rate change? Is there some high ground or vantage point from which we might see what is around the next bend in the future? Might we not turn the barque of our lives around and paddle back upstream? While these are exactly the questions we want to ask about rivers, they have no application to time; no sense has been given to them. An innocent trope can lead us to ask 'What then is time?' and we find ourselves in nonsensical metaphysical speculation.

It is this very idea of a picture that is the basis of Wittgenstein's criticism of traditional philosophy in the *Philosophical Investigations*. Philosophical problems are said to arise when language *goes on holiday* [§38] and thus is not doing its usual job, that is, when the use of certain expressions is mistakenly assimilated to that of others so that these expressions turn out to have no use, no role to play in either language or life. Thus are born those misleading analogies that are the stuff of philosophical theories, those pictures that hold us captive [§109] and prevent us from seeing the world aright. In the stories I have just mentioned Marcel Aymé is exploiting—deliberately—exactly the kind of nonsense that Wittgenstein believes is the very stuff of philosophical theory.

The illusion of sense surrounds many of these events. We may think we can imagine a sudden transformation in which everyone has a body just like the one he had at half his age, or people vanishing for so many days each month and then reappearing. It is tempting to comprehend all this under the traditional category of fantasy and to think it is one with what the wicked witch does in changing the prince into a frog. We hide all the difficulties by whispering 'Magic!' and think no more about it.

Whatever the intelligibility of any of that, the nonsense at work in the stories that I want to consider enters with the description of the goings on as alterations in *time* brought about by legislative enactment. It is as if these descriptions are offered as explanations of the strange events: 'Why is Josette in *Rechute* suddenly a little girl again?' we ask and are told that it is because they passed that law doubling the length of the year. It is important to focus our question on the right target. It is one thing to note that a piece of legislation cannot bring about a physical change, no act of Congress by itself can increase the length of the Mississippi River; that is an empirical truth. In addition to the legislative enactment it would require digging new channels and raising new levees. We can describe clearly what it is that the act of Congress cannot by itself bring about. Can a law nevertheless change the year? Our inclination is to say no. We can always divide the year into twenty four rather than twelve months or decide to count two revolutions of the earth about the sun as one year instead of two, but that changes only how we count birthdays—recall the unfortunate chap in *The Pirates of Penzance* who was born on February 29 of a leap year—but that is not at issue and in any event temporal processes continue the same. (What would it be like if they didn't?) Since no other sense has been

given to the expression 'changing the year' we cannot say what it is that the piece of legislation is supposed not to be able to do.

That these stories of Aymé's are built around a piece of nonsense has not been recognized by his commentators. Jean-Louis Dumont, for example, says that 'Aymé has found in the concept of time the possibility of a notion contrary to the one men have of it'[6] and again, 'his intentions are neither to horrify nor terrify his reader; he simply wants to make him laugh by upsetting the natural order of things'.[7] This is surely wrong. He has not presented us with another possibility at all nor has he upset the natural order which he would have to do by suggesting some alternative order. If he is talking nonsense, then he has removed all place for a new possibility or revised order of things. What we laugh at is the nonsense wrapped up in a picture that radiates the illusion of sense. Each of these stories is an extended conceptual joke.

Equally off the mark is Graham Lord's comment that *La carte* is in part 'a pseudo-philosophical glance at the relativity of time'.[8] The relativity of time belongs to the esoteric reaches of physical theory and has nothing to do with Aymé's playing fast and loose with our ordinary ways of talking. To be sure, *Le décret* mentions several theories of time, including relativity, but that itself is all part of the joke.

Although it is not specifically about Marcel Aymé, the following remark of Marcel Schneider's is revealing:

> It is science itself which restores fantasy to the universe rationalized by the encyclopedists and from which the scientism of the 19th century had pretended to extort its secrets, not only in inventing prodigious machines and means of destruction which disorient thought, but also in rendering precarious, vacillating, and illusory all the certainties on which scientists had built their edifice and which serve as religious dogmas for modern man.[9]

Schneider is obviously referring to the replacement of Newtonian concepts of absolute space and time by Einstein's relativized ones, to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and quantum theory with its particles that aren't anywhere or are two places at once, to Gödel's theorem, and the like. In other words, twentieth-century science is supposed to have done a great many of the very things that the fiction of fantasy has done. It is in this spirit that Graham Lord mentions, apropos of Aymé, 'this questioning of what is often regarded as stable and absolute'. Jean Cathelin, for another, sees him as writing a kind of science fiction, only doing it better than the likes of Arthur C. Clark and Isaac Asimov.[10]

In the next paragraph after these reflections on modern science Schneider suggests that the French may have something to learn from Lewis Carroll whom they had hitherto dismissed as merely a children's writer. The juxtaposition of these topics implies that Lewis Carroll may be one of those who have put the conceptual certitudes of our world in doubt. This has to be a

misreading of the adventures of Alice. We recognize Carroll's nonsense as nonsense precisely because we see it against a background of sense. Carroll's point in playing with nonsense is not to put anything in doubt or to entertain any new conceptual possibilities, but is to remind us where sense is to be found.[11] And so it is, I think, with Marcel Aymé. His play with the nonsense about time is intended to remind us of what the conceptual restraints on our lives really are.

Everyone is agreed that something more, quite a bit more, is going on in these stories in addition to the time fantasy. By and large the critics are right about the nature of this something more—at any rate, it is not necessary to dispute any of the details of it with them. Of *La carte* Cathelin says:

> the satire here is at once social, philosophical and political; the fantasy here serves only to highlight more intensely character traits in a time of penury, of an inhuman and ferocious bureaucratism which believes that in order to find a solution to no matter what problem it is enough to regulate something.[12]

It is worth pausing to add that one of the explicit themes of *La carte* is the resentment of the narrator, a writer, at being included in the decree along with these other 'useless' ones. Writers are characterized as among the 'consumers whose maintenance is not compensated for by any real return'. The narrator admits that he would have expected the decree to apply to painters and musicians. Aymé's playful but not quite unobtrusive proposition is that writing (and reading) are in danger of being understood as uncompensated, or improperly compensated, consumptions of time. We might reasonably take this story as making an issue, however playfully, about the importance of writing and about whether, in particular, it is worth the time that it takes.[13]

It is much the same with *Le décret*. The nonsense about remembering the future directs attention to something important about life and human relations. Think how our relation to another is altered when we know what is going to happen to him; that the company has, for example, already decided to fire him and you are bound not to tell him. The narrator's reflection that 'youth which has nothing to learn is not youth' is a reminder that our concept of youth is not simply a chronological one, a matter of from these years to those, but is in addition the concept of a moral, that is, a human condition, a stage on life's way, if you would. This very same reminder is what makes *Rechute* such a wonderful commentary on the nature of childhood and the logical conditions that make the relation of parent to child what it is. The authority of the parent over the child is not merely a matter of discrepancies in size and physical competence, but is in part a function of the moral incompleteness of the child who must be guided and led and pushed and prodded not only into the paths of righteousness, but also into satisfying the daily necessities of life. This is brought home to us by representing the moral competence of the adult clothed in the body of a child. The unfortunate composite being is

forced to submit to the direction and correction appropriate to a child and the result can only appear as degradation to the adult in child's clothing.

Aymé's stories must not be understood as offering speculative theses about the nature of time, theses which careful examination show to be nonsense. The stories do not advance theories that could demand examination independently on their own merits. Aymé is using nonsense deliberately to say something about the human condition. What is going on in his stories must be distinguished from the inadvertent introduction of nonsense into literature where the aim is to present a piece of philosophy. Sartre's *La Nausée* is a case in point. There is little doubt that Sartre meant *La Nausée* to present metaphysical theses about the nature of the world, that everything in the world is contingent and therefore human practices have no justification, and so on. As philosophy this is elementary confusion and scarcely worth the effort of straightening out. In using his novel to state philosophical theses Sartre falls victim to all the snares and delusions of that kind of philosophy. Fortunately for his readers it is possible to take the novel as offering something other than metaphysics. When we read it carefully in order to follow the fortunes of its hero we sense that Roquentin's worries about necessity and contingency, being and becoming, may be better understood as the manifestation of his dissatisfaction with the lack of direction in his own life and his repugnance at the bourgeois culture of Bouville. What is presented as philosophy becomes instead the vehicle for the expression of what in the most general terms can be described as a mood or frame of mind and is thus not really philosophy at all.

What I have been saying about philosophical theses in literature is in direct opposition to a view of the relation between the two held by Peter Jones. In *Philosophy and the Novel* Jones says, 'I do not examine the literary embodiment of the philosophical views I abstract from the text, . . . I do not consider the particular contexts within the novel which occasion the philosophical utterances . . .'.[14] When we look closely at the context in which those supposedly philosophical remarks occur we do not find them conveying philosophical theses at all, but instead expressing or describing some observation about the course of the world or human relations. It is only when they are taken out of context that they can appear to be *theses*.

It will be instructive to end with a comparison of Aymé's way with nonsense and the way of a philosopher who had learned much from Wittgenstein about how to expose nonsense by telling stories. I am referring to O. K. Bouwsma who raised to an art form the technique of teasing and tickling us with nonsense by telling stories intended to produce philosophical insight, a technique that others practice at their peril. Aymé never explains to us that his nonsense is nonsense. He lays out a situation with a perfectly straight face and proceeds to talk about things just as if they did make sense and were the most ordinary in the world. It must dawn on us that it is all nonsense. To get the point we must already have a nose for it, a quickened sense of the queer, as it

were. Aymé, after all, is teaching us about people and not about nonsense. He is teaching us about people through the medium of the nonsense of conceptual jokes.

Aymé's literary practice is thus rather different from Bouwsma's philosophical practice, the fact notwithstanding that Bouwsma's practice is also very much a literary one. We can see this in his article 'Descartes' Evil Genius'[15] where the Evil Genius undertakes to deceive the innocent and unsuspecting Tom. His first evil essay in that direction is to make everything out of paper. For a time Tom is deceived into thinking that the flowers, his beloved Millie, and even his own body are real, but before long he is undeceived by suspicious crinklings and tearings. Bouwsma makes it explicit that this story trades on our ordinary understanding and familiar use of words such as 'deception', 'illusion', 'real', and the like; in this part of the story we find whimsy, but not nonsense.

Having failed in his first attempt the Evil Genius tries again and this time succeeds, but only too well. All conceivable tests for flowers and Millie turn out positive. The Evil Genius suggests to Tom that nevertheless he is being fooled about all those things, but Tom naturally fails to understand his evil insinuations. The criterion of reality and, consequently, of deception being invoked by the Evil Genius now proves to reside in a sense possessed only by Tom's Adversary. In other words, he does not mean what we mean when we speak of real things and deceptions and their ilk and, furthermore, by the terms of the story we can never know what he means. Now the nonsense has entered and Bouwsma can point out to us how Descartes' talk of the possibility of total illusion is the result of the misuse of language—our language—and that it is really without sense. Bouwsma has used these stories to instruct us in the nature of nonsense, how it can get started and the mischief it can work.

Bouwsma, following Wittgenstein, sees the task of the philosopher as one of turning disguised nonsense into patent nonsense [PI, §464]. The point of this exercise is not merely to remove impediments to theorizing or to permit the beauty of clarity to shine through, but is to remove impediments to seeing the world aright, to seeing other people and ourselves aright and this kind of understanding has much to do with how we are to live our lives. And, I would add, with how we are to allow literature to enter our lives.

In his stories Marcel Aymé exploits patent nonsense, but it is nonsense that passes for neither philosophical theory nor philosophical therapy. Anyone who has developed a philosopher's nose for the use and misuse of language is in a position to distinguish what Aymé is doing in these tales from fantasy and the marvellous and to note its conceptual nature as well as its kinship with the confusions of traditional philosophical theory. And especially are we now in a position to appreciate how this species of nonsense can be a vehicle for conveying important insights about human beings and their lives and problems.

There may not be enough literary examples of the kind of conceptual non-

sense I have been talking about to justify identifying it as a distinct genre, nevertheless there is a significant role for it to play in literature. If this recognition of this role has no other result, it should at least lead us to rethink the spectrum of possible relations between literature and philosophy.

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[1] I was born about ten thousand years ago,
And there's nothing in this world that I don't know
I saw Peter, Paul, and Moses
Playing ring around the roses;
I can whip the guy who says it isn't so. (And so on.)

[2] Marcel Schneider, *La littérature fantastique en France* (Paris: Libraries Arthème Fayard, 1964). Schneider's book is a useful survey of the marvellous in French literature.

[3] In *Le passe muraille* (Paris: Gallimard, 1943).

[4] In *En arrière* (Paris: Gallimard, 1950).

[5] *La carte* and *Le décret* are both published in *Le passe muraille*; *Rechute* is in *En arrière*.

[6] Jean-Louis Dumont, *Marcel Aymé et le merveilleux* (Paris: Debresse, 1967), p. 122. (All translations from the French are mine.)

[7] Dumont, p. 177.

[8] Graham Lord, *The Short Stories of Marcel Aymé* (Nedlands: University of Western Australia Press, 1980), p. 48.

[9] Schneider, p. 391.

[10] Jean Cathelin, *Marcel Aymé* (Paris: Debresse, 1958), p. 145.

[11] Or perhaps he should be understood sometimes as pointing out the mischief that can be occasioned by inattention to sense and conceptual restraint. The White Queen, for example, favours a system of justice in which the punishment, i.e., imprisonment, comes first, followed by the trial, with the crime coming last. And it is all the better if the crime is not committed at all. This, of course, is to make nonsense of the notion of punishment, not to mention the notion of justice, since the concept of punishment is logically linked to that of wrong doing. We can, nevertheless, imagine imprisonment for crimes not committed—actual examples unfortunately abound. This bears a suspicious resemblance to the idea of 'preventive detention' advocated by some upholders of the law in the name of justice.

[12] Cathelin, p. 146.

[13] I owe this understanding of the story to Timothy Gould.

[14] *Philosophy and the Novel* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 148.

[15] In *Philosophical Essays* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965).

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THE BOUNDARIES OF ART

Robert Stecker

IN LATE twentieth-century aesthetics, despite powerful trends against essentialism, the search for a definition of art is alive and well. Furthermore, the types of definition that are considered live options are coming into clearer perspective.

On the one hand, there are recurrent attempts to defend functional theories, theories that define art in terms of a function or functions it performs. The most common and traditional of such theories define art in terms of providing aesthetic experience.[1] The main alternative to a functional theory is a relational theory of art. The best-known example of a relational theory is the institutional definition of art. However, as the defects of the institutional definition are becoming increasingly apparent, another, more historically orientated definition is gaining adherents.[2]

In this paper, I shall focus on the adequacy of historically orientated, relational theories. While I believe that such theories are an improvement over the institutional theory, I shall argue that they share some of its problems. In a more positive vein, I shall argue that it is possible to give a functional definition of art that shares all of the advantages of the historical approach and avoids each of its problems.

I. HISTORICAL THEORIES OF ART

Jerrold Levinson offers the following definition: 'An artwork is a thing . . . that has been seriously intended for regard-as-a-work-of-art, i.e., regard in any *way pre-existing art works are or were correctly regarded*'.[3]

Similarly, Noël Carroll claims that in order correctly to identify a new work as art, one must employ an artwork-licensed strategy which links the new work to ones already acknowledged to be art. Unlike Levinson, Carroll does not claim that the new work must share the intention to be regarded in any of the ways older works have been correctly regarded. The new work can be a repudiation of those older ways of regard, but it is still linked to those works just in virtue of being an intentional, self-conscious repudiation of them.[4]

For both Levinson and Carroll, we identify a new work as art in virtue of discovering a salient relation in which it stands to things already acknowledged as art. Objects are works of art in virtue of being so related to past art.

One purported advantage of this approach, emphasized by its proponents, is that, like the institutional definition, it does not unduly restrict developments

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in the arts by defining art in terms of specific functions or specific perceptual qualities.

However, the historical approach avoids some of the pitfalls of the institutional definition. On any of Dickie's institutional definitions, it is not clear what more is needed for something to be art than that it be an artefact and that it be dubbed 'art' by a recognized art maker. Since such a dubbing could be completely arbitrary, this leaves open the possibility that something can be art without there being any good reason for thinking of it as art. It precludes the possibility, which seems to many people genuine enough, that such an art maker can be carrying out a hoax or simply to have failed in his or her attempt to create a work of art. Finally, the institutional definition precludes the possibility that a permanent outsider to the artworld can create an art work. None of these objections applies to the historical approach. Nevertheless, the historical approach is not without its problems. It is to these that I now turn.

II. PROBLEMS WITH THE HISTORICAL APPROACH

In proposing a strict definition of art, Levinson, if not Carroll, is thereby proposing necessary and sufficient conditions for arthood. The first problem (one about which Levinson is well aware)[5] concerns the necessity of these conditions. The problem is similar to a problem that the late Monroe Beardsley raised for the institutional definition: the problem of the romantic artist.[6] Beardsley found it perfectly coherent to conceive of an artist working outside any artworld, working, perhaps, before the existence of any artworld, producing objects of sufficient aesthetic value to be properly considered art. Levinson can account for *some* cases like this. He can account for cases in which someone works outside the artworld in Dickie's sense but has intentions to create an object possessing an ensemble of qualities regard for which art works in the past have been intended. The case Levinson cannot account for is the case in which the object in fact possesses these qualities, and does so as a result of the making of the object, but in which they were not put there *intentionally*. It seems to me pretty clear that we are willing to call objects of this sort 'art' and even that whole sections of art museums are devoted to such objects. For example, I suppose that we are pretty ignorant whether some works of primitive art are made with any of the appropriate intentions. (We needn't think of all such art as coming to us from the distant past. Such an object may have been made by our contemporary in a remote part of Papua New Guinea). Ignorant or indifferent to the intention with which it is made, we are willing to call it 'art' on the basis of knowing that it was fashioned with skill and care (which is not itself sufficient for arthood) and that it possesses certain striking surface qualities. (Notice that saying this in no way implies that the possession of any such qualities is necessary for arthood.)

It seems to me very important that we don't define art with intentional *necessary* conditions. We may never know the intention with which a work

such as the *Iliad* was created or even if it was created with a coherent ensemble of intentions. On Levinson's definition, we will then not know whether it is a work of art. However, the *Iliad* is and always was a work of art (of great literature) whatever the intention with which it was created.

It is also not the case that Levinson's definition gives a satisfactory sufficient condition for being a work of art. It does not seem that hard to think of cases which fit the definition but are plausibly not works of art. Think of a piece of verse produced by someone completely incompetent in this domain with no redeeming qualities whatsoever. It seems to me that it may be wrong to say that this is a very bad poem. It may be more accurate to say that this is a failed attempt to create a poem or a work of art.

Or consider an individual living in 1989 in the USA but ignorant of developments in music since the classical period composing in the style of Mozart and doing so with competence but no more than that. Again, it is not clear that the appropriate thing to say is that this is bad music or a bad work of art. It is not a work of art. Sometimes complete ignorance of the evolution of an art may guarantee that the attempt to create a work of art fails just as complete incompetence may guarantee this. Yet both the verse and the musical piece may satisfy Levinson's definition.

Let me finally mention a problem with using Levinson's definition. Levinson defines the art of the present relative to the art of the past. No doubt there are many uncontroversial instances of past art. However, there are many unclear, controversial cases of objects that may or may not be art works. These come in a number of different categories. First, within the standard art forms (the novel, poetry, drama, painting, etc.) there will be items of little value (pot boilers, landscapes for tourists) which some will regard as non-art, but which others would regard as bad art. Second, there are various forms which resemble art forms in various ways but which are not part of the fine arts. Many of these are classified as popular entertainment (comic strips, puppet shows, television programmes). At least some objects in these forms can profitably be treated as art works. It's going to be hard to decide which, if any of them, are art. Third, there are going to be various avant-garde efforts from the past whose character as art or non-art may remain unclear. Fourth, there are many kinds of functional objects such as furniture, carpets, jewellery, perhaps even culinary fare which can be created with great imagination, beauty, even expressiveness. Most items in this category (most tables and chairs, most carpets) are pretty clearly not works of art. Our museums testify that some items in these categories are *considered* works of art. Which, if any, are works of art; which aren't?

My present point with regard to Levinson's definition is twofold. First, we might hope from a definition of art for clarification of some of these obscurities. Levinson's can do this only if the questionable works are produced, and known to be produced, with intentions which hook them up in the right way

to uncontroversial works. This knowledge may be quite unavailable. Second, given the surprisingly wide areas of obscurity about what constitutes the art of the past, it's not clear how useful it is to define the art of the present relative to the art of the past.

Not all the problems I have raised for Levinson apply to Carroll just because he does not offer a definition of, or necessary or sufficient conditions for, arthood . However, Carroll faces the problem of resolving the obscurities just mentioned. He also faces the problem that his account, as it currently stands, is overly vague. All that Carroll has given us so far is an open-ended list of strategies for linking the art of the present to the art of the past, and the claim that decisions about which practices are art practices will be given in a historical narrative rather than a set of necessary and sufficient conditions.[7] In the absence of necessary or sufficient conditions, Carroll at least owes us an account of how to evaluate competing narratives especially those which agree on most facts other than the facts about which practices are art practices. It is not clear that the usual standards for evaluating historical narratives (if such exist) will be helpful in this sort of case.

For our purposes, two additional features of Carroll's view are worth noting. First, Carroll thinks of art as a collection of cultural practices. Identifying a particular object as an art work involves positioning it in the developing history of these practices. However, I have suggested that some art works are produced within (largely) non-art practices. Second, though Carroll advertises his view as a historical one, it actually has a functional element as well. Thus Carroll claims that works at the beginnings of art-practice traditions will be characterized as art on functional grounds. Also, art works that are well outside the boundaries of our traditions will be identified as art in virtue of considerations of function. Carroll *might* say that, even in our culture, art works arising in largely non-art practices are identified as art by consideration of (artistic) function.

This impurity in Carroll's historical account, far from being a defect, is rather a saving grace. Except, as I shall now argue, it does not go far enough.

III. DEFINING ART FUNCTIONALLY

An objection to defining art simply in functional terms is that it is too restrictive. This objection derives *in part* from the fact that often functional definitions of art pick out one function—the aesthetic function—and there are too many counter-examples to art functionally defined in *this* way. But there is more to the objection than this. In different eras, art really is conceived differently—in terms of different functions. Hence, it is plausible that even functional definitions mentioning any number of functions may not apply to all the art of the past much less the art of the future.

However, it is possible to define art functionally in a way that avoids this

problem. I will not actually give such a definition but suggest the form it might take.

To see how we might arrive at such a definition, I will first set out facts about our art identifying practices suggested by the criticisms given above of the historical approach.

One fact is that there is a 'multi-track' system for identifying art. On the one hand, there are certain central art forms in which the majority, and probably the most important instances, of art works belong. At any given time, there is a finite list of such forms (which is not to say it is always crystal clear whether a form belongs on the list). This does not preclude the creation of new art forms which become central. In the past four hundred years, many new art forms have been added to the list, e.g., opera, pure instrumental music, ballet, modern dance, the novel, the short story, photography, cinema. Perhaps other forms are no longer on the list. For example, the essay, an important form of literature in the eighteenth century, is perhaps now no longer so automatically considered literature or a literary work of art. The fact that this list of central art forms changes means not only that there are options available to artists now that were not available in the past, but that there were options earlier that are not available now (a point Levinson misses).

However, we also find works of art in various artefacts of a kind typically created with more utilitarian (or intellectual) functions than are possessed by the standard art forms. This is not only true of items mentioned already such as pieces of furniture but also, for example, of certain kinds of writing. Works of philosophy, history, biography, etc., can also be works of literature.

There are rather different criteria for classifying an object as art depending on which of these classes it belongs to. For works outside the central art forms nothing less than excellence in fulfilling some of the recognized artistic functions will do. No piece of furniture will be considered a work of art unless it is very beautiful, or expressive, etc.

For works in the central art forms, such excellence is not required (though it certainly is sufficient for arthood). Levinson comes close to the truth when he claims that all that is typically needed is a certain sort of intention. However, this has to be qualified in two ways. First, some intentions, available in the past, cease to be available. Second, the claim that an object is a work of art can be defeated even though it belongs to a central art form and was made with an appropriate intention. At least one instance of defeat occurs when a perceived lack of competence in the 'artist' does not permit us to take the intention seriously. I would suggest that the common practice of dividing a poet's writing into juvenilia (not to be taken quite seriously as poetry) and mature work is a reflection of this point.

Concerning works from the past, there is a further complication. They can be classified as art according to standards of their own time or of ours (or according to standards of intervening times though this is a less compelling

option which I will ignore). I would suggest that we tend to permit the label 'art' if the object satisfies either set of standards. The reason for this is that, even if something is not of artistic interest by current standards, the fact that it has been valued as art in the past suggests that it may become valuable again in the future (since it is common practice, as Carroll notes, for artists to hark back to more remote art practices in repudiating the practices of the more recent past). In labelling them as 'art' now we keep them available for future use even if no one is currently interested in them.

In the light of these considerations, let me suggest a functional approach to the definition of art which avoids the problem mentioned at the beginning of this section. Objects will be classified as art according to whether they fulfil certain functions. There will be two appropriate classes of functions: those in use when the work was created, those in use when the question of classification arises (or re-arises). A work will be classified as art if it fulfils either class of functions. Objects falling within central art forms will be art if they meet either intentional or success orientated criteria. Objects outside the central art forms will be art only if they meet the appropriate criteria of success. Like a historical approach, this sort of functional approach does not restrict art works to fulfilling a *fixed* set of functions.

The general form of a definition of art on this sort of approach would look something like this. Let F be the set of central art forms at t, S the set of central art forms when a work w was created, G the set of functions standard or correctly recognized for items belonging to F, H the set of functions standard or correctly recognized for items belonging to S, then:

> w is a work of art at t if and only if (a) w belongs to form F, and the maker of w intended it to fulfil a function in G, and he has sufficient competence in form F for that intention to be taken seriously; or (b) w belongs to form S, and the maker of w intended to fulfil a function in H, and he has sufficient competence in form S for that intention to be taken seriously; or (c) w achieves excellence in fulfilling a function in G.

If anyone is sceptical about listing all the appropriate functions that art is regarded as having, relative to a given time, let me point out that the suggestions made here are no worse off than those of Levinson. An important idea employed in his definition is that of a correct way of regard. Presumably, at any given time there are a finite number of these, and, hence, a list of these ought to be possible in principle. These ways of regard are my functions.

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[1] Some recent aesthetic definitions of art include: Monroe Beardsley, 'An Aesthetic Definition of Art', in *What is Art*, H. Curtler, ed., (New York, 1983); William Tollhurst, 'Toward an Aesthetic Account of the Nature of Art', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 42 (1984), 261–9; Richard Eldridge, 'Form and Content: An Aesthetic Theory of Art', *British Journal of Aesthetics* 25 (1985), 303–16. For a more general account of the role of function in defining art see Donald Walhout, 'The Nature and Function of Art', *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 26 (1986), 16–25.

[2] See Jerrold Levinson, 'Defining Art Historically', *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 19 (1979), 232–50; Levinson, 'Refining Art Historically', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 47 (1989), 21–33; Noël Carroll, 'Art, Practice, and Narrative', *Monist*, 71 (1988), 140–56.

[3] Levinson (1989), 21.

[4] That Carroll really differs from Levinson on this point is not clear for at least two reasons. First, Carrol says that typically, when an artist repudiates an art practice tradition, he or she usually identifies his or her art with the intentions of an alternative tradition. Carroll does not say, however, that this always occurs. Second, Levinson seems willing to accept a revision of his definition which would take into account the 'repudiation relation'. See Levinson (1979), 242.

[5] Although Levinson raises this problem in his 1989 article, I cannot see how his subsequent discussion resolves it. See pp. 29–30.

[6] Monroe C. Beardsley, 'Is Art Essentially Institutional', in *Culture and Art*, Lars Aagaard-Mogensen, ed. (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey, 1976), 194–209.

[7] Carroll also says, however, that his view is compatible with Levinson's, which suggests that it is possible, on Carroll's view to give necessary and sufficient conditions of arthood after all.

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YOUNG'S CRITIQUE OF AUTHENTICITY IN MUSICAL PERFORMANCE

Paul Thom

JAMES O. Young,[1] while acknowledging the 'enormous value' of the early music movement, claims that 'authentic performance cannot be characterized in such a way that it represents an ideal which is both attainable and worth attaining'.[2] His argument is that, on each of the proposed characterizations which he considers, authenticity turns out to be not both attainable and worthy of attainment. This argument clearly requires that the list of proposed definitions be exhaustive—a requirement which, I shall argue, is not in fact met. Young's position can be refuted, because a characterization of authenticity can be found, of which he takes no account, and which does satisfy his dual constraint.

Authenticity in performance can be defined as follows. Works for performance are essentially sets of instructions for performance. Some of these instructions are explictly given in the work's score or script. Others are implicit (e.g., instructions to follow the shared performance practices of the cultures in which the work is located). An authentic performance of a work is one which complies with these explicit and implicit instructions. Authenticity in this sense is included in one of the senses recognized by the *OED*, viz., the authentic as what 'really proceeds from its reputed source'.[3] Performances of a work which comply with the work's instructions do really proceed from their purported source, to the extent that that source is the work being performed.

Young takes no account of this kind of definition. All of his definitions treat authenticity solely as a feature of the *sounds*, or of the *air-vibrations*, produced in a performance. A performance's authenticity is for him a matter of its sounding like some (actual or intended or ideal) performance, which then functions as a reference-point for judgements of authenticity. The present approach differs from Young's in taking the *work* rather than any kind of performance as the reference-point against which authenticity is to be judged.

One problem with Young's approach is that authenticity ought to be a feature of performances themselves, not just of the way they sound. Now, a performance might sound authentic without being so. For example, if a Scarlatti sonata requires left-hand trills, or hand-crossings, and a player does the trills with the right hand, or redistributes the notes to avoid hand-crossings, then that player's performance might very well sound like an authentic performance; but it would not be one.

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The proposed definition has two advantages over the ones that Young considers. The first advantage is that, whereas Young's approach is essentially restricted to the authenticity of *musical* performances, the present definition allows for the possibility of authentic performance in any of the performing arts. This is desirable because performances in any of the performing arts may be authentic or inauthentic.

The second advantage is that the proposed definition agrees better than Young's do with the ways in which those involved in the early music movement speak about what they are doing. Roger Norrington, for example, writes about his direction of a performance of Berlioz' *Fantastic Symphony* on period instruments: 'First of all, we try to play the score (of course with all its repeats)'.[4] Norrington obviously takes 'the score' to include the composer's repeat signs, as well as tempo indications ('That "tempo" Berlioz prescribes for every movement'), dynamic markings ('notice at the end of the *Scène aux champs*, the cor anglais gets louder and louder') and precise specifications of instruments ('the Erard [harps] of the 1830s . . . the old narrow-bore trombones alongside the brand new ophicleides')[5]—though presumably the details here would be specified only implicitly. In other words, he takes repeat signs, tempo indications, dynamic markings and precise specifications of instruments to be included among the work's directives.[6] So, his own description of the authenticity he aims at is in terms of the doings that make up a performance, not just in terms of the sounds or air-vibrations produced. And those doings are seen by Norrington as strictly complying with the work's directives (some of them implicit directives).

The proposed definition satisfies Young's dual constraint. Let us consider the question of attainability first. It may be true that we cannot hear music exactly as people heard it in the past. It may also be true that we cannot re-enact past actions, preserving the significance which they had for their original participants or for their original witnesses. But, so long as textual scholarship permits us to identify them, we are still able to carry out the directives that scores from the past contain. A performance can be determined to be authentic to the extent that musicologists (or theatre historians) can recover information about the performance-practice relevant to it. So, authentic performance may be attainable.

Moreover, this goal may be, aesthetically, worthy of attainment. It may be aesthetically valuable to discover the background assumptions concerning the reading of the score or script which were made by people working in the original context of a work, because in doing so one may make an aesthetic discovery: one may learn new ways of seeing the work as part of a larger whole. By learning them, one may learn to treat performance-works from the past positively, as what they are, not negatively as deviations from something that they are not. Roger Norrington's comment is typical of those who pursue authentic performance: 'We find that the more accurately we reflect such

gradations, the better the music sounds'.[7] And the attainability of authenticity in no way militates against the value of attaining it.

There is, then, a concept of authentic performance such that authentic performance may be attainable and worth attaining. But this concept of authenticity does not imply, what Young thinks all such concepts do, namely that 'there is an ideal performance of every composition'.[8] Even though talk of authenticity implies talk of an ideal state in which all of the work's explicit and implicit directives are carried out, absolute authenticity in this sense is not sufficient to determine an artistically ideal performance of the work. Perfectly authentic performances may vary considerably in their aesthetic qualities, because of the performers' interpretation of the work. Perfectly authentic performances follow all the work's prescriptions. Performers' interpretation concerns matters concerning which the work contains no prescription. So, two perfectly authentic performances can differ on questions of interpretation; and one such interpretation may differ aesthetically from another.

The reason, Young conjectures, for the failure of all the definitions that he considers is that they all presuppose that there is an ideal interpretation of every composition, whereas in fact we must all play music in our own fashion.[9] Since the concept of authentic performance has this unacceptable presupposition, it is, he says, not a useful concept. It is not needed to explain the success of successful performances in the early music movement. However, the concept of authenticity in performance does remain a useful one. This does not entail that authenticity is mandatory in all performances of works. Performers are not obliged to perform authentically: they may opt to tamper with the works they are supposed to perform. And the decision to tamper may be the right decision aesthetically. Of course, on the present account of authenticity, performers who do a work inauthentically cannot really be said to be performing that work. But the result may be aesthetically preferable to an authentic performance. Nor does the concept of authenticity imply that there is a single ideal performance or best interpretation of any work. The concept is compatible with the need for performers to interpret works in their own fashion. To affirm the value of authentic performance does not imply that performers can, either by studying the history of performance practice or by imitating leading 'authentic' performers, evade the responsibility to interpret for themselves. It would be delusory to think that either historical knowledge or mimicry can be a substitute for artistry; and, once performers accept their responsibility as interpreters, they may well be right not to interpret in an authentic style.

Young's conclusion, that the concept of authentic performance is not a useful one, is not warranted; and his verdict, that what is of value in the early music movement is the giving of successful (rather than the giving of authentic) performances, is only half right. For clearly, while it may be valuable to

perform works authentically, performances are valuable in other ways too.

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[2] Both comments are in Young, op cit., p. 228.

[3] *The Shorter Oxford Dictionary*, 3rd ed., revised with addenda (Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1956), article, 'authentic', sense 6.

[4] 'Performance Note' by Roger Norrington to Berlioz, *Symphonie fantastique* performed by The London Classical Players, conducted by Roger Norrington (EMI: CDC749541 2 (1989).

[5] Ibid.

[6] Whether all these things are in fact included among the work's directives is a matter of judgement. Those who aim for a different kind of performance may very well judge that not everything Norrington takes to be directed by the work is so directed.

[7] Norrington, op. cit.

[8] Young, op. cit., p. 236.

[9] Ibid.

In Memoriam JOHN L. FISHER

21 FEBRUARY – 23 SEPTEMBER 1989

IT IS with great sadness that we report the death last September at the age of 67 of John Fisher, who from 1973 to 1988, when he retired from the editorial chair, edited with great distinction the journal of the American Society for Aesthetics, the *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*. We shall remember him in Britain for his very high standards of editorial skills and the superb quality of the *Journal*. He brought to the study of aesthetics a formidable mind and was deeply knowledgeable of our field. This was evident in many ways, conspicuously so in the brilliant and witty editorials which he seemed to be able to write unfailingly for each number. Few other journal editors would dare to follow and certainly none could equal him in this practice. There was wisdom as well as wit in his editorials, which deserve to be remembered as more than occasional pieces for the light which they shed on some vexed corners of our subject.

This same capacity to illuminate was evident too in John Fisher's last contribution to this journal, his paper on holography. But besides his evident achievements in aesthetics, and this is not the place to give a detailed account of those, which in any case are a matter of public record, in his death many members of the British Society of Aesthetics have suffered a personal loss.

One of the sadder sides of editing a learned journal, and few knew better how to do this than John Fisher, is losing in death the friends one has thereby made. And in our field of late there seem to have been unusually heavy losses. We have had in recent years to record the deaths of many fine scholars in our subject, and now with heavy hearts we mourn the loss of another.

On a happier note I would like to record the great support and friendship which John Fisher, who was one of our Editorial Consultants, gave to this journal and to me and to Harold Osborne before me. It was always a great pleasure to hear that he was coming to Britain, sometimes on a private visit, sometimes to attend a conference such as the 1985 Bristol conference on Philosophy and the Visual Arts: Seeing and Abstracting, or to meet him overseas at an International Congress of Aesthetics. Indeed the last occasion that many of us had in Britain to see him was at the International Congress of Aesthetics when it was held in Nottingham in 1988, just a year or so as it now turns out before his death.

A pleasure though it was to see him, I recall before meeting him for the first time that I looked forward to the occasion—in London in April 1978—with

some trepidation, for then I knew only of his formidable powers of mind as displayed on the printed page. And his first question did not put me at my ease: 'What', he demanded, 'are the current trends in British aesthetics?'. I felt that our operation in Britain was too small to have trends and that a question such as this could only be answered by reflecting on the work I thought that particular people that I knew happened to have currently in hand. I made a clean breast of it and with some dismay said something along these lines but was relieved to see how well he apparently took this answer. At any rate whatever he may really have thought then I soon discovered in him a man of great kindliness and charm, so that subsequent meetings with him, far from being anticipated ordeals, became occasions of much pleasure, fun and amusement.

Shortly before I heard of his death, I thought about John Fisher, for that very same question which he put to me in London so long ago was asked of me again more recently: this time in connection with an international conference on aesthetics held in Italy in May. It was distressing that he could not be there to hear what I made of it the second time round.

John Fisher was born in New York State. He took his first degree at Wheaton College, Illinois, his M A at Northwestern University and his PhD at the University of Pennsylvania. He saw war service in the US navy. Subsequently he taught for over 30 years at Temple University, Philadelphia, where he was Professor of Philosophy, and chairman of the department for 12. He served as editor of the *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* for 14 years, and travelled widely, addressing audiences in England, Sweden, Poland, Germany, and China.

We send our condolences to John Fisher's widow, Ruth, on her loss and to all the members of the family. Ruth Fisher often accompanied her husband on visits overseas when many of us had the great pleasure to meet her, and all her friends in Great Britain extend our deep sympathy to her.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Interpretation of Pictures. By MARK ROSKILL. University of Massachusetts Press. 1989. pp. 124. £7.40; clothbound, £15.00.

WHETHER OR NOT art history is really in a state of 'crisis' it cannot be doubted that there are vociferous groups within the profession itself who most earnestly hope and claim that it is. Certainly there is a debate, and this debate has led to a spate of books of which Roskill's is the best I have seen.

An interpretation is not necessarily verbal—one thinks of Picasso's interpretation of Velazquez's *Las Meninas*—but one very familiar and influential category takes the form of a text. Roskill considers how art-historical texts are arrived at. He begins by distinguishing three typical pre-nineteenth century ways of looking at and explaining pictures: *ekphrasis* ('an evocation in words of what the artist had chosen to bring out in representing his or her subject'); hermeneutics ('the use of hypotheses about the agency of the artist's inner character and beliefs to determine how the body of his or her work is to be understood') and divination ('images as coded communications . . . yielding themselves to the understanding only of those with privileged access to the key'). This brief survey, with well-chosen examples from Dolce, Bellori and van Mander, prefaces a discussion of the plurality of approaches that exists today.

The three linked essays that follow deal, therefore, with the traditions and practices of interpretation as they are exemplified by a variety of twentieth-century authors. Roskill considers Blunt on Poussin, Panofsky on Piero di Cosimo, Klingender on Goya, Barr on Matisse, among others. He has some excellent pages on Freud and the way that dream interpretations can be analogous to the interpretation of pictures. He concludes with a brief survey of what he calls 'revisionist' interpretation and the state of art history today.

The central problem is that, whatever approach is favoured, we are using words to characterize visual images. Roskill wonders why art historians seem so unaware of this fact—but are they? Perhaps there are some sleepwalkers but, as Michael Podro has pointed out, the theoretical literature of art history has, since the seventeenth century at least, been rather emphatic about the priority of language, and the culturally complex nature of that language, in relation to an artist or work. In fact Roskill's question, why art historians have been so reluctant to assimilate modern (i.e., post-1960) developments in literary theory—structuralism, post-structuralism, psychoanalytical theory, newer Marxist analysis, deconstruction—seems odd. All too many would-be art historians have jumped onto these particular bandwagons, with results that are well characterized by Roskill himself when he explains why such theories cannot be taken over wholesale into the very different field of art history: 'The ponderousness of the terminology brought to bear and the degree of abstraction from the materials themselves, *which has permitted the theory to burgeon of its own momentum*, render any such application to the interpretation of the visual impractical' (p. xi, my italics). Words, as every reader of this journal knows, can weave curious spells of their own. How can the art critic (or indeed any critic) be sure that he is not just juggling with empty signs, shuffling and re-shuffling a set of verbal counters handed to him by other, earlier critics? Modern literary theory, enraptured by its own endlessly ingenious terminology, is unlikely to be of much help here.

It is impossible to do justice, in a short review, to Roskill's carefully pondered and closely written book. Not everything he says is new—for instance his stress on the 'positioned' nature of all interpretation, the insistence that all writing is done from a particular standpoint.

But his discussion here, as elsewhere, is sensible, the language he uses is—on the whole—clear and unpretentious, and there are few loose ends. I can recommend this little book to anyone interested in the central theoretical issues of art history.

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The Imitation of Nature. By JOHN HYMAN Basil Blackwell 1989 pp. 121. £25.00.

I ENJOYED reading this book. The author combines an energetic, breezy style of writing with astute philosophical analysis. By the time I had finished the text I felt that I had learnt something and got somewhere. With all the nonsense being spoken about the end of philosophy it is refreshing to come across writing as illuminating as this

The unifying theme of the book is the relation between the theories of vision and pictorial representation. It is divided into five parts, plus an appendix, on the history of the theory of vision, on problems arising from the causal theory of perception with a bit on the causal theory of depiction, problems arising in the current psychology of perception, on renaissance naturalism and on the inception of Greek naturalism. The Appendix contains a collection of quotations which 'illustrate the influence of Plato's distinction between *eikastikē* and *phantastikē*'.

Very sensibly, Hyman has limited his brief and refused to speak of certain subjects. One sympathizes. A line has to be drawn somewhere and he draws that line at considering the conventionalist debate (presumably Goodman *et al*) and offering an alternative to defective theories, quoting Nietzsche: 'it is not necessary to build new idols in order to show that the old ones have feet of clay' (p. xv). More on this anon.

The first chapter takes us into the historical origins of visual theory. Western European thought has been dominated by a notion of sight inherited from the Greeks, transformed by the Arab Alhazen and revised by Kepler and Descartes (the analysis of Descartes' views is particularly good); it is the notion that we gain experience of things by coming into contact with them and while we may touch objects, we see appearances. A tripartite analogy has been drawn between looking at the world and looking at a picture (1), experiencing a dream/hallucination/illusion (2), and looking at a mirror reflection (3). He has useful things to say about all three analogies, though he has the most to say about the role of the retinal image in our thought about sight. Aristotle's successor, Theophrastus, observed, 'The majority hold that vision is the result of an image being in the eye' and his observation still holds true. Scientists have worried, and still worry, about how we see the world in the way that we do when our retinal image of it is inverted and reversed; but what kind of a problem is this? What is the status of the retinal image in perception? Are these problems to be solved by the philosopher or in the laboratory?

The second chapter is called 'The Cartesian theory of Depiction' and Wollheim identified as its 'most influential exponent'. He argues that humans have the special perceptual capacity which 'allows us to have perceptual experiences of things not present to the senses'. So Hyman raises the problem: 'How are we to determine whether Wollheim's phrase, "visions of things not present" is, like its ancestors, a metaphor that masks a confusion, or whether it is a solution to a philosophical problem? The answer is simple enough: Wollheim has provided a philosophical account of depiction only if the causal theory of perception is coherent; otherwise, it is just raw material' (p 22). It is not altogether clear to me that Hyman has at that point succeeded in fathering the causal theory of perception on to Wollheim but by the end of the chapter it seems to work.

Hyman then presents a very illuminating discussion of the Grice/Strawson versions of the causal theory of perception. His analysis repays close reading and I will not try to summarize it His conclusions do have clear consequences for the tripartite analogy of visual experience Just to give the reader a taste of the problems: is it, for example, the case that having a hallucination is just like seeing something, and is it not the case that seeing a mirage or seeing something in a mirror is precisely seeing something? His pages on what it is to see a picture are particularly good and I like his

observation that: 'the answer to the question whether, when looking at a painting, one can see what it depicts depends on whether the "what" is construed as relative or as an interrogative pronoun. If it is construed as a relative pronoun, then the answer is that one cannot; but if it is construed as an interrogative pronoun, then the answer is that one can. The suggestion that pictures afford us "visions of things not present" betrays a failure to distinguish between the two "whats"' (p. 42). I have always had reservations about Wollheim's view that the 'most primitive instances' of this remarkable capacity 'are to be found in dreams, day-dreams, and hallucinations' (p. 22) and it is nice to see it criticized in such a philosophically tidy way. Hyman's arguments make a lot of sense and any future discussion will have to take them into account.

While I think that professional philosophers will enjoy the second chapter, it was the third chapter, 'Problem and Method', which I found most interesting because of Hyman's comments on contemporary psychologists' persistent fascination with the retinal image. The fact is, of course, that the retinal image does not have a role to play in perception; it is an epiphenomenum in the perceptual process. Aristotle had a glimmer of the idea when he argued that 'the image reflected by the cornea plays no part in the explanation of vision' [*De Sensu*, 2.438a5–12] (p. 70 n.). Psychologists mistakenly think that looking at the world is like looking at a picture of it and that the picture in question is the retinal image. This results in some extraordinary statements. Marr, who is currently the bee's knees as far as computational theories of perception are concerned (I don't know whether Hyman is aware of that), stated: 'vision is the process of discovering from images what is present in the world and where it is' (quoted p. 71). And Gregory, who many unmitiates take as an authority on visual perception, writes: 'The brain has a most difficult task interpreting retinal information from distant objects. The retinal image has lost a dimension: somehow the brain must construct depth from a projection of three dimensions reduced to two' (pp. 62–3). But, as Hyman points out, 'this image, unlike the irradiation of the retina, plays no part in the explanation of vision; and neither the irradiation of the retina nor the consequent changes in nerve-cells of the retina can intelligibly be described as flat' (p. 63). Hyman also has excellent criticisms to make of Thouless's 'Phenomenal Regression to the Real Object' and the notion of a scaling mechanism.

The fourth chapter, on 'Art and Occlusion', concerns itself with the significance of the renaissance discovery of artificial perspective. Drawing a distinction between what is visible and what is seen, Hyman argues that the system of perspective is not used to compress three dimensions into two (Gregory) but to extend two into three by enabling the spectator to gain a sense of what may be visible from a particular vantage point. Somewhat unfairly, he accuses Gombrich of being confused on the subject when the phenomenum of occlusion forms a centrepoint of his paper 'The "What" and the "How": Perspective Representation and the Phenomenal World' in *Logic and Art—Essays in honor of Nelson Goodman* (New York 1972), cited in the Preface to *The Image and the Eye*, referred to by Hyman himself. If Hyman hasn't read this paper he will find that there is much in Gombrich to pre-empt his discussions on this subject. From a purely historical point of view, which is different from Hyman's, I also think that both Alberti and Leonardo were well aware of the difference between what is visible and what is seen. All due credit to Hyman, though, for making the matter explicit in the way in which he does and for drawing the distinction into his argument, it works very well.

The fifth chapter, 'The Inception of Naturalism', has some useful things to say on Plato's distinction between *eikastikē* and *phantastikē*. I like the observation that: 'It is part of the concept of a picture that there is no gap between appearance and reality in a depicted scene' (p. 90). While one may dispute Hyman's account of the intellectual origins of Loewy's *Rendering of Nature in Early Greek Art*, he has some fair points of criticism to make of this pioneering work. I wonder if Hyman appreciates that his formulation '*The development of naturalism was the gradual enlargement of the range of questions that could coherently be asked about a depicted scene*' (p. 105) lies at the heart of Gombrich's 'Reflections

on the Greek Revolution' in *Art and Illusion*? Thus to have Gombrich subscribing to the difference between *eikastikē* and *phantastikē* is to misread his argument. Finally, I am not persuaded that a philosophical debate on the antithesis between *nomos* and *phusis* can explain the emergence of Greek naturalism. I think that Gombrich is on the right lines both in his view of the emerging importance of narrative and the decline in significance of ritual; the 'enlargement of the range of questions' is significant to both.

This review has just touched on the large number of issues raised by the book; it would be difficult to do it justice in anything but a very long review, or a series of articles in reply. It is an excellent book and it makes a major contribution to the philosophical discussions of perception and representation; everyone concerned should read it. If philosophy will ever make a dent on psychological thought, this should be the book to do it. I do hope, though, that Hyman continues his good work and addresses the issues raised by the new movement of Cognitive Psychology. Having said that, he should also turn his attention to the work of the late J. J. Gibson who, in 1952, declared: 'The visual field is the product of the chronic habit of civilized men of seeing the world as a picture.' He might also like to reread Gombrich's *Art and Illusion*.

I look forward to Hyman's future publications and will put this one on my shelf with J. L. Austin's *Sense and Sensibilia* and Jonathan Dancy's *Perceptual Knowledge*. they will be good company for each other. It would be nice to see a cheaper paperback edition which could be used with students. I have only two items of complaint: the book contained too many typographical errors and more discretion could have been exercised in the selection of plates.

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What Makes an Experience Aesthetic? By MICHAEL H. MITIAS. Rodopi, Amsterdam and Königshausen and Neumann, Würzburg. 1988 pp 154. Paperbound, no price given.

Aesthetic Quality and Aesthetic Experience Edited by MICHAEL H. MITIAS. Rodopi, Amsterdam and Königshausen and Neumann, Würzburg. 1988. pp. 176. Paperbound, no price given.

THE CONCEPT of aesthetic experience has undergone severe critical scrutiny over the past thirty years but the attempts to cut it down have invigorated rather than eradicated this hardy and well-loved perennial. The story of its resistance to blight and destruction is not a simple one. The strategies of abolition have been various and have sometimes been applied haphazardly so that the ground for exploration and review is now rough to work. Nevertheless, in *What Makes an Experience Aesthetic?* Michael Mitias has managed to bring some order to this difficult plot

He identifies two main lines of attack on the concept of aesthetic experience. The first focuses on 'aesthetic', maintaining that an examination of the range of accounts of aesthetic experience reveals no feature or element that is common to all of them and concluding that there is no clear or unequivocal characterization of the aestheticness of aesthetic experience. The second line of attack is directed at 'experience'. Its claim is that experience is not something to which qualities can be ascribed and that this means that the whole concept of an aesthetic experience is untenable. Mitias responds to these challenges in the following way. He tries to show 'that it is reasonable to speak of "aesthetic experience" ', he explores what it is that makes an experience aesthetic and he discusses the conditions under which aesthetic quality becomes actual in aesthetic perception. In order to accomplish and inform this enquiry he undertakes the formidable task of providing a critical exposition of the debate about aesthetic experience.

A major opponent of many traditional conceptions of aesthetic experience is George Dickie and one of the targets of his critical attention is Monroe Beardsley's account of the unity, coherence and completeness of aesthetic experience. Dickie argues that although it is entirely possible to say of an art work that it is unified, coherent and complete, it is not possible to say the same of our experience of it; we cannot intelligibly speak of 'aesthetic experi-

ence' mainly because 'we cannot capture, or take hold, in our mind, of the reality to which the expression refers; and we cannot capture this reality because it lacks a structure, a specific identity, which we can conceive or in some way describe—because it lacks, in other words, a unity, i.e., coherence and completeness' (p. 52). Dickie's conclusion is that the unity, etc., that we certainly ascribe to the art work has been wrongly ascribed by Beardsley to the *experience* of it. His criticism is detailed and some of its details have considerable strength It would, for instance, be difficult not to agree with his rejection of I. A. Richards's view (referred to by Beardsley) that when witnessing a performance of *King Lear*, feelings of pity and fear pull us in opposite directions with the result that we in fact remain in our seats. Dickie objects that this sort of experience just does not take place and that 'the spectator remains in his seat for other reasons' (p. 50).

Mitias's defence of Beardsley's position is thorough and painstaking Beardsley, he argues, does not conflate or confuse the unity of the art work with the unity of the experience of it. The experience does have a describable structure and Beardsley does describe it. It consists of effects that are produced by the art work and that can be distinguished from the art work. The unity of rhe experience consists in its parts hanging together in such a way that 'within an experience a part "leads to" or is continuous with, another part . . . The parts . . . are *akin* in nature. They do not contradict but are compatible with each other' (p. 57). Mitias maintains that when we *remember* an art work in the absence of the actual work we do so by reference to something we may call an 'image' and which refers to the work. And he says. 'the act of memory *itself* cannot take place, and it will not be intelligible, unless it is . . . coherent. Coherence is a necessary condition for the activity of aesthetic apprehension' (p 60). Moreover, the conception of an experience that is unified, coherent and complete does not, he points out, preclude its arriving at its wholeness and completion over a period of time in which we gradually 'fill up' and make sense of the perception of an art work through feelings that cohere but that may vary in intensity during their development and that are determined by the art work. 'It is', Mitias affirms, 'meaningful to speak of an experience as a unity, and it is meaningful to speak of unity in the making' (p. 64).

If we allow that an experience is possible, then what is it that can make it aesthetic? Mitias argues that adopting an aesthetic attitude is necessary though not sufficient to make an experience aesthetic. Given the aesthetic attitude, it is the aesthetic qualities of the perceived object that then guarantee the aestheticness of the experience: 'the object acts [on] or in some way permeates the experience with its aesthetic character' (p. 142). Making an experience aesthetic is a causal matter but it is not that there is an already existing 'experience' awaiting the addition of aestheticness. The causality here is a formal one of the Aristotelian kind: 'the full *causal* impact of "make" cannot be considered unless we grant an agent who . . . purposively experiences the aesthetic object in a certain way . . . the activity in which the aesthetic aspect of an object makes an experience aesthetic is an activity of actualizing this aspect in the experience' (p. 142) The experienced object, natural or artistic, becomes an aesthetic object when its aesthetic qualities are actualized by the perceiver of them. But the aesthetic object, according to Mitias, is neither an essence nor a thing; it does not exist outside the event of the aesthetic experience, which is a temporal process, and it is not identical with the work of art: 'the aesthetic object is the given physical work as *meaningful form* . . . it exists as an object of aesthetic appreciation to a percipient who consciously craves it and creatively forms it in the process of aesthetic perception . . . it is immanent in the sensuous being of the art work' (p. 145). Here Mitias is not only discussing the ontological status of the aesthetic object but also maintaining that it is something we *make* when we adopt the aesthetic attitude towards a work or an object possessed of certain qualities. His account of the character of aesthetic experience is redolent —rightly so, I am sure—of traditional and affirmed descriptions that speak of it as requiring disinterested and contemplative attention, a certain detachment and distance, a willingness to respond to the presence of the work and to be informed, in the Aristotelian sense, by what it is.

Here and there Mitias's book is somewhat laboured, even clumsy, in style. This does not matter greatly because, with this particular writer, those faults are the concomitant of a struggle for precision that is valuable for the reader to follow. The book also has more typographical errors than I have ever before encountered in a published work. Again, no great harm accrues, except on p. 49 where a whole line seems to have been omitted from a quotation, thereby rendering it meaningless. Mitias convinces me that aesthetic experience is a concept worth defending and confirms my intuition that it is one without which I cannot do.

I am less enthusiastic about *Aesthetic Quality and Aesthetic Experience*, a collection of ten essays, one of which by Rudolph Berlinger is in German, edited by Michael H. Mitias Concentration in this volume is on the mode of existence of aesthetic qualities and the relationship between aesthetic quality and aesthetic experience. John Fisher's opening essay, 'Experience and Qualities', asks whether the relationship is 'one of necessity, one of possibility, at bottom stupid or fundamentally confused' (p. 2). He answers his question by analysing it as a relation of possibility, as synthetic and contingent. Aesthetic qualities, he maintains, are not identical with although they often approximate to human qualities They are not dependent on aesthetic experience for their existence even though they often have a close relationship with human qualities

Göran Hermerén's paper on 'The Variety of Aesthetic Qualities' sets out to be analytical and classificatory towards aesthetic qualities but the analysis yields no conclusion save that of its honest verdict that the attempted taxonomy confirms the ever-shifting ambiguity and complexity of the terms we use to name aesthetic qualities In Richard W. Lind's 'Aesthetic "Sympathy" and Expressive Qualities' the thesis presented is that 'we can experience an *aesthetic sympathy* which closely resembles altruistic sympathy'. Lind says that the problem of elucidating what we mean when we describe music as sad (or serene, agitated, etc.) presents itself as a paradox: we feel the music's emotion as if it were our own but also recognize it as belonging to the music; and at the same time we recognize a resemblance or correlation of some kind between a sad person and sad music, a serene person and serene music, and so on. He points out that 'while there does seem to be such a correlation, such feelings as slowness, lowness and softness in music are *not sufficient* to express sadness specifically' (p. 46).

Lind's statement of the problem is clear and interesting but his proposed solution, although perceptive in places, is intolerably elaborate. It depends heavily on very detailed definitions of emotion and feeling (with sub-divisions of emotion), an account of altruistic sympathy that analyses it as dependent on a principle of intentional ambiguity, the introduction of a 'micro-phenomenological theory' of the aesthetic, and the requirement of a romantic attitude that 'makes it possible to engage in sympathy, interpreting feeling sensations in the same way as in altruistic sympathy' (p. 59). Very briefly, the adoption of a romantic attitude which assumes that a work of art is an expressive vehicle enables the percipient 'to take immediately given feeling sensations as the sympathetic indicators of the emotion expressed in the music itself' and also 'to take the comportment of the music as expressive behaviour' (p. 63); the three-cornered paradox ceases to be a paradox once it is set in the context of the romantic attitude. It may well be that I have a less than keen appreciation of the full force of the argument that supports this conclusion but I am inclined to think that its cumbersome and labyrinthine complexity raises more problems than it solves.

The papers by Catherine Lord and Maria Golaszewska are clear and readable Golaszewska's 'Quality, Experience, Value' examines treatments of those concepts by Ingarden, Dufrenne, Osborne, Sibley and Mitias in order to focus attention on 'the aesthetic situation' Her conclusion that aesthetic qualities are rooted in direct, sensual experience of the world while aesthetic values are discovered in the course of artistic interpretation is unexceptional but well argued. Lord's paper is a short one that examines the intentionality of aesthetic experience and then modifies and ably defends, against Dickie, a Beardsleyan conception of aesthetic experience which maintains not that the unity of the work of art is reflected

in a unified experience but that 'the intensity of aesthetic experience varies concomitantly with the degree of the unity a work has and the intensity of its expressive properties or its elements such as color' (p. 71). Alicia Kuczynska's 'Qualities of Things as Aesthetic Qualities' strives to elucidate a dual nature for aesthetic qualities, likening them to 'a bridge linking two banks of a river' (p. 159) but the attempt is not wholly successful. The final essay, too, by Robert Ginsberg, does not succeed for me. It aims to discover, by means of an analysis of aesthetic experience of the ruin, 'keys to qualities that illuminate aesthetics as a whole and perhaps human life'. But the analysis displays a quirky idiosyncrasy that militates against the achievement of any such generality or comprehensiveness.

Michael Mitias's own contribution to this volume is probably the best of the collection. It elaborates his view that 'insofar as it belongs to the art work aesthetic quality exists as a *potentiality* awaiting realization, and insofar as it belongs to an experience in which it becomes actual its mode of existence is that of a *noetic feeling*' (p. 28). Once again, Mitias probes and explores, questioning formulations he has already given and reformulating questions he has already asked in his endeavour to home in with exactitude on the issues that concern him.

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The Sense of Beauty: Being the Outline of Aesthetic Theory. By GEORGE SANTAYANA. Edited by WILLIAM G. HOLZBERGER AND HERMAN J. SAATKAMP, JR. Critical Edition, Vol II, *The Works of George Santayana*. MIT Press. 1988. pp. 248 £31.50.

THIS BOOK is the second volume in a critical edition, now in progress, of Santayana's complete works. There is an editorial appendix and an index. The index is much expanded over the original, and will be of considerable help to students of Santayana's aesthetics. The editorial appendix explains, in detail, how this edition of *The Sense of Beauty* is derived from preceding documents, and the respects in which it differs from them. These respects are not remarkable, and only the most minute of scholars will be interested in this new edition of the book on their account. There is an introduction by Arthur Danto which will interest scholars of Santayana's work as well as philosophers generally.

Danto declares (XXV) that the 'exciting and philosophically original' thesis of *The Sense of Beauty* is that beauty is 'pleasure objectified'. He devotes the introduction to explaining how Santayana came to this thesis, and to a critical evaluation of it. He guesses (XIX) (his own word) that Santayana intended to correct the view that beauty is objective as put forward by Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume ('Of the Standard of Taste'); and he bases his guess on Santayana's own statement about his writing *The Sense of Beauty* that 'I followed some quaint old English treatises' (XVIII). The treatises of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume are old, no doubt, and in the English language. But they are scarcely quaint; and if Santayana intended to correct their authors, he cannot have 'followed' them since the followers cannot order the guide upon a different path. Danto's guess falls short of the mark.

Evidence internal to *The Sense of Beauty* points in a quite different direction—that of Kant's analysis of the beautiful, especially the first and second moments. Santayana insists (I, 8) that the beauty of a thing, though it is its pleasantness, cannot be its disinterested pleasantness (the first moment), and that in allowing the supposed disinterestedness of pleasure to pass into the demand for universality and objectivity of beauty (I, 9) (the second moment), there is nothing more than a desire to generalize our own opinions. Nothing more, that is, except for a 'curious but well-known psychological phenomenon, viz., the transformation of an element of sensation into the quality of a thing' (I, 10) or objectification. If Santayana's objectification thesis resulted from his reflection upon, and intention to correct the work of, any other philosopher, that other philosopher must be Kant; and the thesis to be corrected must be that the beauty of an object is its pleasantness made apparently objective by the observer's demand that it please universally.

Santayana tells us that this objectification is accomplished in the way made out by 'the current theories of perception' (I, 10). These 'cur-

rent theories' must be those discussed in and around the Department of Philosophy at Harvard where Santayana studied and taught for many years, and that discussion must have been strongly influenced by his eminent teacher and elder colleague, William James In *The Principles of Psychology*, in the chapter on sensation, James writes a section entitled, 'The Eccentric Projection of Sensations'. In it, he discusses the view that sensations are inherently subjective, but made objective by being projected away from the subject (projected eccentrically, from the centre) as qualities of the thing that causes them. James points out that Taine explains the objectivity of sensations by such projection, exemplifying it by reference to sensations of sight and sound, and naming the result with the lively expression, 'veridical hallucination'; and that Schopenhauer holds, also, that sensations are projected from 'inside of the organism' as qualities of external objects James's *Principles* abounds in references to Locke whose *Essay* is the quaintest of all old English treatises in philosophy as well as the *fons et origo* of the objectification of sensations at least for modern philosophy (they begin life as ideas in the dark closet of the mind); and it contains many references to Taine, and some to Schopenhauer. One cannot but believe that it is out of his reading and conversation in the neighbourhood and company of William James that Santayana came to his view that beauty is the objectification of pleasure. He noticed that he could do for the sensation of pleasure what Locke and others (including Taine and Schopenhauer but not with respect to the will as Danto suggests) had done for sensations of many other kinds.

Danto suggests a modification of Santayana's definition of beauty It is not pleasure objectified because there is more to beauty than pleasure, and because things are beautiful when no one is pleased by them. But he credits Santayana with having approached the more nearly true view that the sense of beauty is the disposition to objectify pleasure, while beauty is whatever properties enable a thing to awaken that disposition. Though he rejects objectification of pleasure as sufficient to define beauty, Danto does not question that the notion may be a part of its definition. But he should as we shall see

Do 'the current theories of perception' succeed in explaining beauty? They explain it as resulting from the projection of pleasure out of the subject who feels it onto the object that causes it. This explanation is a spatial metaphor—the metaphor of projecting or throwing a thing from one place against an object in another as one throws a dart against a target. But a metaphor cannot explain something unless we can identify that something as the proper counterpart of the metaphorical element in the entire metaphorical expression; and the metaphorical element in Santayana's thesis is the element, 'projection' or 'throwing'. If there is a place where pleasures occur (and there clearly is not for most of them such as the pleasures of thought), and if there is a place where beautiful objects occur (and there clearly is not for many, such as musical compositions and works of literature), there is, none the less, no act involving pleasures and beautiful objects that we can identify as the proper counterpart of the spatial act of throwing a dart against a target—no act that we can describe metaphorically as throwing pleasures against the objects that cause them.

That beauty is pleasure objectified is meaningless; the objectification is a metaphor that can find no application Beauty cannot be wholly defined in terms of objectification of pleasure, nor can it be partly so defined as Danto's evaluation of Santayana's thesis would have it. We may add that Santayana's presentation of a definition that does for beauty what Locke and many others—both before and after him—have done for other qualities of things—secondary, primary, and what not—so far from lending his definition authenticity, shows in its meaninglessness the folly of an entire tradition of explaining the objectivity, not to mention the subjectivity, of the qualities of things.

There are other kinds of meaninglessness involved in the objectification thesis; and there are troubles other than meaninglessness, stemming from the fact that the thesis assumes a second form for Santayana, intertwined with the form Danto discusses, and derived from James's view that sensations are inherently objective rather than subjective. But these difficulties cannot be dealt with here.

The trouble in its chief thesis does not count against reading *The Sense of Beauty*. How many philosophical works could merit our attention if it did? Rather, its meaninglessness is so clear that the book serves the useful purpose of exhibiting perspicuously the error concealed in many philosophical treatises, quaint and commonplace, old and new, English and non-English. And Santayana's book may boast other important virtues. It is perhaps the first, and certainly one of the best examples in the English language of systematic aesthetics. There is scarcely any topic of that discipline—speculative or analytical—that does not find a place in the categorial framework it provides: the categorial framework of the matter, the form, the expression, and the value of works of art and of nature. It is a book, for that reason, around and within which a great variety of materials can be organized. Add to these characteristics the elegance of Santayana's style, an elegance approached, let alone found, in almost no contemporary philosophical writing in English; and you have a book not only useful for the clarity of its philosophical error, but pre-eminently worthy as a classic in aesthetics, and as a text for teaching the subject.

KINGSLEY PRICE

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Contingencies of Value Alternative Perspectives for Critical Theory By BARBARA HERRNSTEIN-SMITH. Harvard U.P. 1988. pp. 229. £17 95

NOT FAR from the last page of the footnotes of this conceptually adventurous book we are informed by Professor Smith that if someone uses a description of the motion of Saturn's rings analogically to explain how a telephone system operates, that explanation is not thereby restricted to an explanation of phone calls made *on Saturn*. This seems undeniable. Nor, she says, will such an other-worldly model cease to function beneficially just in case astrophysicists decide the description of Saturn's rings upon which the analogy depends is inaccurate. From Saturn we descend to Bongo-Bongo, where she says—here offering, in microcosm, the governing insight of the entire book—that even if marketplaces do not exist there, the employment of a marketplace model in explaining how those people communicate can still prove illuminating; here too, of course, the power to illuminate is not a function of the *economic* accuracy of the model. And it is, indeed, a particular economic model that she applies with considerable force to the systematically recalcitrant problem of aesthetic evaluation.

Smith thus enters the larger debate concerning value, and particularly literary value, with a very unusual-looking apparatus. That debate, which she ably characterizes at length (even if she does only characterize the extremes), has taken place between the absolutists, the defenders of immutable and objective aesthetic value as it must exist both apart from any individual or collective perception and as intrinsic properties of objects on the one hand, and the relativists, who are forced by consistency to say that, with regard to evaluative utterances, 'anything goes', when they know on the basis of the very text-selections and the ensuing critical distinctions they make that this is, as a brute empirical fact, simply not the case. What she offers is a way between these extremes such that our intuitions and practices concerning literary evaluation are both acknowledged and explained, yet without positing the existence of, or the perception of (these separate matters are treated independently), objective values, where 'objective' means a determinate property of an entity. For Smith's middle way, value is instead determined, like economic value, by a complex network of interlocking forces which, taken together, constitute an evaluative atmosphere surrounding objects such that, within *that* atmosphere, some objects become figural for their specific instrumental utility while others recede into the background; this creates, but again within this *particular* context, a hierarchy of variously evaluated objects. Thus, she says, no evaluation 'can have a truth-value in the usual sense', because, although the hierarchy is relatively stable within a given atmosphere of economic-like forces, that hierarchy is not a function of intrinsic value-carrying properties. Not surprisingly, she also claims, far beyond the more limited confines of aesthetic evaluation, that no less than all meaning, all expressions, all statements—in short, all spoken

languages—are 'conditional, contingent, and variable'. Thus in language too it is the stabilization of linguistic practices that makes meaning, as it occurs within verbal communities, *appear* fixed or invariant. And, of course, as aesthetic evaluation is after all a sub-region of language, we ought not then to be surprised that it is contingent, i.e., determined by extrinsic and ever-fluctuating 'market' forces. Smith ascends still beyond this level to observe that human nature, as it subdivides into its economic, rational, cultural, biological, and further competing aspects, itself exhibits an irreducible '*scrappiness*' such that the 'relations among what we call our "actions", "knowledge", "beliefs", "goals", and "interests" consist of continuous interactions among various structures, mechanisms, traces, impulses, and tendencies that are not necessarily ("naturally" or otherwise) consistent, coordinated, or synchronized and are therefore always *more* or *less* inconsistent, out-of-phase, discordant, and conflictual'. In short, our very *nature*, she claims, precludes the possibility of objectivity (again, where this means fixed, static, intrinsic properties), so again, to find contingency in aesthetic as well as moral evaluation ought to come as no surprise. Following a total immersion in all this contingency, i.e., with all forms of value being explained extrinsically on this dynamic economic model, one might well ask if these different economic systems or hierarchical orbits can be subjected to system-to-system evaluation. Smith's answer, of course, is negative. There is, she asserts, 'no particular single dimension or global parameter . . with respect to which entities can be tagged or tallied as, "in the last analysis", good or bad', and thus the entire question concerning system-to-system evaluation is also motivated only by the illusion of objectivity. She says, employing the economic vernacular as a way of further underscoring the larger employment of the marketplace model, precisely what, given what she has said so far, she must: 'There is no *bottom* bottom line anywhere, for anyone or for "man"'.

This last fact, she claims, is, although captured by Geertz, missed by Rorty and other communitarians, who, she claims, fail to recognize that even the nature of the self is illuminated by the economic model; it too is determined, not with a singular identity, but with a shifting multiplicity, by multifarious allegiances, sub-communities, and social contexts with their own sets of beliefs and motives, all of which demand a more 'dynamic' and 'subtly differentiated' view of both social and mental life than that offered by neo-pragmatists. In addition to Rorty, we find discussions of Hume and Kant, who are set aside for what might now be predictable reasons: the former because of the desire to address the possibility of aesthetic objectivity in connection with properties, the latter for an insistence on a super-human degree of perceptual purity devoid of, indeed, the various kinds of judgemental interests Smith is arguing for.

Among the issues philosophers might find objectionable to varying degrees in this book of literary theory are: the presumption that sensory experiences are metaphysically private as though there exist no discussions of the problems of other minds and scepticism, the presumption that every conception of judgemental truth in aesthetics will require a correspondence theory and direct reference to perceived properties; the characterization, again, of only the most extreme absolute and relative views; the dismissive attitude towards analytical aesthetics while neglecting without apology the best recent work on her topic; and the very high level of generality maintained throughout the book. But these problems merely indicate that one cannot do everything at once, and the last issue is more observation than complaint; Smith does say in the first chapter that this study is 'designed to suggest a theoretical framework' for a new, indeed an alternative, way of thinking, ranging well beyond the boundaries of literary theory, of the covert and overt, non-verbal and verbal, institutional and individual critical judgements we actually make, to bring fresh impetus to the understanding of taste, and to cast new light on the concept of value. With the model of *homo economicus*, appropriated to the problem of aesthetic judgement, this is precisely what she has, with a spirit of adventure, achieved.

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Historical Criticism and the Meaning of Texts. By J. R DE J. JACKSON. Routledge. 1989. pp. 173 £30.00.

THIS BOOK will disappoint those interested in the less prosaic aspects of literary theory. For one thing there is no elucidation of the relation between historical criticism and meaning. While it may be unfair to expect a full-fledged theory of literary meaning, one wants to know how historical criticism, defined as reading 'past works of literature in the way in which they were read when they were new' (p. 3), assigns meanings to texts. But Professor Jackson seems more interested in advocating better microfiche systems and bibliographies than in understanding literature. A conciliatory wish to ally proper historical criticism with other critical practices belies the dust-jacket's promise of a polemical tract; there is no serious theoretical attempt to show that historical criticism is 'the necessary and unavoidable counterpart of all critical procedures' (p. 3). Even if this claim weren't fatuous, Jackson skirts the substantial philosophical issues it raises. The only argument is stipulative: 'in its most comprehensive sense' historical criticism is assumed to be implicit in all reading and criticism (p. 117). Once you have recaptured the past social and literary environment everything else should fall into place.

Jackson's treatment of meaning involves (1) an inadequate distinction between philosophical and philological theories of meaning—focusing on the mind and intentions of the speaker and the evidence of the words spoken (or written) respectively, and (2) 'triangles of interpretation', which diagrammatically represent meaning as generated by the speaker or hearer in his relation to situation, language and utterance (text). The simplistic sketch of the history of semantics, built on a suspect dichotomy between inner/outer, subjective/objective, is the type of analysis which causes confusion in literary theory. When Jackson employs triangles of interpretation language drops out and the all-important term 'environment' is introduced. The historical critic should concern himself with the ordinary and everyday aspects of the original environment, with the commonplace assumptions among the reading public, 'with thoughts and feelings too simple or merely too obviously true to require to be mentioned let alone discussed at the time' (p. 109). 'Did they use shoelaces?' is one of Jackson's typical questions.

We aren't given any guidance on how to differentiate between facts about the original reader's environment—nothing about what is relevant or irrelevant to meaning, except the platitude that anything might be useful. How do we relate aspects of the literary or social environment to the text? However obvious one thinks the relations are, they could not all be of equal value, nor could they self-evidently be contributions to the interpretative task. The theoretician can't answer such questions a priori but he should give us some conceptual clues. Surely it's not enough to place a text in an original historical context. What is the relation, for instance, between past and present meaning?

Jackson tells us that 'historical criticism is not an end in itself but a means to other ends' (p. 5) yet doesn't state clearly what these ends are or what historical criticism does to further them. His main attempt to address meta-critical issues is a confused analogy suggesting how the aims of the historical critic mesh with those of the literary critic: the historical critic is to the literary critic what the botanist is to the gardener. This not only highlights Jackson's respect for Frye's archetypal approach but offers a peculiar account of the aim of the literary critic. The historical critic's supplementary contribution to our understanding and appreciation of literature seems very avoidable and unnecessary—unless there is a separate argument for privileging original meaning.

Jackson isn't oblivious to this and other theoretical problems, in fact, he's expert at mentioning them without really taking a stand. He doesn't endorse the notion of a fixed, essential meaning, unchangeable over time, nor does he privilege authorial intention; he acknowledges the difficulty in trying to recapture past environments and meanings. The fact that interpretation must be applied to all sources and is never complete, that we are trapped in 'triangles of interpretation' and meaning is elusive, is not a knock-down argument against the effort of recovery. But Jackson's only response to the sceptic's hurdle is that we must try anyway.

CAUCUS

By definition the historical critic is engaged in a comparative enterprise and is not just a collator. So why does Jackson touch on many of the philosophical difficulties and then pass the buck to the true 'literary critics'? An obvious question concerning motives arises. is his critic trying to make sense of differences between contexts or attempting to eradicate these differences in a search for a permanent meaning and judgement? Strangely Jackson has it both ways by suggesting that only the literary critic truly interprets texts, while the historical critic merely demonstrates there is no access to 'reality' or meaning without coming to grips with particular interpretations—especially the original ones. By making historical criticism the handmaiden of literary criticism Jackson commits himself to some curious views. Historical criticism is 'incompatible' with evaluation (p. 125) and he identifies a mode of criticism, the evaluative, whose main exponent is Leavis—as if structuralist, formalist; Marxist, feminist and historical critics don't bring moral, aesthetic, and political values to their interpretations and, worse, as if all aren't issuing judgements and evaluations.

Unlike the so-called neo-historicists Jackson is not political and is intent on suppressing his ideology. He wants to atone for deficient manifestations of historical criticism by making a case 'for reviving it in a more satisfactory form' (p. 7) He does nothing to convince us that it should be revived; as he describes it, historical criticism isn't much of an ideal. Self-styled historical critics will not be encouraged by Jackson's watered-down view of their enterprise and advocates of other modes of criticism won't find his book engaging on an intra-mural level.

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A Likely Story: Probability and Play in Fiction. By ROBERT NEWSOM. Rutgers U.P. 1988. pp. 213. $15 00; clothbound, $30 00.

ACCORDING TO Robert Newsom we readers are in two minds about fiction. Suspending disbelief, we may enter the fictional world of say, *Tom Jones*, and accept fully the 'facts' of the plot as they present themselves. All is true. And yet, if questioned, we may admit that such 'facts' are merely the stuff of fantasy and that, therefore, we *know* that all is false. There can be no ascription of degrees of probability for, either in or out of the story-world, we readers are prey to certainty.

What, then, is to be made of judgements of the form, 'The plot of *Tom Jones* relies upon too many coincidences to be probable'? The logic of probability concerns matters of fact about which we are uncertain or in doubt. If fictions are either certainly true, or certainly false, then 'literary probability' would appear to be a contradiction in terms Newsom thinks it isn't, and has christened this seeming aporia between the felt certainty of the reading experience and the obvious fact of literary-probabilistic talk 'the antinomy of fictional probability'.

Newsom does not so much resolve this antinomy as valorize it. When entertaining fictions (Newsom asserts), the reader divides his belief *between* real and fictional worlds. He insists on his belief in the story-world *even as* he insists on his belief in the world of actuality that surrounds him The game of reading consists in recognizing the different qualities of these beliefs while consciously holding them in tension. It is thus somewhat analogous to binocular vision in that it fuses two distinct perceptions into a composite which incorporates the truth of both. At this stage (the stage of the engaged reader) the game admits no notion of the probable.

Talk of the probabilistic kind arises when, moving in and out of the game of make-believe, the reader comes to feel that certain *general* beliefs about his world are in tension with a belief or beliefs generated by the text. And this tension acts to dissolve the boundaries between the actual and the fictional, and to inaugurate an otherwise 'impermissible' communication between text and reader. To say of Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* that 'Kurtz's behaviour is probable/improbable' is to record in a sort of shorthand the reader's movement towards/away from belief. Playing the game of fiction *means* that such a reader is always in transit between assent and denial.

Newsom's thesis is not, finally, convincing. This is largely because he tries to develop a concept of fiction from a rough and ready phenomenology of the reading experience.

And from the concept so derived he attempts further to draw out a theory of fictional probability. The entire manoeuvre is a kind of bootstrap operation, which leads him to the patent (and senseless) circularity of such statements as: 'Precisely because I *pretend* that something fictional is real, there is opened up the possibility of my ascribing probability to it' (his emphasis).

Newsom's reliance on an analysis of individual belief restricts his understanding of fiction in two important respects. Firstly, as *individual* belief, Newsom's concept of fiction is profoundly psychologistic. Although familiar with Ian Watt's *The Rise of the Novel* and critical of Watt's realist bias, Newsom seems unwilling to examine the importance of social or ideological factors involved in an individual's sense of the real. Yet probabilistic judgements on literary texts are (at least in part) socially governed. And they may be so either directly or through that semi-social, semi-aesthetic category known as genre. Newsom, however, can only envisage the institution of literary criticism as a type of free-market arena where readers vie with each other to install their private readings as public wisdom.

Secondly, and I think more importantly, Newsom's concept of fiction (as founded on individual *belief*) misrepresents the readerly encounter with a text. As Coleridge understood, it is not quite right to say that we believe in the fictional world, or even (as Newsom would have it) that we both believe and disbelieve It is difficult, of course, to come at what we should say to describe our relation to fiction and fictionalizing, but belief says more, or says differently, what is at stake here.

Nevertheless, as an introduction to the complex issue of literary probability Newsom's book is a valuable propaedeutic. Those unwilling (or unable) to make their way through Ian Hacking's *The Emergence of Probability* or Douglas Lane Patey's *Probability and Literary Form* will find here a useful summary of probabilistic thought as it bears on literature from Aristotle to Kendall Walton And, finally, one must compliment the author on his choice of title. Behind the humble word 'likely' lie notions of resemblance, probability, analogy, similarity, and effectiveness: all of which figure in the long history of probabilistic language. It is an unfortunate irony of current idiom that 'a likely story' is just that sort of account one cannot quite be persuaded to believe.

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Weighing Delight and Dole: a Study of Comedy, Tragedy and Anxiety. By PETER B. WALDECK. Peter Lang, New York 1988. pp. 275. $36.60.

THIS is a stimulating but unsatisfactory book. It seems to offer a clinical view of anxiety and an account of the role of drama in providing 'anxiety reduction' (never spelt with a hyphen) for the spectator or reader. This would be very interesting as psychological aesthetics, but it turns out disappointing. The inherent difficulties (due to the gulf that separates psychological theory from the appreciation of art or of imaginative literature) are unhappily illustrated rather than surmounted or even acknowledged, and the academic conformism of Waldeck's literary analyses makes the gulf wider than it needs to be. He rightly says (p. x) that in any interdisciplinary study it is important that 'the narrower concerns of traditionally specialized scholarship be complemented by such broader, integrative undertakings' as his. But in the event inter-disciplinary integration eludes him, while his further announcements about his aims and procedures (para. 1, p. 1), if read carefully, appear confused examples of wishful thinking.

The plan of the book is simple and clear. After an Introduction (largely about Albert M. Reh, a German authority on literature and psychology) and a chapter surveying what one must confusingly call the psychological 'literature' on anxiety, the remaining chapters of *Part One. Theory* deal respectively with Comedy and Tragedy. Chapter 2 surveys the 'literature' of humour, chiefly from Bergson and Freud onwards to recent experimental work. In Chapter 3, 'Tragedy', Waldeck boldly aligns the reduction of anxiety with the catharsis of fear in Aristotle's *Poetics*, justifying his comparative neglect of intervening developments by means of a disarming sally of wit: 'We have attempted to sling our theoretical hammock between Aristotle and a few con-

crete psychological ideas' (p. 106). *Part Two. Analyses* contains six essays on selected works of German and English literature. Methodologically it is surely sound to turn to particular works when trying to substantiate any general theory, but much still depends on how the examples are treated.

If interpreted sympathetically Waldeck's book suggests a thesis: that given the universal prevalence of anxiety among all sentient creatures, human societies evolved drama as a means of pleasurably reducing it; and it was in the course of this development that pity, terror 'and similar emotions' (p. 97) came to achieve in tragedy their (desirable) catharsis, as Aristotle taught. A literary critic interested in psychological aesthetics may feel a hunch that this thesis is right. But when we read on there is little to confirm it. After merely making dogmatic claims (pp. 40–1) about the place of anxiety in aesthetic experience, Waldeck quietly leaves anxiety aside and, working from undeclared literary premisses, turns to a much wider range of emotions encompassed in narrative as well as dramatic fictions. In doing so he doesn't distinguish between the feelings we experience as spectators or readers and the feelings of invented characters, except for a nod in the direction of this distinction at p. 8 or p. 135, and in his good essay on *Dantons Tod* he even strays into telling of the feelings of anxiety suffered by its author Buechner while writing the work, hunted by the secret police of his time. A literary reader doesn't mind such flexibility, but for aesthetic theory greater rigour is needed. Moreover, Waldeck treats his chosen tragedies, comedies and novels as free-standing representations of life—less 'the imitation of an action' as in Aristotle than the representation of character, and especially representations of emotions. This is perfectly acceptable literary-semiotic practice, if a little unfashionable. But it doesn't tell us anything about anxiety.

The studies of particular works are welcome but too conventionally academic to help the thesis. If we need an essay on the role of anxiety, or even of other emotions, in (say) Lessing's *Minna von Barnhelm* or in Waldeck's experience of that play, then the historical place of the play in the development of German comedy, and its relation to the works of Plautus are unwanted topics (*pace* Waldeck himself on p. 1). Waldeck's treatment of the novel *The Horse's Mouth* by Joyce Cary (1944) is even more full of red-herrings. The chapter on *Maria Stuart*, guided by Schiller's own essays on tragedy, keeps to the point better.

While there are worthwhile, often subtle, literary-critical insights in all the essays in Part Two, everywhere an attentive examiner (at least in aesthetics) would say of them, 'The candidate has lost sight of the question set'. This is doubly unsatisfactory because Waldeck set his own question and because he declined (p. 1) to keep his nose to the grindstone in answering it. He isn't sufficiently detached about specialized literary scholarship to recognize that its academic-style essays, even good ones, are ill adapted to the purposes of his chosen inquiry as set out ably in most of Ch. 1. In the Conclusion, reverting to the biological view of anxiety and to *The Horse's Mouth*, Waldeck equates 'danger' with 'reality' (p. 242). Thus, by filling out the concept of anxiety as essential to self-preservation, and by being applicable both to spectators (or readers) and to invented characters, seems to come nearer than before to a workable proposal about the role of artistic representation in a viable theory of 'Art (literary art) for Life's Sake'. But by then it is too late.

Perhaps the publishers hope for literary readers who will go for the literary criticism and simply ignore anxiety as a bee in Waldeck's bonnet—as his students at Susquehanna, where he is Professor of German, may have to do. (We all have to ignore his mistakes in English idiom, especially in the choice of prepositions.)

The book is photo-reproduced, with poor lay-out of pages and ragged 'unjustified' right-hand margins. The index is a disaster. It simply doesn't apply to this version of the text. Not only is it incomplete but at best a page number needs to be multiplied by about 1½ to indicate the right part of the book.

In spite of these adverse criticisms, the book has the advantage that unlike most psychological theorists, its author is qualified in literary appreciation. He may have pointed the way for future contributors to psychological aesthetics.

OLGA McDONALD MEIDNER

An Encyclopedia of British Women Writers. Edited by PAUL and JUNE SCHLUETER. Garland, New York 1988. pp. 516. $75.00

I SHALL compare the work under review with the *Dictionary of British Women Writers* (Routledge, 1989), edited by Janet Todd.

What is included in the Schlueter reference work is excellent—all the contributors are to be congratulated on their readable, forthright evaluations and scholarly short bibliographies. It is the editors' exclusions that are mystifying. No Mary Hays, no Adelaide Proctor, no Elizabeth Robins, no Ethel Smyth, no F. M. Mayor, no E. M. Delafield, no E. Arnot Robertson, no Catherine Cookson, no Barbara Comyns—'a broad cross-section' (Introduction) is not an 'Encyclopedia' (Title). In contrast, the strength of Janet Todd's still more recent *Dictionary of British Women Writers* lies precisely in its inclusiveness.

All the writers omitted in Schlueter are discussed in Todd and important genres such as Autobiography and Children's Literature are also given adequate attention. There is evidence overall of a much closer knowledge of contemporary British women's fiction in Todd than in Schlueter.

Where both tomes are weak is in acknowledging the existence of modern women poets and philosophers. Neither work notices U. A. Fanthorpe, Jenny Joseph, Carol Rumens, Jeni Couzyn, Helen Dunmore, Judith Kazantzis or Janet Dubé among the poets, and neither mentions the philosophical writing of Mary Warnock or Mary Midgley. If there is room in Schlueter for Barbara Cartland and in Todd for Enid Blyton, surely the grown-up women writers should get a look-in too.

The most damning absence of all is of the recent contribution made by immigrant British women writers—neither work refers the reader to Joan Riley, Beryl Gilroy, Barbara Burford, Grace Nichols, Jackie Kaye, Lauretta Ngcobo, Merle Collins or Manny Shiraz—and it is both embarrassing and anachronistic to have an all-white cast of literary personae in the Britain of the late 1980s. But to return to what these works do contain rather than what they don't—the more distanced 'Encyclopedia' gains in critical astringency what it loses in kindly intimacy, whereas with the British Dictionary, it is, as Tweedledum said, 'Contrariwise'.

SYBIL OLDFIELD

University of Sussex

Between Feminism and Psychoanalysis. Edited by TERESA BRENNAN. Routledge. 1989. pp. 271 £9.95; clothbound, £30.00

THIS IS a particularly interesting and wide-ranging collection of papers. They were first delivered at a series of fifteen seminars at Cambridge University, organized by King's College and the Social and Political Sciences Faculty, between January and July 1987. Several of the papers include colloquial moments of the spoken voice in their otherwise academic style. Rachel Bowlby's paper, on the history of the charged relations of feminism and psychoanalysis, includes narrative, comedy, word play and definition, and ends with a joke and an endless journey. Even within the academic style, there is considerable variation. Luce Irigaray speaks as a practising psychoanalyst, whereas Naomi Segal, on the French genre of the confessional *récit*, writes a literary exegesis which is both familiar and unusual.

Although most of the contributors are teachers of literature, the two magisterial figures around whom many of their pieces turn remain Lacan and Derrida. They are the heroes of anti-essentialism. But Rose Braidotti, close to Irigaray, defends an 'as if', utopian essentialism: to create an ethical feminine that feminist politics could acclaim.

Two interesting papers, by Margaret Whitford and Morag Shiach, rescue Irigaray and Hélène Cixous respectively from the charges of mysticism and essentialism, and turn them in the direction of politics. Whitford's Irigaray appears a remarkably radical and ambitious thinker, and Shiach's Cixous a powerful writer of deconstructive, political theatre.

A third well-known and controversial feminist who is re-interpreted, or rather deconstructed, in this collection is Juliet Mitchell, by Jane Gallop, who retreats from her own earlier commitment to Lacan. She points out the singularity of Mitchell's Marxist Lacan, and questions her insistence on the absolute split, at the moment of castration, between nature, biology, the non-human, and the pejorative

feminine on the one hand, and on the other, the human, culture, history, liberation, and control. As Gallop points out, liberation and control are dubious outcomes of Lacanian castration. But in a sudden, unexplained move, Gallop adds the unconscious to the nature and biology list, suggesting that a return to Freud might involve a less adversarial attitude towards the repressed, as though there was some uncited point in Mitchell's position which would rule out any possible alliance of ego and id.

Apart from Shiach's enthusiastic essay on Cixous, there is surprisingly no paper which analyses or celebrates any of women's achievements in literature in the last two centuries, and what these achievements might contribute to feminist, and psychoanalytic, understanding. There is also nothing on women's practice in the visual arts. If there may have been a clash between the forum of the seminars (the Social and Political Sciences Faculty) and the literary background of most of the contributors, then the forum seems to have set the agenda, and produced a possibility of lost opportunities. But in that case, how to explain why there is so little on politics?

It is Jane Gallop, in the first paragraph of the first essay, who insists that feminism is a political movement. But having made the announcement, the ensuing debate, on feminist politics, is, throughout the book, disappointingly fitful and hesitant, a matter chiefly of asides and rhetorical conclusions. Politics, in another sense, is inescapable, and to that extent all the essays are indeed political. The commitment of the writers is not in doubt. But in a collection otherwise so scrupulous, there may have been a lack here of necessary detail and development.

The first paragraph of Lisa Jardine's essay, 'The politics of impenetrability', in fact promises excitingly just such detail and development: on university politics, and women's 'relative employment and promotion prospects, their access to the machinery of university government, their access to the means of production of something more material than discourse' (p. 63). But she too spends most of her time on, or against Lacan, and her brief paper ends on an uncertain note. Are we to hear the feminine voice of the body and of the personal history as subversive, useful, or misplaced?

Gayatri Spivak, in a paper for and against deconstruction, moves from epistemological uncertainty, the provisional, or impossible name of 'woman', as the absence of presence, to an ethical, political naming as 'woman' of the 'disenfranchised woman' of the Third World, of Spivak's native India in particular, the object, not of metaphysics, or of *différance*, but of feminist solidarity. If you think this sentence is difficult, you should read the paper. I've done my best, even if (or especially as) I was perturbed by an evasive, and perhaps unconsciously deconstructive, aside: '(I am not being ethereal here. I know the kind of woman I am thinking about. And I also know that this person is not imaginable by most friends reading these words. I cannot enter into the immense and complicated logic of why this is so. Let this remain a lost parenthesis)' (p. 218).

The long Introduction by the editor, Teresa Brennan, is a particularly helpful essay, with which to begin and to conclude this volume. Her starting point is a sense of stagnation in current feminist, psychoanalytic discourse, and a corresponding need to re-examine its boundaries and divisions, its clichés and stock phrases. Her essay is open, tolerant, and painstaking, and although it was presumably written after the papers, it seems to set the tone for them. Indeed, it provides summaries which are useful to the reader both before and after the individual papers, all of which repay an engaged and strenuous reading.

DAVID BALL

Anglia Higher Education College

British Post-Structuralism Since 1968. By ANTONY EASTHOPE. Routledge 1988. pp. 255. £27.50.

IF THE title of this book implicitly raises the question of whether or not the book's alleged subject-matter, a particular variety of Post-Structuralist theory whose specificity results from its 'Britishness', actually exists, Antony Easthope has, I think, convincingly argued that it does. His book proffers a series of integrated tours through a collection of sometimes intense and problematic texts and contexts peculiar to the post-1968 British radical academic scene. Notwithstanding its confusing dust-jacket,

which incorporates visual work by the British, but not 'Post-Structuralist' Art & Language group the text itself is lucid. Easthope is precise and clear about the book's scope: to give a straightforward (but not neutral) account of his selected territory, to draw attention to works which are most frequently missed, and to argue through his assertion that '"ideas" take on meaning according to the discursive context or historical tradition within which they are taken up' (pp. xii–xiii). Thus Easthope remarks in his preface that 'to write a history . . means constructing that history. *British post-structuralism* will welcome the necessity to be polemic, to mark out a preference and name a tradition' (p. xii). He further defines his project as being concerned with what he sees as being Britain's most distinct contributions to the field of Post-Structuralism, contributions which focus in upon the status and construction of the (human) subject, including work in textual studies which examines the convoluted relations between texts and subjects. The not inconsiderable problems of epistemology raised by certain areas of the material under discussion are also singled out and given careful exposition and analysis.

Each of the central chapters of *British Post-Structuralism* covers what are seen to be the major effects of the influence of French theory upon particular disciplines, as well as the writings which have resulted from the intermingling of French and British thought. There are ten chapters which are so conceived, covering the following specific spheres: film theory, cultural studies, the social sciences, historical studies, psychology, art history, musicology, philosophy, literary theory, and deconstruction. This set of what might be called case-studies are preceded by chapters outlining and putting into context the central tenets—if I may employ such a term—of Post-Structuralist thought, and this contextualization is extended to a description of the idiosyncratic nature of left-wing theory in its British form. Beginning with the work of Raymond Wilhams and the New Left one encounters an account of the transformation of the indigenous cultural analyses with the introduction into the United Kingdom of, notably, the writings of the Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser. This theoretical transition takes place not only in the work of such mobile writers as Terry Eagleton but also within the in some ways tightly policed pages of the journals *Screen* and *New Left Review*. Indeed these two journals together form what came to be the most important and influential arena for Post-Structuralist interventions into this country's spaces of Marxist debate.

The concluding sections of the book comprise a summary and several appendices, in the first of which Easthope presents an outline of Mike Westlake's *Imaginary Women* (1987), a work which, we are told, indicates that 'in Britain post-structuralism has not been confined to a merely theoretical intervention' (p 223). Easthope's claim that this work is 'the most significant contribution to the English novel since the publication here of Beckett's *Murphy* in 1938' (p. 228) is very grand, particularly as he makes no reference to, say, the many Post-Structuralist influenced texts of the English novelist Christine Brooke-Rose, whose innovative books precede that of Westlake by at least some fifteen years. There follows a discussion of relevant conferences and journals, which in turn is supplemented by an interview with Jacques Derrida, reprinted from the *Literary Review*. There is an extensive bibliography and a fairly comprehensive index.

Midway through his final chapter, 'Post-structuralism and the English Tradition', Easthope gives us a sentence which might well be used as a summary of the necessarily complex scope of his book: 'At three points British post-structuralism engages critically with English national culture: over the real, over the subject, over the transparency of discourse' (p. 207). A few pages further along this is followed by the deliberately restrained claim that 'work in England has produced two definite advances in theoretical and applied understanding: a critique of the subject especially relevant to the human sciences; a version of textual analysis in terms of position offered to the reader which has application to all forms of signifying practice' (p. 215). Though Easthope's book is a densely packed amalgam of details deployed in an explication of these central themes the spotlight nevertheless falls on figures whose prominent influence justifies the space given

over to them: Althusser and Derrida, particularly the former, from France and, in Britain itself Terry Eagleton, Catherine Belsey, Colin MacCabe, Stephen Heath, Barry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst (whose deeply-set disagreements with E. P Thompson over readings of Marx, of history and of political comprehension in general are the subject of two interesting chapters of the book). *British Post-Structuralism* is, then, a most informative record of the interface between French and British-based debates during the last twenty or so years. As a participant in such debates its author does not, and could not convincingly pretend to be presenting a neutral account. This factor most problematically makes itself evident in the form of exclusions, deliberate or not, of discussions and criticisms of books such as Belsey's *Critical Practice* by writers who do not share Easthope's overt enthusiasm for such 'radical' work (I am thinking in particular of S. J. Wilsmore's paper 'The New Attack on Humanism in the Arts', *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol. 27, No. 4, Autumn 1987, but there are surely others). Such partial exclusions aside *British Post-Structuralism* has, as the first comprehensive map of the terrain in question to be produced, much to offer, deserving a close reading reflecting Easthope's own ambitious and authoritative research.

PETER SUCHIN

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
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THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS

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ERRATUM: In Volume 30, No. 3 (July 1990) the sub heading to the memorial notice for John Fisher (p. 277) should have read:

21 FEBRUARY 1922 – 23 SEPTEMBER 1989

We very much regret and apologize for the incorrect heading that was printed. (Ed.)

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Members of the British Society of Aesthetics who have not yet seen the special issue of *Dialectics and Humanism: The Polish Philosophical Quarterly*, guest-edited by Harold Osborne, will be interested to learn that this is now available. The issue (Vol. XV, No 1/2, 1988) is published under the thematic title 'Art and Philosophy: Mutual Connections and Inspirations' and is available price US $4.50 from *Dialectics and Humanism*, ul. Miodowa 10, 00–251 Warsaw, Poland.

Members of the Society who live within easy reach of Nottingham may be interested to know that Nottingham University has a flourishing Society for Philosophical Aesthetics. This has a full programme of papers and talks every academic year from October to May. For further information contact Dieter Peetz, Dept. of Philosophy, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, telephone Nottingham (0602) 484848.

The University of Edinburgh Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities invites applications from scholars holding a doctorate or equivalent for Visiting Research Fellowships tenable for periods of between two and six months from May 1991 to September 1993. The deadline for receipt of applications is 30 November 1990. Inquiries should be addressed to the Director, Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities, University of Edinburgh, Hope Park Square, Edinburgh EH8 9NW, Scotland.

The Section Philosophical Anthropology and Aesthetics of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Amsterdam is organizing a multi-disciplinary congress on 'Style in Philosophy and the Arts' to be held from 3 to 5 April 1991. The October First 1990 deadline for papers will have passed by the time readers see this notice but for details of registration, attendance, etc., please contact Drs R. van de Vall, University of Amsterdam, Dept of Philosophy, Nieuwe Doelenstraat 15, 1012 CP Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 30, No. 4, October 1990

ART, LIFE AND REALITY

David Novitz

ART, PEOPLE sometimes like to think, is somehow removed from the real world. Whatever their reasons for thinking this, it is plain that for them at least the distinction between art and reality is both obvious and uncontroversial. That it is neither, and that the distinction fairly brims with problems, is by now well known.[1] Much more important is the fact that some of these problems are actually instructive, and help reveal the intricate yet subtle ways in which art finds its place in everyday life.

I. ART AND REALITY

The distinction between art and reality has a long and uneven history. Its unevenness, and many of the difficulties which attend it, stem from the fact that the distinction finds its origin in several quite disparate and conflicting sources. The fountainhead, of course, was Plato. It is, I think, because of the way in which he opposed art to reality that many people persist in thinking of art as something which comments on reality, which represents it, imitates it, but which for this reason cannot be a part of it. Art, they like to think, is *about* the real world, *refers* to it, and so must be something different from it.

If, on this view, the art work is to serve its proper function and so qualify as good art, it will do little more than provide a channel through which to apprehend reality. The best art, therefore, is never the focus of our attention. What we attend to are the realities it lays bare. Ideally we should hardly notice, and we certainly should not attend to, the physical features of the art work, although as Plato acknowledges, art seldom allows us to satisfy this ideal. Instead, through various ploys and embellishments which appeal to the senses and the appetites, art works draw attention to themselves and distort the reality that they purport to represent. The best art is, in a manner of speaking, transparent, and leads the eager intellect to a direct apprehension of reality. The worst emphasizes appearances, embodies these, and effectively occludes the reality it purports to reveal.

Plato, of course, made no secret of his low regard for artists. On his view, artists were not just weak in will and intellect, but confused by the muses, and confounded by their senses and their appetites, they simply could not, in their drunken stupor, do the job demanded of them. From a Platonic point of view, the history of art can be seen as the struggle of wayward artists to free themselves from the constraints of reason and reality, and to draw attention

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instead to the succulent and seductive features of their art works. At first imperceptibly, but after the Middle Ages with ever increasing frequency, embellishment and form came to be emphasized until, in the twentieth century, a good deal of art abandoned altogether the attempt to draw attention to reality, and was satisfied instead to draw attention to the art work itself.

The rise of formalism and abstract impressionism herald the total rejection of the Platonic ideal of art. Art no longer purports to reveal hidden realities, but presents itself as a real object with real properties that deserve scrutiny. Not only is there a shift in artistic emphasis, but there is an accompanying shift in ontology. No longer is reality to be found in the intellectual and somewhat ghostly realm of imperceptible Forms; rather, following in the wake of eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century scientism, it is to be found in what is perceptible, tangible and wholly available to the senses. And so, in the twentieth century, works of art parade their reality by inviting their viewers to attend to their physical features and to nothing else. Art ceases to comment on, to refer to, to imitate and to represent. Instead it *presents* us with an imaginatively crafted but entirely real object which is to be attended to in its own right.

The rise of this movement plainly signals a second view of the distinction between art and reality. No longer is it the case (as Plato maintained) that unreal art imitates a world of hidden and immutable realities. Rather, the art work is thought of as real in its own right, so that there is no proper distinction to be drawn between art and reality. Those who defend this view sometimes take it one step further. According to Oscar Wilde, 'Art begins with abstract decoration', but this does not entail its unreality, for on his view 'Life becomes fascinated with this new wonder', and, in the end, imitates art more than art imitates life.[2] As if to rub salt into Plato's wounds, art is thought of not just as a part of reality; it becomes a touchstone, a measure, of reality, while life, for the most part, becomes no more than a pale imitation of art.

2. WILDE AND WIDE OF THE MARK

The claim that art is reality, the measure of all truth, and that life merely imitates it, will strike the seasoned ear as hearty nonsense. None the less, I shall argue that the claim is not entirely silly, that while unacceptable, it has something to commend it. In arguing this, I will probe the boundaries at which art and life intersect; boundaries, I shall show, that are not as settled as we sometimes like to think.

According to Wilde, 'Life imitates Art. . . . Life is in fact the mirror, and Art the reality'.[3] Here he speaks not just of the lives that people lead, but of nature itself. And so he asks:

> Where, if not from the impressionists, do we get those wonderful brown fogs that come creeping down our streets, blurring the gas-lamps and changing the houses into monstrous shadows? To whom, if not to them and their master, do we owe

> the lovely silver mists that brood over our river, and turn to faint forms of fading grace curved bridge and swaying barge? The extraordinary change that has taken place in the climate of London during the last ten years is entirely due to this particular school of Art.[4]

Wilde's argument for this is simple but wrong. 'Things are', he writes, 'because we see them, and what we see, and how we see it, depends on the Arts that have influenced us.'[5] It follows from this that without art nothing can exist because we are not able to look for and see things, and so bring them into existence. Even if we ignore Wilde's phenomenalism, it seems abundantly clear that objects exist even when those people or animals who experience them have little or no experience of art. The ultra-modern telephone on my desk exists even though I know of no work of art that portrays it, while my cat in his innocence makes a dash for the chicken liver even though he has no acquaintance with an artistic rendition of it. We need to remind ourselves, and Oscar Wilde too, that his concept of art is culturally and historically specific; that this concept emerged in our history in order to mark a discrete category of skills, performances and objects only in the eighteenth century. Much more obvious is the fact that there are societies that have no art in Wilde's sense of this term, but for whom the world continues to exist.

Happily Wilde seems to recognize some of these problems, since it soon becomes apparent that he does not altogether adhere to his theory. Not four sentences later he changes his mind, and tells us that 'There may have been fogs for centuries in London. I dare say there were. But no one saw them, and so we do not know anything about them'.[6] And so it seems that he is now willing to believe that objects exist whether or not we perceive them. But then, in an immediate reversion to the stronger thesis, he writes: 'They [the fogs] did not exist until Art had invented them'.[7]

It is tempting to suppose that Wilde must be profoundly confused, but this seems unlikely. An intelligent man, even if he is a poet, must be able to see a contradiction when it waves at him. An alternative and more plausible suggestion is that the rhetorician in Wilde is taking over, and that by moving to the weaker thesis whenever the stronger becomes embarrassing, and to the stronger whenever the weaker becomes uninteresting, he hopes to lure uncritical readers to a particular point of view. This may well be the case, but it is more charitable to suppose that Wilde has chanced on something important, that at the very point at which he wishes to see art as an end in itself, he recognizes the profound influence that it has on the shape of our world, on the hue of our thinking, and on our everyday behaviour. He does not just wish to say that 'Life imitates Art far more than Art imitates Life',[8] but, more profoundly, that art is a formative influence in our lives, that it actually brings things and states of affairs into being. And yet it seems wild to suggest that art is the origin of all things; that it was not God, nor yet a Big Bang, but art that created the world and all that is in it.

In what follows I want to try and defend Wilde's supposed insight in a way that does not require us to embrace the absurd. There is a sense, I shall argue, in which art is a deeply formative influence in the human world. This, I will try to show, is why art is inextricably bound up with everyday life—with real practices, actions, artefacts and institutions. However, there is no reason to suppose that art is the source of everything. The Impressionists may well have brought the London fogs to our attention, we may not even have noticed them prior to the work of these artists, but it was coal, smoke and damp, not art, that caused them.

3. ART AND LIFE

Wilde, it would seem, is unable to divorce his more innocuous epistemological claims about art (namely, that it influences our perception and shapes our behaviour) from the bolder, more strident, metaphysical claim that art is the source and causal origin of everything. Art, he believes, must be more than merely influential; it must be formative. But he hopelessly overstates his case by contending that it is causally responsible for everything: that it (not God or the Big Bang) was the first, the very first, cause. Any such claim, if taken seriously, would require art to exist without artists, and this so changes our concept of art that we can no longer understand the claim, let alone take it seriously.

On my view, Wilde is correct in thinking that art is more than merely influential; that it is also formative. But a more modest case needs to be made for this, and a good place to start is with Francis Sparshott's observation that traditionally an art was conceived of as a practice consisting of an organized package of more or less integrated skills.[9] In this sense, medicine is an art, as are plumbing and sheep shearing. All consist of sets of skills often housed within institutional frameworks that perpetuate and regulate them.

It is precisely because doctors and shearers have an interest in doing their job well that they think about, and try to improve, their skills. Consequently, the skills themselves, and not merely the ends that they serve, become objects of attention. It is, according to Sparshott, when an art (an organized body of skills) come to be treated as an end rather than as a means, that the fine arts begin to emerge.[10]

Oscar Wilde, of course, was speaking of the formative influence of the *fine* arts, and it becomes possible, I now want to argue, to explain the formative power of these arts if, following Sparshott, we allow that each fine art has its origin in a body of practical skills. It is true, of course, that the application of the skills that constitute a fine art usually result in the production of an artefact which is thought of as a work of art. However, we must not allow the work of art to occlude our awareness of the skills that underlie it, for it is here—within this cluster of skills—that art and life properly intersect.

It is difficult to speak in detail or with authority about the origins of all the

fine arts. The recorded history of art goes only so far, and there comes a point at which it merely speculates about origins. Even so, theorists and art historians generally locate the source of fine art in the everyday practical concerns of human beings. There is good reason for this. It is all but impossible to look at a painting, a drama, a sculpture or a dance without being aware, however remotely, of the practical skills exercised in these works of art. E. H. Gombrich's conjecture that representational art takes root in the human desire to control the environment seems plausible only because we can understand why people think that they can use representations (and hence the skills that they presuppose) in this way.[11] They can, of course, use them stupidly, believing them to have causal or magical powers that they do not have, but pictures and paintings can also be used to draw our attention to objects that are not available for inspection. In this respect the skills of representing have an obvious practical value, for they not only facilitate the communication of attitudes and information, but enable us to negotiate situations of which we have no firsthand experience.

Literature provides an even better example. Poets and novelists are normally skilled in the use of language, and while we do not usually assess their work for the practical value of their skills, it would none the less be wrong to deny that they have practical value. Facility with language is always useful. However, the skills of the novelist and playwright reach further than this. Each constructs an imaginary world, and does so with considerable expertise. These are worlds inhabited by fictional people who are, of course, the product of an author's imaginings. Needless to say, the author does more than merely invent and populate fictional worlds, for a story is usually told in which the characters are made to act out parts of their lives.

Authorial skill, therefore, resides both in inventing a world of people and in telling a story about them. Of course, the ways in which authors tell their stories is itself invented—a product, one might say, of their creative imaginings. However, it is only in the telling that characters are allowed to act out their lives, and to do so in more or less sensible and skilful ways. To the reader it will seem as if the characters themselves possess certain skills, for they have at their disposal strategies of one sort or another for dealing with morally and physically demanding situations—for solving dilemmas, dealing with intruders, consoling their friends, combatting their enemies, and so on. Whether or not these skills actually belong to fictional characters matters not at all. What is important for my argument is that they take root in skills that are part and parcel of everyday life, and that they are perceived as a result to be skills that are eminently useful. It is hardly surprising, then, that the skills exhibited by creatures of fiction should influence the ways in which people act in the real world and the solutions that they adopt to everyday problems.[12]

By the same token, the ways in which people actually act and the skills that they display in the real world inevitably affect the imaginings and inventions

of authors and artists. They furnish the artist with hard experience on which to build imaginatively. But the matter does not end here, for the imaginative transformation of these practices and skills in a work of art at once suggests new ways of acting and behaving to actual people in the actual world.

The relation between life and art (or between life-skills and the fine arts) is reciprocal or dialectical. So, for instance, the pose that a portrait artist encourages in a subject may influence the ways in which people pose in real life—the ways, that is, in which they choose to present themselves to others. But since people generally have an interest in presenting themselves favourably, they reflect on and develop enhanced skills of 'impression management' which, in their turn, might become fuel for an artist's imaginative experiments, and so on.

It is of course true that the interactions between art and life which lead to the development of representational skills will be very different from the interactions that lead to the development of more painterly skills: the skills, for instance, of applying a brush to canvas. Here the developments, say, in colour photography may suggest painterly skills of one sort or another, while subsequent painterly developments in the use of colour may suggest new techniques to the photographer. Whatever the skills and the dialectical interactions from which they derive, the process of their development is in each case fundamentally similar. It involves conjuring up and testing possible techniques, rejecting them when they do not work, and inventing in their stead new techniques. This is the creative, fanciful, or originative imagination at work; and on my view it is at work in just this way whenever one attempts to improve and develop not just artistic skills, but any skill whatsoever.

The reason is obvious, for whenever we run out of know-how and are unable to solve a particular problem by recourse either to our own skills, the skills of others, or the skills encoded in instruction manuals, we are forced to 'cast around', to imagine, conjure up, or invent new ways of proceeding.[13] There are, of course, no clear guidelines which regulate this activity. It is what Kant would have called an 'unruly' activity constrained only by one's past experience—that is, by one's knowledge or beliefs about which techniques are likely and which are unlikely to work. In attending to and devising alternative skills, we project ourselves imaginatively into certain problem situations. We imagine how these techniques would work, and in this way we develop practical hypotheses which we test on the appropriate occasion.

The process, I have said, is fundamentally imaginative, and is the same for all skills—from those involved in writing and bricklaying to those involved in aeroplane maintenance and statecraft. To the extent that a newly invented technique serves its intended purpose and enables, say, a carpenter to solve a joinery problem, or an artist to capture a subject's mood, it will be adopted and will become part of a body of established skills. But whether these skills are artistic or purely technical, the process whereby one invents and so

develops new skills remains precisely the same. It is, as I have said, a process that is fundamentally fanciful; one, moreover, that permeates all walks of life—so that the distinction between art on the one hand, and the practical skills that we live by on the other, becomes rather more tenuous than some have supposed.

Think again of all the many tasks that people perform, and are required to perform on pain of survival. They do not merely make, cultivate and tend, but they are required to co-operate with one another in order to produce goods and reproduce people. The skills involved in all of these basic chores are manifestly complex. If, for instance, you wish me to behave in a way that meets your needs, you will have to ensure my co-operation. You could, of course, do so by force, by winning political power, by argument and persuasion, or else by presenting yourself in ways that incline me to co-operate with you. *How* you do all of this will, of course, depend on your past experience, but you may, if you feel the matter keenly enough, reflect on what you do and try to do it better. The ways in which you present yourself to me, the ways in which you speak about yourself and relate incidents in your life, the way you dress and wear your hair, your use of body language and bonding signs may be immaculately and imaginatively crafted. At least as much imaginative effort and skill may go into all of this as an artist lavishes on a painting or a poem. One can craft, model and shape one's life-narratives, one's appearance, one's behaviour, in ways designed to win the approval of, and in this sense seduce, an audience. And this, of course, is precisely what the conscientious artist tries to do. Oscar Wilde, but so too Salvador Dali and Pablo Picasso, were cases in point: and each crafted themselves in ways designed to win approval for their art and respect for their artistry.

If I am right, and if it is true that the fanciful imagination and its exercise are the province not just of the artist, but of all people in their everyday lives, then, as I have said, the rigid distinction that we like to draw between art and life becomes somewhat less stable. The creativity of the fine arts is to be found as well in the practical skills, the arts, of everyday living; and we have seen that there is a reciprocal, a dialectical, relationship between these practical skills of everyday life and the fine arts. It was, I think, this insight that Wilde was trying to articulate when he maintained that life imitates art more than art imitates life. Wilde, one must suppose, moves freely between that sense of 'art' according to which an art is a practice consisting of an organized body of skills, and the sense of 'art' in which an art is either a fine art or a work of art. What he perhaps saw, however vaguely, was that the skills central to both influence one another, so that life takes its shape both from the arts of living and from the fine arts—although the fine arts, he seems to say, also take some of their substance from life.

Although one cannot draw a hard and fast distinction between art and life, it would be altogether too precipitate to embrace the conclusion (as some are

wont to do) that life and art are one: that life does not imitate art, nor art life, since the two are identical. This, I would venture, is a view that has its origins with the romantics, but it is a view which is confused and which makes the very same mistake that I have attributed to Wilde: it fails, that is, to distinguish adequately between *an art* and *a work of art*. On the view that I have so far defended, an art is a practice that consists of an organized body of skills designed to serve a certain end. Following Sparshott, I have suggested that when an art is considered simply for its own sake, it may become a fine art. It is, however, only when the skills that characterize a fine art result in the production of some or other object, that the object is properly regarded (in our culture) as a work of art.

With these distinctions to hand, it is possible to agree that there can be no rigid distinction between the arts (meaning *organized bodies of skills*) and the practices which characterize everyday life. The organized bodies of skills that constitute the arts are quite often the skills we live by, so that life-skills and arts merge into one another. In one sense, then, the claim that art and life are identical has something to commend it. But there is another sense in which it is plainly false. For if by 'art' is meant *works of art*, it would seem to be abundantly clear that the lives we live or have lived are not art.

Even so, I can imagine someone arguing that we should not dismiss this claim too lightly. Every life, it is argued, is the product of one's life-skills. By attending to and carefully applying the skills and practices integral to living, one can mould, shape and craft one's life in just the way that a sculptor crafts a block of marble to form a statue. The life well lived and properly crafted acquires (on this view) the sort of excellence and perfection—an overall harmony, balance, integration and unity—characteristic of works of art. Certainly not every life is a work of art, but on this view the life well lived is, and should be praised and judged accordingly.

But this position is problematic. According to it, only excellent lives make works of art—and, of course, they always make good works of art. But if excellent lives are good works of art, why shouldn't bad lives be poor works of art? Indeed, why isn't each and every life a work of art irrespective of its merit? The reason is not clear, and yet the thought that every life—from an alcoholic's to Mahatma Gandhi's—should be a work of art is plainly counter-intuitive and does much to devalue the currency of art talk. The obvious way of salvaging the view that only some lives are works of art is by arguing that something becomes a work of art only because of its internal structure and its intrinsic excellence—so that unstructured and indifferent lives cannot be works of art. However, this suggestion fails to take account of the fact that there *are* bad works of art, that it is not merely the skill with which something is executed, nor its intrinsic excellence, nor yet the presence of special properties within it, that makes it a work of art. An excellent tennis match, for instance, although executed with consummate skill, and although in some sense unified,

harmonious and balanced, is not a work of art. In just the same way, the life well lived does not become a work of art just in virtue of its structure or its excellence.

There is a very good reason for this. Not all arts, even when they are attended to in their own right, come to be regarded as fine arts. The arts of leather and metal work, sheep shearing and baking, are often considered as ends themselves. There are, as everyone knows, baking and sheep shearing contests whose aim is not to produce cakes or bales of wool, but to assess and perfect the skills involved in these activities. Despite this, not one of these arts has come to be regarded as a fine art. By the same token, psychologists often consider life-skills not as a means to solving their personal problems, but as ends in themselves—and they try to devise ways of perfecting them. But this, of course, is not sufficient to convert the art of living into a fine art. The culture to which we belong, and, more specifically, the artistic theories and conventions that characterize the prevailing art world within our culture, determine what will or will not be considered a fine art. For the moment these do not allow us to include the skills of everyday living under the banner of the fine arts, so that the product that results from the application of these skills—namely, one's life—is not properly a work of art. All of this may change as our culture grows and changes, and it is, of course, more than possible that the highly contrived lives of Oscar Wilde and Salvador Dali already herald an end to this restriction.

4. CONCLUSION

There clearly is a sense in which art and life are different and distinct. Our lives, no matter how much we praise and revere them, are not works of art. There is, however, another sense in which art and life are not easily distinguished, for the arts are often the skills we live by. My argument in the latter part of this paper has been that these skills do not differ in kind from the skills that characterize the fine arts. If I am right, they are developed in precisely the same ways—through the good offices of the fanciful or creative imagination. Fancy, I have argued here and elsewhere, enters our practical lives at many points, although this, I have said, does not convert our everyday arts into fine arts. What counts as a fine art, and what counts as a work of art, must depend on features of our culture, and not on the excellence of our skills or on the properties of the objects that they are used to produce.

It is true, of course, that reality consists of everything that exists—so that in some sense art must be real. But this observation, while both sane and sage, does little to unravel the complexities that beset the many different attempts to distinguish art from reality. My aim in the initial stages of this paper was to do no more than hint at this complexity and the metaphysical underpinnings responsible for it.

Oscar Wilde's bold claim that art is reality, that it is the measure of all truth,

and that life merely imitates it, seemed similarly metaphysical, although absurdly false. On a closer and more charitable examination, however, it appeared that Wilde was impressed by the fact that the skills by which we live are themselves arts that are shaped by, and help shape, the fine arts. Life and art, I have tried to show, are intimately and intricately involved—although the precise and sometimes lurid details of their involvement must await another time and place.

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[1] See, for example, John Hospers, 'Art and Reality' in Sidney Hook (ed.), *Art and Philosophy* (New York U.P., 1966), as well as the various responses to Hospers's article in Part III of the volume.

[2] Oscar Wilde, 'The Decay of Lying' in James B. Hall and Barry Ulanov (eds.), *Modern Culture and the Arts*, Second Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), p. 7.

[3] Ibid., p. 11.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid., p. 14.

[9] Francis Sparshott, *The Theory of the Arts* (Princeton U.P., 1982), pp. 25–6.

[10] Ibid., p. 30. It is important to recognize that treating such skills as ends rather than as means is necessary but not sufficient for fine art. I shall return to this point presently.

[11] E. H. Gombrich, *Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation*. Third Edition (London: Phaidon Press, 1968), pp. 93–6.

[12] On the ways in which we acquire skills from fiction, see my *Knowledge, Fiction and Imagination* (Philadelphia: Temple U.P., 1987), Chapter Six.

[13] For more detailed argument in support of this view, see my *Knowledge, Fiction and Imagination*, Chapter Three.

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THE PARALLEL FALLACY: ON COMPARING ART AND SCIENCE

David Topper

THE PROPOSITION

AN ILLOGICAL proposition often lurks within comparative discussions of art and science. Coming under various guises, the proposition may be written in abstract form as follows:

> The art work X would not exist without the artist Y, whereas the scientific theory P would exist without the scientist Q; these two precepts therefore reveal a fundamental difference between art and science.

The following statements are concrete examples of the precepts of the proposition:

A. The *Mona Lisa* would not exist without Leonardo da Vinci, whereas the Theory of Relativity would exist without Albert Einstein.
B. *Heart of Darkness* would not exist without Joseph Conrad, whereas the Newtonian Laws of Motion would exist without Isaac Newton.
C. *Nineteen Eighty-Four* would not exist without George Orwell, whereas the Theory of Evolution would exist without Charles Darwin.

It is, of course, possible to generate an indefinite number of such statements, simply by inserting appropriate terms for X, Y, P, & Q.[1]

Another variation of the proposition appears in an essay by Michael Polanyi, where he interjects, within a discussion of aesthetics, a digression on Kepler's discovery of the Third Law of planetary motion. Polanyi first quotes Kepler expressing his sense of awe at his discovery; in typical Keplerian fashion, Kepler says that 'the most marvellous contemplation has shone forth—nothing holds me; I will indulge my sacred fury'. Polanyi then comments upon this passage as follows:

> This passion resembles that evoked by a great work of art, but there is a difference: the emotions of discovery are not transmitted to the student; he learns of the proportionality of cubes and squares in the planetary system [i.e., the Third Law] without being deeply moved by this fact. The difference seems due to the fact that the feelings evoked by a work of art even in the viewer as distinct from the creator are existential rather than intellectual. Kepler himself did undergo a triumphant transformation when his discovery changed the image of the universe, but this experience had to remain his own.[2]

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Thus Polanyi believes his comparison entails something unique about science.

The argument to be developed in this paper is that the proposition and its variants are false. Moreover, the source of error lies in the juxtaposition of the precepts, for all the 'elements' (for example, X, Y, P, Q) are not comparable or 'parallel'. In short, such comparisons commit the 'parallel fallacy'.[3]

THE FALLACY

Since the argument presented here involves comparisons (or parallels), matters may be clarified by making charts or diagrams consisting of columns for 'art' and 'science', and a series of rows for comparative elements of each. Thus the logic of statement A may be diagrammed as in Figure 1. Such diagrams should be viewed as heuristics for clarifying thought, not emblems for ossifying it.

Art	Science
Leonardo	Einstein
Mona Lisa	Theory of Relativity

Figure 1. Fallacious Comparison of Leonardo da Vinci's *Mona Lisa* with Albert Einstein's Theory of Relativity.

The first parallel involves the artists and scientists themselves as makers or doers of art and science; clearly they embody the same elements or facets ('creators', for short) within their corresponding realms. Hence Leonardo and Einstein are placed parallel under art and science, respectively.

In order to see the fallacy in the proposition (Fig. 1), it is helpful to insert another element (or row) in the diagram (see the third row of Fig. 2). This

Realm	Art	Science
Creator	Leonardo	Einstein
World	Mona Lisa	moving bodies
Artefact	*Mona Lisa*	1905 paper
Theory	?	Theory of Relativity

Figure 2. Corrected Parallels for Leonardo and Einstein.

second element consists of what may be called the objects of the world being represented or modelled by the creators. For Leonardo it is the person Mona Lisa; for Einstein it is bodies in motion. As will be seen, the details of this element (the 'world', for short) are not crucial to the argument. Thus whether

'Mona Lisa' was the sitter's real name or whether she even existed (probably she did not) is not problematic here; imaginary entities in both art (unicorns) and science (super-strings) are sufficient for generating 'worlds'. What is not irrelevant, however, is the fact that Mona Lisa (the person) would (or could) exist (really or imaginatively) without Leonardo. This is a non-trivial statement; just as is the following: moving bodies exist without Einstein.[4]

The next row on the diagram presents a crucial juncture in the argument. Statement A parallels the painting *Mona Lisa* with Einstein's Theory of Relativity (Fig. 1). This is the locus in the logic where the fallacy exposes itself.

Consider first the *Mona Lisa*, which I should like to call the artistic 'artefact'. It is an oil painting of a specific size; brushstrokes and choices of colours are applied in a particular way; the composition, the placement of hands and body, and the background specify this unique picture. Without a doubt the *Mona Lisa* (as an individual artefact) would not exist without Leonardo.

Can the same be said of the Theory of Relativity? Statement A, of course, implies 'No', and since Einstein's Theory is placed in same row as Leonardo's painting, it is concluded in the proposition that this reveals a fundamental difference or distinctness between art and science. But I submit that this argument is fallacious because the wrong element for science has been placed in the 'artefact' row: the scientific parallel for Leonardo's painting should really be Einstein's paper, 'On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies', published in volume 17 of the *Annalen der Physik* in 1905. This is the unique artefact created by Einstein. Without him, that scientific paper, with its particular postulates and deductions, would never have existed. Surely no one would have written a scientific paper beginning with the sentence, 'It is known that Maxwell's electrodynamics—as usually understood at the present time—when applied to moving bodies, leads to asymmetries which do not appear to be inherent in the phenomena'.[5] Thus Einstein's monumental paper, like Leonardo's masterpiece, would not exist without Einstein. Accordingly, Einstein's paper, not the Theory of Relativity, is to be placed in the 'artefact' row parallel to the *Mona Lisa* (Fig. 2).

It follows then that statement A and its variants are fallacious, and that no fundamental differences between art and science are implied by the proposition.

WHERE ARE THEORIES?

If this argument is correct thus far, then where is the Theory of Relativity to be placed on the diagram? Since the Theory is not parallel to the *Mona Lisa*, it apparently requires its own row 'below' the artefact row in the science column (Fig. 2). But what does it mean to separate an artefact and the so-called 'theory' supposedly embodied within it? What are the implied dynamical relationships between such elements (for example, between Einstein's 1905 paper and the Theory of Relativity)?

This is a complex issue, which, as far as I know, has not been profoundly explored. In what follows I hope to provide a sketch of this relationship; despite its rudimentary nature, this outline should suffice for clarifying the parallelism problem.

I begin with the following assertion: Einstein's 1905 paper 'On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies' is not an exposition of the Theory of Relativity. As well, analogous declarations may be proliferated indefinitely: for example, Darwin's *Origin of Species* (1859) is not an exposition of the Theory of Evolution; Newton's *Principia* (1687) is not an exposition of Newtonian mechanics; and so forth. Strange as they may seem, these pronouncements contain at their core a fundamental truth.

There is, of course, a superficial sense in which the 'theories' are in the artefacts—for the latter are surely the source of the former. But the crucial point is that theories are abstractions from the original sources; they are distillations and extrapolations of the artefacts; they contain both more and less of what the author first wrote. In short, there is a disjunction between theory and artefact which reveals more about their essential natures than any similarities; for ultimately theories stand autonomous, unfettered to their source.

But if theories are not 'embodied' within artefacts, where then do they so-to-speak reside? I submit that theories are to be found elsewhere—mainly in lectures and textbooks. Evidence for this may be gleaned from the written material itself. Any standard text on 'relativity' bears little resemblance to Einstein's original papers. Or compare any book on evolution with Darwin's *Origin*, a work which does not even contain the word 'evolution';[6] the textbook and the primary source barely resemble each other.

This argument is supported further by a personal anecdote. Many years ago, upon completing an undergraduate course in Newtonian mechanics, I came across a copy of Newton's *Principia* while browsing in the college library. I recall opening the book with a certain anticipation, expecting to find something resembling the material in my mechanics textbook. At least, I expected to see the equation 'F=ma' clearly postulated near the start of the book. What I found, however, first surprised me: the text of the *Principia* (it was the English translation) bore no resemblance to my textbook; there were numerous geometrical diagrams which I could not recognize; and the written text—with phrases such as 'accelerative force will stand in the same relation to motive, as celerity does to motion'—read like a foreign language. My surprise thus turned to confusion; after perusing the book for some time I found nothing familiar or comprehensible. I therefore closed the *Principia*, placed it back on the library shelf, and walked away dumbfounded.

I'm sure my experience is not atypical of those who have made such a journey from textbook to original source. Indeed, I once related this story at a conference of science historians and was pleased to see the empathetic nodding

of heads in the audience, indicating kindred spirits who clearly shared my experience.[7]

If therefore the artefact is not an exposition of the theory, then it is possible to accept the truth of the second phrase in statement A—i.e., the scientific theory P would exist without the scientist Q—and still assert the falsehood of the proposition that this points to a fundamental difference between art and science. For the proposition is based upon an erroneous comparison, namely, it commits the 'parallel fallacy'.[8]

THE CROSSOVER

The realization of the disjunction between artefact and theory leads to the following question (clearly delineated by the question mark in Fig. 2): What element of art should be placed in the row parallel to 'theory' for science? In fact, does there exist within the realm of art something comparable to the 'textbook' in science?

A seemingly appropriate answer is 'Yes'. And, indeed a number of comparative examples come to mind: Leonardo's treatises on painting and perspective; Alberti's treatise on art and architecture; other such treatises by Vitruvius, Dürer, or Palladio; workbooks, sketchbooks, and various 'how-to-draw' manuals for artists; and so forth. But then, again, are these examples of art or science?

To answer this requires an initial compounding of the problem by considering the role of 'aesthetics'—certainly an element central to art. But, to be sure, aesthetic matters are not anathema to science, either. Einstein's 1905 artefact is partially based upon the aesthetic argument that there is an 'asymmetry' in the classical interpretation of electrodynamics; Copernicus says, in so many words, that the geocentric model of the heavens is ugly, and that instead the heliocentric system is beautiful, displaying harmony and symmetry; Galileo, in his *Dialogue on the Two Chief World Systems*, grounds his justification for the concept of circular inertia upon the 'order' of a circular system of the heavens.

But 'aesthetics' surfaces not only within the scientific argument in Galileo's book; according to literary experts, the *Dialogue* itself is a masterpiece of seventeenth-century Italian prose. Thus surely it is also a work of art, and Galileo is both scientist and artist. Which way he is classified therefore depends upon how the *Dialogue* is read; a change in viewpoint or context, and the book crosses over from science to art or vice versa.[9] Potentially then, at least, all works of science may be works of art.

But this crossover potentiality is symmetrical between the realms. Thus a Renaissance painting (a work of art such as Piero della Francesca's *Flagellation*) may crossover and be perceived as a scientific study of perspective. Within this context, Piero's painting joins the tracts on theory (treatises, workbooks, manuals, and other writings on art) not as artistic artefacts, but as scientific artefacts. Needless to say, a Leonardo anatomical sketch exhibits the same

duality, for historically such works have been classified as both art and science depending upon the viewers; but the same may be said for the *Mona Lisa*, which is both a study of human physiognomy ('science') and a display of chiaroscuro and sfumato ('art').

On initial reflection, this crossover phenomenon may appear obvious or evident—perhaps banal. Undoubtedly the classic travel book is at once an autobiography, documentary, memoir, novel, or essay on one or more of the following topics—politics, sociology, religion, anthropology, or philosophy. And pointing this out is not necessarily a profound perception, although the tenacity of conventional classification often delimits this realization. Nevertheless, from the vantage of the parallel fallacy, the apprehension of the crossover clarifies matters; for, despite the consequential fluidity of the art/science classification, there remains a clear delineation of the realms. Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*, for example, is obviously a work of literature, thusly classified as a novel. It is also, at least partially, autobiographical; Conrad himself has written: 'As for the story itself it is true enough in its essentials'. Moreover, the work is a critical essay on nineteenth-century colonialism in Africa (the subject being 'criminality', according to Conrad), and it was primarily viewed within this context at the time of publication (1899).[10] Less specifically, *Heart of Darkness* is a philosophical disquisition on human nature, especially the problem of evil.

Similarly George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is, from a literary viewpoint, a novel of a (then) future society—a dystopian fiction within the category of art-theory. But it decidedly was (and is) a monograph of political theory; for a 'theory' of totalitarianism may be 'abstracted' from Orwell's book and thusly be treated as a scientific artefact.

These and other examples lead to the dictum: ask an art question and receive an art answer; ask a science question and receive a science answer. Accordingly the interested reader may complete Fig. 2 and create further diagrams for the other examples.

Of course not all artists or scientists (and their artefacts) are able to crossover as easily as the previous examples; indeed most artefacts probably stay put in their original and conventional context. Yet in no manner should the fluidity of those artefacts able to crossover be construed as undermining the argument against the parallel fallacy. Columns may mesh, but the rows remain distinctly defined.[11]

FULL CIRCLE

The last sentence propels the argument back to the parallel fallacy. Thus, to bring the analysis full circle, Polanyi's thesis needs finally to be confronted.

His argument was based in part upon Kepler's statement about his discovery of the Third Law of planetary motion. Now surely the 'passion' evoked by Kepler is not an uncommon experience among scientists (although Kepler may

be a bit vociferous in his expression). As well, similar euphoric feelings are of course part of the artistic experience. One of my favourites, which I read many years ago and have never forgotten, is from the American realist Andrew Wyeth regarding his execution of *Christina's World* (1948): when placing the figure of Christina in the previously painted landscape, 'I put', he writes, 'this pink tone on her shoulder—and it almost blew me across the room'.[12] Even the amateur painter knows something of this experience.

Where Polanyi errs is in asserting that although such artistic feelings are transmitted to the art student, similar scientific feelings are not transmitted to the science student. This inference is true only when the art student is contemplating the art-artefact and the science student the science-textbook. But such comparisons commit the parallel fallacy. Rather, the correct comparisons should be artefact-to-artefact and textbook-to-textbook. For surely the art-textbook is as passionless as any science text. And as anyone who has studied the primary sources of science knows, the guts of scientific creativity are to be found in the artefacts.

Ironically enough, Polanyi 'knows' this, since he quotes Kepler's passionate expression. Yet because he has fallaciously paralleled the wrong elements of art and science, Polanyi concludes that Kepler's 'experience had to remain his own', which (except in the most literal sense, which is true for anyone) unquestionably contradicts what Polanyi himself presents. Perhaps those years of study as a student of science—years spent poring over science textbooks—blinded Polanyi to what ultimately is, although often not discerned as, a simple truth.

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[1] The essential argument of this paper is, in many ways, an expansion of an idea I presented in a letter exchanged with Pierre Auger in *Leonardo* vol. 15, no. 2 (1982), 175–6. Specifically I was challenging the logic of the first sentence in his article 'On Creativity and Discovery in the Fine Arts and in the Natural Sciences', *Leonardo* vol. 14, no. 2 (1981), 144–6. His sentence is a variation of what I have called the proposition: 'If Leonardo da Vinci had not lived, the *Mona Lisa* would not have been painted by anyone . . ., but, if Henri Becquerel had not lived, the phenomenon of radioactivity would have been discovered at some date after 1896'. To be precise, for the science-examples, 'could' may be substituted for 'would', unless one believes that the discovery of scientific laws is inevitable.

[2] Michael Polanyi, 'What is Painting?', *British Journal of Aesthetics* vol. 10 (1970), 225–36, quotation from p. 233. Another example is the following by Harold Osborne, 'Interpretation in Science and Art', *British Journal of Aesthetics* vol. 26 (1986), 3–15: '[A] scientific theory once formulated and accepted is in principle common property, not varying from man to man; but in the arts interpreta-

tion is always subjective, carrying the stamp of the artist's personality' (p. 12).

[3] The allusion is to other such supposedly fallacious arguments such as the 'intentional fallacy' or the 'pathetic fallacy'.

[4] I am of course avoiding the philosophical problems underlying the truism assumed here, namely that the world exists independently of us. Fortunately the problematic nature of that statement does not impinge upon the validity of the argument as a whole.

[5] To be precise, the quotation should be in the original German. An English translation is reprinted in *The Principle of Relativity* (New York: Dover, 1923), pp. 37–65. An improved translation is to be found in Arthur I. Miller, *Albert Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1981), pp. 392–415. Perhaps it should be pointed out that I use the 1905 paper as a synecdoche, for the complete Theory (or Theories) of Relativity (the 'Special' and the 'General') grew out of numerous papers published over several decades.

[6] The last word in Darwin's book (used for the first time) is 'evolved'. Charles Darwin, *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P., 1964). This is a reprint of the first edition.

[7] At the meeting of the Midwest Junto of the History of Science Society at Iowa State University (28 April 1989), I presented my hypothesis on the disjunction of theory and artefact.

[8] Nevertheless, there is a school of thought in the history and philosophy of science—some would call it the 'radical fringe'—which asserts that no scientific theory (or law or even fact) exists independently of human activity. In short, without Newton there are no Newton's Laws, without Einstein no Theory of Relativity, without Roentgen no x-rays. This matter clearly dovetails with the philosophical issue mentioned in note 4, above; and, as with that issue, this matter may be debated independently of the argument in this paper.

[9] It is tempting to assert, as a first approximation, that a 'theory' abstracted from an artefact is scientific if it is based upon the content, and is artistic if it is based upon an analysis of form. But a moment's reflection reveals this content/form distinction—problematic in many applications—will not work here; for example, the literary reading of Galileo's *Dialogue* as Italian prose surely entails a content analysis. As well, it could be argued that Miller's excellent analysis of Einstein's theory (see note 5, above) is as much a consideration of the aesthetics of the 1905 paper itself (within an art-artefact context) as it is a study of the aesthetic argument (among other things) in the science-context; and, accordingly, Einstein's paper may exhibit the crossover phenomenon.

[10] Quoted in Joseph Conrad, *Heart of Darkness: An Authoritative Text, Backgrounds and Sources, Criticisms*, ed. by Robert Kimbrough (New York: W. W. Norton, 1971), pp. 122, 129, & 163.

[11] In another article, now in press, I develop further the manner in which artefacts may crossover from art to science by a change of context. Furthermore, the case is made for considering empiricism as a component of art as well as of science; in the framework of the present paper this would entail adding another ('empirical') element (or row) to the diagram. See 'Natural Science and Visual Art: Reflections on the Interface', in *Beyond History of Science: Essays in Honor of Robert E. Schofield*, ed. E. Garber (Lehigh U.P.). Related to this is the issue of art objects as arguments. Because pictures cannot be propositions, the range of 'theoretical' applications of art objects is partially restricted.

[12] Quoted in Richard Meryman, 'Andrew Wyeth and his Art', *Life Magazine* (14 May 1965), pp. 92–102, quoted on p. 95.

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THE DEATH OF THE AUTHOR: AN ANALYTICAL AUTOPSY

Peter Lamarque

I

It is now over twenty years since Roland Barthes proclaimed the 'death of the author' and the phrase, if not the fact, is well established in the literary critical community. But what exactly does it mean? I suspect that many Anglo-American aestheticians have tended, consciously or otherwise, to shrug off Barthes's formulation as a mere Gallic hyperbole for their own more sober 'intentionalist fallacy' and thus have given the matter no further attention. In fact, as I will show, the significant doctrines underlying the 'death of the author' are far removed from the convivial debate about intentions and have their sights set not just on the humble author but on the concept of literature itself and even the concept of meaning.

My aim is to identify and analyse the main theses in two papers which are the seminal points of reference for the relevant doctrines: Roland Barthes's 'The Death of the Author' and Michel Foucault's 'What is an Author?'.[1] I will be asking what the theses mean and whether they are true. I will not be discussing in any detail the broader context of the papers either in relation to general currents of thought or with regard to other work by the two theorists. My interest is with the arguments not the authors. I believe that the ideas as formulated in these articles—ideas about authorship, texts, writing, reading—are fundamental to the movement labelled post-structuralism yet are imprecisely expressed and often misunderstood. Submitting them to an analytical study I hope will be instructive not only to those sceptical of Post-Structuralism but also for those supporters who might be unclear about the precise implications.

I will focus on four main theses which strike me as prominent in the papers. These I will dub The Historicist Thesis, The Death Thesis, The Author Function Thesis, and The *Ecriture* Thesis. All are closely interwoven and each has sub-components which will need to be spelt out. It is not my contention that Barthes and Foucault agree at every point—they clearly don't—but in combination they do present a case about authors and texts which has had a powerful influence on the development of a whole school of modern thought.

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II

THE HISTORICIST THESIS

I will use Barthes's own words as a general characterization of the thesis:

> The author is a modern figure, a product of our society. (p. 142)

Foucault speaks of the 'coming into being of the notion of "author" ' at a specific 'moment . . . in the history of ideas' (p. 101). Both locate the birth of the author in post-mediaeval times, a manifestation of the rise of the individual from the Reformation through to the philosophical Enlightenment. I am less concerned with the historical details than with the status (and meaning) of the Historicist Thesis. The idea that written works only acquired authors at a specific time in history clearly needs some explanation. I suggest there are at least three possible explanations, not mutually exclusive, and they will have a bearing on how to interpret the other theses in the overall argument. I should add that I am going to eliminate as uninteresting a merely lexicographical interpretation of the Historicist Thesis, i.e., an interpretation that sees the thesis as about the *word 'author'*. I take it that there could be authors prior to there being a word 'author' just as there can be writers before the word 'writer' and thoughts before the word 'thoughts'. No doubt for some even this is controversial but I do not believe that Barthes and Foucault had lexicography in mind in their defence of the Historicist Thesis.

The first (plausible) interpretation, then, is this:

> A certain conception of a writer (writer-as-author) is modern

For Foucault this conception is highly specific; in effect it is a legal and social conception of authorship. The author is seen as an owner of property, a producer of marketable goods, as having rights over those goods, and also responsibilities: 'Texts, books, and discourses really began to have authors . . . to the extent that authors became subject to punishment' (p. 108). In a similar vein Barthes identifies the author with 'capitalist ideology' (p. 143). I will call this interpretation of the Historicist Thesis the 'social conception', the point being that at a determinate stage in history, according to the thesis, writers (of certain kinds of texts) came to acquire a new social status, along with a corresponding legal and cultural recognition.

Again, I will not debate the truth of this historical claim—I suspect the actual details would not stand up to close scrutiny—but only comment on its theoretical implications. For example, it entails a distinction between an unrestricted notion of writer-*per-se* (any person who writes) and a more restricted notion of writer-as-author, the latter conceived in social or ideological terms. That distinction is useful in showing that the mere act of writing (writing on the sand, jottings on an envelope) does not make an author. An

author so designated is a more weighty figure with legal rights and social standing, a producer of texts deemed to have value. Significantly, the thesis on this interpretation is about social conventions and a class of persons engaged in particular acts: it is not about a persona, a fictional character, or a construct of the text. Being about the personal status of authors it can offer no direct support, as we will see, for either the Author Function Thesis or the *Ecriture* Thesis, both of which conceive the author in impersonal terms.

The second interpretation of the Historicist Thesis I will call the 'criticism conception':

A certain conception of criticism (author-based criticism) is modern

Here the idea is that at a certain stage of history the focus of criticism turned to the personality of the author. Thus Barthes:

> The image of literature to be found in ordinary culture is tyrannically centred on the author, his person, his life, his tastes, his passions, while criticism still consists for the most part in saying that Baudelaire's work is the failure of Baudelaire the man, Van Gogh's his madness, Tchaikovsky's his vice. (p. 143)

This state of affairs arose, according to Barthes, only after the bourgeois revolution which gave prominence to the individual. We can leave it to historians to debate the historical development of author-based criticism. No doubt it is a matter of degree how much critical significance is given at different periods of history to an author's biographical background or personality. Although the author as person (writer, cause, origin, etc.) is again evoked in this interpretation, it is nevertheless distinct from the 'social conception'. No direct implications about criticism follow from the fact that the author comes to be viewed as having rights over a text. Purely formalist criticism is compatible with a state of affairs where an author is accorded a secure legal and social identity.

The third interpretation is the most controversial but also the most interesting:

A certain conception of a text (the authored-text) is modern

This I will call the 'text conception' of the Historicist Thesis. The idea is this, that at a certain point in history (written) texts acquire significance in virtue of being 'authored'. 'There was a time,' Foucault writes, 'when the texts which we today call "literary" (narratives, stories, epics, tragedies, comedies) were accepted, put into circulation, and valorized without any question about the identity of their author' (p. 109). He contrasts this with the case of scientific discourses which, in the Middle Ages, owed their authority to a named provenance (Hippocrates, Pliny, or whoever). A radical change occurred, so Foucault claims, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when literary texts

came to be viewed as essentially 'authored', while scientific writing could carry authority even in anonymity.

These are of course sweeping generalizations which again invite substantial qualification from the scrupulous historian of ideas. For our purposes further clarification is in order. The text conception is itself open to different interpretations. At its simplest it is just the claim that at a specific point in history (perhaps a different point for different discourses) it became important that texts be attributed. A stronger claim is that this attribution actually changed the way texts were understood. That is, they could not be properly understood except as *by so-and-so*. The author attribution carried the meaning, perhaps as personal revelation, expression of belief, seal of authority, or whatever. Foucault probably has in mind at least this latter claim. But from the evidence of his Author Function Thesis, which we will look at later, he seems to want something stronger still for the text conception. The suggestion is that the personal aspects of author attribution disappear altogether. It is not actual causal origins which mark the difference between an authored and an unauthored text but rather certain (emergent) properties of the text itself. The authored-text is viewed as the manifestation of a creative act but what is important is that this yields or makes accessible a distinctive kind of unity, integrity, meaning, interest, and value. And it is these qualities themselves, rather than their relation to some particular authorial performance, which are given prominence under this strengthened version of the Historicist Thesis.

There is a slide then in the text conception from the mere association of text and author to the much fuller conception of a text as a classifiable work of a certain kind fulfilling a purpose, expressing a meaning and yielding a value. I suggest that the plausibility of the Historicist Thesis weakens as it progresses along this scale. In other words the conception of certain pieces of writing as having meaning, unity and value seems much less datable historically (was there ever a time when there was no such conception?) than the mere inclination to highlight author attribution.

III

THE DEATH THESIS

Against this background we can now turn to the second substantive thesis, which I have called the Death Thesis. At its simplest, this merely claims:

> The author is dead

The meaning of the claim, and assessment of its truth, can only be determined relative to the Historicist Thesis, under its different interpretations. The underlying thought is this: that if a certain conception (of an author, a text, etc.) has a definite historical beginning, i.e., arises under determinate historical

conditions, then it can in principle come to an end, when the historical conditions change.

One complication is that the Death Thesis can be read either as a statement of fact or as wishful thinking, i.e., either as a description of the current state of affairs (we simply no longer *have* authors conceived in a certain way) or as a prescription for the future (we no longer *need* authors so conceived, we can now get by without them).[2] Both Barthes and Foucault seem to waver on the question of description and prescription. Barthes, for example, admits that 'the sway of the Author remains powerful' (p. 143) yet in speaking of the 'modern scriptor', in contrast to the Author (pp. 145, 146), he suggests that (modern) writing is no longer conceived as the product of an author. Similarly, Foucault tells us 'we must locate the space left empty by the author's disappearance' (p. 105), the latter thus taken for granted, yet makes a prediction at the end of his paper that the author function, which is his own conception of the author, 'will disappear', i.e., sometime in the future, 'as our society changes' (p. 119).

To see what the Death Thesis amounts to, let us run briefly through the different permutations.

> (A) [In relation to the social conception of the Historicist Thesis] the writer-as-author is dead, or should be

Does the conception of writer-as-author, with a certain social and legal status, still obtain? Surely it does. Authors are still, in Foucault's words, 'subject to punishment' (they can even be sentenced to death); there are copyright laws and blasphemy laws; authors can be sued for libel or plagiarism; they attract interest from biographers and gossips. Authors under this conception are certainly not dead. But should they be killed off? Should we try and rid ourselves of this conception? The question is political and moral, not philosophical. Should we promote a society where all writing is anonymous, where writers have no legal status and no obligations? Maybe. But the point is quite independent of any theoretical argument about *écriture* or the author function, for it is a point about the treatment of actual people in a political and legal system.

> (B) [In relation to the criticism conception of the Historicist Thesis] author-based criticism is dead, or should be

Here we come closest to the Intentionalist Fallacy in that anti-intentionalists can be seen as advancing some such version of the Death Thesis. But note, first, that anti-intentionalists are not committed to a version based on the social conception of authorship, nor indeed to the text conception. Also, second, they are committed only to the normative element (author-based criticism should be dead) not to the descriptive element (it is in fact dead).

Although there is certainly an overlap here between the anti-intentionalists

and Barthes and Foucault it seems to be the only point of contact. If the Death Thesis simply records and endorses the decline of crude author-based criticism then it is of only modest theoretical interest. Of course the debate continues about the proper role of authorial intention in literary criticism but there does seem to be a general consensus that concentration on purely biographical factors—or the so-called personality of an author—is not integral to a serious critical discipline. In fact, as we shall see, it is quite clear that Barthes and Foucault had something more substantial in their sights when they advanced the Death Thesis. Nevertheless, much of the credibility of the thesis undoubtedly trades off the more secure intuitions within the literary critical community that pure author-based criticism is a legitimate target. It is thus important to identify the real Death Thesis as intended by Barthes and Foucault so that we don't find ourselves forced to assent through a mistaken interpretation.

> (C) [In relation to the text conception of the Historicist Thesis] the authored-text is dead, or should be

Does the conception of the authored-text still obtain, that is, the text conceived as having a determinate meaning, as the manifestation of a creative act? Certainly the qualities of unity, expressiveness and creative imagination are still sought and valued in literary works, indeed they are bound up with the very conception of literature. If possession of these is sufficient for something's being an authored-text, then authored-texts are not dead. Remember, though, that an authored-text, on the strong interpretation, is defined independently of its relation to an actual author (or author-as-person). The meaning and unity of an authored-text are explicable not in terms of some real act of creation, some determinate psychological origin, but only as a projection of these in the text itself. This is the import of the Author Function Thesis.

Foucault would accept that literary criticism still retains its conception of the authored-text: in fact he perceives this conception as the foundation of literary criticism. The Death Thesis, then, in this version, must be seen as a prescription not a description. Foucault's project is to get rid of the authored-text itself (along with its concomitant notions of meaning, interpretation, unity, expression, and value). The Author Function, which is the defining feature of an authored-text, is, according to Foucault, 'an ideological product' (p. 119), a repressive and restricting 'principle of thrift in the proliferation of meaning' (p. 118). In effect Foucault's death prescription is aimed at the very concept of a literary work which sustains the practice of literary criticism (it is also aimed, more broadly, at any class of work subject to similar interpretative and evaluative constraints). The prescription has little to do with the role or status of authors as persons.

Seen in this light, it is no defence against Foucault's attack to point out that the literary institution has long ceased to give prominence to an author's

personality. That would be to give undue weight to the weaker versions of the Death Thesis. There is no room for the complacent thought that Foucault is just another anti-intentionalist. On the other hand, Foucault cannot find support for his attack on the authored-text merely through an appeal to the inadequacy of crude author-based criticism. He has in effect pushed the debate beyond the author altogether.

IV

THE AUTHOR FUNCTION THESIS

The Author Function Thesis is intended to provide further support for the strong version (i.e., version (C)) of the Death Thesis. Although the notion is never explicitly defined by Foucault, the central idea is that the author function is a property of a discourse (or text) and amounts to something more than its just being written or produced by a person (of whatever status): 'there are a certain number of discourses that are endowed with the "author function", while others are deprived of it' (p. 107).

We can identify a number of separate components of the thesis which help to clarify the notion of 'author function'. First there is the distinctness claim:

(1) The author function is distinct from the author-as-person (or writer)

Foucault makes it clear that the author function 'does not refer purely and simply to a real individual' (p. 113). He complicates the exposition by often using the term interchangeably with 'the author'; however, the term 'author' itself is not intended as a direct designation of an individual. He says that 'it would be . . . wrong to equate the author with the real writer' (p. 112) and he speaks of the author as 'a certain functional principle' (p. 119).

What are the grounds for postulating an impersonal conception of an author as distinct from a personal conception? Foucault does not simply have in mind the literary critical notion of an 'implied author', i.e., a set of attitudes informing a work which might or might not be shared with the real author. For one thing Foucault's author function is not a construct specific to individual works but may bind together a whole *oeuvre*; and whereas an implied author is, as it were, just one fictional character among others in a work, the author function is more broadly conceived as determining the very nature of the work itself.[3]

One of the arguments that Foucault offers for the distinctness claim (1), indeed it is also his justification for describing the author as an 'ideological product' (p. 119), rests on a supposed discrepancy between the way we normally conceive the author as a person (i.e., as a genius, a creator, one who proliferates meaning) and the way we conceive texts which have authors (i.e., as constrained in their meaning and confined in the uses to which they can be put). But this argument is unsatisfactory simply because there is no such discrepancy. To the extent that we conceive of an author as offering 'an

inexhaustible world of significations' (p. 118), as a proliferator of meaning, then we expect precisely the same of the work he creates.

It is more promising to read Foucault as proposing a semi-technical sense of the term 'author', one which conforms to the following principle:

> (2) 'Having an author' is not a relational predicate (characterizing a relation between a work and a person) but a monadic predicate (characterizing a certain kind of work).

This principle signals the move from 'X has an author' to 'X is authored' or more explicitly from 'X has Y as an author' (the relational predicate) to 'X is Y-authored' (the monadic predicate). The author function becomes a property of a text or discourse not a relation between a text and a person. We need to ask what the monadic predicate 'being authored' or being 'Y-authored' actually means in this special sense.

First, though, it might be helpful to offer a further elaboration of (2) in terms of paraphrase or reduction:

> (3) All relevant claims about the relation between an author-as-person and a text are reducible to claims about an authored-text.

In this way the author disappears through a process comparable to ontological reduction by paraphrase. In place of, for example, 'The work is a product of the author's creative act' we can substitute 'The work is an authored-text' and still retain the significant cognitive content of the former. Such a semantic manoeuvre is not intended, of course, to show that authors (as persons) are redundant. At best its aim is to show that *relative to critical discourse* references to an author can be eliminated without loss of significant content. I take it that some such thesis underlies Foucault's statement that the

> aspects of an individual which we designate as making him an author are only a projection, in more or less psychologizing terms, of the operations that we force texts to undergo, the connections that we make, the traits that we establish as pertinent, the continuities that we recognize, or the exclusions that we practice. (p. 110)

Foucault is thinking of such aspects as an author's 'design' and 'creative power', as well as the meaning, unity and expression with which the author informs the text. He believes, as we have seen, that these features can be attributed directly to an authored-text without reference back to the author-as-person. This is the heart of the Author Function Thesis.

What support can be offered for propositions (2) and (3)? After all, they are not obviously true and they depart from the more familiar meaning of 'author'. The main logical support that Foucault offers is an argument about authors' names. An author's name, he suggests, does not operate purely referentially; rather than picking out some individual person, it has, he says, a

'classificatory function', it 'serves to characterize a certain mode of being of discourse' (p. 107). I think he has something like the following in mind:

(4) (Some) author attributions (using an author's name) are non-extensional.

If we say that a play is by Shakespeare we mean, or connote, more than just that the play was written by a particular man (Shakespeare); for one thing we assign a certain honorific quality to it (it is likely to be a play worthy of our attention); also we relate the play to a wider body of work, to *Hamlet*, *King Lear*, *Twelfth Night*, and so on. Being 'by Shakespeare' signals not just an external relation but an internal characterization. We move from 'X is a play by Shakespeare' to 'X is a Shakespeare play' or even 'X is Shakespearean'. The latter formulations are non-extensional, or at least have non-extensional readings, in the sense that substitution of co-referential names is not always permissible (does not preserve truth); if Shakespeare turns out to be Bacon it doesn't follow that the plays become Baconian, where that has its own distinctive connotations.

Let us suppose that stated like this the argument has some merit. Does it in fact support the Author Function Thesis? Certainly it provides an illustration of the move from a relational predicate to a monadic predicate: in this case from 'by Shakespeare' to 'Shakespearean'. Is this an instance of the move from 'X has Y as an author' to 'X is Y-authored'? Maybe. But what it shows is that we are not obliged to make the move. 'X has Shakespeare as an author' has both a non-extensional, classificatory meaning *and* a fully extensional, relational meaning. In other words the reference to Shakespeare the person still stands. By pointing, quite rightly, to the classificatory function of authors' names Foucault mistakenly supposes that this in itself eliminates the referential function.

What about the move, in (2), from 'X has an author' to 'X is authored'? This move is not directly supported by the argument from authors' names but hangs on a distinctive conception of an 'authored-text'. This takes us back to the Historicist Thesis. Foucault, as we saw, has in mind not just the attribution of an author to a text, nor in the more sophisticated version of (4) a text classified through a non-extensional attribution, but rather a notion of an authored-text conceived more broadly:

(5) An authored-text is one that is subject to interpretation, constrained in its meaning, exhibiting unity and coherence, and located in a system of values

It is precisely this notion he is attacking when he attacks the author function. But now we can begin to see how uncomfortably the pieces fit together for Foucault. For one thing the author as a person—with a personality, a biography, a legal status and social standing—has no role in (5). The reductive theses (2) and (3) see to that, as does the distinctness thesis (1). In effect, Foucault has recognized, in postulating the author function and the notion of an authored-

text, that the qualities in (5) are *institutionally based* qualities, i.e., part of the conception of literature, and not *individualistically based*, i.e., formulated in terms of individual psychological attitudes.[4] There is no need to see the constraints on interpretation, nor the source of unity and coherence, nor the criteria of value, as directly attributable to an individual (the author-as-person).

If that is the point of the Author Function Thesis then it has some force, albeit reiterating a position well-established in anti-intentionalist critical theory. But Foucault cannot have it both ways: he cannot distance the authored-text from the author-as-person and yet at the same time mount his attack on the authored-text on the grounds that it perpetuates the bourgeois ideology of the individual, that it elevates the author into a position of God-like power and authority, enshrined in law. It is as if Foucault has not fully assimilated the implications of his own Author Function Thesis; he speaks as if his main target is still the author-as-person behind and beyond the work informing it with a secret and inner meaning. Perhaps the source of the problem is the misleading invocation of the author in the terms 'author function' and 'authored-text'. Strictly speaking, authors have nothing to do with it; the authored-text, so-called, at least in its most obvious manifestation, is a literary work, defined institutionally. Literary works have authors, of course; they are the product of a creative act (a real act from a real agent) but the constraints on interpretation, and the determination of coherence and value, are independent of the individual author's will. That is the lesson of the Death Thesis in its more plausible versions and it should be the lesson too of the Author Function Thesis.

V

THE 'ECRITURE' THESIS

Barthes's version of the author function is what he calls the 'modern scriptor' who is 'born simultaneously with the text' (p. 145). But Barthes bases his move from the relational author to the non-relational scriptor—i.e., his version of the Author Function Thesis—on a thesis about writing (*écriture*). The basic claim of what I have called the *Ecriture* Thesis is this (in Barthes's words):

> Writing is the destruction of every voice, of every point of origin. (p. 142)

The implication is that the very nature of writing makes the author—i.e., the author-as-person—redundant. What arguments does Barthes offer to support this thesis?

The first is an argument from narrative:

> As soon as a fact is *narrated* no longer with a view to acting directly on reality but intransitively, that is to say, finally outside of any function other than that of the very practice of the symbol itself . . . the voice loses its origin. (p. 142)

The trouble is, it is difficult to conceive of any act of narration which in fact satisfies the condition of having no other function than the 'practice of the symbol itself'. Nearly all narration has some further aim, indeed the aim in some form or other to 'act . . . directly on reality': be it to inform, entertain, persuade, instruct, or whatever. Narration is by definition an *act* and no acts are truly gratuitous. Strictly speaking the narrative argument collapses here.

Still, one might suppose, charitably, that certain kinds of *fictional* narrative come close to Barthes's specification: narratives where playfulness is paramount. It is a convention of some kinds of fiction that they draw attention to their own fictional status, that they point inward rather than outward, that they teasingly conceal their origin, and so forth. But even if we grant that in these special cases attention focuses only on the 'symbol itself', there is nothing here to support a general thesis about writing (or authors). For one thing, there are different kinds of conventions governing written (like spoken) narratives, often far removed from the tricks of fiction, and in many such cases narrative purpose (and thus the 'voice of origin') is manifest. Also of course not all writing is in narrative form.

A second argument for the *Ecriture* Thesis rests on the characterization of writing as performative:

> *writing* can no longer designate an operation of recording, notation, representation, 'depiction' . . . ; rather, it designates . . . a performative . . . in which the enunciation has no other content . . . than the act by which it is uttered. (pp. 145–6)

But the claim that writing has the status of a performative utterance, instead of supporting the *Ecriture* Thesis, in fact directly contradicts it. A performative utterance only counts as an act—a promise, a marriage, a declaration of war—under precisely specified contextual conditions; and one of those conditions, essential in each case, is the speaker's having appropriate intentions. Far from being the destruction of a 'voice of origin' the successful performative relies crucially on the disposition and authority of the speaker. The analogy, then, to say the least, is unfortunate.

Clearly what impressed Barthes about the performative utterance is another feature: that of self-validation. If I say 'I promise' I am not reporting some external fact but, under the right conditions, bringing a fact into existence. However, even if we set aside the requirement of the speaker's authority, and focus only on the feature of self-validation, the analogy with performatives is still inadequate. Once again Barthes is led to an unwarranted generalization about the nature of writing by taking as a paradigm a certain kind of fictive utterance, which creates its own facts or world, and ignoring more commonplace illocutionary purposes.

The third argument is about meaning. The thought is this, that writing *per se*, in contrast to the constrained authored-text, does not yield any determinate meaning:

> a text is not a line of words releasing a single 'theological' meaning (the 'message' of the Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash. (p. 146)

We find the same idea in Foucault, even though he voices some scepticism later on about *écriture*: 'today's writing has freed itself from the dimension of expression', 'it is an interplay of signs', it 'unfolds like a game' (p. 102). How does this support the thesis that writing has destroyed the voice of origin? The argument seems to go something like this: determinate meaning is always the product of authorial imposition, where there is no determinate meaning there is no author, writing *per se* (*écriture*) has no determinate meaning (it is a mere play of signs), so writing *per se* shows the author to be redundant. The reasoning is bizarre. Its formal validity is suspect and it also begs the question that there is such a thing as writing *per se*. *Ecriture* is in effect stipulated to be author-less, to be lacking in determinate meaning, to be free of interpretative constraints. But this very conception of *écriture* needs to be challenged.

The key is the idea of a 'text'. A 'text', as Barthes conceives it, is a specific manifestation of *écriture*. It is to be contrasted with a 'work'; a work belongs in a genre, its meaning is constrained, it has an author, it is subject to classification. A text, Barthes tells us, is 'always *paradoxical*'; it 'practises the infinite deferment of the signified';[5] 'it answers not to an interpretation, even a liberal one, but to an explosion, a dissemination' (p. 159); 'it cannot be contained in a hierarchy, even in a simple division of genres' (p. 157); and 'no vital "respect" is due to the Text: it can be *broken*' (p. 161). This idea of a text as an explosion of unconstrained meaning, without origin and without purpose, is a theoretician's fiction. Perhaps we could, by abstraction, come to look at writing in this way but it would be quite idle to do so. It would be like trying to hear a Mozart symphony as a mere string of unstructured sounds. More importantly, though, it is no part of the concept of writing (or language) that it should be so viewed. Writing, like speech, or any language 'performed', is inevitably, and properly, conceived as purposive. To use language as meaningful discourse is to perform speech acts; to understand discourse is, minimally, to grasp what speech acts are performed. Barthes's view of *écriture* and of texts tries to abstract language from the very function that gives it life.

An underlying assumption in both Barthes and Foucault is that there is intrinsic merit in what Foucault calls the 'proliferation of meaning'. Perhaps the fundamental objection to their combined programme is that this assumption is unsupported and untenable. By prescribing the death of the author and by promoting the text over the work, both writers see themselves as liberating meaning from unnatural and undesirable restrictions. They both assume that more is better. Part of the problem is that they are trapped by a gratuitous, and inappropriate, political vocabulary: 'repression', 'authority', 'control'. But deeper still they reveal a predilection for a peculiarly sterile form of literary

criticism, exemplified perhaps by certain passages in Empson's *Seven Types of Ambiguity* and pressed almost *ad absurdum* in Barthes's own *S/Z*, where the literary work is seen as a limitless and unrestricted source of connotation and allusion. What is objectionable is that they have set up this conception as a paradigm not only of criticism but, worse, of reading itself.

The critical community at large soon tired of the simplistic proliferation of meaning and outside the literary institution it never even got a foothold. It is a non-starter—pointless if not impossible—to conceive of scientific or historical or philosophical discourse as *écriture*. It is always more interesting, more demanding, more rewarding for understanding, to consolidate meaning, to seek structure and coherence, to locate a work in a tradition or practice. This has nothing whatsoever to do with reinstating some bullying authoritarian author. But then that figure was always just a fiction anyway.[6]

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[1] I will be using the following texts: Roland Barthes, 'The Death of the Author', in *Image–Music–Text*, Essays Selected and Translated by Stephen Heath (Fontana/Collins, 1977); Michel Foucault, 'What is an Author?' in *The Foucault Reader*, edited by Paul Rabinow (Peregrine Books, 1986). All citations and page references are from these editions.

[2] A similar ambiguity lies in the origin of the Death Thesis, namely Nietzsche's proclamation that 'God is dead'. Was Nietzsche describing a new human consciousness already in evidence or was he heralding a radical break with the past?

[3] I am guided here, indeed throughout this essay, by the useful discussion in Alexander Nehamas, 'Writer, Text, Work, Author', in Anthony J. Cascardi, ed., *Literature and the Question of Philosophy* (Johns Hopkins U.P., 1987).

[4] For a clear account of institutional qualities in the literary context, see Stein Haugom Olsen, 'Literary Aesthetics and Literary Practice', in *The End of Literary Theory* (Cambridge U.P., 1987).

[5] Roland Barthes, 'From Work to Text', in *Image–Music–Text*, op. cit., p. 158.

[6] An earlier version of this paper was presented at a conference of the Nordic Aesthetics Society in Helsinki in May 1989.

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PICTURES AND DEPICTIONS: A CONSIDERATION OF PEACOCKE'S VIEWS

G. N. Kemp

IN A recent article,[1] Christopher Peacocke presents an account of pictorial representation that addresses, in a refreshingly straightforward and compendious manner, what are probably the primary concerns we associate with the problem of pictorial representation: to what extent can pictorial representation be explained in terms of strictly perceptual notions, and in what sense, if at all, must intentional or conventional factors enter into a proper analysis of what it is for something to be a picture of something else? The very idea of a strictly perceptual notion performing a philosophically explanatory role has fallen into disfavour in recent years, hence Peacocke's account is perhaps somewhat reactionary, for it is indeed towards the perceptual end of the intention–perception distinction that the account leans. His aim is to do justice to the pre-reflective thought that the nature of representational seeing is primarily a perceptual matter, and is not in the first instance a matter of convention. But this aim is pursued in a way that does not require an absolute distinction between perceptual experience and intentionality, thus avoiding familiar objections to that distinction which we associate with Gestalt psychology and with Wittgenstein.

Peacocke's most conspicuous opponent is of course Nelson Goodman,[2] according to whom pictorial representation must ultimately be understood as a culturally entrenched system of denotative symbols, and hence the commonsense claim that pictures succeed in representing things because in some sense they look like these things explains nothing, if it is not just a superstition, testimony to the efficacy of the system. I think Peacocke's account succeeds on this, its primary front, and for this reason ought to be reckoned a milestone in the history of the subject. All that is necessary to combat such a view as Goodman's, it would seem, is to present an account in perceptual terms which avoids the standard objections to such a view, and this I take Peacocke to have done; the burden of proof is surely on the person who believes that the relation between a picture and what it represents is more like that between a written word and its referent than like that between objects that give rise to similar visual experiences when viewed under certain conditions. But his constructive task remains, I want to suggest, unsatisfactory in an evidently important

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
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respect; rather than following the insights about perception that make the account so appealing to their natural conclusion, Peacocke has allowed the notion of intention a stronger role than it deserves.

I

There are a number of motivations for thinking that it is conventional or semantical notions, and not perceptual notions, that really explain what it is for something to be a picture of something else, but most involve some claim to the effect that the primary notion to which a perceptual account must appeal—that of pure visual resemblance—simply cannot bear much explanatory weight. One such motivation takes the form of scepticism about the notion generally: since perception and intention interpenetrate, we cannot sensibly speak of perceptual experience stripped of its interpretation, and since ways of interpreting are inculcated experientially, and are embodied in concepts, what we regard as resemblance is relative to or conditioned by our interests, practices, and conceptual structures. Another such motivation, more specific to the matter at hand, springs from having been impressed with the fact that a picture is a flat, virtually two-dimensional object, and mere *surface*; how could such a thing represent say, the School of Athens, merely by dint of some sort of resemblance, when the resemblance is on the face of it (pun intended) so slight? And on the basis of this rather equivocal consideration, it is suggested that there must be some sorts of rules of representation which ultimately secure the connection between a picture and its subject.

The virtues of Peacocke's account are that it is compatible with the first of these views, and that it leaves very little left over that must be described in the way suggested by the second. It rests on a simple perceptual notion that Peacocke calls 'experienced shape in the visual field'.[3] Consider the experience of seeing a rectangular envelope lying on a table: unless we view it from directly above, in one sense what we see is an oblique, four-sided figure whose angles are not right angles, but in another sense the same experience is one of perceiving something as perfectly rectangular in shape. It is the former sense to which Peacocke refers as 'experienced shape in the visual field', whereas to the latter he refers as 'perceived physical shape'.[4]

It is possible to experience two things as having the same physical shape—a pair of thumbtacks, for example. And viewed from the same angle, their experienced shape in the visual field will coincide as well. But two such things need not be the same size in order to be so perceived; so long as they are viewed from the same angle, a reduced photocopy of an inkblot can be presented in a region of the visual field which is the same in shape as that in which the original inkblot might be presented, and irrespective of angle of view they will under normal conditions be perceived as having the same physical shape. Yet it is also possible for the former type of relation to obtain among radically dissimilar objects. In particular, a silhouette or photograph of, say, the Golden

Gate bridge, can be experienced as being presented in a region of the visual field similar to that in which the bridge itself might be presented.[5] This rather innocuous observation is summed up in the notion of an F-relation: two things are F-related just in case one is presented in a region of the visual field that is experienced as similar in shape to a region in which the other might be presented.[6] (The variables may range over objects or intensional objects such as concepts or types as opposed to tokens, and the corresponding visual information can be given either in terms of general concepts or as the referents of singular terms, but for the moment I shall pass over any further discussion of this.)[7]

A complementary notion is that of R-relatedness:[8] two things are R-related just in case they are experienced as similar in physical shape. Two things, then, can be F-related without being R-related, but it would seem impossible for two things to be R-related without being capable of being F-related from most angles of view.

It is important to recognize that the notion of an F-relation pertains to *experiences*, and not to objects conceived independently of our experiences and knowledge of them. There is no question of appeal to resemblance between objects *per se*. Nor does the notion concern anything like purely phenomenal objects; the formulation includes inextricably an intentional aspect as well. Still, an account of pictorial representation aims at describing what must be true of the objects, and that two objects should be capable of being F-related in no way implies that one is a depiction of the other. For the relation 'capable of being F-related' (perhaps we will have in the backs of our minds something like similarity of actual shape in some relevant respect, but we need not) would evidently be symmetrical, reflexive and at least weakly transitive (we can imagine a series of apparently adequate pictorial reproductions, each drawn from its predecessor, such that the last fails to be significantly F-related to the first). Neither will the relation be one to one, since there could be any number of things to which an object is capable of being F-related. As such the notion seems insufficient for pictorial representation, since we think of pictorial representation as irreflexive, intransitive and asymmetrical, and also, a set of marks depicting, say, Louis XIV, may be F-related to Beverly Sills, but it is not thereby a depiction of that singularly well-coiffured opera star. It is here that Peacocke recruits the notion of intention more explicitly: if one thing depicts (Peacocke's preferred word, which for our purposes we can read as 'is a picture of') another, he says, then it is intended that it should be seen as F-related to what it depicts.[9] The complete thesis, then, is this:

> Something is a Ø-depiction if and only if (1) it is intended successfully that for those seeing it in its intended viewing conditions it is F-related to the concept-Ø and (since sculptures are not to count as depictions), (2) it is not in those conditions R-related to the concept-Ø.

We shall want to make one minor revision of this straightaway. As it stands, the definition has the consequence that, in a queer way, a picture of something depends for its status as a picture of that thing on who is looking at it; a picture of something whose appearance is known to no living person will not be F-related to it for anyone; for no one will it be presented in a region of the visual field that is experienced as similar in shape to a region in which the other might be presented, since anyone unacquainted with the subject cannot have this experience. Instead, we should state the first clause of the definition to read: 'for those with the requisite awareness of what the shape of a region in the visual field in which the concept-Ø might be presented should be, it is F-related to the concept-Ø (in its intended viewing conditions)'.[10] This should not, we should stress, be understood as a material conditional; it must be understood as a counterfactual, ascribing a disposition to the object. Otherwise it will be vacuously true should there be no living person acquainted with the concept-Ø, and hence there would be no constraints on the form that a Ø-depiction should take.

The account, then, steers clear of the two worries mentioned earlier that are most likely to motivate a semantical or conventional account of pictorial representation. It steers clear of the first, since, as noted, the F-relation requires no absolute perception–conception bifurcation. As for the second, by simply taking care to make some rather straightforward perceptual distinctions, the need to invoke explanations in terms of rules is largely eliminated, except for the purpose of rendering the correct logical character of the relation. These are the successes of Peacocke's account; we turn now to some considerations which suggest that a certain rather interesting revision of it may well be forced upon us, so long as we are serious in thinking of the notions upon which it rests as central to the nature of pictorial representation.

II

In what follows I want to concentrate on what happens when a model, an individual or particular with which the artist is directly acquainted, is pictured, as opposed to pictures drawn from conceptual or propositional knowledge—i.e., knowledge *that*, say, a walrus is a bear-like thing with flippers and tusks. We shall see presently that the logical character of 'something's being a picture of such and such', in the sense I want to explore, is rather different from what Peacocke envisages.

We can begin by noticing two cases of objects fulfilling Peacocke's perceptual requirement for something's being a depiction of a certain thing, yet not the intentional requirement, but which we should still wish to call *pictures* of those things. The first case is that of an accidental photograph, as when a cat trips the shutter of a Polaroid instant camera; an object so produced would be a picture of whatever happened to be before the camera, even though there would be no intention, of the kind required by Peacocke's definition, on

the part of any agent. The second case is owing to the referential opacity of singular terms in epistemic contexts: if, thinking I were drawing Zsa Zsa, it were her twin Eva whom I drew, my having successfully intended that my picture be experienced as F-related to Zsa Zsa would not make it a picture of Zsa Zsa rather than Eva, and furthermore it looks as though I need not have had any intentions at all regarding Eva in order to have drawn her picture; I need not have so much as known of her existence.

One way round the twin case might be this. I need not have had any intention regarding *Eva*, that is, regarding whatever sense attaches to that name, in order to have drawn her, but I must have had an intention regarding Eva in the sense that I meant to draw the woman sitting before me, since that woman was identical with Eva. More generally, where an artist has endeavoured successfully to depict a model, it is necessary that there has been an intention whose object is some such concept or sense as those associated with 'the model' or 'that woman there'; we can allow that sentences ascribing the intention under which the artist works will be subject to the substitutional constraints to which such contexts are normally subject, but maintain that this need not prohibit substitution of co-extensive terms for 'Ø' in instances of the sentence schema 'x is a Ø-depiction'. Since, where a model is depicted, Peacocke's definition will always come out true when 'the model' occurs in each position occupied by 'Ø', all we need do is rephrase the first clause of the definition to read, 'for some concept co-extensive with the concept-Ø, it is intended successfully that for those viewing (the picture) under its intended conditions, and with the requisite awareness of what a region of the visual field in which the concept-Ø might be presented should be, it is F-related to the concept-Ø'.

But this presents other difficulties. First, to liberalize substitution in this way is too strong; it will allow us to say, of a picture that is intended as a depiction of Mr Hyde, that it is a depiction of Dr Jekyll, these being the same man. There is a sense in which we should not want to say this. But things are yet more complex than this: there is a sense in which it would be true to say, of a picture of Scott, that it is a picture of the Author of Waverley, even if no one save Scott knew that Scott wrote Waverley. But so far as epistemic contexts generally are concerned, neither 'The Author of Waverley' for 'Scott' nor 'Jekyll' for 'Hyde' are valid substitutions, without additional, non-logical premisses. We shall have then to distinguish the sorts of substitutions we should wish to allow from those we should not. I shall not present a precise way to do this, but it is evident enough that we should appeal to some such fact as that some modes of presentation of a given object differ in point of visual information, as do the concepts 'Jekyll' and 'Hyde', whereas others do not, as in the case of 'Scott' and 'the author of Waverley'. It should be sufficient to allow substitution only among the latter sort, and not the former.

A second problem is that, in the twin case, since it is true both that the

picture is intended successfully to be F-related to Zsa Zsa and that it is so intended in respect to Eva, there will be no fact of the matter as to whether the picture depicts the one or the other. But the picture clearly is a picture of Eva. Loosely speaking, when an artist aims to draw a model it is what the artist draws *from* that determines what he draws, and not whatever he intends should be seen in the drawing; hence we should add to our definition the proviso that if the artist's intention refers to a *demonstrative* mode of presentation, such as 'that woman there', then only concepts which in point of fact refer to the referent of that demonstrative will truly specify the subject of the picture. Hence, where the artist is directly acquainted with some object, if he means to depict that with which he is so acquainted, this intention will override any others he might have, should they involve false beliefs about this object. But we shall have also to require that the way in which the artist works must be informed primarily by this demonstrative mode of presentation; we do not want to say, of a man working from a set of beliefs about his subject gotten indirectly, by hearsay and so on, that he is working *from* the model, should he happen to have met his subject but forgotten entirely how the subject appeared to him on that occasion. Neither would we want to say, of an artist working from a certain conception of a man gotten by hearsay, that he is not drawing this man, should he also believe falsely that the man corresponding to this conception is identical with some man whose acquaintance he once made, very fleetingly and long ago, and whom he thinks of himself as depicting.

A more telling difficulty, however, is that we have said nothing to help us with the case of the accidental photograph. It is telling, because, in spite of the rather distressing intricacy of what we have ended up saying in order to accommodate Peacocke's definition to the other cases we considered, what we really want to say about those cases is quite simple, and it is exactly analogous to what we should want to say about the case of the accidental photograph. What we want to say is that, in the absence of any intervening intention, as when a model is used only as a crutch for the purpose of depicting something or someone else, if the intention is to draw the model, the subject of the picture is simply the model, whoever or whatever it was, and irrespective of whatever the artist may have truly or falsely believed of it. Similarly, in the absence of an intervening intention on the part of some agent, as when one photographs a man dressed like Lincoln in order to 'depict' Lincoln, the subject of a photograph is simply whomever or whatever, as a matter of fact, was actually before the lens during the instant the shutter was open.

So long as it is a perceptual account of pictorial representation that is desired, I think we are obliged to include the accidental photograph in our account; otherwise, we should be in a position of saying that drawings and paintings and so on are necessarily depictions, whereas photographs are so only contingently if at all. But, so long as we are thinking of pictures of actual individuals, as opposed to depictions of fictitious figures and so on, the motive behind a

bifurcation among such manifestly similar things would be obscure. Photographs and drawings can be almost exactly similar in appearance, and the differences we find between them are owing to such contingent facts as that they are made of different materials, that photographic technology has developed in the way that it has, that people have the drawing skills that they do, and that the ease, accuracy and speed with which photographs can be produced, in comparison with the relative laboriousness of drawing, has brought it about that photography has displaced drawing as the primary means of providing visual records of things, whereas drawing and painting have explored other possibilities, ones for which they are especially well suited.

If there is an essential difference, from a philosophical point of view, it is that a drawing of a given object cannot be produced without there having been a corresponding intention on the part of some agent; it cannot happen by accident. Or so we might think. We can imagine a machine which works just like an ordinary camera, except that it produces images in pencil which are very much like the drawings of a given artist. Should the machine go off by accident, would the objects produced be drawings, or not? If we think that they would not be, that our concept of a drawing includes the element of intention one might be inclined to hear in Peacocke's word 'depiction', then it is not clear that such an intention is necessary in any sense other than the trivial one of its being necessary to have the corresponding intentions in order to, say, boil an egg. At any rate the intention is not, we must recognize, *that* the picture be experienced a certain way—it is not like a speech act—but that it be capable of being experienced a certain way—it is rather like an act of writing; it is an intention to produce an object with certain dispositional properties. But these depend on its having a certain physical shape, a certain morphology, and unlike the case of writing, the correspondence between a picture's morphological properties and these dispositional properties is not a matter of choice or convention. It is no accident that a good drawing of an object will, for the most part, be morphologically similar to a photograph of that object taken from the same angle, and it would be sheer obstinacy to deny that this must be why they are both capable of being experienced as F-related to the object. It would be wrong to suppose that an artist, working from a model, intends simply to produce an object with a certain physical shape, but he does intend to produce whatever physical shape corresponds to a certain dispositional property; we can characterize this, somewhat neutrally so far as philosophical issues are concerned, as an *image* of the subject. There are two ways to produce such an image: you can draw it, or you can photograph it, just as you can make an automobile by hand or let the robots in a completely automated automobile factory do it. But this does not make for an important difference as to the nature of the objects so produced. Nobody would say that these automobiles would be different species of object, even though it is possible that the auto

plant should accidently go off in the middle of the night, and produce an auto, without anyone's having intended that it should do so.

What is wanted, then, is some way of conceiving of the way in which an accidental photograph is produced—a causal interaction between a certain kind of artefact and some other object—and the way in which a drawing is produced—an intentional and causal interaction between an object, an agent, and the medium, in such a way as to regard the relations between the pictures and subjects in the same way for each case. Now, it is important in this regard that we recognize that cameras and such like are artefacts, made for a certain purpose; an accidental photograph is a picture, but a footprint or shadow is not, and this is because cameras are for making pictures, whereas the surfaces upon which we find footprints and shadows do not normally have any such *purpose*. What we can suggest, then, is this:

> We first define a *model* as an extant (at one time) spatio-temporal object (this will, of course, have to be a very liberal sense of 'object', comprising places, events, and so on). We next define a *photographic apparatus* as an artefact which is such that, when an object interacts with it in a certain way (what we shall call the 'normal way'), a second object is produced (also, we shall say, in the normal way) which, for those with the requisite knowledge of some concept which refers to the first object, is F-related to that concept.
>
> We then define what it is for something to depict a model: where an object corresponding to some concept co-extensive with the concept-Ø is a model, then x is a Ø-depiction iff x is not, under its intended viewing conditions, R-related to any concept co-extensive with the concept-Ø, and
>
> (1) An agent intended, via some demonstrative mode of presentation, that x be a depiction of the model, was informed primarily in working as he did by that mode of presentation, and intended successfully that, for those with the requisite knowledge of the concept-Ø, x is, under the intended viewing conditions, F-related to concept-Ø, or
>
> (2) some object falling under the concept-Ø interacted with a photographic apparatus in the normal way, x was so produced in the normal way, and is such that for those with the requisite knowledge of the concept-Ø, it is F-related to the concept-Ø.

This leaves untouched, of course, cases where the artist intends to depict something with which he is not directly acquainted and hence cannot refer via a demonstrative, and also cases where he is directly acquainted with the subject but, rather than being guided primarily by that acquaintance, is guided by other, propositional beliefs about the subject. But these, so far as I can see, are handled perfectly well by Peacocke's original formulation, so long as we include the amendment suggested at the close of section one. Our general notion of depiction, then, will be complex, comprising cases where the artist works from something with which he is directly acquainted and cases where he does not. But I see little to regret in this; most philosophers are willing to reckon on a radical difference between the logic of descriptional terms and that

of so-called directly referential terms such as demonstratives and names, and that there should be an analogous distinction amongst types of pictures should not strike us as any less reasonable. We can in any case be certain that there is such an *apparent* distinction in the case of pictures, and that, just as certain facts seem to call for either a considerable elaboration of classical description theory, or simply some alternative to it, in order to capture the semantics of certain singular terms, so we require either something more than, or something other than, Peacocke's theory, in order to capture the nature of a certain very ordinary sort of picture.

The disjunctive character as to *within* the material we have just now added onto Peacocke's original formulation will perhaps be a source of greater discomfort, but the disjuncts are not without common ground: the idea that, for either a photograph or drawing of a model, the subject of the picture is what was in fact before the camera or artist, is straightforward enough. And nor is the element of intentionality in the case of photographs completely lost; we simply defer it to the more general fact that photographic apparatuses are designed to fulfil certain purposes.

As a final note, it must be admitted that we can still envisage cases where what we have said will seem to yield an incorrect or indeterminate answer. Suppose an artist, directly acquainted with a certain man, C. I. Lewis for example, were to associate with an entirely wrong set of beliefs—one which would be correctly ascribed to C. S. Lewis, for example—and regarded himself, one day alone in his studio, as drawing a picture of the critic (whom he thinks is the man he met), depicting him as having his back turned, say, and as having a row with Eliot. In so far as we should wish to opine upon the question at all, we may want to say that this is a picture of the critic, not the philosopher, should the figure in the drawing representing 'Lewis' be sufficiently ambiguous as to be no more F-related to the one Lewis than to the other. And we could go on dreaming up other examples. But I think we can safely say that for most of these, the problems encountered will not be particularly endemic to the theory of pictorial representation; they will be attributable to the general problem of the individuation of objects of belief and other attitudes. In the above case, I think we should be hard pressed to say which man the artist is thinking about, and we may well be happy to conclude that the man is simply confused, and that there is no fact of the matter either about the object of his beliefs, or about the subject of the picture.[11]

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[8] Ibid., p. 387.

[9] Ibid., p. 388.

[10] It is possible to generate a more fully articulated account by means of a richer panoply of P-relations. Besides being P(shape)-related to what it depicts, a picture may be P(colour)-related, P(contrast)-related, or P(texture)-related, to what it depicts; these relations will again be characterized in purely experiential terms. In the remainder of the paper, however, we shall treat only of P(shape)-relatedness. See *Depiction*, p. 392.

[11] For several helpful remarks I am indebted to Malcom Budd.

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KRISTEVA AND HOLBEIN, ARTIST OF MELANCHOLY

John Lechte

> The representation without artifice of human death, the almost anatomical nudity of the corpse, communicates an unbearable anxiety to the spectator before the death of God, here confounded with our own death, so much is absent the least suggestion of transcendence.
>
> Julia Kristeva, *Soleil noir*

ALTHOUGH CARRIED out through the prism of a contribution to a psychoanalytic theory of depression and melancholia,[1] Julia Kristeva's interpretation and analysis of Hans Holbein the Younger's *The Corpse of Christ in the Tomb* (*Der Leichnam Christi im Grabe*) (1521), embraces a number of different aspects. These deal broadly with the artist's relation to his art within a specific historical setting, and have something of importance to say to a wider public, if only because realism in art and society is at issue—not just any realism, but one that again raises the question of transcendence (perhaps unlike the simulacrum[2]) in relation to a specific configuration of subjectivity. Before we can meaningfully give voice to the hypotheses which Kristeva's reflection on *The Corpse of Christ in the Tomb* might inspire in those apparently transfixed in a banal, and non-transcendent post-modern experience, an exact summary of the way our author situates the painting in space is necessary.

THE PAINTING

Holbein's painting depicts a life-size body (dim: $78\frac{3}{4}'' \times 12''$) of Christ alone in its tomb immediately after the Crucifixion. By contrast with Italian versions of the same scene (e.g., Mantegna), the agony and suffering of a slow death on the cross are clearly visible: the head is bent back and slightly twisted to the right with eyes and mouth still open—a man really dead, one who, in Dostoevsky's words in a passage quoted by Kristeva, was 'subject, on the cross, to the law of nature, fully and completely'.[3] And in the same text, the narrator goes on to say that so death-like is the corpse that it offers no possible hint of the resurrection to come, no sign of a transcendence that would compensate for the suffering endured. In such circumstances, the narrator in *The Idiot* says on more than one occasion, a believer could well lose his faith after viewing the dead Christ in Holbein's painting. Indeed, before such a representation 'without artifice'—before such realism, perhaps—we are reminded of

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our own death, as our epigraph suggests. This is a fundamental theme in Kristeva's analysis, and we shall return to consider it from a number of different angles. Now, however, let us continue to outline the way this painting is situated in space by focusing on the composition.

Here, we need to note that the isolation of the corpse in the tomb is seen by Kristeva to be quite crucial. The body occupying the entirety of the crypt where it is encased intensifies the isolation. Only one body can occupy such a space, and in its isolation it excludes all possibility of the presence of another. It is as though Christ has been truly 'forsaken' by the Father in this *composition de l'isolement*,[4] one achieved for the most part by the fact that in relation to the corpse everything else is marginal and insignificant. Nothing is available, in short, to forge links with an 'elsewhere' of any kind. As a result, the spectator sees the body of Christ and nothing but the body which, once focused upon, offers no means of escape, no turning away from an awesome reminder of death. Maybe, Kristeva speculates, the work in question was intended to be part of an altar setting; however, in fact this was never to be, so that the heavy frame of the tomb, together with the placement of the work outside any explicit architectural context, tends to heighten the sense of separation in the spectator. The painting thus entices the spectator to focus on the body of Christ as the incarnation of death, while at the same time it repels: it shows death *as* separation through this composition of isolation. Death, then, is the absolute alienation of the individual from every other being. Death here would thus be the total absence of others in the paradoxical 'presence' of the void.

If there is any avenue of escape for the spectator, Kristeva suggests, it is to be seen, first, in the signature of the artist and the date of execution of the work at the feet of Christ—a sign of humility implicating Holbein in the death he is portraying with such severity. Secondly, there is the hand and the hair of Christ which exceed the border of the shrouded slab bearing the corpse. Both these features tend to establish a link, albeit minimal, with the spectator, and to this degree relieve the severity of this realism as both isolation and an evocation of death. 'Minimal' is the key term here. For, says Kristeva, Holbein's art avoids what we have come to think of as a more or less traditional Christian symbolism that often exudes a pathetic, and intimately sentimental vision of the Crucifixion. With Holbein, the most troubling sign is often the most ordinary; this is why his realism is so compelling: the corpse, as we have seen, manifests all the banal signs of a cadaver just before the onset of rigor mortis. Such is the significance Kristeva attributes to Holbein's painting. It is one deriving from an interpretation founded on the notion that the painting is inseparable from its relationship with a spectator/artist. Even more: we shall see that the work of art is even constitutive of the very subjectivity that is often supposed to have produced it. Before considering this, we need to look at another aspect of the historical context which should be taken into account in interpreting *The Corpse of Christ in the Tomb*.

HOLBEIN AND ICONOCLASM

The history of Christianity not only reveals many things crucial to the nature of symbolism, the image, and representation, but it also shows us instances of opposition to nearly all symbolical forms. The Iconoclastic movement (725–843) is but one example where the image (icon) is seen to be both evil—because of its giving rise to idolatory (iconoclasts) and sacred (Orthodoxy): the image becomes the means of God's revealing himself to humanity. Kristeva's commentary on *The Corpse of Christ in the Tomb* highlights the fact that Holbein was caught within the re-emergence of the iconoclasm only too evident in the early Protestant Reformation in Northern Europe, and especially in the Basel of 1521–3. Italian iconography, whether depicting the Virgin and Child, or the Crucified Christ, embellished its subject-matter with an intense aura of tranquillity and grandeur. This, in effect, was an aura of optimism and transcendence. Both Luther and Calvin, as Kristeva points out,[5] stand for the severe, anti-materialist, pessimistic face of the Reformation; it refuses to dilute the suffering of Christ in any way. Here we have, according to our author, a historical situation where truth itself comes to be seen as severe.[6] Holbein, the painter of a number of works depicting the Virgin and Child (e.g., *The Virgin and Child*) (Basel, 1514)), thus finds himself in an uneasy alliance with this Northern severity, and will leave for England and the patronage of Henry VIII in about 1526. Before this date, however, he produces *The Corpse of Christ in the Tomb*. Would this painting thus not become a clear indication that Holbein had, for one reason or another, come to accept—at least for a time—the harsh strictures of a Northern iconoclasm which led to the sacking of churches and the destruction of so many (transcendent) images?

THE ARTIST

Kristeva's response is to suggest that Holbein refuses to give up the image; for he is above all an artist. On the other hand, he seems to have been fascinated by the emerging confrontation between man and suffering. It is as though the artist comes to believe that, far from being a threat to the continuation of artistic endeavour, the problem of suffering ushers in a new dimension to art in general, and to painting in particular. For now, instead of placing suffering and death in an idealized, transcendent realm—a realm in fact removed from death, regardless of the iconographic content—Holbein gives it a kind of presence in the work of art itself. This gives art a cathartic character once again, after the interlude of the Italian Renaissance. Moreover, an artist *qua* artist is equipped to bring about just such a catharsis. For, in Kristeva's theory, he or she tends to be a person of sufficient detachment to enable the reality of death to be represented—even when the subject of death is Christ Himself.

As I have explained elsewhere,[7] Kristeva's commentary on Holbein's work occurs in relation to her theory of depression and melancholia. Rather than go into detail once again at this point, let me say simply that a work of art is a defeated depression to the extent that it puts death, as unrepresentable and unnameable, into signs. In the extreme case, melancholia prevents the subject from using signs at all. Pure subject of death, the individual succumbs to a terrible devitalization which evacuates all drive affect from the symbolic and makes language, as the articulation of emotional states, impossible. In psychoanalytic terms this means that the subject is still in a state of pre-symbolic attachment to the mother.[8] Or rather, what the subject finds it impossible to symbolize as such is the separation from the mother. Thus the 'move' into the symbolic—into signs—entails the capacity to signify suffering and the attempt to represent death. For Kristeva, Holbein's 'realism' opens up this cathartic dimension in Western art. It is cathartic because in coming close to experiencing death (*The Corpse of Christ in the Tomb*, Kristeva says *is* mourning as such), the spectator/artist finds another path to transcendence, to Heaven. This path is called Hell. To enter heaven, we need to suffer death, that is, put it into signs. Not to do so at all is to live, at best, in a devitalized symbolic in which life and death become conflated. Of course, death as such cannot appear as a sign; or rather: death in art is only the *sign* of death. Even though this is true, Kristeva suggests that we have to be able to believe that language can evoke death and thus alleviate our suffering. More than this, we need to be artists, that is, people who create signs and images, but who, at the same time, are created as subjects *by* signs and images. In short, an artist is one who can say: 'signs are only signs, words are only words—and yet I believe them to be a mode of access to the real'. This scenario hides another: the *dénégation* of language as an index of the original object (the mother) as eternally lost—and yet 'found' once again in signs:

> Signs are arbitrary because language begins with a *dénégation* (*Verneinung*) of loss, at the same time as a depression occasioned by mourning. 'I have lost an indispensible object which happens to be, in the last instance, my mother', the speaking being seems to say. 'But no, I have found her again in signs, or rather, because I accept to lose her, I have not lost her (here is the *dénégation*), I can get her back in language.'[9]

With severe melancholia, the *dénégation* of language is denied and words and images become quite foreign and entirely incapable of carrying the charge of affect that would enable the subject to 'express' the pain and suffering of which he, or she, is composed as a subject of death in the symbolic.

Kristeva's insight regarding Holbein's *Corpse of Christ in the Tomb* thus derives from the fact that perhaps for the first time in the modern era, a 'Minimalist' style is used to introduce an image of a crucifixion without resurrection, but with the result that a way has been found to put death into signs,

thereby bringing about the resurrection of the depressed subject who identifies with the dead Christ. Furthermore, our interpreter argues, it is the artist who, in putting this suffering into signs, also constitutes his own subjectivity. The greater the suffering, the greater the challenge to the symbolic; but once this challenge has been overcome, the greater the symbolic and imaginary capacities opened up in each individual subject. The expansion of symbolic and imaginary capacities is one aspect of Kristeva's definition of love;[10] in this sense, then, suffering (in signs) also opens the way to love. Death as the destruction of the bonds with others, when signified in signs, thus becomes—potentially—the basis of love, the basis, that is, of the establishment of bonds with others.

REALISM RECONSIDERED

Holbein's realism is but an early example in our era of art which takes suffering and death within a Christian framework as its point of departure. In the nineteenth century, Dostoevsky's writings also make suffering the centre of an artistic endeavour which, let us repeat, is as constitutive of subjectivity as this subjectivity is creative of the artistic object. More precisely, art becomes the means of *identifying* with suffering and death—which means, in Kristeva's terms, putting suffering into the symbolic and, to this extent—it is true—making an 'ideal' of it. We thereby expand our symbolic and imaginary capacities. This is the meaning of Kristeva's notion of a rebirth, or 'resurrection in signs'.[11] Ultimately, though, this 'resurrection' is based on a realism that marks out the boundary between language and the real, suffering and jubilation, life and death.

In light of developments in the discussion and explication of structuralist, and subsequently post-modernist theory, we have come to see realism as a perhaps somewhat outmoded way of talking about art and society. When Roland Barthes declared quite early in the development of structuralist literary theory that 'The reluctance to declare its codes characterises bourgeois society and the mass culture issuing from it: both demand signs which do not look like signs',[12] he was alluding to the notion that, far from being a 'window' onto reality, realism was rather the outcome of procedures having their origin in the symbolic. Human reality is the product of the symbolic—this could be seen as the basis of the structuralist 'break-through'.

More recently, of course, Jean-François Lyotard has affirmed that even historical research charged with throwing light on events of the greatest gravity—such as the Holocaust and the Nazi gas chambers—operates according to specific rules for establishing the existence of a referent.[13] The rules of proof and historical evidence establish the existence of the event; the reverse is not true: the existence of the event does not determine the form and existence of the rules of proof, etc. Is it that Kristeva, in interpreting *The Corpse of Christ in the Tomb* as being 'grief' itself, has now turned her back on the theoretical

work with which she has been so closely associated in the past, so that now realism is no longer to be understood as a product of certain conventions of the symbolic? Has art, in short, now become transparent in Kristeva's interpretation of Holbein?

The answer to the preceding question is quite definitely 'no'. But it is important to understand in what sense this is so, for it takes us beyond the dead-end of Lyotard's post-modern discourse. The point is that Kristeva is not arguing for a renewed emphasis on the notion of the transparence of art or language. She is rather indicating that, on the other hand, the symbolic *does* take the real in charge in some way. Not, however, through an ever-more perfect representation, or imitation (mimesis) of a hypothetical real (whether it be called Nature, or Truth), but through taking in charge what would potentially destroy representation and the symbolic altogether. Psychoanalytically, this real approximates the affective drive charge of unbound energy, the destructive form of the death drive. At a social level, this drive energy recalls Georges Bataille's notion of an expenditure (*dépense*)[14] which ceases to be a means, and becomes an end in itself—to the great detriment of the social body if it is not controlled. For it is a threat to the social as such, and its symbolic basis. Kristeva has always been concerned to analyse this aspect of human existence—especially as it impinges upon language and artistic endeavour. It is what her concept of the semiotic seeks to explain.[15] The semiotic provides the basis of the musicality of words and letters as one experiences them in Mallarmé's poetry, or Joyce's prose. In a certain sense, the semiotic is the basis of the materiality of language given an aesthetic form. The semiotic is the vital, erotic aspect of language; it is the difference between art as drive afffect taken in charge, and art denuded of all affect, the art of a pure symbolic form. Holbein's *Corpse of Christ in the Tomb*, says Kristeva, is outstanding because it weaves, as it were, a passage between the symbolic and the semiotic dimensions. The semiotic appears in the painting as a 'mastery of harmony and proportion'.[16] Holbein paints, Kristeva goes on to say, not by way of an identification with desire, nor entirely through an identification with the cold immobility of death as such—equivalent to the image entirely denuded of affect, as in the presentation of a pure geometrical space. Holbein thus paints neither erotically nor simply melancholically. He paints the 'scission' constituted by the tension between the semiotic and the symbolic: turbulence *and* immobility, life *and* death. Kristeva writes that this '*scission*' 'is the truth of human psychical life'.[17] Holbein's realism in *The Corpse of Christ in the Tomb* (the isolation of the body, and the banal signs of death) is thus the realism of the scission as the embodiment of neither life nor death. It is rather a kind of synthesis of the two, where a minimalism (banalization of signs) combines with the fact of death as represented in signs. Realism here, in effect, is the appearance of the work of art where none would normally exist. Holbein puts art in the place of death—the potential destroyer of art. In Kristeva's words:

'Between classicism and mannerism, [Holbein's] minimalism is the metaphor of scission: between life and death, meaning and non-meaning, it is an intimate and fine response of our melancholies'.[18]

Because Kristeva does not conceive art as the simple expression of a subjectivity, but as an activity which is constitutive of it,[19] the very *fact* of the work of art now becomes crucial—particularly with respect to the melancholic moment at both a historical (cf. the iconoclastic aspect of the Reformation), and an individual (cf. Holbein's aesthetic activity)[20] level. Melancholia is the failure of the symbolic to emerge, and thus the failure of the possibility of the conflict between reality and language, or—as Lyotard would have it—between a phrase and its referent, to emerge. Consequently, realism as Kristeva speaks about it, is not the realism of an adequation between reality and language, but the realism necessary for the symbolic capacity as such to emerge—a capacity we all must have if we are to be truly human subjects, that is, subjects who establish bonds with others, subjects capable of love in the end.

Realism in Kristeva's theory of art and language is thus not the basis of a belief (faith?) in reality, whatever this may be. Rather, it is the precondition of belief as such. This is a realism having the structure of the *dénégation* of language: it is only a fiction—and yet it places us in touch with the real. Roland Barthes detected a similar structure in photography: the photographic image is only an image, but at the same time, this image puts us in touch with what was.[21] What was photographed once existed—such is the basis of every interpretation of the photographic image. It is part of the structure of photography that we are locked into this structure of belief. Complete nihilism here is not possible if photography is to be possible.

With the recognition of this kind of realism in Kristeva's theory of subjectivity and in Barthes's theory of photography, we recognize that the critique of realism had often been made according to a hermeneutics which placed emphasis on the idea that every framework or medium was the basis of an interpretation. Reality would never be reached, in short, because it would always be mediated. Complete transparence thus becomes an impossibility. Such a hermeneutics has its own 'truth of the matter'. It is concerned to establish precisely what is the nature of the case: reality (truth)?—or interpretation?

By contrast, Kristeva displaces the heart of the problem. For her, it is not a question—as I have tried to show above—of finally arriving at a true representation of reality, but of pointing out that a vision of reality (call it the original object) is an integral part of a viable subjectivity, one which keeps extreme melancholia at bay. This vision of reality constitutes the basis of the capacity of identification as such. To identify with a reality—to believe in it—to identify with another—to love another—is to accept the *dénégation* of language founded on an identification which has a symbolic *and* a real basis: an image is only an image, words are only words, but . . . this means that within the world of the

human psyche and the dynamics of subjectivity, there is no symbolic in itself, any more than there is a real in itself. For both exist in this (perhaps paradoxical) world at one and the same time. But, Kristeva's work prompts us to ask,[22] has not Christianity in its Eastern Orthodox and Latin Catholic forms already provided us with this insight in the debates about the trinity (Three=One), and whether the father is consubstantial with the son, or whether the son is only the image of the father?[23] No science is going to be able to verify, or legitimate, this coming together of the symbolic and the real in the imaginary. For science is the result of the radical separation of the symbolic and the real. Consequently, Christianity may not be the basis of scientific truth, but scientific truth, in its turn, cannot do justice to the psychic truth upon which human subjectivity is founded.

To return to Holbein's *Corpse of Christ in the Tomb* by way of concluding, we can say now that before the painting, the spectator is led to *identify* with Christ. As Kristeva puts it: before the painting, the spectator enters hell with Christ by way of an imaginary identification (that is, silently, privately, without ritual), and is invited to become one with Christ's suffering:

> By way of this identification, of course too anthropological and psychological in the eyes of a strict theology, man is nevertheless bequeathed a powerful symbolic mechanism which allows him to live his death and his resurrection even in his body, thanks to the power of imaginary unification—and its real effects—with the absolute Subject (Christ).[24]

On this basis, we need perhaps to reconsider the effects of a post-modern disposition which tends to equate realism with a naïve acceptance of language as transparent, and which sees a Christian religious experience simply in terms of a grand narrative which is no longer credible. For the price of this post-modern disposition may well be a structure of subjectivity which is not able to keep melancholia—that is, death—at bay. Holbein thus has something to say to us, today, in this post-modern *fin de siècle*.

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[2] See Jean Baudrillard's discussion of this phenomenon in *Simulacres et simulation* (Paris: Galilée, 1981).

[3] Fyodor Dostoevsky, *The Idiot*, Book Two, trans Julius Katzer (Moscow: Raduga Publishers, Revised Edition, 1986), p. 103.

[4] Kristeva, *Soleil noir*, pp. 124–7.

[5] Ibid., pp 131–2.

[6] Ibid., p. 138.

[7] John Lechte, 'Art, Love and Melancholy in the Work of Julia Kristeva', in John Fletcher

and Andrew Benjamin (eds.), *Abjection, Melancholia and Love: The Work of Julia Kristeva* (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 24–41.

[8] For a general discussion of the approach involved, see Julia Kristeva, 'The Semiotic and the Symbolic' in *Revolution in Poetic Language*, trans Margaret Waller (New York: Columbia U.P., 1984), pp. 19–106, and especially pp. 46–51.

[9] Kristeva, *Soleil noir*, p. 55.

[10] See Julia Kristeva, *Tales of Love*, trans Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia U.P., 1987), p. 14 and pp. 380–1.

[11] See Kristeva, *Soleil noir*, pp. 145–6, and Kristeva, 'Nom de mort ou de vie' in Jacques Sédat (ed.), *Retour à Lacan?* (Paris: Fayard, 1981), pp. 163–82, and particularly, p. 181.

[12] Roland Barthes, 'Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives' in *Music-Image-Text*, trans Stephen Heath (Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, Second Impression, 1979), p. 116. The original French text appeared as 'Introduction à l'analyse structurale des récits', *Communications*, no. 8, 1966, pp. 1–27.

[13] See Jean-François Lyotard, *Le Différend* (Paris: Minuit, 1983).

[14] See Georges Bataille, 'The Notion of Expenditure' in *Visions of Excess*, trans Allan Stoekl (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, Second Printing, 1986), pp. 116–29.

[15] See Julia Kristeva, 'Le Dispositif sémiotic du texte' in *La Révolution du langage poétique L'avant-garde à la fin du XIXe siècle, Lautréamont et Mallarmé* (Paris: Seuil, 1974), pp. 205–358. Also see J. Kristeva, *Revolution in Poetic Language*, pp. 75–81 (on Sacrifice).

[16] Kristeva, *Soleil noir*, p. 148.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid

[19] Kristeva makes this point in an interview as follows: 'I think that when you say that the artist speaks in the work, you suppose an entity that exists before the work. Yet we all know artists, and we know that very often their individuality is in total discordance or enormously different from what they've produced. In other words, the work of art, the production, the practice in which they are implicated extends beyond and reshapes subjectivity.' And Kristeva continues: 'It is, very simply, through the work and the play of signs, a crisis of subjectivity which is the basis for all creation, one which takes as its very precondition the possibility of survival. I would even say that signs are what produce a body . . .', Elaine Hoffman Baruch and Perry Meisel, 'Two Interviews with Julia Kristeva', *Partisan Review*, vol. LI, no. 1, 1984, pp. 131–2.

[20] See Kristeva, *Soleil noir*, pp. 139–41, and in particular: 'It is not a question of arguing that Holbein was a melancholic, nor that he painted melancholics. More profoundly, it appears to me that through his *oeuvre* (themes and pictorial construction included), a *melancholic moment* (a real or imaginary loss of meaning, real or imaginary despair, a real or imaginary erasure of symbolic values to the point of the value of life itself) mobilises his aesthetic activity which triumphs over this melancholic latency, while still retaining a trace of it', (pp. 139–40) (Kristeva's emphasis).

[21] See Roland Barthes, *La Chambre claire: Note sur la photographie* (Paris: Cahiers du cinema, Gallimard, Seuil, 1980), p. 120.

[22] See for example Kristeva's study of Dostoevsky's writing from the perspective of the trinity in Eastern orthodoxy in *Soleil noir*, pp. 217–21, and *passim*; and also see Julia Kristeva, 'Joyce "The Gracehoper" or the Return of Orpheus' in Bernard Benstock (ed.), *James Joyce: Proceedings of the Ninth International James Joyce Symposium, Frankfurt, 1984* (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse U.P., 1988), pp. 167–80.

[23] Kristeva, 'Joyce "The Gracehoper" or the Return of Orpheus', p. 173.

[24] Kristeva, *Soleil noir*, p. 145.

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THE ROLE OF MUSIC IN NIETZSCHE'S *BIRTH OF TRAGEDY*

Peter Heckman

NIETZSCHE'S ATTITUDE concerning art is both intrinsically interesting and a topic of considerable disagreement among Nietzsche's readers. Although all agree that Nietzsche finds art to be of unique value, there remains a dispute as to whether art is appreciated because it provides us with illusions which mask an unpleasant reality or whether art is valued because it offers us uniquely truthful insight into the nature of reality. This latter suggestion, that Nietzsche views art as a source of truth, is usually made in connection with his early work, *The Birth of Tragedy*. Such a view is put forward by John Arras who tells us that 'in *The Birth of Tragedy* art functions as a medium of truth'.[1] Arras's view that, in this work, it is specifically Dionysian art which 'puts us in touch with the true world',[2] is shared by Silk and Stern who, in their impressive book *Nietzsche on Tragedy*, assert that Nietzsche views the Dionysian art of music as having the unique capacity to reflect the ultimate ground of being itself.[3]

The alternative view, however, that Nietzsche values art for its ability to provide us with illusions rather than truth, is not without defenders. Allan Megill finds, throughout Nietzsche's work, the unambiguous message that 'in Nietzsche's view, art is a vehicle not of truth but of illusion'.[4] Specifically in reference to *The Birth of Tragedy*, we must acknowledge Richard Schacht's detailed analysis of that work which portrays Nietzsche as determining both the essence and the value of art as the ability to 'transfigure' unpleasant reality through the production of pleasant illusions.[5]

In the pages that follow I will consider only one of Nietzsche's works, *The Birth of Tragedy* (hereafter BT), focusing on the role played by music in that work. I intend to show that the disagreement described above concerning Nietzsche's view of art can be understood as a product of the account of music provided in BT. The instability and ambiguity of this account of music is severe enough to generate confusion. Much of this instability can be traced to Nietzsche's acceptance of a Schopenhauerian account of music as symbolic of the world will, even though such a conception does not fit well with Nietzsche's other intuitions concerning music. Nietzsche's inability fully to distinguish music from 'musical mood' is also an invitation to confusion.

BT, of course, is structured upon the confrontation between Apollo and Dionysus. These deities initiate a number of oppositions. At the physiological level, Dionysian intoxication is distinguished from the Apollinian dream; the

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former is associated with frenzy, terror and excess; the latter with calm, pleasure and restraint. In reference to art, Dionysian music is contrasted with Apollinian sculpture, which points to a further contrast between hearing and vision. There are indications, moreover, that the contrast between truth and illusion can also be accommodated within this scheme. I think it is beyond dispute that Nietzsche views Apollinian dream visions as both pleasurable and illusory. Indeed, it is because they are illusory that they are pleasurable. He speaks of the 'beautiful illusion (*Schein*) of the dream worlds',[6] and notes that 'even when this dream reality is most intense, we still have, glimmering through it, the sensation that it is mere appearance (*Scheins*)'.[7] The association of Dionysus with truth, on the other hand, occurs relatively late in the text where Nietzsche describes the entry of Dionysian religion into a Greece committed to the worship of Apollo:

> And now let us imagine how into this world, built on mere appearance and moderation and artificially dammed up, there penetrated, in tones ever more bewitching and alluring, the ecstatic sound of the Dionysian festival; how in these strains all of nature's excess in pleasure, grief, and knowledge became audible, even in piercing shrieks; and let us ask ourselves what the psalmodizing artist of Apollo, with his phantom harp-sound, could mean in the face of this demonic folk-song! The muses of the arts of 'illusion'(*Scheins*) paled before an art that, in its intoxication, spoke the truth.[8]

The association of intoxication and truth is both important and tricky. The text, we should note, has little or nothing to say about alcohol. It is instead music, for Nietzsche, which is the intoxicating agent. We may become intoxicated by attending to the strains of the Dionysian flute, or by attending a Wagnerian opera.

How are we to characterize the truth which emerges from Dionysian intoxication? Here we must acknowledge one further and important contrast between the Dionysian and the Apollinian. This is the opposition between our commitment to view ourselves as separate self-identical individuals and the urge to overturn this commitment. Music, according to Nietzsche, has the unique capacity to initiate the loss of our sense of self-identity. Musical intoxication is precisely the experience wherein we overcome our sense of individuation as 'everything subjective vanishes into complete self-forgetfulness'.[9] The truth which is available through Dionysus is the dizzying awareness of the underlying unity of things, an awareness which is obscured by our more routine perception of the self as separate from the world.

We see, then, that in contrast to the pleasant illusions of the Apollinian dream, Dionysus distinguishes himself by offering the truth which is available in musical intoxication. But this truth, we must not forget, is a very specific one: that the boundaries which divide and structure our world are imposed upon that world rather than integral to it. 'Reconciliation' and 'redemption'

are terms Nietzsche often uses in describing the attainment of this perception. Individuation, it would appear, holds the same place in Nietzsche's thought as the myth of the fall does in the Christian tradition. It is a recognition of tragedy's potential to offer this Dionysian redemptive truth that Nietzsche refers to as 'the mystery doctrine of tragedy', and it is this potential which marks tragedy as valuable: '[F]undamental knowledge of the oneness of everything existent, the conception of individuation as the primal cause (*Urgrundes*) of evil, and of art as the joyous hope that the spell of individuation may be broken in augury of a restored oneness'.[10]

It is clear that, on Nietzsche's view, tragedy which lacks a Dionysian element is without content or significance. The evidence for this is his complaint about Euripides. In tragedy it is the choral element which is the bearer of musical intoxication. In neglecting the Dionysian musical element, in leaving the chorus out of his dramas, Euripides has produced artistic failures. Nietzsche's complaint, let us note, is not that, in neglecting Dionysus, Euripides has produced primarily Apollinian drama. Rather, he asserts that Euripides has 'killed' tragedy. Let us give our attention, then, to Nietzsche's understanding of this extraordinarily important element of tragedy, the Dionysian chorus, for it is a consideration of the chorus which will begin to reveal the ambiguous position of music in BT.

Originally, Nietzsche tells us, the tragedy was 'only chorus and nothing but chorus'.[11] Tragedy's origin, then, is devoid of any Apollinian element. The musical nature of the tragic chorus guarantees that tragedy will offer that experience which adheres to music, it will inaugurate the violation of the principle of individuation:

> The process of the tragic chorus is the dramatic proto-phenomenon: to see oneself transformed before one's own eyes and to begin to act as if one had actually entered into another body, another character. The process stands at the beginning of the origin of drama. . . . Here we have a surrender of individuality (*Aufgeben des Individuums*) and a way of entering into another character.[12]

The drama that dispenses with the choric element has lost touch with its origins. Thus Euripidean drama presents the empty wrapper, the visual Apollinian stage elements, devoid of the Dionysian content, the intoxicated experience of loss of self.

It is important to note, however, that Nietzsche's argument is not merely that the chorus stands at the beginning of tragedy, gradually acquiring the individual characters and dialogue which make up the drama. The suggestion is rather that the stage drama is actually *generated* by the Dionysian chorus: 'Thus the choral parts with which tragedy is interlaced are, as it were, the womb that gave birth to the whole of the so-called dialogue, that is, the entire world of the stage, the real drama'.[13] Apparently, we must supplement our characterization of Dionysus. Beyond initiating the loss of individuation, Dio-

nysian musical intoxication is intrinsically creative as well, it is an experience which compels us to manufacture images. What is it that licenses this addition to the features of Dionysus? In order to respond to this question we need to consider Nietzsche's account of lyric poetry, the art form that prefigures the Dionysian dithyramb which is itself the precursor of ancient tragedy. For the association of creative activity with the experience of the loss of self begins here rather than in the discussion of tragedy proper.

The father of lyric poetry, according to Nietzsche, is the passionate Archilochus, the first 'subjective' artist who, unlike the more 'objective' Homer, is 'continually saying "I" and running through the entire chromatic scale of his passions and desires'.[14] This passionate tendency, however, presents a problem for our appreciation of this poet's abilities, for, Nietzsche argues, it is appropriate that we be inclined to value, above all else, objectivity in art. It would seem that Archilochus, in his continual reference to his own emotions, denies his poetry the universal appeal necessary to art: 'is not he, who has been called the first subjective artist, essentially the non-artist (*Nichtkünstler*)?'[15] The resolution of this problem is achieved through the wholly unexpected appearance of Schiller in the text. Schiller, Nietzsche explains, 'confessed that before the act of creation he did not have before him any series of images in a causal arrangement, but rather a musical mood (*musikalische Stimmung*)'.[16] We recall, here, that ancient lyric poetry was inherently musical, meant to be sung rather than spoken, while the reference to the 'chromatic scale of his passions' further strengthens the connection between Archilochus and music. We are thus led to the realization that the alleged subjectivity of Archilochus has been annulled through the experience of a 'musical mood' prior to his poeticizing. Archilochus, as a Dionysian artist, 'has already surrendered (*aufgegeben*) his subjectivity in the Dionysian process'.[17] The musical origin of Archilochus' poetry, then, is exactly what vindicates it of the charge of 'excessive subjectivity'. The 'self' which is so frequently mentioned in his poetry does not refer to Archilochus at all, it 'is not the same as that of the waking, empirically real man, but the only truly existent and eternal self resting at the basis of things'.[18]

Nietzsche's discussion of lyric poetry, it appears, bears an importance which is not immediately evident. For the notion that the Dionysian chorus 'gives birth to' the other elements of the drama, the idea that tragedy is born from 'the spirit of music', can be traced to nothing other than the discussion of Archilochus.[19] The suggestion that the poetry of Archilochus originates in musical self-abnegation is, in turn, based upon a remark made by Schiller, that his poems begin with a 'musical mood'. Schiller's remark, it seems, stands as the sole justification of the idea that music can give birth to such things as poetry and drama. Certainly this is rather a thin reed upon which to place so heavy a burden. We shall return, shortly, to the creative capacity of music. Let us first, however, consider how it is possible that the loss of the sense of self-individuation may be linked to creative productivity.

If one understands the term 'metaphysical' to refer to the belief that our 'ordinary reality' rests upon a deeper, or *noumenal*, ground of things, there is good reason to think that Nietzsche, in this early work, is a metaphysical thinker.[20] The two terms most often used to describe this primordial reality are 'Dionysian' and 'contradictory' (*Widerspruchlich*). The ground of things is not static, it 'is', rather, an unstable dynamic process, a becoming rather than a being. Here we encounter the seed of an idea which is consistent throughout Nietzsche's work, that only that which constantly creates beyond itself, or overcomes itself, bears any degree of reality. We must, apparently, make contact with this productive *Urgrund* if we are to succeed as creative artists. It is our perception of ourselves as stable self-identical beings, then, which frustrates this goal and stunts our creative potential. Only through the loss of self may we become creative: 'Only insofar as the genius in the act of artistic creation coalesces with this primordial artist of the world, (*mit jenem Urkünstler der Welt verschmilzt*) does he know anything of the eternal essence of art'.[21] By virtue, then, of its ability to provide us with the experience of self-abnegation, music is taken to be a source of artistic productivity. Nietzsche makes this clear in his description of the lyric poet who 'can express nothing that did not already lie hidden in that vast universality and absoluteness in the music that compelled him to figurative speech (*zur Bilderrede nöthigte*)'.[22] Thus it is evident that 'lyric poetry is dependent on the spirit of music'.[23]

Let us now turn to the equivocations which surface in Nietzsche's discussion of music. We have seen that, for Nietzsche, artistically viable poetry and drama must originate in the experience of self-abnegnation which Nietzsche, following Schiller, is prepared to describe as 'musical mood'. The relation between music and musical mood, however, is never fully explained. What is more striking is Nietzsche's inability, or unwillingness, consistently to distinguish between the two. It is readily apparent that, within the context of Nietzsche's discussion, there exists a powerful need for an entity such as musical mood. Nietzsche's primary interest, after all, is not in an object such as a musical work, but in a particular *experience*, described as self-abnegation, and the specific *activity*, the production of images, poetry, or drama, which this experience initiates. 'Musical mood' and 'the spirit of music' serve as means for talking about music, not as an object, but as an experience or activity. Such a way of speaking allows one to argue, for instance, that tragedy is a product of the 'striving of the spirit of music toward visual and mythical objectification'.[24] Although music cannot strive towards anything, 'the spirit of music' may be understood to have such a capacity. Given that the distinction between music and musical mood serves an important function in Nietzsche's text, his argument is damaged much more than it is served by his occasional conflation of the two. In his assertion, for instance, that 'melody generates the poem out of itself',[25] or his reference to 'the capacity of music to give birth to myth',[26] Nietzsche appears to be granting music, as such, a function which can only be

performed by musical mood or the spirit of music. Such carelessness can serve only to confuse Nietzsche's readers.

A further difficulty, inherent in Nietzsche's account of music, is rooted in Nietzsche's commitment to Schopenhauer, his readiness to rely on the latter's 'profound metaphysic of music'[27] when it comes to providing an unambiguous understanding of music.

Certainly one of the things most desired by the reader of BT is an exact account of the relation between Dionysian and Apollinian art. We are pleased, then, to find Nietzsche willing to address the issue in answer to the question, 'how is music related to image and concept?'[28] We are soon disappointed, however, to find that Nietzsche, as an answer to this question, can do no better than quote Schopenhauer at great length. Schopenhauer tells us that music can disclose the 'secret meaning' of events and serve as a uniquely expressive 'universal language' because it does not just copy phenomena but is 'an immediate copy (*unmittelbar Abbild*) of the will itself'.[29] Nietzsche collapses Schopenhauer's 'universal language' and 'immediate copy' into a single phrase in the assertion that 'according to the doctrine of Schopenhauer, . . . we understand music as an immediate language of the will'.[30] Nietzsche is indebted to Schopenhauer, therefore, for an understanding of music which is structured in accordance with *mimesis*. According to Schopenhauer, music must be construed as a language which copies, or symbolically expresses, a deep truth. It is this Schopenhauerian understanding which underlies Nietzsche's assertion that 'truly Dionysian music presents itself as such a general mirror of the universal will',[31] or his assumption that 'music has been correctly termed a repetition (*Wiederholung*) and a recast (*ein zweiter Abguss*) of the world'.[32] Nietzsche appears, then, to be committed to a view of music as a kind of 'cosmic symbolism'.[33]

The problem with this, however, should already be evident. The intimate association between music and the experience of self-abnegation pushes us towards the assertion that music is not a symbol at all. Rather music, or musical mood, serves to *generate* symbolic production. Nietzsche's discussion has tended towards a description of symbols as images, and thus Apollinian entities, which are generated by the Dionysian experience. 'To grasp this collective release of all the symbolic powers', Nietzsche tells us, 'man must have already attained that height of self-abnegation (*Selbstentäusserung*) which seeks to express itself symbolically through all these powers'.[34] It is difficult to see how music can instigate the production of symbols while being a symbol itself. Consider, for example, a passage which seems to be Nietzsche's most concise account of the relation between Dionysian and Apollinian art:

> Dionysian art therefore is wont to exercise two kinds of influences on the Apollinian art faculty: music incites to the symbolic intuition (*gleichnissartigen Anschauen*) of Dionysian universality, and music allows the symbolic image

> (*gleichnissartige Bild*) to emerge in its highest significance. From these facts, intelligible in themselves and not inaccessible to a more penetrating examination, I infer the capacity of music to give birth to myth (the most significant example), and particularly the tragic myth: the myth which expresses Dionysian knowledge in symbols.[35]

One must admit that the phrase 'music incites to symbolic intuition' does not unambiguously decide the case for or against the notion that music is a symbol. Yet the assertion that music gives birth to myth, and that the myth expresses itself symbolically, certainly leaves the characterization of music as symbol in an awkward position.

There are indications that Nietzsche is himself aware of this problem. He describes, at one point, the musical reflection of 'primordial pain' as 'inchoate and intangible (*bild- und begrifflose Wiederschein*)'.[36] 'Inchoate' seems an inappropriate translation for *bildlose*, but one can understand Kaufmann's hesitance here. Although a more appropriate translation, 'imageless reflection' is an extremely troublesome phrase. Schopenhauer's term 'immediate copy' is somewhat useful given his view that the arts besides music portray reality indirectly through the portrayal of Platonic archetypes. Nietzsche's use of such terms, however, without acknowledging a Schopenhauerian hierarchy of the arts, is infelicitous at best. An immediate perception of something is a perception which requires no copies or symbols, for symbols play a mediating role between the subject and that which is expressed. The Dionysian experience, as we've seen, is fundamentally the loss of the distinction between subject and world. There is, then, no role for the symbol to play in such an experience, for the gap between subject and world, the gap in which the symbol plies its trade, is lacking. It is Nietzsche's inability to embrace fully the consequences of his argument, his unwillingness to put aside a Schopenhauerian understanding of music, that leads him to depend upon conceptual monstrosities such as the 'immediate copy'.

Music, in its capacity to initiate productive activity, does not mirror, but is rather more intimately linked with the creative ground of existence itself. Nietzsche appears to be aware of the close association between music and the 'world will' entailed by his discussion, for he clearly feels the need to overturn this tendency:

> Here, however, we must make as sharp a distinction as possible between the concepts of essence and phenomenon; for music, according to its essence, cannot possibly be will. To be will it would have to be wholly banished from the realm of art—for the will is the unaesthetic-in-itself; but it appears (*erscheint*) as will.[37]

Yet Nietzsche's offering, here, cannot, by itself, undermine the discussion which has preceded it, and which forces music and the world will into closer and closer association. I must confess, in any event, that I do not know what it

means to say that 'music appears as will'. The preponderance of Nietzsche's assertions link the creative capacity of music with the productive nature of the primordial reality. Nietzsche, in BT, appears to take very seriously Schopenhauer's assertion that 'we might, therefore, just as well call the world embodied music as embodied will'.[38]

The role of music, in BT, is uniquely endowed with the capacity to frustrate both those who argue that Nietzsche values art for providing illusions and those who view Nietzsche as praising art for its capacity to disclose profound truths. The distinction between music and musical mood as well as the instability of that distinction, the assertion of a creative capacity inherent in music and the consequent identification of music with the world will, coupled with the equivocation as to whether or not music is to be construed as a symbol, serve to confound those who would derive a clear and unassailable message from the work. To the extent that this book adheres to a Schopenhauerian conception of music and a Kantian commitment to a noumenal reality (both positions which Nietzsche will soon dispose of), Nietzsche's later criticism of BT as a work in which he 'tried laboriously to express by means of Schopenhauerian and Kantian formulas strange and new valuations which were basically at odds with Kant's and Schopenhauer's spirit and taste',[39] appears justified. If, however, BT ultimately fails to provide a clear message concerning the meaning of art, it fails in fascinating and instructive ways. More importantly, the unresolved tensions and problems in this work are such as to inaugurate further exploration by Nietzsche. Much of his later work can be understood as an attempt to develop further the issues that have arisen in BT. There is a good deal of wisdom, then, in Nietzsche's retrospective summation of BT as 'a first book, also in every bad sense of that label',[40] to which we need only add that it is first in a very good sense as well.

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[1] John D. Arras, 'Art, Truth and Aesthetics in Nietzsche's Philosophy of Power', *Nietzsche-Studien* 9 (1980), p. 246.

[2] Ibid., p. 247.

[3] '*The Birth of Tragedy* takes over Schopenhauer's postulate that behind ordinary reality lies an ultimate ground of being, the *Urgrund*, and that whereas other arts, including those based on the word, reproduce ordinary phenomena, music uniquely reflects the ground itself'. M. S. Silk and J. P. Stern, *Nietzsche on Tragedy* (Cambridge U.P., 1981), p. 241.

[4] Allan Megill, *Prophets of Extremity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), p. 36.

[5] Richard Schacht, 'Nietzsche on Art in *The Birth of Tragedy*' in *Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology*, ed. George Dickie and R. J. Sclafani (New York: St Martin's Press, 1979).

[6] Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vin-

tage Books, 1967), p. 34, (22). The number given in parantheses refers to the page in *Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, ed. Colli & Montinari (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1972), III, 1.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid., p. 46, (36).

[9] Ibid., p. 36, (25).

[10] Ibid., p. 74, (69).

[11] Ibid., p. 56, (48).

[12] Ibid., p. 64, (57).

[13] Ibid., p. 65, (58). Also: 'But now we realize that the scene, complete with the action, was basically and originally thought of merely as a vision: the chorus is the only "reality" and generates the vision (*die Vision aus sich erzeugt*), speaking of it with the entire symbolism of dance, tone, and words'. Ibid.

[14] Ibid., p. 48, (39).

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid., p. 49, (39).

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid., p. 50, (41).

[19] The notion that Apollinian art originates in the Dionysian experience undermines the view that the two deities, in BT, compete on anything near equal footing. As Paul de Man, for instance, points out: 'The text is held together by the pseudo-polarity of the Apollo/Dionysos dialectic that allows for a well-ordered teleology, because the ontological cards have been stacked from the beginning. With unquestionable fidelity to the dynamics of the text, Gilles Deleuze can say: "In a tragedy, Dionysos is the tragic essence. He is the only tragic character, the suffering and glorified deity; his sufferings are the only tragic subject, the sufferings of individuation reabsorbed in the joy of original oneness." What is being said here about tragedy in general would seem to apply to Nietzsche's text as well. Truth, Presence, Being are all on Dionysos's side, and history can only occur as the birth and rebirth of a father in whose absence no son could exist'. Paul de Man, *Allegories of Reading*, (New Haven: Yale U.P., 1979), p. 83. At least one reason for giving priority to Dionysus over Apollo is owing to the richness of the symbolism which gathers around Dionysus relative to that governed by Apollo. This is a point made by Sylvain de Bleeckere: 'The difficulty in reading BT lies in the fact that there is a distinction between Dionysus as the name of the metaphysical primordial unity and Dionysus as the name of the artistic force of nature in the world of phenomena or appearances'. Sylvain de Bleeckere, '*Also Sprach Zarathustra: Die Neugestaltung der Geburt der Tragödie*', *Nietzsche-Studien* 8 (1979), p. 272, (my translation).

[20] Again and again, in BT, we encounter references to a 'primordial reality' or *Urgrund* described variously as '*der innerste Kern der Natur*', '*das Wahrhaft-Seiende*', '*innerster Grund der Welt*', '*Herz der Welt*', '*das ewige Sein*', '*das eine wahrhaft seiende Subjekt*', '*ewiger Kern der Dinge*', '*Ursein*', '*Urmutter*', and '*Urwesen*'. This point is articulated by, and the foregoing list is indebted to, Friedhelm Decher, '*Nietzsches Metaphysik in der Geburt der Tragödie im Verhältnis zur Philosophie Schopenhauers*', *Nietzsche-Studien* 14 (1985), p. 115.

[21] Nietzsche, *Birth*, p. 52 (43). Also: 'Dionysian art, too, wishes to convince us of the eternal joy of existence: only we are to seek this joy not in phenomena, but behind them. . . . We are really for a brief moment primordial being itself, . . . In spite of fear and pity, we are the happy living beings, not as individuals, but as the one living being, with whose creative joy we are united'. Ibid., p. 104, (105).

[22] Ibid., p. 55, (47).

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid., p. 106, (106).

[25] Ibid., p. 53, (44).

[26] Ibid., p. 103, (103).

[27] Ibid., p. 51, (42).

[28] Ibid., p. 101, (100).

[29] Ibid., p 102, (102).

[30] Ibid., p. 103, (103).

[31] Ibid., p. 107, (108).

[32] Ibid., p. 49, (40).

[33] 'Language can never adequately render the cosmic symbolism of music, because music stands in symbolic relation to the primordial contradiction and primordial pain in the heart of the primal unity, and therefore symbolizes a sphere which is beyond and prior to all phenomena'. Ibid., p. 55, (47).

[34] Ibid., p. 41, (30).
[35] Ibid., p. 103, (103).
[36] Ibid., p. 49, (40).
[37] Ibid., p. 55, (46).
[38] Ibid., p. 102, (102). Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe has suggested that '*The Birth of Tragedy* is ultimately nothing but the ambiguous commentary of this single statement by Schopenhauer, never accepted without reservations, but also never truly contested'. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, 'Le Détour', *Poétique* 5 (1971), p. 70. This translation provided by Paul de Man in *Allegories of Reading*, p. 96.
[39] Ibid., p. 24, ('Attempt at a Self-Criticism'), (13).
[40] Ibid., p. 19, (11).

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THE AESTHETIC RELATION OF MUSICAL PERFORMER AND AUDIENCE

Daniel Putman

WHEN A musician is performing in front of an audience, what aesthetic characteristics enter into a good performance? While this question is often in the background of musical aesthetics, it has rarely been addressed directly. The most recent argument put forward and one that has some intuitive appeal is that the performing artist is expressing his or her feelings about the music. An aesthetically pleasing performance is one in which the performer expresses those feelings well and in which the emotions are shared by the audience.[1] But this is only a very partial explanation of a successful performance. Not only does the sharing of emotions seem incomplete in comparison to our actual experience at a live concert but the explanatory power of this view is limited when dealing with certain critical questions in the aesthetics of performance. In this paper I will argue for a perspective on the aesthetics of live musical performance that is grounded more in the structure of the music itself and less in the emotions of the performer. In so doing I will touch on several related issues that enter into the aesthetics of interpretation.

The question of what constitutes a good performance can be approached by asking what the purpose of a performance is. Laszlo argues that the aim of all true interpreters of music is the expression of their own feelings.[2] Even though they are on a stage, they ultimately play for themselves and the audience derives enjoyment from overhearing them and sharing the emotions. Laszlo claims that it is not necessary for the performer to share the actual specific feelings the composer may have had at the time the work was produced. Nevertheless, a 'qualified interpreter' feels both the general kind of emotions felt by the composer and feels them roughly in the sequence in which the composer felt them.[3] The sensitive audience, by overhearing both the kind and sequence of emotions expressed, is able to share with the performer the emotions inspired by the work.

Several points need to be considered here. First, Laszlo himself confuses the emotions felt by the composer and the emotions inspired by the work. Sometimes he implies that the performer is getting in touch with the kind and sequence of emotions felt by the composer while the work was being composed; other times he implies that the performer is experiencing the emotions produced by the structure of the music. These are not at all identical and much has been written about the problems of the former view. If a composer

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understands the relationship between a particular sound structure and the emotions it inspires, then he or she need not feel joyful personally in order to produce joyful music nor feel sad in order to compose a funeral march. No chain exists then between the actual emotional states of the audience, the performer and the composer. The structure of the work, not the internal state of the composer, is the cause of the emotions felt by both the interpreter and the audience.

This leads to a second point about the aim of a performance. If the major aim of a performance were to express the feelings of the performer, then it would follow that a performer who did not actually feel the appropriate emotions implied by the work could not offer a strong performance. But this seems to be a dubious claim at best. It would certainly seem that, if a composer need not feel the emotion in order to create a significant work, a performer need not feel the emotion in order to play it well. I do not think buying a ticket to a concert is a bet on the emotional condition of the orchestra's members. Rather, just as for the composer, a superb interpreter is someone who understands the emotion reflected in the sound structure and can express that appropriately. In other words, the performer needs the capability to understand what the emotion is, how the sound structure reflects that emotion, and what technique best expresses that. Given a deep sensitivity to the work itself, a sad violinist could play a joyful piece and do it well. If one is going to discuss the feelings of the performer himself or herself, I would argue that the only relevant factor is that those particular feelings should not get in the way of the performance. That is quite different from actually having to feel the emotion at every performance. The professionalism of an outstanding orchestra does not lie in the members' emotive potential but in their ability at any given performance to understand what the structure of a work implies, emotionally and otherwise, and to express that work well.

But does not 'understanding' an emotion and how it can be expressed musically imply somehow that at some level that emotion must be felt? A scene described by Levinson sheds some light on this question. An individual satisfied with his life will deliberately set aside a block of time, set up the proper audio equipment, and proceed to immerse himself completely in sad music.[4] Why? People do not usually enjoy feeling sad and would rarely go out of their way to experience it. The aesthetic experience has to do with the contemplation of the emotion. Distance from a negative emotion in music, like distance from a tragic drama, produces a peculiarly aesthetic sense of enrichment. The mind continues to play a central role. Like Levinson's listener, qualified interpreters in both music and drama understand the aesthetic impact of the work. This understanding of the work, rather than simply expressing their own feelings, is what *makes* them qualified. The mental activity of the performer is critical in order to communicate the aesthetic experience. Sensitivity to a musical piece by a performer is not then a re-

enactment of the composer's feelings nor primarily an expression of the performer's feelings. It is a fusion of intellect and emotional capability focused on the artefact itself, whether it be a musical score or a drama on stage. Like the composer, the performing artist knows what it would be like to experience sadness and, again like the composer, knows how this particular sound structure expresses that emotion. This requires an openness to the emotion—as noted above, one's own feelings must not get in the way. But it does not require actually feeling the emotion.

From this perspective it is worth while reviewing some other issues surrounding a musical performance. What is the aesthetic role of the listener or audience at a concert? Laszlo claims that the audience 'overhears' the performer and that the performer is ultimately playing for himself only.[5] The focus on the emotions of the performer reinforces this view. But if the audience is going to share in the aesthetic experience of a performance, I would argue that the listener must take a much more active role. Rather than overhearing the piece, the audience participates in it. This result is a combined function of the quality of the work and the quality of the performance but the major vehicle for the audience's participation is the work itself. An orchestra can get a truly beautiful work wrong but cannot, no matter how strongly it feels, make a genuinely bad piece of music something worth sharing.

What does 'participation' mean? There is an active element in listening to a symphony. This activity is not an attempt to feel what the performers feel but to concentrate on the work. Musical concentration is not an overhearing; it is an activity. Laszlo latches onto the fact that when we see an orchestra member working hard—a cellist doing Beethoven's Fifth—we empathize with his or her emotions and in that way we share the aesthetic experience. But it is the music that communicates to both the cellist and the audience; the emotions of the cellist are the result of his or her concentration on the work. To an audience emotions are an indication of a level of concentration *worth doing*, i.e., when a listener recognizes the emotions of the performers, he or she is recognizing the work as something worth taking seriously. That recognition reflects back on the listener's own ability to concentrate and participate in the music. The emotion of the performer is not the only way this result might occur for the listener. Increased concentration and appreciation could also happen as a result of recognizing the skill it takes to master a particular piece. Again that would indicate that the piece had special qualities that make concentration worth doing. Performance factors such as technical expertise and emotional expressiveness are ways which make it easier for the listener to participate actively in the experience by concentrating on the work at hand. The musicians then are not playing solely for themselves. Qualified musicians are those whose various performance capabilities are vehicles for communicating the power or beauty of a particular work to an audience willing to listen actively.

This argument clarifies one of the differences between attending a live per-

formance and listening to an excellent recording of the same music. The implication of Laszlo's view is that what makes a live performance superior is the chance to identify directly with the emotions of the performer. In a recording one has to imagine such feelings. What I am implying is that a live performance provides more cues to the beauty of the work itself and these cues go beyond the emotions of the performers. The sight and sound of the actual instruments, the co-ordinated movements of the performers and the conductor, the response of other audience members and, yes, the emotions of the performers all can provide a much greater impetus to concentrate on the work being performed. There is no question that a sharing takes place, not only between performers and audience but also between audience members themselves. But the goal of a live performance is not to share emotions *per se* but to share them as a means of concentrating together on a work of art. Recordings lack such cues. I suspect that some people find such visual cues hindrances to experiencing the music. Instead of helping them concentrate, the movements and emotions of the performers actually get in the way of careful listening. With recordings the sound structure itself becomes the sole focus of concentration. What may be the lack of a shared experience for some becomes a purer musical experience for others. Whether one is aesthetically superior to the other is open to some debate.

A possible support for the idea that the aesthetics of live performance rests on the sharing of feelings is the leeway offered the musician in interpreting a musical score. Just how fast is 'allegro moderato' or how sweet is 'dolce'?[6] This range available to the musician makes it more difficult to speak about the work itself as a discrete entity. One might argue that it is exactly in the 'dolce' or the 'forte' that emotions enter and give the audience a basis for sharing with the performer. But, while there is leeway for interpretation, the performer is not being given a blank cheque. The musical work calls for an interpretation that falls into a particular family of possibilities. One of the richest musical experiences is to hear a well-known piece played on different occasions by different outstanding orchestras. The performances will differ somewhat but their very differences can highlight the strengths of the work. This appreciation of minor nuances in a piece is not a reflection of different emotions by the orchestra's members but a reflection of the breadth and depth of the work itself. The situation is analogous to a drama being staged by different companies. It is possible to give different emotional and tonal variations to Hamlet's soliloquy. But the work still sets certain parameters. The emotions of the actor which affect the audience may differ somewhat from company to company or from performance to performance but all acting that is well done will highlight the power of the work itself. The emotions, even if they vary somewhat, are all cues to the audience for the significance of what is being said. The same holds for music and different interpretations by different qualified performers. While variation is possible, excellence in performance always

directs the audience to the power or beauty of the work being performed.

A final point I want to consider is the distinction between the performing artist and the entertainer. Laszlo correctly points out that the entertainer's focus is on the audience. The content of the act depends on the audience's preferences. On the other hand, the artist is someone who respects the autonomy of the feelings he expresses in a work and does not change simply to please the audience.[7] But again the emphasis is too strongly on the feelings the performer happens to have. While it is true that the performing artist would not change his or her feelings to suit the audience, the reason for that is because the work itself has an integrity and quality that would be compromised if the feelings of an audience became the sole criterion of success. It is the integrity of the musical piece that is respected by the performing artist, not the autonomy of his or her feelings.

It is logically possible that, even when the performer's feelings are distinct from an audience's preferences, the performer might have the *wrong* emotional response intended by a work.[8] Then a closer reading or a deeper sensitivity to the sound structure might serve to correct the response. Thus there really is nothing 'autonomous' about the performer's feelings; the only autonomy belongs to the work. It is even conceivable that the audience might have a more accurate reading of a piece than the performer does. The performer might then consider modifying his or her response because the listeners better understand the aesthetic quality of the work. Just as an audience can pick up emotional cues from the performer about the depth of a piece, the performer can pick up cues from sensitive listeners about the aesthetic quality of a work. Unlike the entertainer the performing artist does not change his or her interpretation simply because of audience reaction. But the feelings of the performer are never autonomous from the work itself and may be refined by the listeners' reactions and comments concerning the piece. The musical artefact remains the final source of the aesthetic experience, whether it be the experience of the performer or that of the audience.

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[1] Ervin Laszlo, 'Aesthetics of Live Musical Performance', *British Journal of Aesthetics* 7 (1967), pp. 261–73.

[2] Laszlo, p. 264.

[3] Laszlo, pp. 268–9.

[4] Jerrold Levinson, 'Music and Negative Emotion', *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 63 (1982), p. 327.

[5] Laszlo, p. 264.

[6] Kivy discusses these issues at length in his analysis of what constitutes a musical work. See *Sound and Semblance: Reflections on Musical*

Representation (Princeton U P., 1984), esp. ch. 6.

[7] Lazlo, p. 265.

[8] This is analogous to reading a smile the wrong way. People who know other people well will do this less often. The same is true for professional musicians with extensive experience.

BOOK REVIEWS

Evaluating Art. By GEORGE DICKIE. Temple U.P. 1988. pp. 193. $29.95.

IN THIS work Dickie aims to offer a theory of art evaluation with the help of the writings of Ziff, Beardsley, Sibley, Goodman, Wolterstorff, Hume, Vermazen and Urmson. Dickie has interesting things to say about most of these writers; but the 'compromise view' he ends up with is in my opinion of very doubtful merit. He is at his best when discussing Hume, partly because of the superior quality of the base text (the essay on taste), and partly because he has sufficiently steady nerves to accept, as Hume did, that no tolerable aesthetic can eschew relativism entirely. It is unfortunate, however, that Dickie selects as the prime inspiration for his own theory not Hume but Beardsley: for although he goes some way to correcting Beardsley's grave mistakes, he does not go nearly far enough.

Three elements of Beardsley's theory are important for Dickie. the distinction between primary and secondary positive criteria of aesthetic value (the former conferring merit on a work of art directly, the latter recursively via the primary criteria); the claim that unity, intensity and complexity are primary criteria; and the instrumentalist thesis that the value of a work of art lies in its ability to promote mental health (as assessed from a neutral standpoint). Dickie's own theory collapses the distinction between primary and secondary criteria, producing a unified category of positive (and negative) criteria which are defined to be such that they enhance *jewells*, considered in isolation from other properties, the value of the work in question; he allows properties other than the three favoured by Beardsley to count as such criteria; and he adopts a more cautious instrumentalism, to the effect that the value of a work of art consists in the value of the aesthetic experiences to which it gives rise.

I take these points in order. Dickie's own definition of a criterion of aesthetic value is open to the objection that it is simply incoherent to attempt to assess the merit of an aesthetic property in isolation from other properties. The phenomenon of interaction between such properties, which Dickie rightly deploys to undermine Beardsley's definition of primary criteria, makes havoc also for his own version. It is not that the contribution of aesthetically relevant properties cannot be assessed; it is that they can only be assessed *in context*. It makes no sense to ask: setting aside all its other properties, what do you think of the tempo of the quartet? The tempo is only of aesthetic significance when it is identified as precisely the tempo of *this* piece, i.e., all the other properties counted in. It must be stressed that this is a matter of principle. The point is not that it is extremely difficult to direct one's mind on to just the tempo of the piece, shutting all the other properties out; it is that such a mental focusing of attention would not capture anything of *aesthetic* significance. (This remark has the flavour of a philosopher who is, regrettably, not to be found among Dickie's authorities: Wittgenstein.)

What are the criteria of aesthetic excellence? Dickie endorses Beardsley's choice of unity, intensity and complexity, and, following Sibley, adds some others. The problem with this sort of quest for utterly general criteria of aesthetic merit is that it oscillates uneasily between triviality and falsehood. Take unity. On a sufficiently robust and interesting conception of unity, a chessboard has it and many Braque paintings do not; but Braque was a better artist than the inventor of the chessboard. On the other hand, if you stretch the notion of unity to incorporate Braque, the thesis that unity is a merit-conferring property tips over into triviality. Almost anything on that conception of unity will count as unified; but the cost of giving the concept some empirical bite is the falsity of the main thesis.

Dickie is much better on the topic of

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instrumentalism. He rightly castigates Beardsley for attempting to reduce the evaluative to the non-evaluative. Such a manoeuvre avoids relativism, but at far too high a price: it ought to be obvious that there is no way of naturalizing value But Dickie's own version of instrumentalism is not quite candid. He dismisses objectivism early on much too brusquely, and in consequence fails to see that any acceptable instrumentalism about aesthetic value must embrace a form of objectivism, at least to this extent: given that, phenomenologically, aesthetic experience discerns value in the experienced object, no theory which disregards that fact, and seeks to confine value to the experiential component of the relation, has the resources so much as to delimit aesthetic experiences within the wider class of all experiences. Dickie is unable to give objectivism a fair hearing, dismissing it on the grounds that it requires a special cognitive faculty (hardly a criticism, just so far, of a position which is often avowedly non-naturalistic), and finding difficulties for it on the basis of the phenomenon of disagreement: but it is unclear, without further argument, why even irremediable disagreement in aesthetic judgements need undermine the objective status of aesthetic value.

The book is of very uneven quality, and unfortunately ends badly, with a misguided attempt to bring quantitative methods to bear on the 'compromise view', out of a scientistic urge to supply an account of 'what critics' evaluations . . would be like if they were made as precise as they could be made'. In fact I think Dickie's account is mathematically flawed: the phenomenon of total interaction among the aesthetic properties of a work surely makes the prospects of drawing up and exploiting comparison matrices much more difficult than Dickie allows. But I won't go into the formalities, because my principal objection is that quantitative methods cannot be applied here at all. Aesthetic evaluation is not imprecise in the sense in which physics was imprecise before Galileo; or in the sense in which much economic theory will always be imprecise; rather, it is not even in principle possible to make aesthetic evaluations precise. The pseudo-mathematics surfaces at several points in the book, and unfailingly generates, under a spurious shimmer of rigour, complete nonsense. On the occasions when Dickie treats of his subject discursively, he can be sharp and helpful, as for instance in a persuasive defence of the indispensability of extra-fictive referentiality to fictional names; but like many others, he feels the fatal attraction of theory, a tendency which has done great damage in recent years to the humanities The plain fact is that aesthetics cannot be axiomatized, and those who disregard this—to most people—obvious truth in a specious attempt to win public respectability for the subject (or whatever their game is) will only bring it into disrepute among those who actually know where the proper domains for applied mathematics lie. Aesthetics is and will remain essentially a discursive subject.

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Aesthetics and the Good Life. By MARCIA MUELDER EATON. Associated University Presses. 1989 pp. 209. $34.50.

We live in an age of ecology, an age in which people (at least in the advanced industrial societies) are increasingly dissatisfied with the extent to which industrial technology pollutes and degrades the environment. Many fear that we are in danger of losing the environment as an aesthetic resource and therefore see the preservation of the environment as one of their prime duties.

But how are we to judge the aesthetic value of the environment? How do we judge, for example, scenic value? We need a definition of the aesthetic to serve as a theoretical foundation for assessing the aesthetic value of the environment. There is the danger that if philosophers do not provide the right definition then the professionals will attempt to describe aesthetic preferences in terms of the wrong models.

Thus in 1975 a Seattle consulting firm, Jones and Jones, was asked to determine how the recreational and aesthetic resources of the Upper Susitna River in Alaska would be affected by the construction of four hydroelectric dams and their reservoirs. The result was a 320-page report that attempts to quantify the

aesthetic properties of the landscape. According to the report aesthetic value (AV) is determined by vividness (V), visual intactness (VI), unity (U), and visual uniqueness (VU) in this way: AV=V+VI+U/3=VU (p. 70).

Eaton is rightly sceptical of purely quantitative assessments. It leads to what she calls 'the quantitative fallacy': the view that aesthetic judgements about the environments are objective only if based on a number (p. 87). It is to assume, like Lord Kelvin, that 'when you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about it' (p. 93). But in fact the reverse is true: we can only quantify something if we first know what we are talking about. There is the Socratic presumption: how can you know what is of aesthetic value unless you know what 'aesthetic' means?

Eaton considers several definitions of the aesthetic: Beardsley's notion of 'aesthetic gratification', Stolnitz's notion of 'disinterestedness', Sibley's notion of 'taste'. But Eaton believes that the common fault with these definitions is their failure to see the importance of cultural traditions in determining aesthetic pleasure. It is not enough, she says, to analyse aesthetic pleasure in terms of 'intrinsic' properties *per se*, we must also see these properties as entrenched 'within cultural traditions' (p. 144).

Eaton's own definition of the aesthetic is: 'An experience is aesthetic if there is delight taken in an intrinsic feature of an object or event, and that feature is traditionally considered worth attending to, that is, worth perceiving or reflecting upon' (p. 147). Given the emphasis placed on 'tradition' Eaton is sensitive to the charge of elitism. 'Some readers may object that my heavy use of tradition results in a characterization of the aesthetic that is conservative, elitist, and fascist.' She rejects this charge as a distortion and I agree.

However, it does seem to me that she is open to a different and more serious charge: namely, that she gives insufficient attention to the role of individual judgement in determining aesthetic delight. Eaton finds no room in her account for the Kantian idea that aesthetic delight is the product of the individual freely determining how he or she sees and feels. At the end of the day it is up to us (not to tradition or what others say) whether we find an object aesthetically pleasurable.

In the final chapter of the book Eaton raises the issue of the relation between the aesthetic and the ethical. What is the connection (if any) between the sphere of aesthetic experience and the sphere of moral experience? 'Consequentialists' see an empirical connection: as a matter of fact people who develop taste become morally better human beings. Eaton points to the many counter-examples against this view. What of Hitler and the many other arts loving Nazis? What of Blunt the traitor who was also a sensitive art historian?

Though there is no necessary connection between the aesthetic and the moral at the surface level of life it seems to be Eaton's view that at the deeper, meaning-of-life level, moral and aesthetic value come together in the sense that both are necessary ingredients in a meaningful life (p. 171). I am not quite clear what precisely she is getting at but in any case is it true that aesthetic experience is a necessary ingredient in a meaningful life? Aristotle did not seem to think so. There is no mention of the aesthetic in Aristotle's account of the happy life in the *Nichomacean Ethics*. The same could be said for the life prescribed by most religions. To my knowledge Christ is never represented as having any interest in the aesthetic. Would we say that the life of Mother Teresa was less meaningful if we discovered that she had no interest in the aesthetic at all? I don't think so.

I hope my criticisms do not give the wrong impression of my assessment of the book. The book is scholarly, clear and readable, but above all it breaks new ground. It is a genuine work of 'applied' aesthetics, bringing philosophical aesthetics to bear on ecological issues. It is intended that the book be read by philosophers and environmentalists alike; however, I suspect it will only be the former who read it. What a pity.

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An Ontology of Art. By GREGORY CURRIE. Macmillan Press. 1989. pp. 143. £29.50.

GREGORY CURRIE intends his admirably clear, resourceful and carefully argued book to be both a contribution to the advancement of the

philosophy of art and an introduction to some of its central topics. It succeeds on both counts, rarely being too difficult for the serious student—who must, however, be prepared to entertain unlikely examples—or tedious for the specialist. He argues for two main theses, the *Action Type Hypothesis* (ATH) and the *Instance Multiplicity Hypothesis* (IMH). The ATH, in the specific form Currie advocates, presents a solution to the problem of the identity of works of art: What features are constitutive of a work? The IMH, as Currie develops it, yields a solution to the problem of identity within a work: Under what conditions is an object an instance of a particular work? Whilst the IMH does not entail the ATH, the specific version of the ATH that Currie recommends does entail the IMH, although not the strong extension of it that Currie wishes to establish. He therefore deals with the two hypotheses relatively independently of each other.

The ATH in its most general form maintains that all kinds of works of art belong to the same ontological category, the category of action types: it denies that while some works of art are types (of one sort or another), some are physical objects, for example. The specific form of the ATH that Currie advocates represents a work of art as being identical with an action type consisting in the discovery of a certain structure (of sounds, coloured shapes, etc.) via a particular 'heuristic path'. Currie argues that it is possible for the same structure to be discovered by different artists via the same heuristic path. Hence a work of art is not individuated by the artist who is responsible for it: if two artists were to discover the same structure via the same heuristic path, there would be two instances of the same work. So Currie holds that no particular work of art is inherently singular (and hence neither is any art form). The IMH maintains that all kinds of works of art can in principle have multiple instances (in the sense in which there is more than one instance of Rodin's cast bronze bust of Mahler). Although this is a direct consequence of Currie's specific version of the ATH, in its undeveloped form the IMH does not deliver a solution to the problem of identity within a work. Currie resolves this problem by an elaboration of the IMH, according to which (roughly) any correct copy of an original is an instance of the work that the original is an instance of. The result of these various claims is that Currie embraces not only the view that a mechanically produced perfect copy of a painting is an instance of that painting, but also the stronger view that, strange though it may seem, someone other than Poussin might have painted his 'Echo and Narcissus', perhaps thousands or millions of years before Poussin did, or someone else, uninfluenced by Poussin's painting, might paint it at some distant future date, and (whether or not this has happened or will happen) all that Poussin actually did was to produce an instance of that work of art.

Much of Currie's position (which my summary of the main elements does scant justice to) is highly attractive, especially the emphasis he places on the relevance of the history of production of a work of art to its appreciation. In particular, he makes out a strong case for the view that to appreciate a work of art is to appreciate the artistic achievement it represents, so that aesthetic experience must be informed by an understanding of the aesthetically relevant facts about the work's history. But is Currie right to reject the artist's identity and the time of production as essential features of the work, and to identify a work of art with an action type? Consider the situation in which Poussin has an exact counterpart in the history of Twin Earth. The artistic achievement of the counterpart in painting *his* 'Echo and Narcissus' (whenever this took place) would be exactly the same as Poussin's. Currie concludes that neither the Twin's nor Poussin's canvas would be identical with any work of art but only instances of the same work of art, Poussin's (or Twin Poussin's) 'Echo and Narcissus', which is the action type *the painting of coloured pattern P via heuristic path H* (where P is the coloured pattern shared by the two canvases and H is the common heuristic path). But there are at least two steps in Currie's argument at which one might balk. The first is the move from the proposition that Poussin's and Twin Poussin's 'Echo and Narcissus' are alike in all aesthetic respects to the conclusion that therefore neither of them is *identical* with Poussin's (or Twin Poussin's) 'Echo and Narcissus', but

only an instance of it. The second is the move from this conclusion to the thesis that the work of art each has painted is an action type.

In the first place, it is hard to believe that there is a real issue about the number of works of art painted by the two Poussins. What is undoubtedly true is that there is no difference in the artistry manifested in, or the aesthetic properties of, the two canvases. It appears to be a matter of choice, however, whether we accept the principle that if there is no aesthetically relevant difference between two paintings, then they are instances of the same work of art, and so conclude that Poussin and Twin Poussin have painted two instances of one work of art, rather than two aesthetically equivalent works of art. The idea of a work of art as it figures in our thinking about art is not sufficiently well established and definite to select one of the two possible answers as correct. Currie's proposal certainly provides an economical ontology that imposes order and definiteness on the uncertain concept of a work of art, but it does no more than that.

Secondly, although the ATH favoured by Currie secures the desired conclusion that the appreciation of Poussin's picture is the appreciation of Poussin's achievement in painting the picture, it does so only at the cost of identifying the picture with the type of action Poussin performed in painting it, thus violating (or at least requiring extensive re-interpretation of) our normal linguistic practices. Currie concedes that, strictly speaking, I cannot read a literary work (since a literary work is not a text), and he must also concede that, strictly speaking, I cannot look at Poussin's picture (since the painted canvas is not—and is not even an instance of—an action type). He also sets himself the task of specifying criteria for an object or event to be (what he characterizes as) an instance of a work of art, while being fully aware that his version of the ATH rules out the possibility that the object or event could instantiate the work—only an artist's performance of an action of the right type could do that. Buying the ATH means turning all works of art into (types of) *events* or *processes*, and failing to credit even those works of art that do have temporal parts with a duration commensurate with their real length. But it is unnecessary to pay this price, for it would be possible to achieve the required result without transforming a work of art into an action type, simply by placing the right emphasis on the fact that 'Echo and Narcissus' is a canvas Poussin painted as a result of following a certain heuristic path (to use Currie's favoured expression), so that a mere awareness of the coloured surface of the picture is insufficient to reveal Poussin's artistry and hence the artistic properties and so the artistic meaning of his product. The most obvious fault with the view—one of Currie's principal targets—that a work of art is a structure of sounds, words, coloured patches, etc., is that it presents the structure as one that lacks any correct artistic interpretation, whereas a work of art has a meaning and is appreciated properly only if it is correctly interpreted. If we feel the need to formulate an answer to the ontological question Currie addresses, then, adapting Wittgenstein's account in the *Tractatus* of a proposition as a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world, we might say that a work of art is a structure of elements in its aesthetic relation to the artist and his art historical circumstances. Currie will object, however, that a structure in its aesthetic relation to an artist and his circumstances is not a genuine entity, but a hybrid hovering uneasily in the space between an action type and a structure or a particular performance of the action and the realization of that structure in the product of the action. So perhaps it is best not to present a rival answer to the ontological question. The vital point is that the heuristic path is essential to the work of art it individuates just because it determines aesthetic properties of the structure *when the structure is considered from the point of view of its being discovered, conceived or realized by the artist*. These aesthetic properties partly compose the aesthetic meaning embodied in the structure when it is regarded as a discovery or conception of that individual. To appreciate the work of art it is necessary to consider the structure (or an embodiment of the structure) from a point of view that takes in the activity of the artist; but this is not to identify the work of art with an action type. Notice that this alternative to the identification of a work of art with a type of action cannot be rejected on the ground of the indefiniteness of

revised concept of the sublime will be able to be accommodated within the aesthetic domain.

Crowther now seeks an aesthetic rather than a moral grounding for our experience of sublimity. For Kant, ascriptions of sublimity are evoked by overwhelmingly large or powerful aspects of nature which make us aware of 'a faculty of mind transcending every standard of sense'; we are unable to encompass the boundless might of what we perceive but in recognizing that incapacity we experience our moral independence as sublime. On an analogy with Kant's morally grounded account Crowther argues that the pleasure we take in the sublime arises from a realization that although we cannot in imaginative or perceptual ways encompass the overwhelmingly huge or powerful, we can nevertheless conceptualize them and relate them to our own insignificance. He writes: 'In such an experience, we feel ourselves as transcending the limits imposed by embodiment' (p. 147). We discover the sublime aesthetically. Such judgements of sublimity are relatively rather than absolutely disinterested because they do presuppose that their objects can be recognized as exceedingly huge or powerful. They are disinterested in that we do not need to know if the perceived object is real or not, 'For the scope of rational cognition can be "realized" just as much by the appearance of vastness and power, as it can by the vastness or power of a real object' (p. 149).

Crowther's final chapter relates the sublime to art. Kant had ruled out any kind of *pure* judgement of sublimity in respect of art because sublimity—characteristically unbounded—cannot be ascribed either to works of art or to natural objects 'that in their very concept import a definite end' (*Critique of Judgement*, p. 100). But Kant then goes on to show, Crowther maintains, 'precisely why such objects *can* be sublime' (p 152). It is when something is so monstrous that its size 'defeats the end that forms its concept'. And if natural objects can be thus sublime then so can works of artifice. On this basis Crowther works up a four-part concept of the sublime in art. He concludes with an extremely valuable discussion of the broader significance that the sublime might have for us: of its aptness to generate both a sense of beholding the world *sub specie aeternitatis* and a respect for persons.

Throughout this book Crowther's lucid way with material that often appears darkly opaque is impressive and springs, one guesses, from an exact blend of argument and passion. This is philosophy as it should be written. I find the book rewarding.

There is one cause for complaint. It is that the quotations from the 1973 Meredith edition of the *Critique of Judgement* are not always accurate. Words and phrases are sometimes left out without indication of their deletion, some italics are ignored and punctuation is sometimes altered or incorrectly transcribed. I have noticed small infelicities of this kind on pp. 54, 90, 91, 94, 96 and 97. In the quotation on p. 88 these kinds of errors are compounded and, more seriously, a whole line is omitted, thereby rendering the passage meaningless.

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Eseje o Pięknie (Problemy Estetyki i Teorii Sztuki). Edited by KRYSTYNA WILKOSZEWSKA. Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warsaw and Cracow. 1988. pp. 321. zł 540.

ESSAYS ON Beauty (Problems of Aesthetics and Theory of Art) is the title of these specially written essays in honour of a distinguished Polish aesthetician, Maria Gołaszewska, disciple and follower of Roman Ingarden. Her *curriculum vitae* and impressive bibliography are included at the end of the book. We learn from this appendix that under Ingarden's direction she prepared a doctoral dissertation on creativity and personality. Her post-doctoral thesis on 'The philosophical basis of literary criticism', was certainly also inspired by Ingarden. She collaborated with him for a number of years in the Jagiellonian University of Kraków. After his death she took over his functions as Secretary of the Aesthetic Section of the Philosophical Society, and in 1984 was appointed to his chair of Philosophy.

Of the twenty essays offered to Professor Gołaszewska, nine are written in Polish (with *resumés* in English), six in English and the remainder in German, Russian, French (with Polish *resumés*).

Not only the Polish authors but all of them

refer respectfully to the many scholarly contributions of Professor Golaszewska. They are her intellectual friends, and she probably remained in close contact with them through numerous international congresses she attended from 1964 on. But neither the national nor the academic affiliations of the authors are stated in this book. I searched for this information in the Introduction by the editor but found instead only a graceful mini-essay on creativity, 'On Creation—Impression'.

The essays are classified under the following (unexplained) general titles: Art-Experience-Value; About Specificity of Arts; Problems of Interpretation; Aesthetic Conceptions.

These categories obviously overlap and one can't help wondering why, for instance, an essay by Katarzyna Rosner, 'The Theory of Interpretation of Paul Ricoeur in Face of Two Semiotic Traditions' is classified under the category 'Aesthetic Conceptions' and not under the category 'Problems of Interpretation'.

But such an overlapping of classificatory categories may probably be found in all interdisciplinary endeavours. And aesthetics is not an autonomous science. It relies on the scholarly traditions, methods and concepts of philosophy, history, linguistics, psychology, sociology and even physiology. Reliance on philosophy (linguistic—neo-positivistic traditions, and even more so phenomenological traditions) is most evident in these essays, which deal with aesthetic aspects of the plastic arts, literature, music, the performing arts, nature, technology, science and human relations.

Philosophical activities such as the elimination of unclear concepts, clarification of those which may be saved, and speculations on how one should practice aesthetics, occupy far more space in this book than do substantial findings dealing with various aspects of aesthetic experience and artistic creativity.

The Western reader of this book will be probably surprised at the almost complete absence of Marxist aesthetics and at the strong emphasis on overcoming trivial relativism and on efforts to reach inter-subjective agreement on such controversial issues as what is good art, what is beautiful, etc. Such efforts are best illustrated in an important opening essay by Harold Osborne which has the narrow title 'Kant and Cognitive Beauty'.

Another intriguing trend present in many essays is the emphasis on the élitist character of art (in contrast to the trivial egalitarianism infecting many studies on creativity), and on the role of cultivation. This is most clearly formulated by Osborne. 'Aesthetic activity', he concludes, 'is the cultivation of percipience, the direct awareness which underlies all our cognitive contacts with the environment. As the impoverishment of percipience is one of the dangers of our times, so its enhancement and enlargement does most for the enrichment of personality. Works of art are complex artefacts whose primary purpose and justification is to stimulate and expand our powers of direct apprehension. This is the basis for the value that is attributed to the cultivation of the arts. And in face of this value individual pleasure is seen to be incidental and trivial' (p. 26, op. cit.).

Among the many interesting essays I myself for personal reasons was most intrigued by two which seemed to me, judging from the titles, inspired by my highly admired professor of philosophy, Tadeusz Kotarbiński of Warsaw University. He wrote a great deal on praxeology (or praxiology), the theory of efficient action (individual action, co-operation and struggle) and its relation to ethics. He spoke about possibilities of praxeological analysis of art as well. (Tadeusz Kotarbiński, *Praxiology (An Introduction to the Science of Efficient Action*, Pergamon Press, Oxford, London, 1965); 'Les principles de bon travail', *Studia Philosophica*, Vol. III, 1939–46; 'Les valuers techniques de l'activite', Vol. IV, 1951; 'La notion de l'action', *Proceedings of the XIth International Congress of Philosophy*, Vol. VII, 1953.)

To my surprise, however, neither of these two essays (Karel E Boullart's 'Some remarks on praxeological foundation of aesthetic categories', and Zbigniew Kuderowicz's 'A model of aesthetics in Polish "Philosophy of Action"') referred to Kotarbiński's praxeology.

Boullart, starting with a rejection of historicism, argues for a new aesthetics more in tune with rapidly changing contemporary culture and based on 'a theory of human nature', see-

ing man as 'a more or less conscious and self-conscious, i.e., self-regulating problem-solving and radically finite acting being' (p. 96).

Kuderowicz in his essay revives the vitalistic philosophy of the Polish nineteenth-century philosopher August Cieszkowski and his followers, who rejecting Hegel's 'end of art theory', argued that art, particularly poetry, can intuitively grasp the character of a given nation, and thus predict its future.

There is no analysis in praxeological terms of such complex co-operative artistic efforts as, e.g., the orchestra, nor any attempt to analyse the efficiency of the multi-media arts.

Although in Boullart's essay I did not find anything connected with Kotarbiński's praxeology, his 'new aesthetics' offers us an interesting (Schellerian in its spirit but more precise) definition of the tragic hero, who 'is confronted with cultural contradictions that signify the limits of the problem-solving power of his culture' (p. 101). I also find his definition of kitsch as the art-form which inherently sees all problems solved and denies its own problem-solving power both original and useful.

Whatever its virtues and deficiencies this volume of essays dedicated to Professor Gołaszewska provides a good insight into the trends of contemporary aesthetics, and shows how much aestheticians have in common, and how little (in comparison to sociology for instance) aesthetics is affected by the simplifications of mass-media and the falsifying passions of politics.

ALICJA IWAŃSKA

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The Dark Side of Creativity: Blocks, Unfinished Works and the Urge to Destroy. By CECILE NEBEL. Whitston Publishing Company, Troy, New York. 1988. pp. 162. $18.50.

WHAT MAKES some artists despair over their work, unsure of their originality, their genius or their ability to put their feelings into expression in whatever medium—notes, paint, words, etc.? Cecile Nebel, in *The Dark Side of Creativity*, has looked into the unhappy side of the process of creativity. She has studied letters and diaries of several writers, musicians and painters where this uncertainty about their creative ability is documented. This reveals to us fears about using models and patterns from other people's work and a consciousness of being influenced by others' work, but not wishing to be so. Nebel shows us too how aware some artists are of the discrepancy between what they see in their imagination and what they are able to produce. Here too is the inability some have in living with works which they consider inferior or unworthy. Often, in this case, their judgement is erroneous, but because the work as executed falls short of what he or she imagined he or she could produce, this awareness leads to frustration and despair.

The book is divided into four chapters, sandwiched between an introduction and conclusion. These four chapters deal in some detail with the problem of several artists in finding peace of mind over what they had created.

In one chapter Nebel looks at three French writers, Flaubert, Proust and Martin du Gard. All three suffered greatly from doubts about their talent and not only constantly rewrote parts but also destroyed many of their early works. All three felt they had to, indeed wanted to, write but once something was produced it proved an immediate disappointment. Martin du Gard, for instance, was quite happy in the preparation stage of his work and made that last a long time. Once he began the work proper he was prey to despair. Both he and Flaubert were very self-conscious writers and were striving to attain a degree of perfection which was to some extent purely theoretical. The continual rewriting that both did meant that they became too involved in what they had produced and so lost the ability to appreciate it properly. Flaubert, it is well known, worked hard for the 'right' word in the 'right' place and disliked committing himself to a final version. Those works that he 'finished' demonstrate what a great writer he was and that his ability to select the correct language to portray atmosphere and emotion was true. Yet he apparently felt that there was still a better version in him.

Nebel also considers those artists who experienced a block when they attempted what they intended to be their greatest work. For example Wordsworth writing *The Recluse* felt he must write what was in him but because it

was so personal he believed that what he would in fact write would be too subjective to be of intellectual value. He too spent many long hours preparing the work but the commitment to a final version proved a great hurdle.

Kafka was able to write but judged his work mediocre. When he was dying he ordered many of his notebooks to be destroyed and viewed his life's work with not only disappointment but with dismay. To this was added the bitterness of feeling that he had made many sacrifices for the sake of his art but that it had not been worth while. He felt in the end that the life he had led for art, and the ideas he had in his head, had destroyed him.

The accounts of the emotions of these people and the anecdotes are very readable and it is interesting to learn why some artists feel they have to destroy their work. It is stated in the conclusion that those who destroy works do not commit suicide, whereas those who do not, kill themselves. I'm not sure that it can be as simple as that, nor can it only be a case of artists. Given that they are people of all sorts of characters, it surely is the case that similar people in other walks of life feel the same blocks, the same disappointment and the same dismay over their work but, because they are not such public figures and because it is not a work of art involved, the matter is not so well documented. Perhaps it is a human condition rather than an artistic one! Perhaps to emphasize it so is to distort what is just an aspect of life. Perhaps scientists also experience these emotions in their work but don't articulate them. Perhaps you and I feel the same lack of confidence in our ability to create and the same disappointment with what we produce, knowing we have better in us! Perhaps we should read *The Dark Side of Creativity* merely out of interest (and indeed it is of interest) and not analyse too much the emotions revealed.

CECILIA HYNES-HIGMAN

Metaphor and Art: Interactionism and Reference in the Verbal and Non-Verbal Arts. By CARL R. HAUSMAN. Cambridge U.P. 1989. pp. 238. $25.00.

JULIET, OF COURSE, was not the sun. But then again, she was, and it is the desire to explain the sense of this latter assertion, and to apply that explanation throughout the arts, that propels Carl Hausman through this rich and expansive study.

As the subtitle suggests, this work is meant to illuminate the nature of artistic meaning in the non-verbal as well as the verbal arts, and this itself indicates that Hausman is concerned with something well beyond the employment of metaphor in literary contexts. He is concerned, rather, with what he regards as the very *structure* of artistic meaning, where this structure is founded upon, or follows, the form of verbal metaphor and yet need not exemplify it. Thus the grandeur, or the hope, or the soaring quality of a Bach chorale are to be explained through a theory of metaphor, just as is the claim 'Man is the dream of a shadow' Hence, it is clear from the outset that Hausman is pursuing an analogy with language, and not a reduction to it; this is made explicit in his review of the impossibility of metaphorical paraphrase.

Before embracing his interactionist theory of metaphor, Hausman sets out most of the alternatives. The starting point is Aristotle's view of metaphor as name-substitution yielding a transference of reference in genus to species, species to genus, or species to species. Because Hausman recognizes that Aristotle's view suggests that the production of a metaphor is a *creative* act, his own view could be accurately, if loosely, characterized as neo-Aristotelian. Beardsley's useful catalogue of metaphorical theories is surveyed next; these include the emotive theory (which, incidentally, seems to fit some cases better than Hausman allows, viz. the assertion 'Men are pigs' is not often well answered by a detailed investigation into analogical cognitive content), the comparison theory, where the meaning of one referent modifies the meaning of another, e.g., 'Time is a river', and the interactionist theory, which Hausman ultimately favours, a rudimentary example being found in the phrase 'blue mood', where 'blue' by itself, and 'mood' by itself, now each carry some of the connotations, or metaphorical 'enrichment', of the other. But it is the creative dimension of interactionism which Hausman most wants to emphasize, because this will provide the link to artistic creativity. It was Black who was first

among recent writers to emphasize this aspect of metaphor, and Hausman reminds us of Black's claim that 'a metaphor producer may introduce a novel and non-platitudinous "implication-complex"'. Hausman develops this by claiming that when a metaphor is made, it does not only restate, or make salient, interrelations between the sets of characteristics associated with specific referents, nor does it only discover them, but the making of the metaphor itself creates those associations. The interaction between terms institutes a new perspective, which is itself, as a platform providing a new point of view, creative. But it also, for Hausman, creates a new *referent*, and this, as he is the first to acknowledge, seems paradoxical. If a metaphor provides insight, then it provides insight into something already existent. Yet, he claims, metaphors create as well the very things they provide insight into. And this paradox motivates the large-scale reconsideration of interactionism to follow.

This reconsideration, far too detailed to be represented adequately here, identifies tension as a crucial element of metaphor, where this tension may be psychological, or felt by its creator or hearer, and must in any case be epistemological. A more extreme form of the same variety of tension is found in the oxymoron, but in the case of metaphor the self-contradiction found there decreases to conceptual incongruity, so that metaphorical expressions 'say what in literal terms cannot be'. So the epistemological tension is severe, in that something that cannot be the case is being asserted as the case, and where it is understood that the assertion is not intended literally (as is evidenced in the fact that we do not refute metaphorical utterances on literal grounds). Yet this tension does not demand resolution, and indeed resists it, because 'the terms join and interact to say something not otherwise said under standard interpretation'. A frozen metaphor is thus explained as precisely one that is no longer perceived to possess this tension. To say that the world is a stage, or that it is an unweeded garden, or that man is a wolf, or to refer (approaching an oxymoron) to the cool heat of the imagination, is not merely to invite one to see this as that (and thus Hausman finds the aspect-perception account of metaphor insufficient), but rather it creates a perspective within which one can, in a tension-filled if not paradoxical fashion, 'see that this is what this is not'. And while such metaphorical utterances cannot be exhaustively paraphrased, they can be interpreted, and now explaining metaphorical interpretation metaphorically, 'interpretation requires attention that shifts within a spiral rather than a circle. Interpretive circling brings increasingly more meaning to the fore.' And, since metaphorical meaning cannot be captured in paraphrase or stated in literal or direct terms, 'Interpretation, then, must go on indefinitely and perhaps *ad infinitum*'. But this does not mean that interpretation is not constrained; it is. And these constraints are set down by metaphorical reference, an explanation of which is the next step in Hausman's project.

It must be said that it is not an easy matter to follow Hausman into this part of his discussion, but it is in any event clear that metaphorical referents, although created by the metaphor, nevertheless offer insight into a pre-existent state of affairs, and through this combination of autonomous and dependent meaning constitute forms of meaning that are 'extra linguistic and unique', and that they thus 'may be thought of as individuals'. This individual then continues to invite a new 'way of seeing the world, in the same way that appreciators of Cezanne now see Mt. Saint Victoire in a "Cezannish" way and in light in this can "go on" seeing in a "Cezannish" way other things in the world not imaged in any known Cezanne painting'. Even if one might feel some resistance to putting the matter in just this way, it is true that Hausman has both identified a familiar aesthetic phenomenon that too often eludes explanation and has offered a way of understanding it. And as to the individuals created by metaphor, one feels here (in a way both acknowledged and, in an extended appendix, developed) the influence of C. S. Peirce, where focuses of relevance are themselves construed as existent particulars or 'dynamical objects', such that a 'way of seeing' becomes, indeed, a referent both singularly referred to, and in part created by, a metaphorical utterance. But the fact that they are *referents* means, for Hausman, that there are correct and incorrect, or faithful and unfaithful, treatments

active sub-systems: the sympathetic nervous system (excitation), and the parasympathetic nervous system (inhibition). These control, at a sub-conscious level, the body's reaction to promises and threats from the environment. It is their various degrees of interaction that underlie our difference in personal style, or personality.

The mind came into being as an evolutionary development in response to a hostile environment, which then calmed down leaving the mind with more 'power' than it needed. It became a threat to itself, and so 'externalized' its power in the creation of art. From then on, evolution was driven not only by physical, but also by psychological needs—needs for 'orientation'. Dr Gear presents a chart on which we can place personality differences in terms of differing endocrinological states. By avoiding classification according to stereotype, and allowing for degrees of exemplification of properties, she avoids the implausible simplicity of earlier classification schemes. This chart not only gives a classification of various forms of intelligence, but also forms of lack of intelligence (although that is not to imply a difference in kind). She concludes that individuals vary in endocrinological states, and therefore in 'individual styles' in reaction to the environment.

Dr Gear stresses that the theory is a synthesis: it purports to provide an underlying account of species learning as well as individual learning. It is developments in style, or culture, that form the content of Part II. This is divided into two chapters. The first traces the evolution of style from the middle of the previous century to the present, and the second deals with the consequences Dr Gear sees her theory as having for education. The latter chapter is a plea for educationalists to take account of different 'orientation needs'. It contains both criticisms of current educational practice and far-reaching suggestions for improvement. However, it is the former chapter that will be of most interest to readers of this journal, and it is on this that I will concentrate.

In Part II Dr Gear switches her emphasis from the development of individual style to the level of cultural change. She adopts a theory put forward by Jay Appleton to account for our appreciation of landscapes. Appleton believes that pleasurable experiences can be linked to the appreciation of landscapes favourable to biological survival. There are three relevant concepts. Some landscapes are rich in prospects (offering us opportunities to 'keep open one's channels of perception'), others are rich in refuges (places to hide) and some are rich in hazards (things not conducive to survival). These are not exclusive. Appleton's theory applies only to representations of things or states of affairs. Dr Gear extends it by claiming that all sensory experience (no less) has a 'physiognomic' aspect. That is, everything has some emotional impact; examples are a red patch which is 'physiognomically' threatening and drooping lines which are 'physiognomically' sad. Naturalistic explanations are hypothesized for these connections. Works of art therefore have a non-rational physiognomic impact. Subsequent rationalizations of this initial impact are, Dr Gear says, arbitrary. Dr Gear then traces the development of style as a move across her personality chart: a move from focus and control towards a fragmentation of both form and content. She presents a range of examples between her paradigm of focus, control and refuge, the Pre-Raphaelites, and her paradigm of disintegration, 'Hot Art'.

In his foreword, Richard Gregory comments that psychology tends towards two extremes: it either covers a wide range of phenomena, but lacks content, or is precise, but limited in its application. The breadth of Dr Gear's book is achieved in two ways. Firstly, the theory avoids stereotypes, and will only categorize in degree. This means that any personality can be accommodated, as we are all something to some degree or other. Hence, it lacks predictive bite. Secondly, Gear interprets concepts very loosely. Are all reflective aesthetic judgements really *arbitrary*? Are all decisions really *aesthetic*? Why should the fact that pleasure involves pain undermine our concept of pleasure?

The lack of content to her generalizations also affects the chapter on style. In the same way that no combination of traits is a counter-example to Dr Gear's map of the personality, none of the surprising turns in artistic development is a counter-example to Dr Gear's theory

of style. Dali thought of himself as close to Millet and Vermeer. Dada embraced the Berlin dadas, and also their physiognomic opposite; the work of Jean Arp, Hannah Hoch and Eric Satie. If all this can be easily accommodated, then anything can be easily accommodated.

As the explanations Dr Gear gives are in terms of endocrinological processes, they will not hold a great deal of interest for philosophical aestheticians. Philosophy is, at least primarily, concerned with concepts that inform our aims and attitudes. It aims to produce a rational understanding of the natures of, and relations between, these concepts. As such, it deals with reasons which are not merely causes. It may be the case that reasons give out sooner than some think, but philosophical explanation lies in that sphere of rationalization Dr Gear stigmatizes as arbitrary. I found it interesting to read the debate from the other side, as it were, and Dr Gear's might be an important contribution here. However, this book is not continuous with, indeed hardly mentions, philosophical debate on style.

Dr Gear writes well; with passion and a nice taste for polemical asides. Her polemic against philosophy with which I began fails to bite, I am afraid, because it springs from ignorance as to both the content and the aims of the subject.

DEREK MATRAVERS

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The Power of Images. Studies in the History and Theory of Response. By DAVID FREEDBERG. University of Chicago Press. 1989. pp. 534. £37.95.

IN SPITE of a straightforward title this is a difficult and complex read, not made easy by an over extensive vocabulary necessitating frequent use of a good dictionary.

Professor Freedberg's arguments are very much situated within the social sciences at the expense of aesthetics and art history. There is nothing new in this as the sociology of art (e.g., the work of Janet Wolff) has been addressing itself to this issue for many years now. In the book great pains are taken to dissociate the work from both the above areas and in order to legitimate a 'theory of response', anything involving 'art as art' is definitely out. It is easily understood why the preface states. E. H. Gombrich 'made his doubts and disagreements plain'. Even leaving aside scholarship of individual paintings, the kind of psychology involved goes far beyond ways of seeing and simple gestalt shifts. Freedberg's world is hardly a world of art at all, arguing as he does throughout that rigid distinctions cannot be made between the natural and the aesthetic.

By pursuing the importance of the visual in and of the world, Freedberg seems to be suggesting that the study of it has been pre-empted by art history and for true explanations we have to look elsewhere, in particular to the disciplines of psychology and sociology. The argument of his cognitive psychology runs: why confine what is behind the 'primitive' to tribal and essentially non-Western art, for in so doing we miss much that is vital in the functioning of visual images. This is a strong argument, for here at least we are talking about 'life' as opposed to art/non-art categories imposed by those having little interest beyond the academic or the profitable. Certainly the arguments of such vested interests do little for the explanation of the mass of the population, most of whom have something on their walls which did not get there by chance. In looking elsewhere, Freedberg's arguments centre on the power of the visual image and he quotes with approval Gadamer and those bits of hermeneutics which state that 'art' is not just a copy of something else but a part of nature in its own right, i.e., 'an ontological event'. As such this is an argument for the examination of individual consciousness rather than the visual object itself, which does not simply present itself to the world as a neat bundle of ideas ready for academic attention.

In pursuing these ideas alone one would have a briefer, more manageable book. Freedberg, however, wants to go on to say much more. He argues that, until their neutralization in art where they work differently, images absorb and don't merely reflect that basic 'stuff' which is in each and all of us. For this reason we often fear images leading at times to iconoclastic practices destroying the key components of the image. He is right to eschew the historical evolution of the visual; what is there, is there, precisely because of what the object does to us

and what we do to it. History can add little to this significant idea. But surely Freedberg goes too far in his pursuit of this point by his devolution of the visual image to the representational and the sexual. Undoubtedly something such as a Rothko has a cognitive power which is other than mere status as art, but it is difficult to see in it an 'aspect of our own sexuality that it may threaten to reveal'. It is also hard to argue that verisimilitude of representation of the image (albeit often crude and one step removed from nature) is necessarily more important than 'colour, handling and composition' being the categories which 'obscure the analysis of response'. If Freedberg is suggesting (p. 23) we can understand the nudes of Giorgione and Titian by analysing our response to contemporary soft porn, the fact still remains that it is only those professionally involved in the study of art who might make such comparisons. For the general public paintings, whatever the content, are just so much colour and composition, i.e., 'art' not erotica. Whether or not the public are missing out on the kind of explanation that Freedberg wants is not the issue. Art/non-art dichotomies, discounted in the book, do exist in a lot of people's minds, thus shaping in an important way categorization of the visual. So if art is still a workable concept, aesthetics justifiably has a place alongside social science in the formulation of explanations and arguments against total generalization in art vindicated.

The book is too long and meanders around many points, some of which are interesting, some are trivial or have been said before. On the other hand there are genuine insights, such as the evil fascination of waxworks which have nothing to do with resemblance to persons depicted.

In short, there are too many 'bits' of information which need a more simplified argument. This is necessary if the book is to go beyond 'the power of images' saying everything and nothing.

R. N. WYNYARD

Design as Aesthetic Communication: Structuring Random-Order, Deconstruction of Formal Rationality. By ASGHAR TALAYE MINAI. Peter Lang. American University Studies, Series XX, Vol. 9. 1989. pp 458. 172 illustrations. Clothbound, $67.95.

THE ONLY conceivable reason for reviewing this work is that it belongs to a series of textbooks that are widely recommended to students in the USA. As such it is an extremely poor exemplar—poor as a model of scholarship and technically inept as a publication. It is replete with uncorrected typesetting errors—hardly a paragraph is unblemished—including a vast number of spelling mistakes, 'sentences' bisected with rogue full-stops, opened quotations that remain unclosed, closed quotations whose openings cannot be traced, and lost phrases and sentence-endings. There are also misquotations, which is unforgivable in any academic work and is especially serious in a study which constructs its principal substance from references to other authors' writings. Minai has the highest qualifications in urban design, and it therefore seems appropriate, for an insight into what has motivated this book, to observe him addressing architectural matters. However, even readers without specialist knowledge of this field will be dismayed by his constant misspelling of key names—Mies 'Vander' Rohe, Alvar 'Alto' and Michael 'Grave'—and by his rather curious reference to Frank Lloyd Wright's 'Parrie school' of design.

Readers who are teachers in Minai's field will also be dismayed by the gross oversimplification and misinformation he offers a student readership. The following passages are by no means atypical. 'In daily life when we listen to music, wander round watching scenes, etc., we are constantly going through processes known as "sensory recognition". That is, we classify buildings in terms of style or identify them with particular architects and so on. There is nothing more than classifying received data into classes of information based on their outstanding characteristics being identical to what is on [*sic*] our memory as "classic", "Le Corbusier work", etc.' (p. 134). And: 'Hegel tries to see any architecture as combination of opposite forces, created [*sic*] architecture of formations between science and mathematics and

aesthetics, and Gothic architecture between form and "spiritual content." Peter Serenyi suggests that the dialectic thesis of Hegel has influenced two movements, namely Marxism and de Stijl, both of which used the dialectical mysticism of nature as the foundation of their philosophies. In the case of the Stijl, Hans Jaffé, its founder [*sic*], has noted parallels between what Theo van Doesburg describes as neo-plasticism and neo-Hegelian concepts . . .' (p. 351). Minai is also a master of the anticlimax: 'Discoveries in the physical sciences as well as the dramatic shift of philosophical orientation from the mechanistic deterministic views of Newtonian physics to quantum physics, colored by Einstein's postulates of relativity and Heisenberg's principle of "uncertainty" made quite a shift at the turn of the century' (p. 22).

In so far as it is possible to discern an argument in *Design as Aesthetic Communication* it seems likely that the following is what most readers will grasp. Works of architecture may be construed as special kinds of 'event' which bear messages of meaning. This may be either rational or random, the former promoting well-ordered social conditions but the latter providing the necessary variety that transforms the mundane into the interesting. The historic task of the designer is to strike a balance between these polarities, using (consciously or otherwise) a measure of environmental quality analogous to entropy. The elusive standard is an '"order" that is more meaningful than the order imposed by formal rationality'. This process occurs in individual acts of designing, and it also exists at the macro-level of architectural movements and counter-movements. Thus—and here is the book's intended timely content—an architecture of Modernism has given way to one of Post-Modernism, but these two tendencies require further reciprocal moderation, for what is needed today is the elimination of their respective extremes.

It would have been reasonable to present such ideas as what they are—speculations that many architects and designers would readily affirm. However, Minai marshalls a great number of such affirmations and sympathetic allusions, and he maintains that their apparent agreement constitutes a theoretical proof. The icing on this theory is the number of scientific formulae he believes he is justified in annexing from a wide range of disciplines in order to dignify and extend what would otherwise be very bald and brief. This apparent compliance of science further persuades him of the validity of trying to measure the relative degrees of orderliness and chance in 'environmental distribution patterns' of architectural events ranging in scale from window details to city blocks. He therefore postulates a system of entropic co-ordinates that have served his own planning, designing and teaching. He does not stop far short of advocating that design should in fact begin with some notion of ideal dynamic quotients which could then be deployed according to his premiss of maximizing the unexpected within a regulated context. The praxis advocated in this book is therefore as eccentric as its theory. 'The answer lies in the notion of the circumestatuality [*sic*] of nature's fields of interactions, the overall mood and atmosphere of man's knowledge and conditioning. The conditions which actually make up the potential forces of this cycling [*sic*] process are circumstantial to themselves and to the total cosmic order. The philosophy which stands for our time says, given circumstances within which certain life forms are produced, I can pre-produce those life forms' (p. 23).

Minai is in fact attempting to enlist a younger generation to the cause of reintroducing visual variety into urban design. This is heartfelt and most obviously sincere, although its constant repetition throughout nearly five hundred pages diminishes its urgency. *Design as Aesthetic Communication* should have been a pamphlet rather than a book—a short propaganda for an approach to design that is certainly necessary. However, Minai has succumbed to the temptation to enhance the quality of his material with great width: this book is not his only missive, but is part of a string of books and articles in which he is 'developing' his theme. In order to deploy a strategic system of visual patterning 'all that remains for the disciplines and professions to do is the following: create a comprehensive overall framework system relating all various factors and components together, while the components (subsystems) of the system and their interrelationships are all well defined' (pp

62–3). A prime objective of this enterprise would be to: 'minimize the problem of biafrication [*sic*] between physical and nonphysical environmental properties by using common primary units such as environmental, behavioral, and symbolic cues in order to avoid viewing architecture as mere masses or "buildings"' (p. 74).

This book's praiseworthy insight is damaged irreparably by inept articulation and typographic absurdity. It should not fall into the hands of students, though their teachers should be aware of its existence in case it does. The several dangers are that it will be acquired serially by libraries and entered automatically on to students' lists of required reading, and that a student readership will be naturally respectful of its contrived scope. A harmful message that will undoubtedly be received is that crude scholarship may be justified by the sublimity of its cause. To quote its very last paragraph (p. 458) is merely to labour its shortcomings: 'So if there is a message in this book it is that todays [*sic*] we should free architecture from its tight boundaries and begin to see architecture within a much broader view. Tradition assumes that aesthetic judgement is a function of a select group and bases [*sic*] on certain predefined criteria. This of course is questionable and domed [*sic*] to become obsolete sooner or later. No one is there to tell me that all of the beautiful "Architecture without architects" and aesthetic values attached to them are any worse than those designs by architects today.'

DAVID THISTLEWOOD

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The Claims of Feeling: Readings in Aesthetic Education Edited by MALCOLM ROSS. Falmer Press. 1989. pp. 355. £11.95; clothbound, £25.00.

THIS BOOK is a collection of essays on the theme of 'arts education'. The essays are somewhat loosely grouped under the categories of History, Theoretical Issues, Professional Development and Examination and Assessment.

Malcolm Ross's opening essay is a review of the last twenty-five years of the arts in education together with the now familiar argument that as feeling or the aesthetic are features common to all the arts they should combine together in defence of their common educational purpose. Particular criticism is directed to the visual arts and to music for standing out against this argument.

This is not the place to rehearse the educational issues that arise from this position, except to say that they are substantial and mark a profound difference of view between those who, like Ross, argue for some sort of amalgamation of the arts in education, usually to promote the idea of 'aesthetic understanding', and those who argue that whatever aesthetic understanding may be it can only be achieved through the study of the arts individually.

It is a pity that a polemical tone has entered into this argument obscuring the practical implications of combining the arts for educational purposes and also the philosophical basis of the argument itself. There is no doubt, however, that the 'arts education' movement has provoked much new thinking in this area and offered to teachers working in the field the stimulus and the opportunity to analyse their own ideas and practices. Freed from the need to start from specific aspects of practical knowledge and matters of technique, discussion now ranges, as this book illustrates, over wider educational horizons.

The distinction that is now opening up in education, however, between the separate arts on the one hand and the abstractions of the aesthetic or of human expressivity on the other, seems to have about it echoes of older arguments which have resulted in the polarization of education between practical and abstract reasoning, and in particular between the traditions of art teaching and those more bookish forms of learning which are generally accorded a higher value in English education. There are matters of commitment to particular traditions and working practices involved here, supplying a richness to aesthetic appreciation, which Ross too readily overlooks.

The remaining essays cover subjects of specialist educational interest and are reassuring in showing a high level of concern and knowledge about their various topics.

PHILIP MEESON

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Rethinking Art History: Meditations on a Coy Science. By DONALD PREZIOSI. Yale U.P. 1989. pp. 269. £25.00.

DONALD PREZIOSI's 'rethinking' of Art History is exemplified by a short passage at the end of a chapter entitled 'The Panoptic Gaze and the Anamorphic Archive', where he says: 'It has been suggested here that the modern discipline operates as an anamorphic archive keyed by a panoptic gaze, a metamorphosis of Bentham's Panopticon, Camillo's Memory Theatre, the perspectivalism of Renaissance realist painting (and scenography), and the discursive instrumentalism of analytico-referentiality symbolized by the Galilean telescope, into the epistemological format of the modern cinema. Modern art historical practices have woven together these varied historical practices into a supremely cinematic discursive space' (p. 78). So that's what art historians have been doing! Have they been told, one might ask. Preziosi actually repeats this code (not a coda, of course, as Preziosi is too hip post-structurally to have any truck with origins or closures) *ad infinitum* throughout the 269 pages of *écriture* and academic footnoting which constitute this rethink. 'Rethink', 'Double-think': the Orwellian parody of authoritarian nomenclature is brought to mind as Preziosi exhausts the metaphors of Foucauldian and Derridean exposition and 'coins' one or two of his own. The most striking is his resort to the notion of art history as 'carpentry': obviously within the metaphor of an academic discipline as an architectural or architectonic entity 'carpentry' would have a place, but its onamatopoeic qualities jar somewhat with the intended eloquence of Preziosi's prose. The problem with *Rethinking Art History* is that it reads as if it were written primarily to be quoted by participants in an argument elsewhere: it has a corrosive and unappealing self-consciousness, unrelieved in relentless footnotes directing us to other key texts by the author. Norman Bryson's second and third books similarly suffered from the success of *Word and Image*. Bryson recommends *Rethinking Art History* as 'timely', 'incisive' and as clearsighted, rigorous and witty (dust-cover). In one sense, then, this is a kiss of death. Bryson and Preziosi represent academic revisionism within the Post-Structuralist camp, determined to reveal art history (all 57 varieties) as 'constru[ct]ing' (Preziosi's favourite piece of graphic bricolage) unstable metaphors of origins, meanings and values, which those suitably equipped conceptually can 'deconstruct'. Once these 'Sign Busters' get going, no one's analytico-referentialism is safe.

One thing links Bryson's and Preziosi's 'project' and one thing separates them. Bryson and Preziosi are both 'anti-marxists', although the latter doesn't reveal this until the final pages of his last chapter, where T. J. Clark comes in for the quotidian accusations of originary fantasies, closures on meaning, historicism, etc. (see 'Seeing Through the Social History of Art', pp. 159–68). Bryson attacked 'Marxism', emblematically, in *Vision in Painting: The Logic of The Gaze* (1983) in a short paragraph about the Stalinist linguist N. S. Marr. Both reduce a complex and contradictory set of traditions of thought and research to single figures who are then metaphorically disembowelled. Through this kind of selection and reduction both Bryson and Preziosi create their own tyrannical anamorphic gaze, centred on a narrow 'perspectivalism' which also reduces important aspects of Derrida's own writing—see, for example, Michael Ryan's *Marxism and Deconstruction* (1982) and Terry Atkinson's discussion of that in 'Rothko: Convention and Deconstruction', *Art Monthly*, no. 131 (November 1989). Bryson, unlike Preziosi, however, has written and researched beyond the level of survey historiography, and no matter how 'provisional' the 'constructed' object of study may be, there is a sense that beyond summary abstractions and generalizations (which litter Preziosi's text) there was an attempt to engage with substantial materials and evidences. Preziosi's book consists of a set of chapters yoked together into a single 'text', yet they read as both highly repetitive and as discontinuous—many footnotes in one 'chapter' reference books already cited in another. They read like seminar papers which have been presented at different places to different audiences. All the 'chapters' discuss the same three or four conceits (encoded in my opening excerpt), with some variation in examples of art historical text: Morelli (connoisseurship), Panofsky (iconology), Marshack (Paleolithic

artefacts), Clark (social history of art), and so on. The range of reference was, no doubt, intended to be impressive: as if Preziosi had managed to embrace a totality of 'discursive practices' within art history. However, he manages to reduce this sense of a projected totality to a rather seamless, continuous and homogenous mass: as if the elements within the totality simply exemplify the varying forms of logocentrism which Preziosi, *pace* Derrida, identifies. Ironically this assembled totality (which *is* only a rhetorical projection) submitted to Preziosi's own deconstructive analytic gaze itself constitutes a variant of the panopticon which is claimed to inhere in the discipline of art history. In one sense Preziosi's book actively reproduces this panoptic structure, encoding the various 'frames' of the disciplinary gaze and, beyond that, producing a meta-narrative for its legitimation. Towards the end of the book Preziosi's project becomes clear: the deconstruction of the discipline is part of a purifying operation which will enable a more defensible panoptic structure to emerge, one which 'might be the history, theory, and criticism of the multiplicity of cultural processes that can be construed as enframing: an accounting for objects and their subjects with all that might entail' (p. 179). It is clear, then, that Preziosi is more worried about the survival and legitimation of the academic discipline of art history than anything else, a goal which has also been behind the work of Bryson and others, who have been concerned to 'modernize' the discipline through the application of structuralist and post-structuralist 'double glazing', so to speak.

The book is not without interest or amusement, though to describe it as having 'wit' would be slightly too generous: Preziosi's metaphors are far too laborious and contrived for that. The opening section on the 'crisis' in art history in the USA is entertaining and the account of the Fogg Art Museum's classrooms, slide collection and library as a kind of 'panopticon' is of some interest as an institution intended to be 'modern' in its functions as a pedagogic site (the museum was opened in 1895).

Despite these passages, however, the book as a whole seems curiously dated. This may be to do with the 'time difference' between the USA and Britain. In this country I would venture that this kind of obsessive self-scrutiny has given way to an emphasis on doing different research and attending to agendas other than those bent on 'refitting' the discipline, 'plumbing' in some feminism here and the odd piece of class analysis there. As many of the contributors pointed out in A. L. Rees and F. Borzello's *The New Art History* (1986 (1988 in the US)), simply reforming the discipline in order to make it respectable was not the point. The same contributors recognized that the idea of a book called *The New Art History* was itself part of that academic reformism. In particular, for example, Lynda Nead argued that: 'Feminism is not and should never be an approach to art history. Rather, feminism has identified art history as a form of patriarchal culture, and has begun to challenge the values and ideas constructed within art history as part of its programme of cultural politics'. (Lynda Nead, 'Feminism, Art History and Cultural Politics', in A. L. Rees and F. Borzello, *The New Art History* (Camden Press, London, 1986), p. 121.) In distinction from this quite general recognition in this country, proponents of 'the new' in the US have seemingly come simply from an academic milieu (I exempt feminist art historians and the odd Marxist from this). Their radicalism is an academic radicalism, the primary struggle, presumably for them, takes place in departmental meetings and over conference lecterns in some Hyatt-Regency hotel every year. This might explain the lack of irony which Preziosi's book exhibits: in this country 'Marxists' and 'Feminists' have to defend *any* kind of art history in order to protect their jobs and resources in starved institutions; in the US, with postgraduate institutions such as the Center for Advanced Study in the Visual Arts (CASVA) in Washington seemingly awash with private capital, there is the space to imagine that intellectual and pedagogic activity has serious autonomy.

Symptomatically, perhaps, Preziosi does not deal with feminist art history in any serious way. In fact it receives less attention than 'Marxism' which gets ten pages out of 269. This is because, I would argue, both Feminism and Marxism raise the question of extra-

academic interests and values, of a world beyond texts, textbooks and slides. Preziosi is comfortable with books and words, which for him constitute the world of art history. Not much else gets into his working definition of meaning or value. This is one final irony: 'art history' is also the words that are spoken, but never written down; the gestures with arms in front of slide screens which are never notated; the essays written by students in illegible green ink which are graded and then returned. These things constitute a world anterior and external to the grammatological archive of art history. *Rethinking Art History* is for those training to be professional art historians, a closed book for those who inhabit the world outside the Academy.

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Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies. By STANLEY FISH. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1989. pp. 613. £35.00.

TWENTY-TWO chapters, burgeoning to over six-hundred pages, are a lot of Fish. The organization of the book into four areas ('Meaning and Constraint', 'Professionalism', 'Consequences', 'Rhetoric'), the handsome presentation, and the reader-friendly voice of the author all help to make the ideas accessible. Stanley Fish is a notoriously entertaining writer, simultaneously combative and disarming in his self-appointed role as the scourge of his fellow professionals, as the second part of this book amply demonstrates: yet, while one cannot but admire the intellectual energy, wit and tenacity in argument, there is an undeniable feeling that this twenty-two course menu is overdone. In characteristic fashion, Fish anticipates the criticism that 'every essay in this book is the same' and that, by implication, there is too much repetition in argument. However, the 'enriched notion of practice' that supposedly answers such criticism scarcely justifies his habit of lengthening many previously published journal articles into chapter form here. Too often, Fish seems the victim of his own energy. His intellectual zest can lead him into misjudgements, idiosyncrasy, even apology. How else can one but judge the laboriously detailed reply to Dworkin in Chapter Five, or the long-winded circularity of the argument for anti-professionalism in Chapter Eleven? How else is one to explain quirky personal habits such as the ubiquitous parentheses (pp. 12–13 hold the record at 22!) or the overworked rhetorical questions? How else is one to respond to the authorial feelings about forty pages of critical storytelling about *Paradise Lost* Books XI and XII, which are revealed in his repeated 'What's the point?' or his 'God Forbid', at the thought of the chapter being even longer, but as apologetic acknowledgements of self-indulgence?

Such characteristics will be familiar to readers who know Fish's earlier book, *Is There a Text In This Class?* So, too, will the author's theoretical orientation. Fish customarily bypasses the debates that preoccupy cultural theorists about the historical and social formation of our actions by effectively acknowledging that *all* action is thus framed. He goes on to focus upon the phenomenon of what he calls our 'unreflective actions' in which we find ourselves 'doing what comes naturally'. His position is outlined in the introductory chapter as he conducts the reader 'Down the Anti-Formalist Road', gripping him, by the one hand, with a view of language and meaning and, by the other, with the relationship between practice and theory. Thus, the major enterprise of linguistics, to build a theoretical model of language, is summarily dismissed as 'wrong and misguided'; words do not have clear, literal meanings; all meaning is interpretative—a truth which is taken as axiomatic and illustrated from law, literature and scripture. Complementing this orientation is the view that the relationship between theory and practice is conventionally elitist; or, more positively, theory has no consequence because it does not exist as a context-free concept. Theory is seen as an articulation of a shift in ideas that has largely already occurred; it is a rationale for practices already in place. The journey down this road leads inexorably to two of Fish's key words: 'change' and 'rhetoric'. The conclusion of the book is that we live in a rhetorical world and that change is a matter of language, identified when new vocabularies we adopt become 'unreflectively asserted in everyday practices'. The land-

scape of the journey is thus sketched in the opening chapter; the rest of the book fills in the details.

Much of the argument in Part I takes issue with the notion of determined and indeterminate elements in the meanings we make with literary and legal texts. The main targets are Wolfgang Iser and Ronald Dworkin in both of whom he finds the supposedly self-deluding tendency to honour both the text and the reader by allowing the fixed, unchanging nature of the one and the free, ever-changing nature of the other (pp. 74–5; 95). Fish, it seems, is still arguing that the reader's cognitive activities supply everything, that we 'write' the texts we read when, to many, this debate seems to have run its course. Perhaps a more statesman-like position, such as Bruner's, that at the heart of all creative activity—including reading—there lies paradox, would free Fish from his evident need to protest his case so insistently. Yet, the style reflects the man—in this case, an oppositional, debating style which, on the evidence of the last part of the book, derives from a belief that rhetoric is all we have. Here in the lead chapter (Chapter 20, 'Rhetoric') as elsewhere (for example, p. 406ff on 'Unger and Milton') the argument is predicated in terms of oppositions—public/private, universal/particular and so on—to the extent that there is surprisingly little discussion as to *why* this mode of discourse. What is it about the human condition and our modes of thinking and feeling that dictates that we try to explain them through such dualisms and polarities? It would have been good to hear Fish being more explicit about this.

The principal concept in the middle part of the book is 'Anti-foundationalism'. Fish rejects any attempt to ground enquiry and communication in anything 'more firm and stable than mere belief or unexamined practice' and evokes a picture of men and women whose acts are socially constituted and whose world is created from the historical and conventional forms of thought that bring it into being. Yet, if the traditional absolutes and 'certainties' are rejected (whether called God, logic, eternal values, etc.) this is not to say that anything goes. Fish stresses the crucial importance of 'situatedness'—the principle that insists upon the regulating context of human actions; in his words, the individual is 'tethered by the local or community norms and standards that constitute it and enable its rational acts' (p. 346). This is naïve. As with his notion of the authority of the interpretative community in his earlier book, so here Fish assumes a community of benign consensus and overlooks the coercive power that less sunny communities than his own can exert.

The rider to this anti-foundationalist position is that awareness of one's situatedness gives no immunity from its effects. The researcher in whatever discipline cannot make allowance for realizing that he or she is part of the action, one more factor or variable to be accounted for. Awareness does not confer escape; the standpoint of the detached onlooker remains an abstraction.

But it is a rider that does confer protection for, through it, Fish can always rebut his critics by appealing to the 'circumstantiality of his convictions' while simultaneously enjoying the experience of making universally true statements (p. 467). There is a touch of smug egocentricity about Fish but there is no denying the cleverness with which he fights his corner. In the end judgement of the book is as much to do with the sort of volume this is as with the exercise of its author's logical skills. Frank Kermode remarked recently that 'It is far easier to achieve a level of sophistication as a theorist than as an actual reader of texts. There is a good deal of literary theory that is now floating free of literature.' Free-floating Fish is largely what is on offer; this reader, for one, would have preferred a more balanced diet, one which included more about particular works of literature.

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The Future of Literary Theory. Edited by RALPH COHEN. Routledge. 1989. pp. 445. £14.95; clothbound, £45.00.

THIS BOOK contains twenty-two essays, most of which are by well-known literary critics and theorists plus several by writers from such fields as history, art history, philosophy, psychoanalysis. Anyone who reads the book expecting to find that anything like a consensus

on the future of literary theory emerges will be disappointed for inevitably one is confronted by a number of different and sometimes radically opposed viewpoints. This need be no bad thing, of course, if it created interesting debate but all of the essays have been written in isolation from each other, so that one's impression is of a series of self-enclosed positions being presented to one.

The editor tries to overcome any sense of fragmentation the reader might have by grouping the various contributions into different categories: 'I. Political Movements and the Revision of Literary Theory: II. Incorporating Deconstructive Practices, Abandoning Deconstructive Ends; III. Non-Literary Disciplines and the Extension of Literary Theory; IV. Seeking the New, Redefining the Old, and the Pleasures of Theory Writing' (pp. vii–viii). This is a useful breakdown though the last two categories are fairly loose. He draws some sharp conclusions from the essays which fall into the first two categories. Though feminist and black theorists 'aim to change how readers read, think, and write' by 'making them conscious of the groups to which they belong and [teaching] them to read oppositionally texts that support the prejudices of an exclusionary society', the fact that such critics are based in academic institutions 'delimits both their vocabulary and their contribution to the larger non-academic audiences they wish to change' (pp. ix–x). On the other hand the essays contributed by deconstructionists 'describe deconstructive theory in decline' (p. xii).

Feminist and deconstructive critics and theorists are well represented in the volume with essays by Hélène Cixous, Gilbert and Gubar, Catharine Stimpson, Elaine Showalter, Geoffrey Hartman, J. Hillis Miller, and Jonathan Culler. The major omission from the book, especially noticeable since the editor highlights political criticism as a category, is of any major Marxist or New Historicist theorist. This is a surprising absence since Marxist critics have been widely recognized as making an important contribution to contemporary literary theory and the New Historicism has become a powerful force in criticism and theory in the 1980s.

Another significant omission is the work of so-called 'New Pragmatists' who have created an anti-theoretical form of theory which argues that theory ought to be abandoned since it can never control practice by establishing a position which is independent of practice. A question perhaps that should have been central to this book is whether or not literary theory does have a future. The matter is raised only fleetingly by a footnote in Geoffrey Hartman's essay which indicates that since he wrote that essay his mind has changed somewhat. In the light of the Paul de Man affair he fears that theory is threatened by deep-seated intellectual fundamentalism: 'At this point, then, while I stand behind my essay, I am less certain that literary theory has a future We may have to produce not only (as I indicate) a better sociology of literature; we may also have to overcome the suspicion that theory is but an exercise in ideology, or the opium of intellectuals who wish to evade political commitments and hard judgments' (p. 86). Since the essays that make up this volume were written events have moved in such a way perhaps as to make speculations about the future of theory particularly problematic.

One suspects, however, that few readers (apart of course from reviewers) read such volumes all the way through and that therefore there is less worry about the total picture presented. Readers tend to glance at the list of contents and read those essays that look interesting. Virtually all of the essays, considered in their own terms, are worth reading. I was particularly impressed by Elaine Showalter's essay which both provided a valuable overview of feminist criticism and discussed interactions between feminist, black, and post-structuralist theory. If literary theory is to develop, it would seem necessary for different theories to engage with each other and be changed in the process and Showalter's essay was particularly useful in indicating how this might happen.

Another consideration central to the development of theory is its role in teaching. If authentic teaching must be both aware of the theoretical underpinning of all approaches to literary criticism and communicate that to students, this has significant implications for the teaching of literature. Gerald Graff's essay, 'The Future of Theory in the Teaching of

Literature', is particularly valuable because it confronts the implications of this. He argues that teaching must abandon the endeavour to create 'consensual resolution', accept theory as an area of conflict, and 'exploit the conflicts themselves as an organizing principle'. Literature departments need to go beyond the pluralism of 'presenting students with a rich array of choices. A more functional pluralism would mean not just agreeing to differ, but to stage differences openly' (p. 261). The editor argues that Graff's position 'neglects to inquire into the construction of theories or perspectives' (p. xi), but it does suggest a way of giving theory a central role in teaching, one that could energize the teaching of literature and thus have great educational benefits.

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Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. By RICHARD RORTY. Cambridge U.P. 1989. pp. 201. £7.95; clothbound £25.00.

ONE IMPORTANT strand of contemporary theory in the broad sense suspects theory in the narrow sense. This position, identified most closely with Richard Rorty, suspects that theory always wants to achieve foundational certainty, that it desires to find something that will bring together the practical, cognitive and aesthetic spheres; in short it is nostalgic for metaphysics. Indeed, according to Rorty, whenever we encounter the appearance–reality distinction, an appeal to a common human nature or essence or the assertion that a final 'description' has been arrived at, then we are in the presence of metaphysics.

In *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* Rorty concentrates his fire upon another metaphysical desire—the discovery of a vocabulary, i.e., description, theory, vision, to unite our private with our public self-conception and goals. As he asserts early in the book, 'there is no way to bring self-creation together with justice at the level of theory. The vocabulary of self-creation is necessarily private, unshared, unsuited to argument. The vocabulary of justice is necessarily public and shared, a medium for argumentative exchange' (xv). Indeed, the recognition of the impossibility and hence undesirability of this union is one of the most salient distinctions between liberals, in the broadest sense, and everyone else: 'We should stop trying to combine self-creation and politics, especially if we are liberals' (p. 120).

What then does Rorty's liberal alternative look like, what is a 'liberal ironist', Rorty's own preferred self-description? First, Rorty's liberal belongs to those 'who think that cruelty is the worst thing we do' (xv). In turn the ironist is 'the sort of person who faces up to the contingency of his or her own most central beliefs and desires' (xv). Furthermore, rather than searching for a theoretical foundation for action, thought and judgement, the liberal ironist looks to or constructs narratives for cues and clues to appropriate self-descriptions.

Indeed, this is where Rorty's specific interest for aesthetics and literary theory comes in. Though Rorty is highly ambivalent about much of what is known as Post-Structuralism, he does agree with Derrida, among others, that nothing essential for his purposes distinguishes what we call philosophy from what we call literature. Both are just 'kinds of writing'. From this perspective, Proust, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida are equally important as sources of new ways of seeing ourselves and new metaphors for characterizing our situation. The philosophers' work carries no more (or less) truth value than the novelists' or poets'. But Rorty's judgement on the political capabilities of what might be called 'strong' ironists is that 'they are at best useless and at worst dangerous' (p. 68). The reason is that their urge towards the sublime as a replacement for philosophical foundations leads strong ironists to subordinate the prevention of cruelty and a commitment to solidarity to extremities of thought and experience, to the world as an aesthetic phenomenon.

In the realm of social and political concerns where the values of solidarity and justice are primary, Rorty remains generally committed to the moderate Enlightenment project of a more decent society, the goal of such disparate thinkers as John Stuart Mill, John Dewey, Irving Howe and some of his fellow New York intellectuals and contemporary thinkers such as Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls. Though Rorty refuses to say that there is any one way for writers, particularly novelists, to be politi-

cal, his strong preference is for those who explore the private temptations to, and the public, political dimensions of, cruelty and suffering. For him, Vladimir Nabokov stands supreme in his delineation of the possibilities of private cruelty, while George Orwell, particularly in *1984*, stands out as the contemporary figure who has most powerfully represented a post-totalitarian order founded on cruelty.

This is not, however, to say that Rorty accepts the distinction between the 'moral' and the 'aesthetic', between l'art pour l'art and social improvement. Rather, he claims that the only meaningful distinction in this area might be one which 'separate[d] books which supply novel stimuli to action . . . from those which simply offer relaxation' (p. 143). Thus by extension Rorty has no problem with accepting the moral purposes of art in the broadest sense. With Rilke he would seem to say 'You must change your life'.

In *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* Rorty is as stimulating as ever, even if, for some such as Bernard Williams, he 'has seemingly lost the sense of a difficulty, of anything that needs to be got right' (*London Review*, 23 Nov. 1989, p. 3). For instance several critics have wondered what a Deweyan pragmatist such as Rorty is doing making such a rigid distinction between thought and action, philosophy and politics, even private and public. Yet Rorty's position is not quite as strange for a pragmatist as it might seem on first glance. First, his demarcation of politics from philosophy and art arises not from disdain for politics but from a feeling that the survival of liberal institutions is of highest priority and that, as mentioned earlier, the search for certainty or for exalted states of experience can be quite destructive of those institutions. But though it is a minor point, I do find it strange that Rorty pays almost no attention to perhaps the main form of narrative writing—history—in his accounts of either individual or collective self-definition.

Moreover, I am struck by the thinness of Rorty's definition of the liberal. Surely 'liberal' means more historically than one who is opposed to cruelty: indeed, there can be few this side of fascism who wouldn't claim that such a basic impulse informed their political position. This 'Hippocratic' conception of politics, i.e., 'do no harm', does not seem to me adequate to Rorty's or any liberal's political hopes and aspirations. Indeed several times in *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* Rorty suggests that our cultural heroes should be strong poets *and* revolutionary utopians. Yet there is no figure, whether literary or philosophical, in his book who could possibly serve in the latter capacity. Orwell, admirable though he is, could not. In other words Rorty offers no examples of the kind of creativity in our concern with justice, freedom, equality, i.e., politics, to match his discussion in the area of private self-description. Surely there are new vocabularies of political description and judgement to be suggested; more to his point, there are certainly novelists who have tried to explore what it means to live explicitly political lives. Of this we are given little or nothing.

Nor finally is Rorty's proscription against combining public and private vocabularies altogether convincing. This century has certainly seen the distasteful results of trying to resolve personal crises, i.e., crises in self-description, through political action. Frantz Fanon's therapeutics of violence is one such example. But then so is Martin Luther King's philosophy of non-violent direct action. More generally political self-creation seems to me a fact of life, one which will likely be with us for quite a while, and it needs to be both recognized by and incorporated into the liberal imagination Rorty has delineated for us.

RICHARD H. KING

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The Problems of Modernity: Adorno and Benjamin. Edited by ANDREW BENJAMIN. Routledge. 1989. pp. 220 £30.00.

THIS STIMULATING book of essays is evidence of a revival of interest in the founders of Critical Theory. There are a number of reasons why this should have occurred. First, the conditions which contributed to the creation of the Frankfurt School as a forum for the rethinking of Marxian theory in the 1930s have been echoed in the rise of the 'new right' over the past decade. Second, the recent debates around post-modernism, while often superficial, have prompted a re-assessment of modernism in art and its relation to historical and philosophical

modernity. And third, Jürgen Habermas' critique of both French post-structuralism and his Critical Theory predecessors Benjamin, Adorno and Horkheimer in *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (1985, trans. 1987) has instigated a debate between Critical Theory and post-structuralism, and a defence of earlier Critical Theory within the tradition itself. This collection, while not suitable as an introduction, will be of interest to those already familiar with these debates.

The dialogue between Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno—which much of Adorno's work after Benjamin's death could be understood as an attempt to continue—traces a transformation in the conception of the role of art in modernity. Whereas Benjamin attempted to hold strategy and redemption together in a notion of art as a means for collective, political self-realization, they break apart in Adorno. Neither the relation between Benjamin and Adorno, nor its historical context, are discussed in this volume. For Benjamin, in his writings of the 1930s, art is a means to a political end, while for Adorno in *Aesthetic Theory* (1970, 2nd ed. 1972), modernist art, as an end in itself, is to be deciphered by philosophy as a determinate negation of instrumentality, of the totality of means-end relations which society has become in the bourgeois era. In effect, modernist art, for Adorno, replaces the proletariat as the concrete basis for categorial critique. Perhaps the subtitle of *The Problems of Modernity* should therefore have been 'Adorno *or* Benjamin', since the two names stand for conflicting interpretations of the political potential of art.

The authors writing within the tradition of the Frankfurt School tend to favour Adorno. Jay Bernstein defends Adorno from Habermas: whereas Habermas, essentially a neo-Kantian, wants to uphold the separation of the validity claims of science, morality and art as an achievement of modernity, Bernstein maintains that it is a problem. Adorno's argument that art lodges a claim to truth challenges the separation of spheres. The role of art in the critique of instrumental rationality is to undercut the rigid juxtaposition of rationality and particularity rather than challenge rationality *per se*.

Habermas has argued that both Adorno and post-structuralism offer totalizing critiques of reason which are self-contradictory and undervalue the positive, emancipatory achievements of modernity. Peter Dews and Andrew Bowie both want to separate Adorno from post-structuralism, thus providing a vindication from this attack, by retrieving a critical conception of subjectivity from his work which might be opposed to the dissolution of subjectivity supposedly carried out by the French thinkers. For Dews, this would be 'a true identity—one which would be permeable to its own non-identical moment'.

Peter Osborne wants to develop a critique of post-modernism using Adorno's categories. He rejects the Weberian conception of modern society as the totalization of instrumental relations, and the unilinearity of Adorno's conception of history as the dialectic of enlightenment reverting to myth, for a more variegated account of uneven social development and emergent possibilities, in the hope that Adorno's aesthetic theory can be reconnected with an analysis of social movements, and his notorious pessimism overcome.

Those authors who incline towards post-structuralism tend to favour Benjamin. For Andrew Benjamin, it seems that Walter Benjamin ought to be more post-structuralist than he is. Benjamin's conception of the lost, traditional community as a unified whole leads to a view of the present as incomplete, the site of the loss of tradition and a cleavage between moment-to-moment and cumulative experience (*Erlebnis* and *Erfahrung*), and a utopian conception of the future as a synthesized totality.

Irving Wohlfarth combines the approaches of Critical Theory and post-structuralism in his substantial and scholarly essay 'On Some Jewish Motifs in Benjamin' The convergence of German romanticism with Jewish theology enabled Benjamin to capture features of modernity which might have escaped a more obviously materialist Marxism. The themes of remembrance, redemption and the arbitrariness of the signifier as a fall from the grace of naming enabled Benjamin to conceive a temporality which provides a critique of the telos of progress.



Two essays take a feminist perspective. Joanna Hodge's focus on Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva challenges the exclusion involved in subtitling a volume on 'The Problems of Modernity' with the proper names of two men. In 'The Invisible *Flaneuse*: Women and the Literature of Modernity', Janet Wolff argues that the 'separation of spheres' included the social separation of the public and private spheres as well, and the exclusion of women from the public sphere of the emerging culture of the modern city, except in such marginalized forms as widow, prostitute, lesbian, and murder victim—the '*flaneuse*' of her title is thus an impossible figure.

Adorno's pessimism could, from the comfort of an academic chair, provide its own satisfactions, not least that of never allowing oneself to be fooled. Benjamin did not rise to such heights. His strength as a critic was that he could be wrong—he took risks and made commitments. In 1935 Adorno wrote to Benjamin, 'I would surmise that the greatest interpretative results will be achieved here if you unhesitatingly follow your own procedure, the blind processing of material. If, by contrast, my critique moves in a certain theoretical sphere of abstraction, that surely is a difficulty'. Adorno could hardly have expected Benjamin to miss the allusion to Kant's dictum that 'Intuition without concept is blind, concept without intuition empty'. If Benjamin suffers from an intuitive over-immersion in the phenomena—John Rignall suggests in his essay that Benjamin as narrator unreflectively repeats the unmediated seeing of his *flaneur*—Adorno tends towards a conceptual *hauteur*. That this opposition remains a problem for us, and repeats itself to some extent in the polarized interpretation of Adorno and Benjamin's writings, may well be an indication of 'dialectics at a standstill'—but this is not the fault of dialectics alone, and may, it now seems, have been but an interlude. Perhaps it is time for a volume on Ernst Bloch, the author of *The Principle of Hope* (1959, trans. 1986).

MICHAEL NEWMAN

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Teoría y Estética de la Música. By FRANCISCO JOSÉ LEÓN TELLO. Taurus, Madrid. 1988. pp. 190. Paperbound, no price given.

THIS BOOK is one of a series from this publisher on various aspects of music. It is the only one (so far) by a Spanish writer, the remainder being translations of somewhat older works written in English, or, in one case, French. The series is aimed as much at the general reader and music lover as the student or music specialist: most of the books in it are translations of the series of 'Pelican Originals' which appeared in the 'fifties and 'sixties, in which a volume is devoted to a musical form, e.g., Ralph Hill's *Concerto*; Denis Matthews's *Keyboard Music* and so on. Some of the books included pre-date this Pelican series: the work on *The Evolution of Music*, for instance, is by *The Times* critic and 'Grove' editor H. C. Colles. Tello's book is clearly intended as a general introduction to the rest of these works. It covers some of the same ground as (to take another 'Pelican Original' from the same period as those mentioned) Ottó Károlyi's *Introducing Music*, in that nine of its thirteen chapters are devoted to succinct, historical introductions to basic elements of music and Western musical forms: thus there are chapters on rhythm; polyphony; fugue; sonata form, and so on. (These topics are discussed almost exclusively without music examples.) Tello's work differs from Károlyi's in having three introductory chapters devoted to the physics of sound production and the physiology of hearing, and a concluding chapter on the aesthetics of music. The word 'theory' in the title does not mean what in English is referred to as 'music theory', but means instead 'general principles'.

Tello's book is to be judged, then, as a short guide to musical theory and aesthetics for a wide readership, and viewed in this light is an entirely competent work. The outline of an aesthetic of music in the final chapter, for instance, is eminently sane and balanced. He regards both formalism and theories of 'music as expression' as incomplete. Formalism runs the risk of reducing the aesthetic encounter with music to an arid and merely intellectual exercise, whereas expression theories can often encourage inattention to the music, as a consequence of over-emphasis on one's own emo-

tional condition. Every aesthetically valuable work of music has both a structure and an expressive content, and due attention must be given to each. Tello describes such a successful piece of music as a 'galaxy of vibration' ('galaxia vibratoria'), by which he means a unique, self-contained aesthetic object of organized sound in which form and expression are organically fused and inseparable (pp. 179–87). This he regards as the single most important thesis which an aesthetic of music should elaborate.

The brevity of the book does not allow Tello to do more than hint at his views on some of the most elusive aspects of musical aesthetics. When trying to explain how it is that organized musical sound can have expressive properties, for instance, he states that the basis of an explanation must lie in an 'intuitive choice of formulae for the ordering of sound based on spontaneous observation of a correspondence between the physical properties of sound and our inner world' (p. 163), a view which he is careful to round out with a due recognition of the roles of both association and above all of artistic convention in understanding musical expression. What these 'correspondences' between sound and the inner life might be we are not told at this point, and I can find only one hint as to an example much earlier in the book. Discussing features of human nature without which music would be impossible, he singles out the ability to discriminate fine changes in levels of sound intensity. The expressive power of music is due in large part to this ability, he argues, since varying levels of sound intensity are a 'fitting and immediate' ('idóneo e inmediato') analogue for changes in the intensity of affective states (p. 14). He does not amplify this remark at all. It would be of interest to have his reply to the obvious question as to how it is that music can embody manifestly different affective states, all of which have variation in intensity as a common property.

I would not like to suggest, however, that it is the norm in this book for obvious questions to go unnoticed. Granted the amount of ground to be covered and the restricted space available in which to do it, Tello's synopses and suggestions are always fair, balanced and never misleadingly over-simple. The book satisfies the purpose for which it was written, and is as good of its kind as any I have ever come across.

ROBERT WILKINSON

The Open University.

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